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SUMMARY
Using unpublished official and private 
papers to supplement published Western and Soviet 
sources, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that 
Anglo-Soviet relations from 1927 to 1932 retained 
much of the mutual suspicion and misunderstanding 
characteristic of relations in the early 1920s, 
thereby restricting co-operative responses to the 
rising threats to their interests from Japan and 
Germany in the early 1930s.
Anglo-Tsarist enmity and the vicissitudes of 
the first decade of Anglo-Soviet relations conditioned 
the political and institutional problems in recon- 1 
ciling the two powers, difficulties which were com­
pounded by the antipathy between the practice of 
Stalinist communism and British Imperial interests.
The British remained suspicious of Soviet intentions 
towards the Indian sub-continent.
Chamberlains policy of 1 studied reserve1 
in the face of both Soviet intransigence and party- 
political pressure was nullified by the Arcos raid 
and the rupture of relations, but, contrary to the 
alarums of the Soviet 'war scare', this was not the 
prelude to wider British action. Relations marked 
time until mid-1929.
For Britain, the results of the Labour 
Cabinet's renewal of relations were disappointing,
* for controversy over Soviet internal conditions 
combined with the unresolved propaganda and debts 
issues to hamper the creation of mutual understanding. 
Under the National Government relations remained dis­
tant, and, with British export expectations unfulfilled, 
and a deteriorating economic climate in Britain and 
the Dominions, trade relations were re-assessed.
For the Soviet Union, with Stalin taking 
effective control of Soviet foreign policy, internal 
considerations predominated over objective perceptions 
of the changing international environment in the West 
and the colonial world during the Depression. Whilst 
.France gradually became the focus of Soviet interest, 
no real Anglo-Soviet understanding emerged on either 
bilateral or international issues.
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to examine the 
troubled course of relations between Britain and the 
Soviet Union during the years from 1927 to 1932, a 
period which contains ample evidence of the friction 
and frustration which were the substance of inter-war 
relations between the two powers. Although detailed 
research has been undertaken on the origins of the 
Anglo-Soviet relationship and on a number of incidents 
such as the Zinoviev Letter, the Arcos Raid, the 
resumption of relations in 1929, and the Metro-Vickers 
Trial, no published scholarly study has yet covered in 
detail the period under investigation here, that is, 
the period up until the arrival of Adolf Hitler on the 
international scene altered the foreign policy perspec­
tives of both countries.
For the British side, in view of the fact 
, that the wide scope of the 'Russian question' brought 
it within the purview of other governmental departments 
besides the Foreign Office, the material available 
from the published Foreign Office documents has been 
supplemented by the use of a wide range of unpublished 
official papers, not only Foreign Office and Cabinet 
records but also, where available, the records of other
Government departments (1). In addition, collections 
of private papers, particularly the papers of Austen 
and Neville Chamberlain and Ramsay MacDonald, have 
provided corroborative material and in some cases 
added new light to the picture available from the 
official sources.
For the Soviet side, the primary material 
available is still woefully inadequate, but use has 
been made of the series of published foreign policy 
documents, which now cover the whole period of this 
study. To assist in setting the Anglo-Soviet relation­
ship in its international perspective, use also has 
been made of American, Canadian, French, German and 
Italian documentation and of unpublished material in 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives.
The nature of the primary material available 
tends to encourage concentration on the vicissitudes 
of the Anglo-Soviet relationship as seen chiefly from 
'the British side, but as far as possible due considera­
tion is given to Soviet perceptions and policies.
Western and Soviet scholars are in general 
agreement on the unsatisfactory state of Anglo-Soviet
1. Enquiry has ascertained that certain classes of
documents which undoubtedly contain important material 
of relevance to the theme of this thesis, for example 
Home Office records in class H .0. 144 and India Office 
records in class P & J (S), are still cbsed to 
researchers .
relations during the inter-war period. A Soviet 
historian, Viktor I. Popov, has written that 'there 
were times when they were close and friendly, but there 
were also moments when Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. 
were enemies' (1), while a British historian, David 
Carlton, has argued that 'relations between the Soviet 
Union and Great Britain between the two world wars 
were marred by a complete ]ack of mutual trust and 
understanding' (2). American historian Robert Warth, 
in drawing parallels between the Cold War after the 
Second World War and Anglo-Soviet relations in the 
1920s, has observed that 'during the decade following 
the Bolshevik Revolution the only occasion when the two 
countries might be described as reasonably friendly was 
under James Ramsay MacDonald's short-lived Labour 
Government of 1924'. (3).
Scholarly opinion, however, has shown less 
unanimity on the reasons behind this troubled relation­
ship. More than thirty years ago two British Marxists, 
Ken and Zelda Coates, produced a general survey of 
Anglo-Soviet relations in which they argued that 'the 
attitude of successive British Governments towards the
1. Viktor I. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie Otnosheniya, 1927- 
1929, (Moscow 1958) p.3. ~
2. David Carlton, MacDonald versus Henderson, (London 1970) 
p. 144.
3. Robert Warth, 'The Arcos Raid and the Anglo-Soviet 
"Cold War" of the 1920s' in World Affairs Quarterly,
July 1958, p.116.
Soviet Union was so unprecedented that it is no 
exaggeration to state that the normal state of Anglo- 
Soviet relations up till the time when the Nazi menace 
began to throw its ugly shadow over Europe was abnormal' 
They placed the responsibility for this on British 
policies, which were 'throughout ridden by inner 
contradictions' between the 'State interests of Britain' 
and *the class prejudices of sections of the British 
ruling classes against a workers' Government' . In analy 
ing the period under study in this thesis, they refer 
repeatedly to two themes; a continuous flood of anti- 
Soviet lies, alleging religious persecution, forced 
labour, imminent financial collapse, etc* from 'anti- 
Soviet elements' in Britain, and 'the developing Soviet 
economy, particularly under the Five Year Plans, which 
had put the Soviet Government in a position to place 
valuable orders in Britain, which would have provided 
ample work for idle factories' (1).
These two basic themes, anti-Soviet class
/
prejudices as the mainspring of Conservative and even 
Labour policies and the missed opportunities for the 
British economy, have been repeated and amplified by
1. W. P. and Z. K. Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet 
Relations, (London 1943) pp.743, 746-747.
-  b -
Soviet historians writing more recently (1). In 
addition, in tracing back the origins of the Second 
World War, some Soviet historians have criticised the 
British for adopting a policy of ’non-resistance and 
virtual encouragement’ of Japanese expansionism in 
the Far East in order to involve the Soviet Union in 
a war with Japan (2) . Soviet historians have 
contrasted the British attitude with that of the 
Soviet Government which ’from the very first day of 
its existence • ; • held that peaceful co-operation with 
Britain is not only possible but necessary’ (3).
Non-Marxist historians have looked for other
explanations for the unstable relationship. British
historian Philip Reynolds has argued that the ’shifts
and changes in Soviet policy’ made ’impossible an
adequate explanation ... except in terms of Marxist-
Leninist ideology’ and that, towards Britain, the Soviet
attitude of ’open or underground hostility in varying
degrees of intensity persisted throughout the period’.
/
On the other hand, British policy ’was guided not so 
much by rational judgement as by emotion, fear on the
1. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie Otnesheniya, op. cit. pp.3, 63-64 
95, 138; same author, Diplomaticheskie Otnosheniya 
mezdhu SSSR i AngUiei, (Moscow 1965) pp .56, 68j 73, 100.
2. Boris Ponomaryov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy,
1917-1945, (Moscow 1969) p.294.
3. I. D. Osyany, A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy,
(Moscow 1975) p. 197.
part of the Conservatives and nostalgic illusion among 
the Labourites’ (1).
An Indian historian, Zafar Imam, however, 
has argued that Britain’s distrust and suspicions of 
the Soviet Union were ’mainly based on the concrete 
issue of safeguarding her imperialist interests against 
the Soviet Union, and not, as has often been suggested, 
on her idealistic and moral dislike of ’’the totalitarian 
and bloody regime” of the Bolsheviks’. In his opinion, 
the ’virulence of Soviet propaganda against Britain and 
the British Empire was so staggering and the various 
shifts and balances of Soviet policy .... were so novel 
that they tended to cloud the vision of successive 
British Governments’ (2).
An American historian, George Kennan, has 
suggested that the ’sharply divisive’ effects of the 
different images of the Soviet Union held by British 
society in the 1920s, namely the divergence of views 
between the Conservatives and the Labour movement, were 
’quite sufficient to create resounding and enduring 
differences of opinion on questions of policy towards 
Russia* • He saw the issue for Britain, and indeed for
1. Philip A. Reynolds, British Foreign Policy in the 
Inter-War Years, (London 1954) pp.65-66.
2. Zafar Imam, Colonialism in East-West Relations, 
(New Delhi 1969) pp .479-480 . ~
other Western powers, as one of ’how you deal with a 
power which openly avows its total enmity towards you, 
but professes an intention to carry it forward not on 
the plane of direct military warfare but on the plane 
of limited political and economic competition’. He 
ascribed a leading part in causing the Soviet friction 
with the West to Stalin himself, for whom ’normal 
diplomatic contact had no place*. (1).
This thesis seeks to examine the validity of 
these differing interpretations to the course of the 
Anglo-Soviet relationship between 1927 and 1932. The 
subject and period are taken as forming the framework 
for a case study as part of the broader problem of 
Soviet-Western relations in the inter-war period, and, 
by extension, of the post-1917 problem of relations 
between the Western democracies and communism.
The period encompasses three Governments on 
the British side, the Conservative, Labour and coalition 
National Governments, whose policies towards the Soviet 
Union, while having more points in common than the 
wilder comments of the back-benchers made it appear, 
nevertheless had instructive differences, and on the 
Soviet side, the rise to supreme power of Joseph Stalin, 
who imprinted his own pattern on Soviet foreign policy 
as conducted through its two arms, the Communist
1. George Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and 
Stalin, (Boston i960 ) pp .226, 228, 233, 239.
International (the Comintern) and the People’s 
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (the Narkomindel).
The diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union 
by the majority of the Western world in the mid-1920s 
did not solve the problems for Western policy-makers 
in reaching an understanding of and with the Soviet 
Government’s unconventional approach to international 
intercourse. As Don Gregory, an Assistant Under­
secretary of State, noted in May 1927, there were 
’notoriously no precedents for dealing with a regime - 
one can hardly say a country - like the Soviet’ (1).
During a period of mounting pressure on 
British commitments and resources throughout Europe 
and the British Empire, successive British leaders’ 
guiding concern for reconciliation between the world 
powers failed to reach fruition in the case of the 
Soviet Union. This thesis seeks to examine the complex 
interplay of the domestic and international environments 
as they affected British policy-makers in their attempts 
to establish viable political and economic bases for 
relations with Soviet communism under Stalin. British 
policy cannot be thus explained in terms simply of 
’class interests* or ’emotion*.
1. Foreign Office Papers, held in the Public Record Office, 
London, Gregory to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Foreign 
Secretary, 19 May 1927, FO 800/260.
Taking into consideration the background 
of Anglo-Tsarist enmity and the vicissitudes in the 
first ten years of the Anglo-Soviet relationship 
which shaped the perceptions (and misperceptions) of 
both sides, this thesis seeks to demonstrate, through 
adding some fmeatf to the present rather 1 skeletal’ 
knowledge of this period of Anglo-^Soviet relations, 
that the dominating thread of mutual mistrust and 
mutual misunderstanding hindered any real rapprochement 
and left the two powers poorly equipped to respond in 
any co-ordinated manner to the rising threats to their 
interests from Japan and Germany in the early 1930s.
CHAPTER ONE: THE PRELUDE
Both British and Soviet policy-makers 
considered their policy decisions not purely against 
the exigencies of the moment but in the light of their 
knowledge and interpretation of prior events. Georgi 
Chicherin, Commissar £or Foreign Affairs from 1918 to 
1930, exhorted his officials in the Narkomindel to 
study the history of Anglo-Tsarist relations, while 
British Cabinet members looked for comparisons between 
Tsarist and Soviet policies towards the British Empire. 
It is necessary therefore to examine briefly the frame­
work, political, economic and strategic, which had 
developed during the period of Anglo-Tsarist rivalry, 
before considering the modifications brought about 
after the October Revolution.
Anglo-Tsarist hostility was the fruit of 
competitive Imperial ambitions, which in the nineteenth 
century transformed into neighbours in the colonial 
world two powers which previously had been remote and 
which, since the sixteenth century, had enjoyed 
relatively friendly if limited contacts based mainly 
on commercial considerations. The two powers came 
into conflict in a basically non-European context, as 
they spread outwards and towards each other, filling 
the Asian power vacuum. In this fGreat Game*, India
was the king-pin for Britain. Indeed, it was to 
become the justification for the Empire, and any 
threat to India or the routes to India met with a 
vigorous response. When the Foreign Office came to 
consider future policy commitments after the Great 
War it was noted that nineteenth century British 
policy fhas been inductive^intuitive, and quite 
deliberately opportunist, but through it all has run 
the dominant impulse of the defence of India1 (1).
As a result of the possession of India complications 
arose with Tsarist Russia in the Near East and Central 
Asian areas .
Although the current of Anglo-Russian 
animosity only resulted in one open conflict, the 
Crimean War, it did find expression in British public 
opinion with the growth of 'Russophobia', which 
continued to be the dominant mood until the 1907 
Anglo-Russian entente. Moreover, criticisms from 
radical and liberal circles of the autocratic Tsarist 
system were to be reinforced by the mood of revulsion 
against fimperialism1 after the Boer War. '
As for Russia, despite the appeal of Pan- 
Slavism to influential circles in Russian society and 
the tacit assent given to the expansion beyond the
1. Memorandum by Harold Nicolson, member of Central 
Department, 10 July 1920, file C948/948/62, FO 
371/4713 .
Eurasian plains, it would be inaccurate to characterise 
(as Engels did) Tsarist foreign policy as desirous of 
world domination in any meaningful sense. However, the 
Russians did see Britain as a threat to their stategic
interests in securing a warm water outlet through the
a
Dardanelles and in securing control of Central Asia. 
Consequently, the brief interlude of Anglo-Russian 
friendship after 1907 was in many respects a precarious 
one (1) .
Under pressure of war old suspicions reappeared, 
and the February Revolution was greeted with some relief
both by the British Government and radical circles.
It was the advent to power of the Bolsheviks which 
caused the complete break in ideological and military 
terms between the two Allies.
Although the Bolsheviks repudiated traditional 
diplomacy and intended to fshut up shop1 as the 
revolutionary wave spread across Europe, within six 
months they had to sign the 'humiliatingT Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty and reconcile themselves, for the time being at 
least, to the capitalist encirclement. At the same time, 
however, they recognised that the capitalist world might 
not be uniformly hostile and that these contradictions 
could be exploited, even though this feature was not to 
find full expression until the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922.
1. See John H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in
Great Britain, (New York 1972); David Gillard, The 
Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914, (London 1977).
The hostility of the Bolsheviks was directed 
in particular against Britain and the British Empire, 
which symbolised the imperialist social and economic 
structure that they sought to overturn. The British 
Coalition Government reciprocated the feelings of 
antagonism, and the Allied Intervention, which was 
predominantly British intervention, became after the 
armistice an overt effort to overthrow the Bolshevik 
regime. From 1918 to 1921 the Soviet leadership were 
involved in a battle for survival as the White Russians 
and the Allies, coupled with economic chaos and famine, 
threatened the very existence of the new regime . During 
1920 the British commitment to the anti-Bolshevik cause 
was finally liquidated, but the reactions of Britain 
and the other Allied powers to the Russian Civil War 
confirmed Bolshevik preconceptions as to the hostility 
of the imperialist world and left a legacy in the re­
current bogey of a renewed capitalist intervention.
The Soviet attempts to export revolution, which 
were institutionalised with the establishment of the 
Comintern in 1919, suffered set-backs in Germany and 
eastern Europe; the period 1920-1921 therefore saw a 
concentration on revolutionary and diplomatic activities 
in the Near and Middle East, directed primarily against 
British interests. As the extension of the areas under 
effective Soviet control brought the old Russian and 
British spheres of interest back into contiguity, Soviet
policies looked like a resuscitation of old Tsarist 
policies. However, they were overlaid with Lenin1s 
new doctrine of the * alliance with bourgeois nationalism1, 
a concept which, in the Near and Middle Eastern context 
at least, was not well understood by some British 
policy-makers (1). Translated into practice this 
brought friction with Britain, especially in the 
Indian sub-continent and in China.
As the apparent Achilles heel of Britain,
India represented to the Soviets a way of weakening 
the country which was regarded as the principal obstacle 
to world revolution and the greatest threat to the 
security of the Soviet state. Moreover, India, which 
erupted into political violence and civil turmoil after 
the War, seemed to represent an important revolutionary 
breeding-ground. For the British in India, apart from 
anxiety about Soviet military activities in 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia in 1920-1921, the para-
t
mount concern in the early 1920s was with maintaining 
internal order. The threat to India was depicted not 
in the military terms of a Tsarist Russia but rather, 
to use the words of a 1920 General Staff appreciation, 
in terms of fBolshevik activities', which may have been 
'less imposing' from a military point of view but were
1. E. H. Carr, A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik 
Revolution, 1917-1923) Vol 3 (London 1966 - Penguin 
ed.) pp.232-271.
nonetheless 'more subtle and imminent' (1). The 
strict surveillance and detention of Comintern agents 
which culminated in the Cawnpore conspiracy trial in 
1924 showed the sensitiveness of the Indian authorities 
to the as yet incipient communist movement. However, 
it also created a deep-rooted suspicion amongst British 
and Indian authorities about the nationalist movement, 
partly because of the apparent community of interests 
between the Indian nationalists and the Soviet Union; 
they looked for signs of Bolshevik connections behind 
the nationalist agitation. Although all British 
political parties were committed to progress towards 
Indian independence and the beliefs of Lord Curzon that
'as long as we rule India we are the greatest power in
<
the world' were no longer so strongly held in the mid- 
1920s as in the nineteenth century, the whole perspective
t
of Imperial responsibility was still dominated by the 
'impulse' of India, and as such made it an enduring 
factor in Anglo-Soviet relations, as it had been in 
Anglo-Tsarist relations.
On the Soviet side, after 1921, the need to 
defend the achievements of the Government and to 
rebuild the shattered economy began to outweigh hopes 
of extending the revolution to other countries in 
Western Europe. In arguing for and introducing the
1. Cited in Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment, 
(London 1974 - Penguin ed.) p.77.
New Economic Policy in the spring of 1921, Lenin also 
advocated the foreign policy corollary, the establishment 
of normal trade relations with the capitalist powers, 
for 'without equipment, without machines obtained from 
the capitalist countries, we cannot ... restore the 
economy' (1). In this sense also, Britain was a point 
of Soviet interest, for as Georgi Chicherin, the Soviet 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, wrote: 'The predominant 
position of England in the world's economy makes it 
especially important and valuable for us to have 
peaceable co-operation with England in the economic 
field' (2) . The signature of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement 
in March 1921 not only gave the Soviet Government de facto 
recognition but also seemed to pave the way for closer 
economic links. Lenin argued that as long as the 
capitalist world was economically and militarily 
stronger than Soviet Russia, Soviet foreign policy would 
have to exploit the differences and disagreements in the 
capitalist world, both between states (such as between 
the Allies and defeated Germany, as was done at the 
Genoa Conference) or between classes and groups within 
states (such as the Soviet encouragement of both the 
'Hands Off Russia* movement and British business circles 
during 1920-1921).
1. V. I. Lenin, On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State, 
(Moscow n.d.) pp .330-331.
2. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie Otnosheniya, op. cit. p.8.
Realisation by the Soviet leadership that 
'for a fairly long time* they would be unable 1 to 
vanquish all the imperialist powers1 amd'ithat a 
certain temporary co-existence could be utilised for 
economic reconstruction did not imply any diminution 
in the belief in ultimate victory, but it did encourage 
efforts in the early 1920s to bring about a separation 
of all the overt connections between the two arms of 
Soviet foreign policy, the revolutionary and the 
diplomatic. By 1924 the line of argument that the 
Comintern was an independent body, financially, 
organisationally and ideologically, was becoming 'one 
of the most familiar commonplaces of Soviet diplomacy'(1). 
This line of argument was stubbornly maintained by Soviet 
diplomats in their dealing with the British throughout 
the inter-war period. The Comintern was the main 
organ through which propaganda amongst the workers of 
the capitalist countries and the peoples of the 
colonial countries was carried out, and its activities 
were a constant source of irritation to the British and 
other Western governments. The word 'propaganda* in 
fact came to cover the whole range of revolutionary 
activities which were a part of the normal conduct of 
Soviet foreign policy and which aimed to undermine the 
British Government and foment revolution in the Empire.
1. E. H. Carr, A History of Soviet Russia: Socialism in 
One Country, (London 1972 - Penguin ed.) Vol 3, p .14.
The Soviet Government agreed to clauses prohibiting 
propaganda in a series of Anglo-Soviet agreements, 
commencing with the 1921 Trade Agreement, but they 
consistently refused to accept responsibility for the 
Comintern's activities. In the early 1920s British 
and Indian Government intelligence services obtained 
a considerable amount of information on Soviet anti- 
British activities at a local level (1), and although 
later in the 1920s such information was not so readily 
available, the knowledge and suspicion of these 
activities, subsumed under the heading of 'propaganda', 
was a constant factor in Anglo-Soviet relations during 
the period under study.
Although some sections of British opinion 
misunderstood the Soviet hierarchy, by the mid-1920s 
it was accepted by the Foreign Office that both the 
Comintern and the Narkoraindel were directly under the 
control of the Politburo of the Communist Party. It 
was indeed at this level that the apparent conflicts 
between the two arms of the Soviet foreign policy 
machine were resolved, as the Politburo deployed either
1. Christopher Andrew, 'The British Secret Service and 
Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920s. Part I', in 
Historical Journal, September 1977, pp.678-694; 
Government of India, Home Department, Intelligence 
Bureau, Communism in India, 1924-1927, (Simla 1927), 
pp .5-60 .
institution (or even both) as the occasion seemed to 
demand. Several scholars have noted that Chicherin 
occupied a relatively inferior position in the Party 
ranks by comparison with the Comintern leaders, who 
were often in the Politburo (1) . However, the Politburo 
took a direct interest in the lines of Narkomindel's 
activities, as Lenin outlined in March 1923, when he 
commended 'this flexible amalgamation of a Soviet 
institution (Narkomindel) with a Party institution' (2). 
After the death of Lenin, the Politburo continued to 
maintain overall control of the foreign policy 
machinery .
Apart from propaganda, the other issue which 
was the subject of prolonged Anglo-Soviet controversy 
during the 1920s was that of debts and claims. After 
the October Revolution Soviet decrees had provided for 
the nationalisation of private enterprises and the 
cancellation of the State debt; when the Russians began 
to consider opening trade relations with the West, these 
unsettled debts were linked with talk of credits and 
loans. The 1921 Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement contained 
a recognition 'in principle' by the Soviet Government 
of debts to private British citizens in the Tsarist
1. Theordore von Laue, 'Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. 
Chicherin, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
1918-1930', in Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, The 
Diplomats, 1919-1939, (New York - Atheneum ed.) 
pp.234-265; Julian Towster, Political Power in the 
U.S.S.R., 1917-1947, (New York 1948) p. 162.
2. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow 1966) Vol 33, 
pp .495-496.
period, but laid it down that the details of these and 
all other classes of claims should be left to be dealt 
with at a later date (1). The following year saw 
efforts by David Lloyd George to bring Soviet Russia 
into the economic reconstruction of Europe through the 
international conferences at Genoa and the Hague, but 
the debts and credits talks broke down, and Soviet 
Russia signed a separate Treaty with Germany at 
Rapallo (thereby in effect cancelling all German claims 
so long as the Russians repaid nothing to other 
countries) (2) . Henceforth, Britain, like the other 
Western powers, was forced to struggle with the problem 
on separate lines. Pre-Revolutionary investment in 
Russia had been heavily concentrated in British and 
French hands, and organisations to gain recompense 
for expropriated capital (such as the Association of 
British Creditors) were often stronger and more vocal 
than organisations promoting trade with Soviet Russia.
At the start of Anglo-Soviet negotiations in 1924 
leading City bankers adopted a strong position on the 
claims issue, demanding that any treaty be made dependent 
on a settlement (3) .
1. For details of all aspects of the Trade Agreement 
negotiations, see Richard Ullman, The Anglo-Soviet 
Accord, (Princeton 1972) pp.397-453.
2. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, op. cit. Vol 3, 
pp .339-380 .
3. Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Precarious Truce, (Cambridge 
1977), pp.16-21.
Lloyd George had been inspired in his 
moves to bring Soviet Russia into fthe reconstruction 
of European trade and business* by visions (unfounded 
in reality) of *bursting cornbins1 to feed Europe and 
of a vast potential market to solve the problems of 
British export industries and by the belief that 
trade contacts would ’civilise* the Bolsheviks (1).
While the negotiations for the 1921 Trade Agreement 
were being undertaken, a Soviet trading company was 
registered in Britain under the name of Arcos (All- 
Russian Co-operative Society), and this organisation 
handled the bulk of trade in the early years, although 
by the mid-1920s some mixed companies for special lines 
of trade had been established. Soviet foreign trade 
had become a State monopoly in April 1918 and this 
tenet was made inviolable in 1923 despite some intra- 
Party controversy. Nevertheless, in spite of efforts 
to restore agricultural output and marketing to pre­
war levels, in the mid-1920s foreign trade lagged far 
behind other sectors of the Soviet economy. The 
disruption of export patterns restricted import capacity, 
and only through the use of credits could the growing 
demands for machinery and raw materials be met. From 
the mid-nineteenth century to World War I, Germany was 
Russia’s best trading partner for both exports and
1. Ullman, op. cit. pp.36-39, 432-438.
imports, and this tradition, assisted of course by 
certain political considerations, gave Germany a pre­
dominant position in Soviet foreign trade plans. In 
the case of Anglo-Soviet trade, British exports only 
increased slowly from £3 million in 1921 to £11 million 
in 1924, while imports from Soviet Russia increased 
more rapidly from £2 million in 1921 to £19 million 
in 1924. The absence of British Government guarantees 
meant, as a Board of Trade survey later noted, that 
*few orders can be obtained by British firms unless 
they are prepared to grant a large amount of credit* (1).
Apart from bodies such as the Russo-British 
Chamber of Commerce, the Labour movement was the main 
advocate of increasing trade with Soviet Russia.
Unlike Weimar Germany, where pro and anti-Soviet 
feeling split across party allegiances (2), in Britain, 
as indeed in France, British opinion divided generally 
on party lines. After the October Revolution the 
British Labour movement displayed a benevolent, almost 
paternalistic attitude towards the Soviet Government, 
which evoked a sympathy amongst a section of British 
opinion that Tsarist Russia had never succeeded in
1. Cabinet Papers, held in the Public Record Office, 
London, Memorandum by Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, 
President of the Board of Trade, 28 January 1927, 
•C.P.27(27), CAB 24/184.
2. Walter Laqueur, Russia and Germany, (London 1965) 
pp.134-143.
obtaining (1) . These feelings were to find 
expression in the opposition to British intervention
A
in the Russian Civil War, in the Councils of Action, 
and in the mid-1920s, in the Anglo-Russian Trade 
Union Committee. However, this benevolence on the 
part of the mainstream of the Labour Party towards 
the fBolshevik experiment* was gradually tempered by 
a growing distaste #fprSoviet communist methods and 
clearly did not extend to the British Communist Party, 
which was formed in July 1920 from a collection of 
Marxist fringe groups (2). While the left wing of the 
Labour movement continued to be sympathetic to the 
Soviet Union (on social and political grounds in the 
1920s but on economic grounds by the early 1930s) and 
attempted to influence the policies of the Labour Cabinets 
of 1924 and 1929-1931 on more pro-Soviet lines, the 
mainstream of the Labour leadership showed progress­
ively less enthusiasm for the nature of the Soviet system. 
They attached importance to trade with Soviet Russia 
as a means of averting unemployment and believed that 
contact with the Soviet leadership would ’moderate'
1. In May 1918 Ramsay MacDonald explained to Litvinov, 
the unofficial Soviet representative in London, that 
he was 'not a Bolshevik’, but ’I shall support every 
revolutionary govt, so far as to give it a chance to 
settle Russia & establish the Revolution’. David 
Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, (London 1977), p.226.
2. Walter Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain, 
1900-1921, (London 1969) pp. 188-268; John Mahon~ Harry 
Pollitt, A Biography, (London 1976) pp.54-87.
the latter*s attitude to the West, but they reacted 
strongly to communist attempts to infiltrate the 
Labour Party and trade union movements. There are 
grounds for comparison between the attitudes of the 
majority of the Conservative Party towards Italian 
fascism and the majority of the Labour Party towards 
Soviet communism in the 1920s, in that both felt some 
limited 'admiration* for the systems in the respective 
countries but not as ideologies for 'export', for 
they felt that these were applicable only to those 
particular countries and not to Britain.
When the Labour Party took office for the 
first time in January 1924, one of their first foreign 
policy decisions was to accord de jure recognition 
to the Soviet Government. In fact, 1924 came to be 
known as the 'year of recognitions’ as European and 
Asian countries followed the lead of Britain in 
granting recognition (Germany’s having been accorded 
by the Treaty of Rapallo) and vying for economic con­
tacts with the Soviet Union. From April to August 
1924 the British and Soviet delegations argued over 
the whole range of economic and political questions, 
finally concluding two treaties, a Commercial Treaty, 
which gave most-favoured-nation treatment and extended 
the Export Credits Guarantee system to trade with 
Soviet Russia, and a General Treaty, which contained 
the controversial provision that a Government-guaranteed
loan would be given after a settlement of mutual 
property claims (1). Parliamentary criticism of 
the terms of these Treaties, followed by the 
notorious Campbell Case prosecution (2), precipitated 
the General Election in October 1924. The two Treaties 
once again became the subject of Anglo-Soviet con­
versations in 1929 with the Labour Government’s 
commitment to renewing relations, but for both sides 
there were changes in attitudes and circumstances as 
compared with 1924.
The Liberal Party, split by Lloyd George's 
Coalition, never effectively reunited and suffered 
progressive electoral eclipse during the 1920s, but 
the issue of policy towards Soviet Russia was one on 
which it did exert some influence. Ironically, in view 
of his earlier concern to develop links with the 
Russians, it was Lloyd George who, in 1924, led the 
Liberals into opposing the Russian Treaties and so 
brought down the minority Labour Government.
The Conservative Party, like the other two 
parties, suffered from internal divisions on the 
Russian question. The right wing of the Party not 
only opposed the complete basis of the communist social 
and political system but also at times tried to brand
1. Gorodetsky, op. cit. pp.7-35.
2. Marquand, op. cit. pp .364-378.
the Labour Party as the 'apostle of Red Revolution* 
(this is seen most clearly in the 1924 election 
campaign). In the Coalition period, as the British 
Intervention became less justifiable, Conservative 
back-benchers nevertheless opposed contacts with the 
Soviets until after the recognition of Tsarist debts, 
indemnification for confiscated property and the 
cessation of propaganda, and even within the Cabinet 
some Ministers resisted to the last the signature of 
the 1921 Trade Agreement. After the break-up of the 
Coalition, the successive Conservative Cabinets of 
Andrew Bonar Law and Stanley Baldwin retained the 
Trade Agreement, but trade only increased slowly and 
Soviet subversive activities prevented any notable 
political rapprochement. Dissatisfaction with the 
Soviet attitude reached a peak in May 1923, when the 
Foreign Secretary, Marquis Curzon of Kedleston, issued 
his ’ultimatum', which adumbrated a series of British 
grievances centering on subversive activities by 
Soviet diplomats in Persia and Afghanistan. The 
Soviet side, which could not afford a breach at that 
time, promised virtually unqualified acceptance on all 
points except one, responsibility for the Comintern 
activities (1).
1. Andrew, op. cit. pp.692-695; E. H. Carr, A History 
of Soviet Russia: The Interregnum, 1923-1924, 
(London 1969 - Penguid ed.) pp. 176-192.
Relations remained stationary for the 
remainder of the Baldwin Cabinet's life, but when 
Baldwin came to form his second Cabinet in November 
1924 the atmosphere was considerably more tense. The 
incoming Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, 
brought two aspects of the 'Russian question' before 
his coleagues: the immediate question of the
resolution of the 'Zinoviev Letter' controversy, and 
the more wide-ranging question of the lines of general 
policy towards Soviet Russia.
The British election campaign had been 
considerably enlivened by the publication on 24 October 
1924, five days before polling, of a copy of seditious 
instructions to the British Communist Party, alleged 
emanating from the Comintern's President Grigori 
Zinoviev, and of a Note of protest against this 'direct 
interference from outside in British domestic affairs' 
from the Foreign Office. Controversy over the roles of 
MacDonald and the senior Foreign Office staff and over 
the authenticity of the Letter has continued to rage 
ever since (1). Although the publication of the Letter 
probably did little more, in electoral terms, than to
1. Andrew, op. cit. pp. 673-678, 700-706; Lewis Chester, 
Stephen Fay and Hugo Young, The Zinoviev Letter, 
(London 1967) passim; Sibyl Crowe, 'The Zinoviev 
Letter. A Reappraisal' in Journal of Contemporary 
History, July 1975, pp .407-432.
make more overwhelming the likely Conservative victory, 
neither the Labour nor the Conservative Party saw it in 
such unemotional terms at the time; indeed, throughout 
the 1920s 'the letter became an enduring factor in 
party strife* (1). Although the balance of evidence 
now seems to suggest that the Letter was not a forgery, 
its importance lies rather in that MacDonald's 
confusion typified the dilemma of a moderate Labour 
Cabinet in its dealings with the Communists, that the 
style and content of the Letter were not untypical of 
Comintern pronouncements of the period, and that the 
atmosphere produced by its appearance (particularly 
amongst Conservative back-bench opinion) set the tone 
for the new Cabinet's Russian policy.
The special Cabinet Committee set up by the 
Conservatives concluded that the Letter was genuine, 
and this conclusion was transmitted to the Russians, 
who continued to maintain that the Letter was a forgery. 
However, with that further exchange Chamberlain decided 
to disengage from the controversy. As to more general 
policy, the Cabinet rejected any ratification or 
implementation of the two Treaties of August 1924, but 
more drastic steps, such as withdrawing recognition 
(as had been advocated by at least two Cabinet members),
1. Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession,(London 1958) 
p .330 .
were not undertaken (1).
Chamberlain1s Russian policy was based on 
the premise of avoiding precipitate action and waiting 
for the Soviet side to take genuine steps to improve 
relations. His policy of 1 indifference1 found its 
clearest expression in a letter in June 1925, when 
he wrote: 'it would be very inexpedient to provoke a 
controversy with the Soviet Government if it can be 
avoided, ... the less attention we pay to them the 
more anxious they will be to come to terms with us’ (2). 
In contrast to the beliefs of Lloyd George that contact 
and trade would 'civilise' the Bolshevik 'barbarians*, 
of Curzon that 'to have dealings with such people is 
bad at all times', and of MacDonald that 'standing 
aloof* from Soviet Russia was 'pompous folly', 
Chamberlain believed that Soviet Russia should not be 
treated as a 'leper', that some contact should be 
maintained, but that an attitude of 'studied reserve' 
would encourage the Soviet evolution to 'normal* 
standards •
Baldwin, unlike Lloyd George, was prepared to 
give his Foreign Secretary a generally free hand and,
1. Pravda, 28 October 1924; Cabinet Conclusions,
19 November, 60(24)9, and 20 November 1924, 61(24)3, 
both CAB 23/49.
2. Chamberlain, in Geneva, taSir William Tyrrell, 
Permanent Under-Secretary.' 10 June 1925,
N3432/102/38, FO 371/11016.
although at times Chamberlain wished for more 
positive support, Baldwin did tend towards endorsing 
Chamberlain's Russian policy; at least he ensured that 
it had a fair hearing in the Cabinet discussions (1).
The multi-faceted nature of the 'Russian question' 
brought it within the purview of Departments other 
than the Foreign Office. By personal and political 
inclination three senior Cabinet Ministers, Sir 
William Joynson-Hicks at the Home Office, Lord 
Birkenhead at the India Office, and Winston Churchill 
at the Treasury, preferred to reduce dealings with 
Soviet Russia to a minimum, and not only within the 
areas of their departmental competence but also in 
their general approach to the Russian question argued 
for strong measures to be taken; from the inauguration 
of the Baldwin Cabinet they were at odds with 
Chamberlain over his Russian policy (2).
However, on the next occasion when Chamberlain' 
Russian policy was reviewed by the Cabinet, in early 
July 1925, he still had sufficient support for his
1. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin. A Biography 
(London 1969) pp.342-345.
2. Fred G. Stambrook, 'The Foreign Secretary and Foreign 
Policy: The Experiences of Austen Chamberlain in 
1925 and 1927', in International Review of History 
and Political Science, August 1969, (mimeographed 
version) pp. 18, 23-24 .
policy of keeping a watchful eye on developments, 
of keeping 'formal relations as distant as possible' 
but reserving 'the liberty to take any action that 
might be deemed necessary when sufficient evidence 
of Soviet misdeeds was forthcoming', to be endorsed (1). 
Later in the month Chamberlain gave an ad hoc Cabinet 
sub-committee details of the evidence obtained 
pertaining to 'the continuous hostile activities of 
Soviet Agencies against the British Empire, more 
particularly in the East' but received unanimous approval 
for the continuation of his policy (2).
In January 1925, at Chamberlain's request, 
the Foreign Office had reviewed the whole basis of 
Britain's policy in Europe, and in Nicolson's result­
ant position paper, Soviet Russia, 'the most menacing 
of all our uncertainties', was largely left out of 
account because she was considered to be at that time 
more of an Asian than a European problem and because 
her future was so obscure that a policy of security 
had to be framed 'in spite of ... perhaps even because 
of Russia' (3). In 1924-25 it was the Asian aspects 
of Soviet policy which seemed the most threatening to 
British interests.
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 8 July 1925, 36(25)3, CAB 23/50.
2. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 24 July, and Minute by 
Chamberlain, 30 July 1925, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
held in the University of Birmingham Library, AC 52/81.
3. Memorandum by Nicolson, 23 January 1925, W2035/9/98,
FO 371/11065.
A certain disillusionment with relations 
with the West prompted the Soviet leadership to 
refocus the emphasis of Soviet foreign policy . On 
the revolutionary front, the German fiasco of October 
1923, and on the diplomatic front, despite the year 
of recognitions, signs of Germany moving closer to 
the other Western powers and of British hostility (as 
the rejection of the Anglo-Soviet Treaties was taken 
to signify), made the prospects in the East seem more 
promising. Chicherin explained the situation to the 
German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Ulrich von 
Brockdorff-Rantzau, in March 1925: 1 It can be assumed 
that the development here will take a different course 
from what it has until now. At present the Soviet 
Union finds herself compelled to become active in Asia 
and her interests in the first instance point towards 
the east where she finds herself colliding everywhere 
with English interests' (1).
After the treaties signed with Persia, 
Afghanistan and Turkey in early 1921 reduced British 
influence in those areas, Soviet interest died down 
(although not entirely?as the detailed dispositions 
of the Curzon ultimatum showed), and the renewed 
interest in Asia in the mid-1920s centered on the Far
1. Cited in Harvey L. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet 
Russia, 1926-1933, (London 1966) p.15.
East, above all China, where nationalist movements 
expanded during 1923-1924. The Fifth Congress of the 
Comintern, in July 1924, on the basis of highly optimistic 
reports of the success of 'communist groups' in India, 
reaffirmed the policy of supporting the Indian nation­
alists, but by criticising the lack of interest shown 
by the communist parties of imperialist countries in 
the affairs of their colonies prompted action by the 
British Communist Party in India in the mid-1920s 
(although the first emissary was to discover, in 1925, 
that no real communist movement existed in India).
However, it was China, rather than India, which seemed 
to the Russians to be the more promising area; China 
was to be the focus of Soviet revolutionary hopes in 
the mid-1920s (1).
In May 1925, the Chinese Kuomintang, with 
Soviet encouragement and assistance, organised a 
violent general strike which, for a time, endangered 
British lives and interests in the Canton area of 
China. A community of interest in resistance to 
British imperialism cemented the alliance between 
Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang and the Russians, and not 
until the Northern Expedition in 1926-1927 did the 
basic incompatibility of the national revolution desired
1. Imam, op. cit. pp.204-206, 217; Carr, Socialism in 
One Country, op. cit. Vol 3, pp.628-647.
by Chiang and the social revolution desired by 
Moscow become apparent. In the short run, the 
disturbances provoked Conservative back-benchers 
and some Cabinet members to demand changes in the 
policy towards the Soviet Union, but Chamberlain 
resisted such moves. Chamberlain and the majority 
of Foreign Office opinion were also against any direct 
intervention in China against the communists, feeling 
that Bolshevism in China would destroy itself as it 
had done in Europe (1).
Stalin reviewed the European situation in 
May 1925 as follows: 'the revolution in Europe has 
begun to ebb ... a certain lull has set in, which we 
call the temporary stabilisation of capitalism, while 
at the same time the economic development and political 
might of the Soviet Union are increasing' (2). Stalin, 
winning the first round of his power struggle with Leon 
Trotsky, was gaining Party endorsement for his theory 
of 'socialism in one country', which, reduced to a simple 
formula, argued that socialism could be built within the 
confines of a single isolated state. It matched the 
subsidence of revolutionary hopes in Europe and implied
1. Warth, op. cit. p.123, suggests that the Foreign Office 
'insufficiently understood' the Chinese situation, 
but the materials used by Wm. Roger Louis, British 
Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939, (Oxford 1971) 
pp.122-124, discount that assessment.
2. J. V. Stalin, Works, (Moscow 1953-), Vol 7, p.91.
that the task of the foreign communist parties was 
to defend the Soviet Union.
The weakness of the British Communist Party 
helped to convince the Russians that the only hope of 
a communist success in Britain lay through a trade 
union united front . In August 1924 the National 
Minority Movement was inaugurated to work for a 
militant industrial policy within the unions, and this 
was followed, in the spring of 1925, by the establish­
ment of the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee. The 
Politburo, particularly Mikhail Tomsky, the President 
of the Central Council of Russian Trade Unions, seem 
to have envisaged this organisation not only as a means 
of spreading Soviet influence through the British labour 
movement but also as a means of putting pressure on 
the Conservative Government to abandon its supposed 
anti-Soviet policy (1). However, Conservative opinion 
saw its formation as yet another example of Soviet 
interference in the internal affairs of Britain (2).
The Soviet leadership were suspicious of British 
intentions in Europe, and their fear that the new 
Baldwin Cabinet would pursue an anti-Soviet crusade to
1. Gorodetsky, op. cit. p p .86-115; Daniel Calhoun,
The United Front, (Cambridge 1976) pp.94-159;
Roderick Martin, Communism and the British Trade 
Unions, 1924-1933" (Oxford 1969) pp. 1-54.
2. Roger Schinness, ’The Conservative Party and Anglo- 
Soviet Relations, 1925-7’, in European Studies Review, 
October 1977, p.395.
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the extent of organising a crusade against them does 
seem to have been genuine, at least initially (1). 
Chamberlain made it clear that the British Government 
’have neither undertaken nor lent countenance to any 
anti-Soviet combination, nor have they any intention 
of so doing1; a point repeated to the Soviet Charge 
d ’Affaires in London, Khristian Rakovsky, in conversa­
tions in January and April 1925 (2). The Foreign 
Office even deprecated arrangements with other 
European powers for the exchange of information re­
garding communist activities in Europe (3),
The Russians were also suspicious of the 
growing German rapprochement with the Western powers .
For Germany the question of relations with Soviet >
Russia was an important one; it was also a card to 
be used skilfully in the negotiations for a security 
pact with the West. To the French and British it was 
not of ’prime significance’, but one consideration of 
British policy was certainly ’the desire to convince 
Germany that she had more to gain from friendly relations 
with the west than from a commitment to the Soviet Union’(4)
1. Ann Orde, Great Britain and International Security 
1920-1926, (London 1978) p. 126. Ponomaryov, op. cit. 
p.251, argues that 'the Conservative Government set 
itself the task of forming a system of diplomatic 
and military blocs with the ultimate object of start­
ing a war against the U.S.S.R.’.
2. Cmd. 2895, 'A Selection of Papers dealing with the 
Relations between His Majesty’s Government and the 
Soviet Government, 1921-1927’, pp.35-39; Chamberlain 
to Sir Robert Hodgson, Charge d ’Affaires in Moscow,
30 March 1925, N1314/102/38, FO 371/11015.
3. Orde, op. cit. p.128.
4. Ibid.
The initialling of the Locarno Treaties in October
1925 was received on the Soviet side with a mixture 
of indignation and apprehension, for although the 
Treaties contained no mention of Russia, Zinoviev told 
the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925 that 
’Locarno is directed against the Soviet Union ... its 
edge is turned against the U.S.S.R.' (1). The 
Germans tried to reassure the Russians that not only 
would Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant 
not be implemented by Germany against the Soviet Union 
but also Chamberlain was not trying in fact to form
an anti-Soviet bloc. To Gustav Stresemann, the German 
Foreign Minister, a continued relationship with Soviet 
Russia, as part of a'balanced commitment', was central 
to his foreign policy aims (although Soviet-German 
relations were never as important as Western-German 
relations), so he conducted a 'holding action' vis-a-vis 
Soviet Russia and only in response to repeated Soviet 
promptings was a Trade Treaty signed in October 1925, 
to be followed up by the Treaty of Berlin in April
1926 (2).
1. Carr, Socialism in One Country, op. cit. Vol 3, 
pp. 289, 428.
2. Ibid, pp .440-454; Kurt Rosenbaum, Community of Fate, 
(Syracuse 1965) pp .188-219;EIeonore Breuning, 
'Brockdorff-Rantzau: The "Wanderer between Two Worlds" 
in C. Abramsky and Beryl Williams, Essays in Honour
of E. H. Carr, (London 1974) pp.134-140.
In early November 1925, before leaving for 
his new appointment in Paris, Rakovsky visited 
Chamberlain, who was at pains to refute Soviet 
accusations that Locarno was the prelude to an anti- 
Soviet move. After expressing doubts as to whether 
Chamberlain’s colleagues would allow him ’to give 
full effect’ to his policy, Rakovsky enquired whether 
the British would change their policy as regards 
credits and loans to Russia. Throughout 1925 Soviet 
diplomats had made efforts to persuade British 
financial circles to grant credits; Chamberlain saw 
these endeavours as a sign that his policy was 
beginning to have an effect on the Russians (1) .
In the spring of 1926, in fact, a reconsider­
ation of the Russian policy began in the Foreign Office. 
Reports from the British Mission in Moscow argued that 
the time was right for a re-examination, not least
because of the economic advantages which could accrue
✓
from better relations,, Hodgson, the British Charge 
d ’Affaires, both during his leave in London at the 
end of 1925 and after returning to Moscow, argued for 
a ’more constructive policy’ . In early May 1926 he 
sent his most reasoned despatch in favour of abandoning 
the policy of reserve (2). Moreover, a small group of
1. Gorodetsky, op. cit. pp .82-83; Cmd. 2895, op. cit .pp. 
39-41.
2. H.M. Stationery Office, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy, 1919-1939, (London 1949 -) (hereafter cited
as D.B.F.P. series/volume) Series IA/\51ume I,Doc .No .504 .
Conservative back-benchers returned from a visit to 
the Soviet Union convinced of the importance of trade 
links (1). Stresemann too, in explaining the details 
of the Soviet-German negotiations, tried to persuade 
the British that the policy of aloofness was no 
longer appropriate (2). With this weight of opinion 
receiving some sympathetic consideration by senior 
Northern Department officials, on 24 May Chamberlain 
decided to undertake a review of his policy, and as the 
first step ordered a re-examination of the 1924 Treaties 
to be undertaken as a basis for any renewal of 
negotiations (3).
However, the General Strike and the Soviet 
response to it destroyed the embryonic efforts to 
improve Anglo-Soviet relations. The development of 
the coal miners1 strike into a General Strike had 
initially surprised the Russians, but determined them 
to give assistance through Profintern, the Red Inter­
national of Labour Unions. Two attempts were made to 
transfer funds to the General Council, but the first 
sum of £26,427 was refused by the General Council on 
the grounds that it would be ’wilfully misrepresented 
and acceptance would be misunderstood*, while the
1. Robert Boothby, I Fight to Live, (London 1947) 
pp.74-86; Papers of Stanley Baldwin, held in the 
University Library, Cambridge, Vol.113.
2. Gorodetsky, op. cit. pp.139-141.
3. Minute by Chamberlain, 24 May 1926, in file 
N2241/387/38, FO 371/11786
second sum of £100,000 was blocked by emergency 
regulations introduced by Joynson-Hicks (1). After 
the collapse of the General Strike, the Russians 
decided to transfer the funds instead to the miners.
The Foreign Office, on the basis of Hodgson’s reports, 
concluded that the only point on which protest could 
effectively be made was the Soviet Government’s grant­
ing of special permission for the transfer of funds 
abroad, and a memorandum on this point was handed to 
the Russians on 12 June (2).
Chamberlain had probably hoped to head off 
back-bench criticism by authorising this protest • 
Joynson-Hicks incautiously stated in the House of*
Commons on 10 June that ’some money from the Russian 
Government’ had been received by the strikers (3), 
a statement which drew protests from the Russians and 
embarassed the Foreign Office who felt that it was not 
’susceptible of proof' and he followed up, at the 
Cabinet meeting of 16 June, with a demand for the 
expulsion of the Russians from Britain. He received 
support at the two lengthy Cabinet meetings from 
Churchill and Birkenhead, but Chamberlain, while not
1. Harriette Flory, ’The Arcos Raid and the Rupture of 
Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1927’ in Journal of 
Contemporary History, October 1977, p.711. See also 
Ernie Trory, Soviet Trade Unions and the General 
Strike, (Brighton 1975) .
2. D.B.F.P. IA/II, Doc .Nos. 52, 55; Gorodetsky, op. cit. 
pp.168-173.
3. House of Commons Debates (hereafter cited as H.C.Deb.),
Vol 196, Col 1680.
wishing to exonerate the Russians from the charges 
(he agreed that the Soviet trade unions were 
Government institutions), felt that any action in addition 
to the protest would be superfluous. At the end, there 
was ’complete unanimity’ in the Cabinet that they would 
be ’fully justified in breaking off diplomatic relations’, 
but the majority agreed with Chamberlain that ’the 
moment was not opportune for a rupture ... and that, on 
a long view of the situation, any immediate political 
advantages would soon be outweighed by practical dis­
advantages* (1).
Although Chamberlain had received endorsement 
for his policy, the strength of the opposition to him 
was clearly showing signs of increasing. With regard 
to the tentative steps towards a rapprochement with 
the Soviets, a member of the Northern Department 
commented on 26 June: ’Thepresent agitation against 
the Soviet gold for the strike & the strength of 
feeling it reveals seem likely to have the effect of 
postponing any advance to the Soviet Government’ (2). 
Moreover, the Cabinet had been in general agreement
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 16 June 1926, 39(26)7 and 
40(26)5, CAB 23/53. At the end, Birkenhead and 
Churchill ’to their astonishment and indignation’ 
were in *a minority of two'. Neville Chamberlain 
Papers, held in Birmingham University Library,
N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 20 June 1926, 
NC 18/1/532.
2. Minute on Treasury Memorandum, 26 June 1926, N2802/ 
387/38, FO 371/11786.
that ’steps ought to be taken to enlighten the public
as to the menacing character of the Soviet Governments
policy1, which some Cabinet members saw as licence to
attack the Soviets, Churchill warned traders not to
lend money to Russia; Birkenhead publicly expressed
doubts about the desirability of maintaining relations;
on 24 June Joynson-Hicks released a blue book of
documents confiscated from the headquarters of the
British Communist Party during the arrests of twelve
m
leaders of the Party in October 1925 (all were found 
guilty of seditious conspiracy); Conservative back­
benchers forced a debate on the issue of cancelling 
the 1921 Trade Agreement (which was defeated). Through­
out the autumn support grew for the ’Clear Out the Reds 
Campaign’, and at the annual Conservative Party 
Conference in early October a resolution in favour of 
breaking relations was carried (1) , The Conservative 
press too, with the Daily Mail in the van, was increas­
ingly critical of Soviet actions and Chamberlain’s 
policy. By December 1926, the Foreign Office could note 
that * the agitation for the expulsion of the Bolshevik
Mission (or missions) from this country is becoming
i
well-nigh irresistible’ (2),
1, Coates, op. cit, p.244; Schinness, op. cit. pp.396-397
2. D.B.F.P. IA/II, Doc. No .350 .
Such domestic pressures, both inside and 
outside Parliament, limited Chamberlain’s freedom of 
action and made it also increasingly difficult for him 
to justify what seemed to be a policy of ’drift1 
rather than a ’positive’ policy. On 14 December 
Baldwin received a deputation of Conservative back­
benchers, who tried to impress on him the gravity of 
the situation, and, although he admitted that they 
had ’good reason to be uneasy*, at the Cabinet meeting 
the following day he still seems to have been convinced 
of the validity of the Foreign Office’s case. It has 
been suggested that at this meeting, Chamberlain’s 
policy ’probably met with considerable opposition’ 
as it was decided only to watch the development of 
the situation carefully and to continue the discussions 
after the Parliamentary recess (1).
The Committee of Imperial Defence also 
discussed the Russian question in the second half of 
1926 in the light of doubts about Indian defences 
prompted by increased Soviet-Afghan tension in early 
1926. The Chiefs of Staff reported in early July 1926 
that as Soviet policy towards India was ’identical’ 
with Tsarist policy (though by 'more insidious* methods), 
’the integrity of Afghanistan was indispensable for the
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 15 December 1926, 65(26)3, 
CAB 23/53; Schinness, op. cit. p.398.
security of India1. Churchill agreed that Soviet 
policy was k development of the old Czarist policy 
disguised under a veneer of Communism1 but argued that, 
as existing Imperial forces were inadequate for the 
defence of India, ’the great counterpoise of alliances 
and agreements’ (specifically the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance) should be revived. Birkenhead felt that the 
Russians were trying to 'hem India in by a ring of 
Soviet republics’ and urged an examination as to the 
degree to which Soviet Russia would be vulnerable in 
the event of war breaking out over Afghanistan. 
Chamberlain saw the issue as a political rather than a 
military one. He thought attempts to extend British 
power in Afghanistan could be counter-productive and 
would only increase the ’nervousness’ of Soviet Russia 
which was 'really frightened of being attacked’; 
moreover, the Russians would not engage in 'open 
warfare’ but 'by means of peaceful penetration would 
sow the seeds of revolution* (1).
The full Cabinet were in agreement that 
Birkenhead should discuss the state of India's defence 
with the Government of India. The spectre of a Russian 
military threat to the approaches to India, therefore, 
had arisen again. As a result of these discussions 
Tyrrell prepared a memorandum which agreed with Churchill
1. Minutes of Committee of Imperial Defence, 22 July 
1926, CAB 2/4.
that a Bolshevist Russia pursuing the 'same aims1 
as Tsarist Russia was 'the enemy1 (rather than Japan) 
but pointed out that neither a reconstitution of the
Anglo-Japanese alliance nor war against Soviet Russia
W  a .3
wasse 'practical politics' (1).
On the Soviet side, the post-Locarno period 
saw an increase in diplomatic efforts towards the 
states bordering on the Soviet Union in order to 
prevent them being utilised as possible bases for 
renewed British pressure, whether in the military or 
economic sphere. On the Asian frontiers success was 
achieved with Treaties of Non-aggression and Neutrality 
being signed with Turkey in December 1925 and 
Afghanistan in August 1926, In the spring of 1926 
bilateral approaches were made to the Baltic states 
and Finland, with the hope also of blocking Polish 
aspirations in that region. After Marshal Josef 
Pilsudski came to power in May 1926 (by a coup which 
the Russians suspected was master-minded by the British), 
Poland was seen as being strongly pro-British and anti- 
Soviet and as likely to become Ta jumping-off point for 
military intervention1 . The initiatives in the Baltic 
area were unsuccessful, except in the case of Lithuania, 
which signed a Non-aggression Treaty in September 1926. 
The most important result of the Soviet diplomatic 
offensive, however, was the conclusion of the Treaty
1, Orde, op, cit. p.179; D.B.F.P. IA/II, Doc. No. 103.
of Berlin, which contained the provision that Germany 
would not join in any financial or economic boycott 
if Soviet Russia were to be attacked (1).
While some diplomatic successes were being 
recorded on the broader international front, the 
revolutionary arm of Soviet foreign policy was in 
some confusion over events in Britain, The Soviet 
leadership seem to have underestimated the militancy 
of the miners and the possibilities of a general strike, 
but they had to make some response, hence the monetary 
assistance (the miners eventually received nearly 
£1,200,000), The opposition of the newly-reconciled 
Zinoviev and Trotsky pinned the blame for the failure 
of the strikes on Stalin's opportunism, attacking 
first his attitude to the General Council and then 
the continued existence of the Anglo-Russian Trade 
Union Committee. Stalin was forced on to the defensive, 
but he still professed belief in the efficacy of the 
Anglo-Russian Committee (2). Nevertheless, he was 
forced into criticism of the General Council, which 
in turn dampened the enthusiasm of the British trade 
union leaders for the continued collaboration. Meetings 
of the Joint Committee in July and August 1926 brought
1. Dyck, op. cit. pp.38-40; Malbone Graham, 'The Soviet 
Security System' in International Conciliation, 
September,1929, pp.345-425.
2. Gorodetsky, op. cit. pp.145-168.
little narrowing in the gap between the British and 
Soviet delegates; it failed to act as a protector of 
Soviet interests in a period of increasing Anglo- 
Soviet tension (1) . Stalin worked to outmanoeuvre the 
’joint opposition’ by pushing the internal debate on 
to questions of Party discipline rather than policy, 
and at the Fifteenth Party Conference in November 
1926 both Trotsky and Zinoviev were removed from the 
Politburo (2). To Stalin, the failure of the strikes 
in Britain seemed to justify his belief that the 
construction of socialism inside Russia would be *a 
support, as a means, as a way to the victory of the 
proletarian revolution in other countries'. Taking 
up a Leninist argument, Stalin pointed out the 
corollary that foreign communist parties should repel 
any attacks directed against the Soviet Union, but, in 
the British case, the Communist Party, disrupted by 
the prosecution case in October 1925, confused over 
tactics after the General Strike, and losing membership 
again in the winter of 1926 after a summer boom, was 
unable to respond (3).
1. Calhoun, op, cit. pp.261-289.
2. Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, (Oxford 1970) 
pp .279-296.
3. Stalin, Works, Vol 8, pp.205-214; Gorodetsky, op. cit. 
pp. 193-195; E. H. Carr, A History of Soviet Russia: 
Foundations of a Planned Economy, Vol 3, (London 1976)
p.121.
In the second half of 1926, therefore, neither 
the British trade unions nor the British Communist 
Party seemed likely to be, from the Soviet point of 
view, significant factors in arresting the deteriorating 
atmosphere in Anglo-Soviet relations. On the inter­
national level, some success had been apparent in 
breaking-up the encirclement supposedly being planned 
by Britain. Finally, in the belief that economic 
inducements might be an effective counter, Leonid 
Krasin, who had played a leading role in the negotia­
tions for the 1921 Trade Agreement, was sent to London 
in September 1926 as Charge d'Affaires. The Foreign 
Office adopted a non-committal attitude to his 
approaches, but before his death at the end of 
November 1926, Krasin had made a number of contacts 
with City and business circles (1). Summarising the 
situation in December 1926, the Temporary Charge^ 
d ’Affaires, Arcady Rosengolts, reported to Moscow that 
there had indeed been a ’coolness and deterioration of 
relations’ in the second half of 1926, but that the 
Foreign Office desired ’to preserve as far as possible 
external correctness in relations’ (2). However, as 
the events of early 1927 were to show, the Foreign 
Office’s voice was not the only one in the decisions 
over policy towards the Soviet Union.
1. Coates, op, cit. pp.243-246; Gorodetsky, op, cit. 
pp. 185-189.
2. Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR, Dokumenty 
Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, (hereafter cited as D.V .P.)
(Moscow 1958 -) Vol IX, Doc .No .346 .
In summing up the Foreign Office’s assess­
ment of the position and policies of Soviet Russia at 
the end of 1926 certain points should be noted. There
was general agreement that, whatever internal doctrinal 
Wight have VeenJ
disputes there Tmyssbw', the Soviet Government had come 
to stay and that a certain stability, in both political 
and economic terms, had been acquired. The Soviet 
Union was seen as *a society partly capitalist, partly 
Socialist, partly Communist’, in which Stalin, envisaged 
as a man of moderation, was trying ’to keep a balance 
between the extremes of capitalist and communist 
tendencies’ . Although the activities of the Comintern 
’have everywhere assumed a particularly anti-British 
character, partly because the character and stability 
of the British Empire make it the chief obstacle to the 
spread of revolutionary communism, partly because its 
extent and distribution expose it at so many points to 
attack', Chamberlain ventured to suggest to the 
Imperial Conference in October 1926 that ’the next few 
years in Russia will show a growth of the tendency 
towards nationalism and away from internationalism1.
These conceptions had obviously been behind the tentative 
moves towards reconsidering the state of.relations in 
early 1926, but the events surrounding the General 
Strike in mid-1926 had jeopardised such moves and once 
more added confusing factors into the picture as seen 
by the Foreign Office.
It was agreed in the! Foreign Office that 
the Russians had Completely failed to carry out the 
undertakings with regard to propaganda assumed in the 
Trade Agreement1. The inter-connection of the arms 
of the Soviet foreign policy machine was accepted, 
as one member of the Northern Department observed, 
for *although it may be convenient to distinguish 
betwen unfriendly acts of the nominal Soviet Govern­
ment, practical antipathy on the part of the Red 
Trades Unions, and undisguised propaganda by the 
Third International, it is to be remembered that such 
distinction is arbitrary and that in the minds of the 
Bolsheviks it is, save where expediency compels its 
simulation, non-existent1.
Despite the efforts of the diplomats in 
Moscow and the intelligence services centred in London 
and New Delhi, the British still suffered from a lack 
of adequate information as to the situation inside the 
Soviet Union. As Chamberlain observed, Conditions 
in that vast country still remain obscure, and are 
very imperfectly revealed by the accounts which reach 
us1 .
Well aware of the difficulties in understand­
ing and communicating with the Soviet Government, the 
Foreign Office officials, nevertheless, were still in 
general agreement that whatever the justification for 
breaking off relations, there seemed to be 'no practical
advantage' in so doing (1).
1. These paragraphs are based on a Foreign Office 
Memorandum, 27 February 1925, C .P. 181(25), CAB 
24/172; Hodgson to Chamberlain, 6 May 1926, and 
Foreign Office minutes in N2241/387/38, FO 371/11786; 
D.B.F.P. IA/II, Doc. Nos. 103, 344 and Appendix.
CHAPTER TWO: WARNING NOTES
At the end of 1926, the Foreign Office staff, 
aware of the growing domestic pressure in favour of 
drastic action against the Soviets, were again forced 
to reconsider the bases of their policy. Gregory, 
an Assistant Under-Secretary of State, had argued 
in June 1926 that 'there is no use in slamming a door 
which has only got to be opened quite soon' (1), and 
in a memorandum which he drew up in December 1926 
he found no reason to alter that conclusion. He argued 
that although the ejection of the Soviets would be 
'a thoroughly pleasurable proceeding' it would be 
'rather the satisfaction of an emotion than an act of 
useful diplomacy', as 'the arguments pro and con are 
to some extent evenly balanced, and, though a negative 
policy suggests a certain paralysis, a positive policy 
in this case is unlikely to make things, taken as a 
whole, any better than they are at present' (2).
After discussing with Tyrrell the alternatives to a 
complete break in relations, Gregory instructed the 
Northern Department to prepare a draft for a possible 
despatch to Moscow 'enumerating the iniquities of the 
Soviet Government in their published utterances alone';
1. D.B.F.P. I A/I I, Doc. No. 56.
2. Ibid. Doc. No.350.
he intended, to use an expression of Tyrrell himself, 
to 'throw a bun' to those groups which urged a break 
of relations (1).
The draft was prepared by mid-January, and 
Chamberlain informed the Cabinet on 17 January that 
he proposed to print and circulate the draft so that 
'they might see exactly what material was available' 
for a protest (2). Although prepared to give due 
consideration to a possible protest note, Chamberlain, 
still opposed to a rupture of relations, was not as 
yet convinced of the efficacy of sending such a 
protest. In order to justify his position, at the 
end of January 1927 he circulated to his Cabinet 
colleagues not only Gregory's memorandum but an 
exhaustive covering memorandum by himself. It was a 
lengthy exposition of his opposition to a rupture, 
based on considerations of both foreign and domestic 
policy (3).
1. Minute by Gregory, 12 January 1927, N87/87/38,
PO 371/12585.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 17 January 1927, 2(27)1,
CAB 23/54. Gorodetsky, op. cit. p.212, writes that 
'the disturbances in China served the die-hards as 
grounds for a resolution in Cabinet instructing 
Chamberlain to prepare a protest note’, but in fact 
the Cabinet were merely 'informed' that the Foreign 
Office were already working on such a draft. More­
over, these instructions had been given by Gregory 
'shortly before Christmas'. See the Minute cited 
in footnote (1) this page.
3. D.B.F.P. IA/II, Doc. No.422.
A rupture of relations, he felt, would ’mark 
our displeasure and indignation' but it would not be 
a 'fatal or ... even a serious blow' to the Soviet 
Government. A break in relations was unlikely to be 
followed by any similar action by other powers, and 
it would, in fact, have a 'very disturbing effect' 
throughout eastern Europe, in Turkey and Persia, and, 
above all, in Germany, where it would 'gravely 
embarrass Dr. Stresemann in the pursuit of his policy 
of reconciliation with the West'. In domestic terms, 
he argued, the expulsion of the Russians 'would not 
prevent propaganda in this country nor stop the 
transfer of money to this country for use in 
communist agitation'. Trade interests would be 
affected and 'it would be represented that we were 
aggravating unemployment and driving trade away'. 
Against the background of a split within the Labour 
Party after the 1926 strikes and of the unresolved 
problem of the Trades Disputes Bill (1), a rupture 
would provide an issue which would reunite the two 
Opposition parties and present the extremists in the
1. A Trades Disputes Bill, dealing with illegal strikes 
(which were defined asgeneral or sympathetic strikes 
designed to 'coerce' the Government), had received 
serious consideration during the General Strike 
but after representations from King George V and 
others it was postponed. However, after further 
Cabinet discussion a Bill was introduced in April 
1927, and with strong right-wing Conservative 
support was made law in July 1927. I am indebted 
to Mr. Julian Lax for discussing this question 
with m e .
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Labour movement with a victory. Chamberlain concluded:
'Since the breach of diplomatic relations 
will not seriously weaken the position of 
the Soviet Government, it cannot be 
expected that it will lead to a change of 
policy on their part. It will merely 
cause them to intensify all the acts of which 
we complain. What then is to be the end?
We have shot our bolt. Short of declaring 
war, there is nothing more we can do. The 
situation will continue indefinitely. I 
can see no prospect of its leading to 
conditions in which we could resume 
relations or even renew negotiations with 
any prospect of success'.
These cogent arguments against a rupture of 
relations, enumerated at greater length than at any 
time during the previous two years (1), were to 
receive support from some Cabinet members, not least 
from Baldwin, but the 'flood of memoranda* during 
the following month leading up to the Cabinet decision 
on whether to undertake a protest showed the strength 
of Chamberlain's opponents on this issue.
In the latter part of 1926 foreign observers 
had noticed increased anxiety and uncertainty in 
Soviet foreign policy (2), and, to a considerable 
extent, this was a reflection of the deteriorating 
state of Anglo-Soviet relations, coupled with a certain
1. An earlier but briefer exposition of these arguments 
is contained in Chamberlain's letter to Baldwin,
24 July 1925, FO 800/258. Chamberlain's belief that 
a break in relations would have little effect on 
communist agitation was forcibly spelt out in a 
letter to Joynson-Hicks on 24 January 1927, A. 
Chamberlain Papers, AC 54/25.
2. Von Laue, op. cit. p.278.
nervousness over the German connection, which was 
still of importance to the Soviet side. The diplo­
matic offensive of 1925-26 had reached a certain
hiatus, but Chicherin, who was in Western Europe
for convalescence from the end of November 1926, was,
as he reported to Moscow in December, determined that 
relations with France and Germany should be improved 
'in order to prevent England from forming an anti?
Soviet bloc', even though the idea of a Soviet-Franco- 
German grouping, floated by Litvinov, the Deputy 
Foreign Commissar, in conversation with the Germans 
in August 1926, was incompatible with German interests 
vis-a-vis the West (1) . Speaking at a press 
conference in Berlin in 6 December 1926, Chicherin 
specifically drew attention to the 'policy of encircle­
ment' being pursued by Britain, but added that the 
Soviet Union was 'fighting back, not without success' .
The Soviet Government 'has offered and continues to 
offer the hand of peace to England, but it is left 
hanging in the air' . Nevertheless, there were still 
strong ties with Germany and the Soviet Government 
was 'avoiding isolation ....(by) ... establishing 
friendly political and ever improving economic relations 
with other states' (2).
1, Dyck, op.cit. pp.64-65; I. Gorokhov, L. Zamyatin and
I. Zemskov, G.V. Chicherin, (Moscow 1973) p.208. The 
Soviet Union needed German and possibly French support
•against Britain, but Britain seemed to be Germany's 
best aid against France and the Versailles system.
2. Jane Degras, editor, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 
(London 1952) (hereafter cited as Degras, Soviet 
Documents) Vol II, pp.144-147.
The measured optimism apparent in Chicherin*s 
statement was repeated in an article in Izvestiya on 
30 January 1927 by Karl Radek, an authoritative 
spokesman on foreign affairs, who wrote that the 
Soviet Union still had ample time to prevent the 
formation of an anti-Soviet bloc. The Soviet leadership* 
feelings that an English-dominated anti-Soviet front 
could be frustrated should be contrasted with an 
obvious anxiety over Anglo-Soviet relations per se. 
Towards the end of 1926 the Comintern began to play 
up *a new danger of war* and in January 1927 several 
Politburo members made public speeches warning that 
war could come during the coming year (1) . This lack 
of confidence vis-a-vis Britain was clear from letters 
to Rosengolts from Litvinov, who wrote on 15 January 
that fa diplomatic rupture must be avoided at all 
costs' (2), and from Theodore Rothstein, a member of 
the Collegium of Narkomindel, who wrote later the 
same month: 'It seems to me that you will soon have 
to pack your bags. My impression is that the British 
Government will bring our relations to a decisive 
crisis in the coming spring* (3).
1. John Sontag, 'The Soviet War Scare of 1926-27' in 
Russian Review, January 1975, pp.68-69.
2. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie Otnosheniya, op. cit. p .32.
3. Ponomaryov, op. cit. p.260.
The Narkomindel were aware of the growing 
pressures on the Conservative Cabinet for a break.
In his report of 10 December 1926, Rosengolts had 
told Moscow that the reasons for the coolness in 
Anglo-Soviet relations were 'Chinese events, the 
help given to the miners and, in particular, Cook's 
recent journey to Moscow’ (1), but a conversation 
with Gregory on 14 January made it clear that when 
the British official referred to public opinion 
being 'very much affected by what it saw and read 
of anti-British action by the Soviet in various 
parts of the world', he had in mind primarily the 
events in China (2). Soviet participation in the 
events in China exacerbated Anglo-Soviet relations 
as they once again became the subject of Cabinet 
discussions.
In July 1926 Chiang Kai-shek launched his 
Northern Expedition, and the Russians and the Chinese 
communists, after initial reservations, decided to 
support it actively and turn it to their advantage (3). 
This movement north naturally had serious implications 
for British lives and interests, particularly in the
1. D.V.P. Vol IX, Doc. No. 346. Arthur Cook, Secretary
of the Miners' Federation, visited Moscow in
December 1926. Calhoun, op, cit. pp.326-330.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/II, Doc. No. 410.
3. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op. cit.
Vol 3, pp.698-737.
Yangtse basin, as they became the major target of the 
anti-foreign violence. The Foreign Office's attempts 
to pursue a 'patiently conciliatory' line with the \
Chinese Nationalists, which was to be exemplified by 
the 'December memorandum' (1), were severely tested 
when a Chinese mob seized the British concession at 
Hankow at the beginning of January 1927. The Cabinet 
decided against regaining the concessions by force 
but in favour of troop reinforcements at Shanghai and 
other settlements where British interests were of a 
greater magnitude (2). Despite the deteriorating situation 
from the point of view of safeguarding British interests, 
the Foreign Office still did not countenance active 
intervention, a step advocated with increased 
stridency by some sectors in Britain, to whom events 
in China served merely to harden their opinions about 
the disruptive effects of communism. Cabinet Ministers, 
such as Churchill, Joynson-Hicks and Leo Amery, the 
Colonial Secretary, publicly blamed Soviet influence 
for the Nationalists' anti-British attitude; an assess­
ment endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff (3). A Northern 
Department official noted sorrowfully: 'the recent 
action of the Soviet agents in China has introduced a
1. For Britain's China policy see F.S. Northedge,
The Troubled Giant, (London 1966) pp.290-298;
Akira Iriye, After Imperialism, (New York 1973)
Atheneum ed. pp.98-103.
2. Louis, op, cit. pp.130-132.
3. Coates, op. cit. p.254. Joynson-Hicks wrote to 
Chamberlain on 7 January 1927: 'I believe that the
Chinese leaders are Bolshie at heart', FO 800/260.
The Chiefs of Staff report is cited in Louis, op. 
cit. pp.131-132.
new factor which the anti-Russian section of the 
community have not been slow to grasp1 (1). Its 
influence on the Cabinet's discussions of the Russian 
problem in mid-February is not to be under-estimated.
The Chinese situation was the principal topic 
of the Seventh Plenum of E.C.C.I. in November- 
December 1926, when Nikolai Bukharin, who replaced 
Zinoviev as the head of the Comintern, noted in his 
report on the international situation that world 
revolution, despite capitalist stabilisation, was 
moving forward in three parallel columns, in Russia, 
in England, and in China. Stalin's influence was 
sufficient to prevent his own views on the correct 
policy to be adopted towards China, that is the 
continuance of the alliance with the Kuomintang, from 
being seriously challenged (2). The Plenum did call 
for a 'vigorous fight' against British intervention 
in the Chinese revolution, and in early 1927 the 
British Communist Party tried to translate this into 
practice by organising a 'Hands Off China' campaign 
on the lines of the successful 'Hands Off Russia' 
campaign in 1920. By the end of February 1927 over
1. Minute by Alvary Gascoigne, 10 February 1927, 
N646/130/38, FO 371/12586.
2. Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in South-East 
Asia, (Princeton 1966) pp.53-56; Jane Degras, editor, 
The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents,  ^
(hereafter cited as Degras, Comintern) (London 1965) 
Vol II, pp.338-348.
seventy committees had been set up, but they 'did 
not succeed in stopping a single troopship or other 
form of reinforcement' (1), and it is doubtful 
whether Stalin set much store by their activities.
With rumours beginning to appear in British 
and foreign newspapers that a British protest might be 
imminent, Litvinov gave an anticipatory press 
interview on 4 February. He dealt first with the 
Chinese situation, accusing some Conservatives of 
trying to make the Soviet Union a 'scapegoat' for Britain 
own mistakes there, then reiterated that the Soviet 
Government respected the propaganda obligations, and 
finally, after pointing out the damage being done to 
British trade interests, tried to capitalise on the 
evident split in the Cabinet by expressing the hope 
that the 'reasonable elements in English society and 
in the English Government will prevail over the pro­
tagonists of the mailed fist policy' (2).
Although the Narkomindel informed the Soviet 
Mission in London in early February that 'here we have 
been keeping completely calm during the whole crisis' (3) 
Hodgson noted that during a conversation on 11 February 
Litvinov was 'in rather a perturbed state of mind'.
1. L. J. MacFarlane, The British Communist Party,
(London 1966) pp.178-179.
2. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc. No. 26.
3. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie Otnosheniya, op .cit. p .32 .
Despite this anxiety, Litvinov did express some 
confidence that attempts by the 'financial magnates’ 
in Britain to intimidate the Soviets would 'lead to 
nothing' (1). He returned to the same theme in his 
specifically requested report to the Central 
Executive Committee on 21 February, but included 
'certain members of the English Government' in the 
organisers of the 'systematic' anti-Soviet campaign, 
which he blamed for disturbing 'the calm atmosphere 
necessary for prolonged economic intercourse' and for 
creating a threat to peace (2) . From the tone of 
Litvinov's conciliatory remarks and his repetition 
of the desire for better relations, it seems that the 
Moscow leadership, while displaying some anxiety, felt 
that a break might be avoided. Chicherin, who 
remained abroad throughout the first half of 1927, 
was not so optimistic, as will be seen.
By the time that Litvinov made his statement 
to the Central Executive Committee preparations were 
well advanced on the British side for the sending of 
a protest note. The initial Foreign Office draft, 
prepared by mid-January, consisted of a repetition of
1. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc. No. 11.
2. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc. No. 32 and note 18.
the substance of MacDonald1s protest of October 1924 
supplemented by a long series of quotations from the 
Soviet press and other published sources, concluding 
with a demand for the cessation of such ’hostile 
statements’. The Cabinet’s discussion centred on 
the wording for the conclusion of the protest note.
Preoccupied with Chinese affairs and as yet 
not completely convinced as to the merits of sending 
a protest note, Chamberlain tended to leave the 
re-drafting problem to his Cabinet colleagues. 
Birkenhead, who was impressed by the ’compendious' 
material assembled, felt that the proposed ending was 
’so feeble’ that the Note was not worth sending. He 
suggested substituting a much stronger conclusion, 
namely that ’unless ... the anti-British campaign at 
home and abroad ceases forthwith’, the British 
Government would be at liberty to terminate diplomatic 
relations ’forthwith and without any further 
negotiation or discussion1 (1).
Cunliffe-Lister, the President of the Board
of Trade, was more dispassionate in detailing the
Anglo-Soviet trade situation'. He suggested that, in
the event of a rupture of relations, the Soviet
Government would ’probably stop purchasing in this
country’ and might ’default on instalment payments for
. ,  ——■ ■■ -■ ■ -  ■ ■ »■ ■ ■ ■— - — » ■
1. Note by Birkenhead, 26 January 1927, C.P.24 (27), 
CAB 24/184.
work already in hand in this country for Russia, 
though this would have a reaction on the credit of 
the Russian Government which they appear to be very 
anxious to build up and maintain’ . On the other 
hand, he noted that the balance of Anglo-Soviet trade 
was favourable to the Soviet Union, that British 
exports to the Soviet Union were substantially below 
pre-war figures, and that the British business 
community was split in its attitude to the Soviet 
Union, and he argued that, given the existing political 
climate, the Soviet Union’s ’absence of a large 
reserve of foreign currency* and the lack of British 
Government-guaranteed credits, there was no 
immediate prospect of a large scale increase in 
British exports to Soviet Russia (1) .
However, with some encouragement from 
Chamberlain, two of his supporters, Sir Arthur Steel- 
Maitland, Minister for Labour, and Sir Arthur Balfour, 
Lord President of the Council, produced memoranda 
favouring a protest note but against any ’sensational’ 
step such as a rupture of relations (2).
1. Memorandum by Cunliffe-Lister, 28 January 1927,
C.P. 27(27), CAB 24/184.
2. Chamberlain to Balfour, 22 January 1927, Chamberlain 
to Steel-Maitland 26 January 1927, Balfour to 
Chamberlain, 26 January 1927, all FO 800/260, Steel- 
Maitland to Chamberlain, 7 February 1927, N589/209/38, 
FO 371/12589.
The Foreign Office also consulted with senior
British diplomats abroad as to the likely repercussions
of a change in the policy towards the Soviet Union.
Gregory summed up the replies for Chamberlain’s use
in Cabinet discussions by noting that ’on the whole ...
the balance of opinion is against an immediate breach’, *
with one Ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, in Berlin,
’definitely against it, on the grounds that it would
handicap us more than the Russians’ (1). Hodgson, in
Moscow, objected even to a protest note and proposed
instead a statement in Parliament. He returned to
London on leave in mid-February and added some weight
to those within the Foreign Office who argued against 
• c
a rupture,as a mere demonstration of resentment at 
indignities put upon us without seeing daylight beyond 
would be trivial* (2).
The whole question was discussed at two 
long Cabinet meetings on 16 and 18 February 1927.
1. Minute by Gregory, 10 February 1927, N590/209/38,
FO 371/12589. Chamberlain later circulated to the 
Cabinet a despatch from Lindsay recording the 
’anxiety’ of the State^Secretary of the German 
Foreign Ministry, Carl von Schubert, over Anglo- 
Soviet tension. Memorandum by Chamberlain,
19 February 1927, C.P.66(27), CAB 24/185.
2. Hodgson to Charles Orde, member of the Northern 
Department, 4 February 1927, N546/209/38, Minute 
by Tyrrell, 18 February 1927, N780/209/38, and 
Memorandum by Hodgson, February 1927, N791/209/38, 
all FO 371/12589. During an earlier crisis, in 
April 1923, Hodgson had argued against breaking off 
contacts. Hodgson to Curzon, 13 April 1923, N3334/ 
3198/38, FO 371/9365.
The course of these two meetings is clearer from 
comments afterwards by participants than from the 
Cabinet Conclusions. Birkenhead wrote after the 
first meeting: ’We have had a long and indecisive 
Cabinet... Opinion is very strong in the party, and 
in the House of Commons in favour of getting rid of them 
(the Russians). The Foreign Office is most strongly 
opposed to this course. I should think that by a 
narrow majority it will for the moment make its view 
effective* (1). After the second meeting Chamberlain 
wrote to his sister Ida: ’The Cabinet have been very 
tiring and contentious, and I have been disappointed 
at receiving so little support from some of my 
colleagues and having my informed and considered 
opinions swept aside so lightly by them under pressure 
from the Daily Mail and the back benches who don’t 
know what I know of the state of Europe and how thin 
the crust is on which I have to tread* (2).
Baldwin seemed ’inclined to send the protest 
but not break off relations’, a view which predominated 
in the Cabinet. The brief Cabinet Conclusions noted 
that ’the view generally accepted by the Cabinet’ was 
that, ’given the state of public opinion in this 
country, if the present policy of the Russian Soviet 
Government was continued a breach of relations within
1. Earl of Birkenhead, The Life of F.E. Smith, First Earl 
of Birkenhead, (London 1959) p.537.
2. A. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, 20 February 1927,
A. Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/1/410.
the next few months was almost inevitable*. The
e
Cabinet agreed that the probable siffect on inter­
national relations did not make the moment 1 opportune* 
for a rupture, and, moreover, *no especially signifi­
cant event had occurred, comparable to the publication 
of the Zinoviev Letter or the intervention of the 
Russian Soviet in the General Strike, to justify a 
sudden rupture* . In this context, Chamberlain was 
clearly not impressed by Churchill*s arguments that 
bloodshed in China could be such a justification (1). 
The Cabinet left the bulk of the Foreign Office draft 
unaltered, apart from removing one of the appendices 
to the Note concerning trade unions (probably at 
Steel-Maitland*s insistence) and rewriting the final 
paragraph to the Note. The final draft for that 
paragraph, which was accepted by the Cabinet at their 
meeting on the morning of 23 February and incorporated 
into the Note handed over the Rosengolts that afternoon, 
owed much to a compromise suggestion from Neville 
Chamberlain, who told his brother that he was concerned
1. Memorandum by Churchill, 16 February 1927, C.P.61(27), 
CAB 24/185. John Davidson, Chairman of the 
Conservative Party, wrote to Baldwin in mid-January 
expressing his concern over party reactions to 
Chinese events, and suggesting an immediate de­
nunciation of the Trade Agreement so as to 'save 
the Government’s face to some extent, and throw 
the onus, with the whole of public opinion behind 
the Government, on to Russia’s shoulders’. Baldwin 
papers, Vol. 115.
1 to warn without shooting the bolt and to point to 
the state of public feeling as the danger spot’.
In the Note, the British Government warned the 
Soviet Government ’in the gravest terms that there 
are limits beyond which it is dangerous to drive 
public opinion in the country, and that a continuance 
of such acts as are here complained of must sooner or 
later render inevitable the abrogation of the Trade 
Agreement, the stipulations of which have been so 
flagrantly violated, and even the severance of 
ordinary diplomatic relations’ (1).
The majority of the Cabinet evidently reasoned 
that a Note of protest would have the advantage of 
putting the Conservative government on record as taking 
a firm position and as such might take some of the 
steam out of the back bench movement, while at the 
same time it would leave the way open either for an 
improvement in relations or failing that serve as the 
first step towards a breach if necessary (2).
Chamberlain accepted the Cabinet decision, for reasons
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 16, 18 and 23 February 1927 
10(27)3, 12(27)1, and 13(27)1, all CAB 23/54;
N. Chamberlain Papers, Diary entry 18 February 1927,
NC 2/22; A. Chamberlain to Lord Eustace Percy, 
President of the Board of Education, 22 February 
1927, FO 800/260. The full text of the Note is in 
Cmd . 2895, op .cit. pp .45-63.
2. Flory, op .cit. p.713. Neville Chamberlain wrote to 
his sister Ida on 26 February that 'I am satisfied 
that if we had not sent it the pot would have boiled 
over in this country’. N. Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/ 
564.
he explained to his sister Hilda: fI took the idea 
of a Note as a compromise, for it gives me a little 
time & others a warning, but I wish rather than hope 
that it might not be necessary to go further’ (1).
By ’warning* he was thinking in terms both of Soviet 
Russia and of other European states . By calling the 
Soviet Government’s attention to the existing situation, 
he gave them ’one more opportunity to conform their 
conduct to the ordinary rules of international life 
and comity’ (2); Chamberlain clearly maintained his 
belief that the emergence of Stalin was a sign that 
the Russians were ’beginning to realise that world 
revolution does not pay' (3). On the other hand, as 
he explained to the Italian Ambassador, other countries 
were warned as to the 'uncertain character' of Anglo- 
Soviet relations and of the 'possibility that we might 
not be able to continue them much longer’ (4).
1. A. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 27 February 
1927, A. Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/1/411.
2. H. C. Deb. Vol 203, Col 634.
3. A. Chamberlain to H. Chamberlain, 27 February 1927, 
A. Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/1/411. Early in March 
1927 he told Stresemann that he hoped ’much from 
Stalin, who was regarded as a moderate man’. Eric 
Sutton, Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries, Letters and 
Papers, (London 1940) Vol III, p .122.
4. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc. No .30. Similar sentiments 
were expressed by Chamberlain in a letter to 
Lindsay, 1 March 1927, FO 800/260, and in a 
conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in London, 
Baron Matsui, 2 June 1927, A. Chamberlain papers,
AC 50/341.
However, as a means of quietening back­
bench clamourings, the Note was not as effective as 
Chamberlain had hoped. During the House of Commons 
debate of 3 March Chamberlain found himself under 
attack from two sides; from Labour and Liberal M.P.s 
who felt that discussions were better than represent­
ations, and from Conservative back-benchers who felt 
that mere representations were insufficient. Follow­
ing guide-lines approved by the Cabinet that morning, 
Chamberlain urged 1 patience and forebearance’ over 
the Soviet Union’s ’continued provocation’, although 
he added that such patience was not unlimited (1).
He carried the day, but apparently only because prior 
to the debate he had prevented a back-bench revolt by 
’personally and confidentially’ addressing a meeting 
of about 200 Conservative M.P.s (2). The Secretary 
of State for Air, Sir Samuel Hoare, wrote to the 
Viceroy in India assessing the situation at the 
beginning of March as foILows: ’As I told you the die- 
hards are growing more and more discontented over our 
refusal to break with Russia and the delay in 
introducing trade union legislation. Stanley (Baldwin),
I know, thinks that influence is veering to the moderates 
in the party. I take the contrary view and believe that
1. H.C. Deb. Vol 203, Cols 599-676 (Chamberlain’s
speech is Cols 626-634); Cabinet Conclusions,
3 March 1927, 14(27)1, CAB 23/54.
2. E. Sutton, op. cit . Vol III, p.121.
the drift is to the extreme right1 (1). Chamberlain’s 
policy line was to become increasingly difficult to 
maintain as domestic pressure grew. Rather, as 
Gregory had begun to realise by early February, in 
the light of the increased domestic concern over 
Chinese events, the presentation of the protest Note 
now left the Foreign Office caught in between the 
two alternatives of 'kicking the Bolshevists out or 
leaving them alone altogether* (2).
The official Soviet reply to the British 
Note was presented by Litvinov on 26 February. He 
denigrated the British accusations, describing them 
as undocumented, and, conceding little to the British, 
added counter-accusations about the speeches and 
activities of British politicians. He ended by saying 
that the Soviet Government would not be intimidated by 
the threat of a rupture, which, if it did occur, would 
be solely Britain’s fault (3). There is some evidence 
to suggest that the Moscow authorities misread the 
British Note as being sent merely out of deference to 
back-bench opinion, and therefore failed to realise, 
as Chamberlain himself was to realise, that it altered 
the situation and carried matters one step nearer to a
1. Hoare to Irwin, 2 March 1927, Halifax Papers, C152/17
2. Minute by Gregory, 8 February 1927, N546/209/38,
FO 371/12589.
3. Degras, Soviet Documents, op. cit. Vol II, pp.159-164
breach. Izvestiya commented that the Note Tas a threat 
will have no effect’, and saw Chamberlain's speech 
to the Commons as a continuation of the 'no rupture 
and no negotiations’ line (1). The keynote of the 
Soviet response was in Stalin's speech of 1 March, 
when he played down any apprehensions by saying that 
a rupture of relations by Britain was 'hardly likely'.
He argued that there would be no war during 1927, for, 
although the danger of war existed, the Soviet Union's 
enemies 'more than anyone else fear the outcome of a 
war, because the workers of the West do not want to 
fight the U.S.S.R.... and, lastly, because we are 
conducting a firm and unwavering policy of peace'(2).
However, Stalin’s speech roused Chicherin, 
in Germany, to address a letter to Stalin and Alexei 
Rykov, the Chairman of the Council of People’s 
Commissars, on 11 March, in which he warned them 
against under-estimating British hostility towards 
the Soviet Union and criticised those who thought that 
Britain would not continue as far as a break in 
relations. He wrote: 'I protest against this naive and 
harmful self-complacency. Moscow should not close their 
eyes to the fact that the English campaign against us 
will continue will develop, will go further’ (3).
1. Izvestiya, 27 February and 5 March 1927.
2. Pravda, 3 March 1927.
3. Gorokhov, Zamyatin and Zemskov, op .cit. p.208.
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While Chicherin was arguing for a more 
realistic interpretation of the state of Anglo-Soviet 
relations, there were signs that both he and the 
Moscow authorities were becoming assailed again by 
doubts about the wider implications, that is, there 
was a revival of fears of an anti-Soviet bloc being 
formed. Crucial to this was the meeting of the League 
of Nations Council in Geneva in early March, at which, 
according to Rykov, perfectly concrete plans for the 
formation of an anti-Soviet bloc were quite seriously 
put forward by the English' (1). The accounts of the 
meetings contained in the British and German archives 
show that Chamberlain put forward no such suggestions, 
and that the tone of his press interview on 8 March, 
when he publicly dismissed these rumours as baseless, 
was indeed accurately representative of his attitude 
in private discussions with European diplomats (2). 
Stresemann in fact faithfully transmitted to Nikolai 
Krestinsky, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, the gist 
of the conversations with Chamberlain, including the 
statement that England would not conduct a war against 
Russia even after a rupture (3).
1. Degras, Soviet Documents, op. cit. Vol II, p.365. 
This interpretation still receives currency from 
Soviet historians. See Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie 
Otnosheniya, op. cit. p.40.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc.No.39; Times, 9 March 1927.
The limit of Chamberlain's efforts was to express 
mild regret to Stresemann that German credits to the 
Soviet Union had probably freed equivalent Soviet 
funds for propaganda purposes. E. Sutton, op.cit.
Vol III, p.122.
3. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc. No.57.
Of more moment were the reassurances the 
Soviets received that Germany would not support any 
efforts to isolate the Soviet Union. Chicherin, who 
had always been a strong advocate of the German 
connection, had written to Stalin in mid-February 
protesting over Bukharin's belittling of what 
Chicherin considered to be one of the strongest of 
the 'favourable factors' for Soviet foreign policy, 
namely the relationship with Germany (1). Despite a 
temporary uneasiness over the 'Excelsior incident' in 
early March, the Soviet diplomats' conversations with 
the Germans led them to feel that they could rely on 
German support. This confidence was expressed by 
Rykov at the Fourth Congress of Soviets in mid-April 
1927: 'in our future relations with Germany we shall 
proceed on the assumption that in the event of any 
intrigues against the U.S.S.R. Germany will not allow 
itself to be used for any armed attack upon us' (2).
Although there was no attempt at Geneva to 
forge the anti-Soviet front which the Soviet leadership 
expected, the announcement during the Council's sittings 
that the Italian Government intended to ratify the
1. Cited in article by Andrei Gromyko in Izvestiya,
5 December 1962.
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, op. cit. Vol II, p.190.
For details of the German response in March 1927 see 
Dyck, op. cit. pp.69-72.
Bessarabian Protocol (by which the Allied Powers had 
recognised the Roumanian sovereignty of Bessarabia) 
without further delay (1), caused Chicherin to see 
this sudden action as confirming his predictions.
He wrote to Rosengolts that there was no doubt that 
'Mussolini's act has been mainly stimulated by 
England' and that 'England's attack on us will spread 
all the wider' (2). This action did produce a flurry 
of diplomatic activity as the Soviets tried, success­
fully, to persuade the Japanese not to follow on with 
their ratification (3).
1. The Protocol signed in 1920 could only come into 
force after all the ratifications took place. 
Britain ratified in 1922 and France in 1924.
Alan Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, 
(Princeton 1970) pp.350-352.
2. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .No. 64. Immediately prior to 
the Italian announcement Mussolini had spoken to 
Chamberlain 'of the probability of Italy's one 
day making this step, but without indicating any 
date'. Times, 9 March 1927.
3. The Foreign Office were not over-anxious for Japan 
to follow suit. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 268.
The Japanese, while avoiding a categorical refusal 
to ratify (the action urged by the Russians), also 
were unsympathetic to Rumanian entreaties for a 
speedy ratification. Japanese Foreign Ministry 
Archives, held in the Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryokan, 
Tokyo, (hereafter cited as J.F.M.A.) file
'Dairokujuyon Gikai Yochosho: Jokan* .
Soviet diplomatic soundings in a number of 
European countries other than Germany were in 
evidence in the spring of 1927. When Khristian 
Rakovsky returned to his post in Paris in early March, 
he brought with him fresh instructions for reviving 
the Franco-Soviet debt negotiations (which had reached 
an impasse in the autumn of 1926) (1). Poland was 
still assigned a leading role in the Soviet perceptions 
of Britain's policies, despite assurances from British 
diplomats that ideas about an Anglo-Polish bloc were 
'pure nonsense’, so, at the end of February, Piotr 
Voikov, the Soviet Minister in Warsaw, suggested to 
the Poles that 'the moment would seem propitious for 
pushing on with the negotiations* for a non-aggression 
pact. Negotiations with Estonia and Latvia were also 
resuscitated, leading to the initialling of a Soviet- 
Latvian treaty on 9 March 1927 (2).
r
The results of these diplomatic soundings, 
particularly the reconfirmation of the German link, 
must have, despite Chicherin's warnings, reassured 
Moscow that that the Anglo-Soviet tension could be 
kept to a certain extent in a watertight compartment.
1. Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, (New 
York 1960 - Vintage ed.) pp.521-522; D.V.P. Vol X, 
Doc .Nos. 66, 69, 76, 114.
2. Josef Korbel, Poland between East and West, 
(Princeton 1963) p .210; D .B .F .P . Ik/II, Doc .No . 62; 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey
of International Affairs, (London 1928 -) (hereafter
cited as Survey, year) 1927, pp.228-229.
On 29 March Rykov was able to tell a meeting in 
Moscow that 1 in the immediate future, neither war 
nor intervention on Soviet territory is expected ...
In the foreseeable future, that is in the next year 
and a half, it is unlikely that a war will break out, 
provided the present distribution of power can be 
preserved* (1). Chamberlain, working from different 
premises, nevertheless had reached similar conclusions 
as regards the intentions of other European states 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In support of his earlier 
arguments and probably with the hope of dampening some 
of his colleagues' enthusiasm for action, he told 
the Cabinet in mid-March that there was 'not the 
smallest sign that, if we broke off relations with 
Soviet Russia, any nation would follow our lead' (2) .
Rykov's rider about the existing distribution 
of power being preserved seemed particularly relevant 
as two events in China in April 1927 dealt blows to 
Soviet aspirations in that country and had repercussions 
on both Anglo-Soviet relations and .the internal power 
struggle inside the Soviet Russian leadership.
1. Cited in Paul Blackstock, The Secret Road to World
War II, (Chicago 1969) p.128. Directives issued to
the Soviet frontier forces in early April 1927 for
the coming half-year anticipated diversionary 
activities on the European borders but did not refer 
to any wider military threat. Institut Istorii SSSR, 
Pogranichnie Voiska SSSR, 1919-1928, (Moscow 1973) 
pp. 238-240.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 16 March 1927, 17(27)4, CAB 23/90B.
See also D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc. No. 39.
On 6 April 1927, acting under orders from Chang 
Tso-lin, a powerful war lord in north China, police 
entered the Soviet Legation quarters in Peking and 
seized a large number of papers and documents which 
were subsequently given wide publicity in the world 
press. The Soviet press depicted the raid as being 
inspired by the British (1) and described the 
documents published as counterfeit (2). The Foreign 
Office did not receive copies of these documents 
until later in the summer, and until then had to 
base their judgements on the press reports, which 
increased British suspicion of the Soviets and were 
seized upon eagerly by the proponents of a rupture as 
evidence of 'treacherous propaganda' (3).
1. Pravda, 8 A$ril 1927; Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie 
Otnosheniya. op .cit. pp.46-53. The British, although 
aware of Chang's 'growing tendency* towards some 
kind of action, had avoided offering any encourage­
ment. Sir Miles Lampson, Ambassador in Peking, to 
Chamberlain, 11 April 1927, F5130/3241/10,
FO 371/12501.
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, Vol II, pp.200 202.
C. Martin Wilbur and J. Lien-Ying How, Documents on 
Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 
1918-1927, (New York 1956), examined approximately 
half of the documents now available in published 
form and believe them to be genuine.
3. See Birkenhead's comments in the House of Lords 
Debates, (hereafter cited as H.L.Deb) Vol 67, Col 703. 
After finally receiving copies of the documents, the 
British commented that they did not disclose 'any new 
aspect of Russian anti-British activities'.
Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
October 1927, C.I.D. Paper 829-B, CAB 4/16.
The Peking raid came at a time when the 
Kuomintang forces had been making decisive advances 
in the south of China and had entered Nanking in late 
March 1927. Although the manner of the seizure of 
Nanking had raised new fears for British interests, 
the Cabinet maintained a policy of 'inactivity', 
bolstered by information about strains in the 
alliance between Chiang Kai-shek and the 'Left'
Kuomintang faction. However, the British were as 
surprised as the Russians when, on 12 April, Chiang 
suddenly turned on the communist and left-wing 
organisations in Shanghai and Nanking (1). This was 
a major blow to the Politburo's China policy, and 
provided ideal ammunition for Trotsky's attacks on 
Stalin, for at the end of March the Opposition had 
begun to openly criticise Stalin's policy (2). As 
the British were aware, the Russians' could draw solace 
from the losses that they had inflicted on British trade 
and finance in China, but this was small consolation 
for Stalin, who, trying to salvage something, now urged 
the Chinese communists to coalesce with the Left 
Kuomintang (3). For Chamberlain it was a justification
1. Louis, op. cit. pp.133-134; Harold Isaacs, The 
Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, (Stanford 1951) 
p . 162, 175-185; *Note on Russia and Eastern Unrest,' 
E.U.8, 12 April 1927, N2062/1479/97, F0371/12557.
2. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op .cit. Vol 3
pp .753-768.
3. Degras, Soviet Documents, op. cit. Vol II, pp.193-198
Lampson to Chamberlain, 17 June 1927, F6820/3241/10, 
FO 371/12501.
of his China policy, and he noted that 'the 
communist agitators have been punished by the Chinese 
Nationalists with a severity and effectiveness of 
which no foreign Power was capable' (1). Ironically, 
although the April events in China proved to be a 
serious blow to Soviet aspirations inside China and 
as such an unexpected relief for Britain, the 
revelations of the previous Soviet activities in China 
only served to add fuel to the fire of the 'die-hards' (2) .
In fact, as the Cabinet were well aware, 
evidence of Soviet subversive activities was forth­
coming from sources other than the Chinese. On 
16 March 1927, Sir Douglas Hogg, the Attorney-General, 
had reported to the Cabinet on his investigations into 
information received from secret sources (so secret 
that he 'thought it inexpedient to put anything in 
writing*) about a communication from the Comintern 
to the British Communist Party. He stated that 'while 
he himself had no doubt as to the authenticity of the 
information, the evidence was not such as could be 
produced in a Court of Law or published'; moreover, 
the intelligence source would be exposed to the 
Russians. In the light of these circumstances and
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 206, Col 21.
2. Flory, op .cit. p.715; Times, 9 May 1927.
Chamberlain’s review of the ’general nervousness1 
in Europe, the Cabinet had decided by a majority to 
keep relations with Soviet Russia 'on their present 
footing' (1).
There is little surviving evidence as to 
Chamberlain's attitude to relations with the Soviet 
Union in the late spring of 1927, but, writing to the 
British Ambassador in Peking a week after the above 
Cabinet meeting, Chamberlain reitereated his belief 
in his declared policy of reserve, and added that 
although the situation was 'very indefinite', 'a 
breach with Russia is unlikely at present and there 
are certain indications that the Soviet government are 
anxious to come to an understanding with us* (2). 
Chamberlain's coolness to attempts through inter-
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 3 March, 14(27)1A, and 16 March 
1927, 17(27)4, both CAB 23/90B. At a meeting with 
press proprietors on 14 March 1927, Joynson-Hicks 
made an intriguing reference to 'a war with Russia, 
with China and all Communists involved' which might 
be caused by 'the premature publication of a second 
Zinoviev Letter'. Home Office Memorandum, 13 June 
1930, W11561/11561/50, FO 371/14939.
V
2. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc. No .53. Chamberlain was probably 
referring to an informal proposal from Litvinov to 
the French Ambassador in Moscow, Jean Herbette,
that the Soviet Government were prepared to negotiate, 
if the British side concretely defined propaganda. 
Gregory minuted that it was too early to judge 
whether the Russians were 'really going to turn over 
a new leaf'. Aristide Briand, French Foreign Minister, 
to Foreign Office, 11 March 1927, N1167/209/38,
FO 371/12590.
mediaries to bring about some reconciliation of the 
two powers was probably caused by his own feelings 
of frustration with his Soviet counter-parts, 
re-inforced by the realisation that in the prevailing 
domestic climate it was 'deeds rather than words' 
that were necessary from the Soviet side (1). When 
he wrote to the British Ambassador in Oslo, Sir 
Francis Lindley, a month later, he reiterated his 
reluctance to introduce 'any fresh element of 
disturbance' into the European situation, 'particularly 
as it might affect Germany', but he also recognised 
that 'it may at any moment become impossible longer to 
maintain the semblance of diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Government* (2).
Although the Cabinet did not meet to discuss 
the Russian question during the period from mid-March 
to mid-May 1927, several Ministers found the question 
brought to their attention during the Committee of 
Imperial Defence's discussions over the Indian defence 
situation. As a result of exchanges of opinion 
between the British and Indian Governments during the 
winter of 1926-1927 it became clear that Afghanistan 
was the focal point of both British Imperial and Soviet 
interests and aspirations in the Indian sub-continent.
1. Some businessmen and journalists offered to act as 
intermediaries. Foreign Office minutes in April 
and May 1927, N1908, N2129, N2161/209/38, FO 371/ 
12590 .
2. Chamberlain to Lindley, 27 April 1927, FO 800/260.
On 17 March 1927 the Committee of Imperial Defence 
discussed at length a proposal made by Churchill that 
a special sub-committee be set up to examine the threat 
to Afghanistan (and consequently India) from Soviet 
Russia. There was general agreement among the 
participants as to the inadequacy of the Indian 
defences, but differences of opinion were apparent over 
the definition of the 'integrity of Afghanistan" and 
the strategic implications for the defence of India.
In order to effect a thorough reassessment of these 
bases of British policy on the borders of India, a Sub­
committee, under the chairmanship of Birkenhead, began 
meeting at the end of March and continued their 
discussions throughout the summer of 1927 (1).
Inside India the authorities kept a close 
watch on the nascent Indian communist movement, on
the growing contacts between the British Communist
P U r
Party and Indian radicals (in secret through/Spratt 
and in public through the tour of India in early 1927 
by the sole British Communist M.P., Shapurji Saklatvala), 
on the founding of the Workers' and peasants' party in 
Bengal, and on signs of the nationalist movement's 
growing sympathy for the Soviet Union as Anglo-Soviet
1. C.I.D. Minutes, 15 February and 17 March 192 7, both 
CAB 2/5; Memorandum by Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, 
Secretary of State for War, 15 March 1927, C.I.D. 
Paper 782-B, CAB 4/16.
relations deteriorated (1) . Nevertheless, the 
Government of India's annual report for the 1926- 
1927 period was able to note that 'indigenous 
communism, as represented by the so-called Communist 
Party of India, seems to have made little appreciable 
headway', and, at an inter-departmental meeting in 
London on 6 May 1927, the India Office representative 
felt able to state that, although Birkenhead was still 
anxious over Bolshevik activities in and around India, 
'the internal situation was fairly satisfactory and 
the Bolshevists had not made much progress' (2). In 
the first half of 1927, therefore, the majority of the 
British saw the threat to India as an external rather 
than an internal one.
In fact, for the Soviet leadership, China 
rather than India was the focus of their attention in 
the spring of 1927. This preoccupation meant that the 
fostering of the almost non-existant communist movement 
in India was left to British Communist Party represent­
atives. To the Politburo and to the Comintern, India 
was not the most crucial factor in the Asian scene. 
Russian eyes as well as British eyes were on China.
1. Imam, op .cit. pp.230-231; Communism in India, op .cit. 
pp. 116-119, 142-145.
2. Government of India Publication Board, Government 
of India Report, 1926-27, (Calcutta 1927) p.289; 
Foreign Office Memorandum, 6 May 1927, F5346/28/10,
FO 371/12421.
The events in China in the first half of 
April led to a certain confusion in Soviet foreign 
policy-making, which was reflected in Rykov1s major 
policy report to the Fourth Congress of Soviets on 
18 April 1927. He stated that 'the world situation 
in regard to the U.S.S.R. is considerably more 
alarming than it was at the time of the last congress 
(May 1925)', and was particularly critical of British 
actions in China. He blamed the February Note on the 
anti-Soviet agitation of a large part of the Conservative 
Party, and argued that a rupture of relations would be 
'bound to have repercussions on the entire European 
political situation*. Nevertheless, he stated, the 
Soviet Government, being on their guard, would 'do 
everything possible to prevent war' . Alarm at the 
prospect of an imminent rupture was not evident in his 
remarks that the campaign of the Conservatives 'may, in 
certain circumstances, lead to a break' and in his 
references to the previous Soviet proposals to discuss 
outstanding questions with Britain (1). On 29 April, 
Kliment Voroshilov, the People's Commissar for War, 
referred to the provocations of neighbouring states 
in trying to draw the Soviet Union into war and to 
the consideration being given to the defence situation 
of the Soviet Union, but, again, there was no suggestion
1. Degras, Soviet Documents, op. cit. Vol II, pp.182-192.
of an imminent attack (1). Moreover, in the know­
ledge that their participation in the movements in 
China had been one of the factors exacerbating Anglo- 
Soviet relations, the Soviet leadership might well 
have considered that the reversal in Soviet fortunes 
in China 'should have eliminated the grounds for an 
unyielding British stand1 (2).
Despite the warnings and criticisms from 
Chicherin, the Soviet leadership seem to have felt 
at the beginning of May 1927 that an immediate rupture 
of relations was unlikely; there was a certain degree 
of measured optimism that the Baldwin Cabinet would 
maintain, at least for the moment, their existing 
attitude of 'no rupture, no negotiations' .
In terms of Britain^s policy towards the 
Soviet Union, the first months of 1927 had seen 
Chamberlain's freedom of action limited by the growing 
parliamentary and press dissatisfaction with his marked 
reluctance to bring matters to a head, by a gradual 
erosion of his support within the Cabinet, and by the 
lack of any positive response from the Soviet side to 
his strictures. The Foreign Office did receive 
indications from diplomats of other powers that the
1. Blackstock, op. cit. p.129.
2. Dyck, op. cit. p.87.
Russians wanted to avoid a rupture if possible (1), 
but Chamberlain required 'deeds rather than words' 
from the Soviet side if his position was not to be 
further undermined. On the day before the British 
Note was presented, Chamberlain had to make clear to 
Churchill that though fI don't doubt the strength of 
feeling among a section of the Party.... I am foreign 
minister. I have to think of consequences' (2). The 
defiant note struck in that letter to Churchill 
covered up the reality of his lack of confidence in 
the future . He was certainly not sanguine when he 
wrote to his sister the following week about the 
possibility of a break with Soviet Russia:
'I fear that it will come nevertheless before 
long, though some of them, Stalin now their 
biggest force among them, are beginning to 
realise that world revolution does not pay 
them. But I doubt if they can keep off it,
& the toes of my colleagues are itching to 
kick them even tho1 it be but a useless 
gesture' (3).
The late spring of 1927 was indeed the lull before the 
storm.
1. D.B.F.P. IA/II, Doc .No. 53; Sir John Tilley, 
Ambassador in Tokyo, to Chamberlain, 2 March 1927, 
N937/209/38, FO 371/12589. See also Rosenbaum, 
op. cit. p.242.
2. Chamberlain to Churchill, 22 February 1927, A. 
Chamberlain Papers, AC 35/1/19.
3. A. Chamberlain to H. Chamberlain, 27 February 1927, 
A. Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/1/411.
CHAPTER THREE: BREAKING RELATIONS
On the afternoon of 12 May 1927, the 
premises known as Soviet House, at 49 Moorgate in the
City of London, were entered by a strong force of
Metropolitan Police and Special Branch officers, who 
detained the staff and began a systematic search of 
the premises. The search, which continued untij. the 
evening of 15 May, was carried out in pursuance of a 
warrant issued under the Official Secrets Act, on the 
grounds that a 'document of an official and highly 
confidential character* had been 'conveyed to Soviet 
House and there reproduced by means of a phOtO-static 
apparatus' (1). Soviet House was occupied by the 
All-Russian Co-operative Society (Arcos), the joint 
stock company registered under British laws, and the 
Soviet Trade Delegation, operating under the terms of 
the 1921 Trade Agreement, but, as was later explained 
to the Commons, it was impossible to differentiate 
between the offices occupied by the two organisations. 
The police broke into several safes in concrete strong­
rooms during the search (2).
1. The raid is described in H.C.Deb. Vol 206, Cols
1842-5.
2. Ibid. Col 910.
The raid was prompted by information given 
to Joynson-Hicks on the evening of 11 May by Worthington- 
Evans to the effect that a British Army signals 
training manual had been photocopied in the Arcos 
offices. Joynson-Hicks immediately visited Baldwin, 
who gave his approval for a search, and Chamberlain, 
who, after inquiring of his colleague whether he 
would order a search of 'any business house in London 
entirely unconnected with Russia' in similar circum­
stances and receiving an affirmative answer, replied 
'very well then, raid it' (1). Unpublished documentary 
sources show that Viscount Cecil, the Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster, was mistaken when he recalled 
later that Joynson-Hicks 'was authorised by the Cabinet 
to have Arcos searched' (2). Baldwin and Chamberlain 
had given approval for Joynson-Hicks to search Arcos, 
but he must have exceeded this authority when applying
1. Ibid. Cols 2302-3. Confirmed by a minute by 
Chamberlain, 17 May 1927, T6374/600/373, FO 372/2315. 
According to Gregory, when he heard of the raid he 
'rushed off in a great state* to see Chamberlain, 
who 'quite unconcerned and not realising the 
significance of the raid said: "Oh, yes, I believe 
Jix did say something to me about it last night"'. 
Kenneth Young (editor), The Diaries of Sir Robert 
Bruce-Lockhart, (London 1973) p.84.
2. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, A Great Experiment, (London 
1941) p.183. Also incorrect is Bernard Newman's 
assertion in Spy and Counter-Spy, (London 1970) p.170, 
that the Cabinet met three times before authorising 
the raid. Neville Chamberlain wrote to his sister 
Hilda on 15 May: 'We have not had the slightest 
intimation at the Cabinet that anything of the kind
was in contemplation'. N .Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/574
for the warrant the next morning, since, as a Foreign 
Office legal expert noted afterwards, it 'clearly 
empowers the search of the premises, not only of 
Arcos. but also of the Trade Delegation' (1).
The information came from a former employee 
of Arcos, whose identity is still unknown (2), and 
was misleading only in the sense that the police were 
unable to locate the missing confidential document on 
the premises (3). The Soviet authorities were quick 
both to deny having any knowledge of the missing document, 
as elaborated in a statement on 15 May by Ivan Boev, 
the acting head of the Soviet Trade Delegation, and to 
accuse the police of planting forged documents amongst 
the mass of papers confiscated during the raid, thereby 
echoing Soviet claims made after the Peking raid one 
month earlier (4).
1. Minute by George Warner, head of the Treaty 
Department, 18 May 1927, T6175/600/373, FO 372/2315. 
Chamberlain later explained to a meeting of European 
Foreign Ministers in Geneva that when he consented 
to the raid, he had 'no idea of a perquisition of 
the trade delegation premises'. D.B.F.P. 1A/III,
Doc .No. 240.
2. Amery to Dominion Governments, 24 May 1927, N2404/ 
209/38, FO 371/12591.
3. A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, (London 
1965) p.255, writes that the Home Office were acting 
on 'a false tip' from 'a double agent'. Percy too, 
in his memoirs, Some Memories (London 1958) p.143, 
refers to 'misleading information'.
4. Pravda, 17 May 1927; Coates,op.cit. p.273; D.V.P. 
Vol X, Doc .No . 123 .
Sir Wyndham Childs, head of the Special
Branch, later recalled: 'It has often been stated that
the Russians were prepared for the raid. This may 
have been so, but all I can say is, that never did 
I see people more taken aback than they were' (1).
The Soviet officials in both London and Moscow appear 
to have been surprised by the sudden raid, despite the 
probability that the Peking raid in April had caused 
the Soviet authorities to consider possible further 
action being taken against Soviet organisations in 
other countries (2) . According to a telegram made 
public by the British, Rosengolts had informed Moscow 
in mid-April that, despite rumours to the contrary,
'I very much doubt the possibility of a raid on our
Embassy' (3); he was correct only in so far as no raid 
was made on the Embassy itself.
On hearing about the raid, the Soviet 
diplomats tried to contact the Foreign Office, but 
when Dimitri Bogomolov, the First Secretary, visited the 
Foreign Office in the evening he was received by Michael 
Palairet, the head of the Northern Department, who knew
1. Wyndham Childs, Episodes and Reflections, (London 
1930) pp.236-237.
2. Grigori Bessedovsky, Revelations of a Soviet Diplomat, 
(London 1931) p.97.
3. This telegram, intercepted by British intelligence, 
was published in the White Paper, Cmd. 2874,
'Documents illustrating the Hostile Activities of the 
Soviet Government and the Third International against 
Great Britain', p.31.
nothing of the details of the raid (1). Bogomolov 
. visited the Moorgate site, while Rosengolts, having 
failed to reach Chamberlain, talked over the situation 
with Arthur Henderson, the Labour Party whip, at the 
House of Commons (2). The next morning, 13 May,
Rosengolts handed over a written protest to Chamberlain, 
complaining of police misconduct during the raid and 
describing the raid as 'a flagrant violation’ of the 
diplomatic privileges of the Trade Delegation.
Chamberlain, probably hoping to avoid diplomatic 
complications, said that he had not yet received a 
report from the Home Office, but that the raid was 
'not an administrative act but a process of law taken 
in pursuance of a magistrate's warrant' (3).
The Soviet press reacted by linking the 
'provocation in Peking' with the current raid and 
warning of the harmful affects on European and 
British society and economy of any rupture (4). On 
17 May, Litvinov handed William Peters, the acting 
Charge d'Affaires, a lengthy protest note 'confirming
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 206, Col 1166; Coates, op .cit .pp .269-271; 
Minute by Palairet, 18 May 1927, T6374/600/373,
FO 372/2315.
2. H.C.Deb. Vol 206, Cols 2292-3; Minute by Warner,
16 May 1927, T6175/600/373, FO 372/2315.
3. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 193; Degras, Soviet Documents, 
op.cit. Vol II, pp.202-204.
4. Pravda, 14 May 1927; Izvestiya, 14 and 15 May 1927.
and supporting M. Rosengolts's protest in the most 
emphatic manner1, repeating the charges of diplomatic 
impropriety and warning of the difficulties of 
conducting trade in the existing situation. Litvinov 
ended his protest by demanding 'a clear and unequivocal 
reply' from the British that they intended to abide 
by the Trade Agreement in the future, and added that 
the Soviet Government reserved the right to ask for 
compensation later (1).
The veiled threat in this representation and 
statements made by representatives of the Trade 
Delegation that orders would be diverted from Britain 
unless normal conditions were restored, was clarified 
by a special decree passed by the Council of People's 
Commissars on 17 May, whereby Soviet foreign trade 
operations were to be 'as a general rule' confined to 
'those countries with which the U.S.S.R. has normal 
diplomatic relations, and in which the Soviet foreign 
trade agencies are assured of conditions guaranteeing 
the possibility of an unhindered and normal course for
1. Degras, Soviet Documents, op. cit. Vol II, pp.204- 
208. Peters reported that since 14 May the Soviet 
Note had been 'apparently subjected to continual 
redrafting'. D.B.F.P. IA/III, iDoc.No. 204.
commercial operations' (1). Peters in Moscow and the 
Northern Department officials correctly interpreted 
this as 'a deliberate attempt at the eleventh hour 
to avert a rupture' (2), for, with the Soviet 
authorities unable to predict with any great certainty 
the probable effects of the raid, not until 21 May 
were instructions given for this decree to be implement­
ed and not until 24 May did Anastasii Mikoyan, the 
Commissar for Foreign and Internal Trade, give a press 
interview in which he stated that 'we will cease all 
our trade operations with England', after fulfilling 
the already existing obligations (3). By then the 
Soviet authorities had become convinced of the political 
consequences of the raid, for as Litvinov wrote to 
Rosengolts: 'from all the contradictory news... it seems 
that one can unerringly draw the conclusion that Anglo- 
Soviet relations will not remain as they were before, 
that they will be quite inevitably changed' (4)*
1. Degras, Soviet Documents, op,cit. Vol II, pp.208-209. 
Clearly one exception to the rule was meant to be the 
United States, which had not yet recognised the 
Soviet Union.
•2. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .Nos. 204, 206. Alan Hamilton- 
Gordon, a junior member of the Northern Department, 
minuted that this decree 'undoubtedly constitutes 
an additional argument against breaking off relations'. 
Minute, 21 May 1927, N2312/9/38, FO 371/12581.
3. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 206; Pravda, 25 May 1927. 
Gorodetsky, op.cit. p.226, criticises the view that 
this decree was an attempt to forestall diplomatic 
action, but theprogression of events show that not 
until after Baldwin's Commons statement was the threat 
actually put into action.
4. Ponomaryov, op.cit. p.260.
The apparent initial Soviet hesitation in 
drawing conclusions from the raid was caused by signs 
that the British Cabinet were still not in complete 
agreement over what course to pursue in the aftermath 
of the raid. The matter was not, in fact, brought 
before the Cabinet until 19 May; until then it was 
dealt with by the Home Office and the Foreign Office. 
At a meeting on the afternoon of 13 May, the Foreign 
Office legal experts discussed with Home Office 
officials the questions arising from the Soviet claims 
of immunity. The Foreign Office opinion was that 
while immunity under Article 5 of the 1921 Agreement 
might logically extend to the office of the Soviet 
trade representative, it could not include the whole 
building (1). However, at Home Office instigation, 
the search was extended to all the offices in the 
building; at a further interdepartmental meeting on 
16 May the Foreign Office representatives acquiesced 
in the interpretation that the various offices had not 
been 'properly identified and delimited', so that they 
were indistinguishable to the police (2). At this 
stage the Foreign Office officials were thinking in
1. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .Nos . 194, 212. Lev Khinchuk, 
Head of the Soviet Trade Delegation, did not have 
any diplomatic privileges but he was entitled to 
certain privileges under the Trade Agreement by 
virtue of also being the Soviet Official Agent.
2. Minute by Harold Scott, a senior Home Office 
official, 17 May 1927, T6727/600/373, FO 372/2315.
terms of replying to Rosengolts's Note by expressing 
regret at the search but dismissing the claims to 
diplomatic immunity (1).
On 18 May the Foreign Office received 
copies of the material seized by the police and a 
covering report from the Special Branch. The Northern 
Department’s cautious comments, as made by Palairet, 
were that although the Trade Delegation were ’entirely 
discredited’, *1 do not see that any of the facts dis­
closed herein can be taken as incriminating either the 
Soviet Diplomatic Mission or the Soviet Government' (2). 
The documents consisted of lists of addresses of 
communist individuals and organisations in Britain 
and the rest of the world, correspondence concerning 
contacts with British trade unions and, particularly, 
seamen, and application forms for membership of the 
National Minority Movement (3).
1. Scott to Warner, 16 May 1927, T6175/600/373, and 
related drafts in T6116 and T6299/600/373, all 
FO 372/2315.
2. Scott to Warner, 18 May 1927, N2289/2187/38, FO 371/ 
12602. The Special Branch report included with Scott's 
letter contained many phrases about 'incontrovertible 
evidence’, but the Northern Department were sceptical 
as to what exactly was proved. See minutes in same 
file. On 15 May, Chamberlain had written to his 
sister Ida: 'to tell you the truth I have no great 
faith in Sir W. Childs or in some of his people' .
A. Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/1/418.
3. Nine of these documents were subsequently published in 
the White Paper, Cmd.2874, op .cit .pp .4-28 . It is 
difficult to reconcile the statement of Flory, op .cit. 
p.726, that the police took away 'an estimated 250,000 
pieces of incriminating evidence' with that of Childs 
himself, op.cit. p.225, that 'the whole of our bag at 
Arcos was inserted' in the White Paper.
Early the next morning Chamberlain discussed 
with his senior officials and Childs the contents of 
these documents and a draft statement prepared by 
Joynson-Hicks. Records of this meeting are not 
available, but it seems to have been crucial in making 
Chamberlain realise that diplomatic consequences were 
inevitable in the existing political climate. Gregory 
argued that there could be no via media, that it would 
be necessary to admit that the Arcos revelations either 
added nothing new and so did not affect existing 
relations or that they were of ’such gravity that we 
cannot consistently allow any Bolshevik of any kind to 
remain in our midst' (1). Chamberlain was concerned 
with providing a 'justification' for their action. On 
15 May he had written to his sister, while the raid was 
still in progress, about his lack of confidence in the 
Special Branch, saying: 'I can only trust that they 
will find something worth all the fuss. They & we will 
look foolish if they don't’ (2). After his meeting with 
his officials on 19 May he wrote to Baldwin that the 
Home Secretary’s statement 'appears to me to present the 
case in so weak a form as to amount practically to a
1. Gregory to Chamberlain, 19 May 1927, FO 800/260. 
Gregory did not urge, as Gorodetsky mistakenly 
interprets his letter (op .cit. p.227), expelling all 
the Russians; he saw it only as one of the alter­
natives, the other being doing nothing.
2. A. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, 15 May 1927,
A. Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/1/418.
confession of failure1 (1). Chamberlain probably 
considered the Arcos revelations as sufficient to 
indict the Trade Delegation (immediately after the 
meeting with his officials he went to see off Briand, 
who had been accompanying the French President on a 
visit to Britain, and told him that the results of the 
search were ’graver than I had anticipated’)(2), but 
he was also appreciative of Gregpry’s arguments about 
the difficulties of a half-way position; this left 
only the alternative of a full rupture.
$
He prepared his own draft for the Cabinet 
meeting later that morning, and as he explained to 
Baldwin, it was a justification so complete that ’the 
only criticism to be made upon it is that it must 
almost certainly involve the dismissal of the Soviet 
Mission’ (3). However, at the Cabinet meeting, neither 
his nor Joynson-Hicks’ draft was thought to be 
appropriate, and a special committee, under the chair­
manship of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cave, was set up 
to prepare a redraft. The Cabinet minutes, vague as 
they are, suggest that a full rupture had not yet been 
accepted as policy by the whole Cabinet, as Amery was
1. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 19 May 1927, A. Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 38/3/2.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc. No. 201.
3. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 19 May 1927, A. Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 38/3/2.
instructed only to warn the Dominions that the 
Cabinet might decide at their next meeting on removing 
the Trade Delegation from London (1).
Only limited evidence is available as to 
the opinions of other Cabinet members. Two supporters 
of Chamberlain’s earlier opposition to a rupture wrote 
to him advocating steps of less finality than a 
complete break. Percy considered that the Arcos 
raid evidence did not necessarily show more than the 
necessity to expel the Trade Delegation officials and 
possibly Rosengolts, so leaving the decision for a 
complete break, if it came, to come from Moscow (2). 
Balfour was diffident in expressing what he realised 
was a minority opinion, but he suggested that the 
Soviet Government should be given one further opport­
unity to make new proposals for methods to prevent 
’the sinister combinations of legitimate trade with 
illegitimate propaganda* (3).
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 19 May 1927, 32(27)2, CAB 23/55. 
Neither of the drafts are extant. Joynson-Hicks 
wrote to Baldwin on 20 May that Chamberlain’s draft 
was 'merely a re-hash' of his own but ’spattered 
over with ’’Daily Mail" adjectives'. Baldwin Papers, 
Vol 115. This particular letter reads like an attempt 
at self-justification and ingratiation.
2. Percy to Chamberlain, 19 May 1927, A. Chamberlain 
- Papers, AC 54/418.
3. Balfour to Chamberlain, 20 May 1927, N2309/209/38,
FO 371/12590.
Neither of these Ministers, however, were 
members of the Cabinet Committee which sat for three 
hours on 19 May and again for a long session the 
following morning to hammer out a redraft of the 
proposed statement. The trend of their discussions 
can be surmised from Chamberlain’s enquiry of his 
officials later on 20 May as to the correct procedures 
involved on the assumption that the Trade Agreement 
would be denounced and the respective diplomatic 
missions withdrawn. Nevertheless, he himself still 
showed some reservations: 'I am not even sure that we 
ought to denounce the T.A. as a whole ... It is the 
special privileges of article V which we should 
necessarily terminate’ (1).
On 23 May the Cabinet met to discuss the 
statement drawn up by Cave’s Committee. There was 
’general agreement’ that the Trade Agreement should 
be terminated ahd that the Trade Delegation and 'all 
individuals in Arcos known to be engaged in propaganda 
work’ should be expelled, although Arcos should be 
allowed to continue trading . The Cabinet also agreed
1. Joynson-Hicks to Baldwin, 20 May 1927, Baldwin Papers, 
Vol 115; Minute by Chamberlain, 20 May 1927, 
N2309/209/38, FO 371/12590. Gregory minuted on 
21 May that it did not seem possible, without 
Soviet agreement, to revoke the special privileges 
of Articles IV and V of the Trade Agreement.
that it would be impossible to allow the Soviet 
Mission to remain because of its links with the Trade 
Delegation and Arcos and because of 'overwhelming 
secret evidence of unquestionable authenticity' that 
it too had engaged in 'in illicit interference in the 
internal affairs' of Britain. However, as Cave pointed 
out to the Cabinet, 'the complicity of the Soviet 
Diplomatic Mission at Chesham House with the propagandist 
activities of 49, Moorgate, could not be completely 
substantiated from the documents seized at the latter 
establishment, and that this could only be done by 
using secret documents of a class which it is not 
usual to quote in published statements' . Referring back 
to the precedent of the 1923 Curzon ultimatum, the 
Cabinet sanctioned the publication of the secret 
material. According to the Cabinet minutes, Chamberlain 
said that
'though he would still have preferred, from 
the point of view of foreign policy, to avoid 
a rupture of relations if that had been 
possible, the situation was no longer the same 
as when the Cabinet last discussed the matter, 
and the ill effects, if any, on the general 
European situation would now be much less.
He ... was quite prepared for a rupture if the 
Cabinet decided to approve publication of that 
portion of the secret information which he 
thought suitable for the purpose' (1)
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 23 May 1927, 33(27)1, CAB 23/55.
The additional secret material was included
in Baldwin’s statement to the Commons on 24 May 1927
and in the subsequently published White Paper. The
items chosen were seven intercepted telegrams, one 
*
between the Narkomindel and the Soviet Ambassador in
Peking (about Michael Borodin, the Soviet representative
attached to the Kuomintang), the others from Rosengolts
to the Narkomindel (two about disclaiming Soviet
Government responsibility for Borodin, two about
supplies of information for anti-British campaigns,
*
and two concerning cyphers and documents in Soviet 
premises in London). Baldwin’s statement concluded 
that ’both military espionage and subversive activities 
throughout the British Empire ... were directed and 
carried out from Soviet House', although the published 
documents contained detailed evidence of Soviet 
propaganda activities but minimal evidence of the 
material undoubtedly available from the British secret 
service on Soviet espionage activities (1) .
Louis Fischer has written that 'by basing its 
policy of rupture on the Arcos raid, the British 
Government removed its real grievances from the lime­
light’ (2). However, on the contrary, care was taken 
in the Foreign Office to draw up the note to be presented
1. H.C. Deb. Vol 206, Cols 1842-1845; Cmd. 2874, op.cit. 
pp. 29-31.
2. Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, (New 
York 1960 - Vintage ed.) p.509.
to the Soviet Government in such a way 'as to base 
our action in denouncing the Agreement not on the 
Arcos discoveries but on our previous complaints for 
which no satisfaction has been given, with the result 
of the raid brought in merely as a reinforcement1 (1).
At Chamberlain's suggestion the decision to 
break was announced in Baldwin's statement on 24 May, 
but the actual notification of the step was only to 
be handed over to the Russians after the Commons 
debate on 26 May (2). In the debate, Chamberlain said 
that the British Government had 'practised forebearance 
until forebearance was out-worn,' and reviewed Soviet 
intransigence over anti-British propaganda 'not merely 
abroad, not merely in Asia, but in this country'.
While admitting that the published material had been 
in the Government's possession 'much of it for a long 
time and some of it for only a short time', he refused 
to elucidate on the methods by which this material was 
obtained. He was careful to point out that trade 
should continue. Joynson-Hicks ended the debate with
1. Minute by Gregory, 21 May 1927, N2309/209/38,
FO 371/12590.
2. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 23 May 1927, Baldwin Papers, 
Vol 115. After listening to Baldwin's statement, 
the Labour M.P. and writer, Sidney Webb (later Lord 
Passfield) wrote to his wife: 'We thought that
Austen Chamberlain looked unhappy but Churchill 
triumphant' . Passfield Papers, held in the British 
Library of Political and Economic Science, London,
II. 3 (i) .
further references to the Soviet ’spy network1 in 
Britain. Conservative back-benchers were enthusiastic 
about the course of events, and, in the absence of 
Liberal support, the Labour Party's motion of calling 
for a committee of inquiry was defeated by a large 
majority (1).
The following morning a Note, detailing the 
termination of the 1921 Trade Agreement and the 'sus­
pension' of diplomatic relations, was handed over to 
Rosengolts. As in the February Note, reference was 
made to British public opinion, which was said now to 
have reached the 'limits of its *patience'. Again it 
was made clear that the Government did not wish to 
'interfere with the ordinary course of legitimate 
Anglo-Russian trade* (2). The use of the word 
'suspended* may have been utilised by the Foreign 
Office to denote a more 'temporary' state, but this 
nuance of procedure made no practical difference to 
the actual break in relations as implemented by the 
withdrawal of the respective diplomats (3).
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 206, Cols 2195-2326; Spectator,
28 May 1927.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 215.
3. Sir Robert Clive, Minister in Teheran, told a 
Persian Minister of Court that there appeared to be 
'a very great difference between the words suspension 
and rupture'. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 520. Herbert 
Malkin, a legal expert, minuted on 19 May that a 
rupture could be 'a suspension, possibly temporary,
of diplomatic relations pending amendment of behaviour, 
or something more permanent'. N2309/209/38,
FO 371/12590.
With the Cabinet’s policy at last becoming 
clear after Baldwin's statement, the Soviet side attempted 
to reply to the charges. On 25 May the Soviet Mission 
issued a statement denying having received or sent any 
of the telegrams quoted by Baldwin (1), and, in 
Moscow, Litvinov gave a press interview in which he 
described the rupture as 'no casual or unexpected 
event* connected with the Arcos raid, but as the 
'logical conclusion' of the Conservatives* anti-Soviet 
policy; the rupture was interpreted as 'an energetic 
preparation for war* (2). The official Soviet reply 
to the British Note, handed to Peters by Litvinov on 
28 May, dismissed the British charges as 'entirely 
groundless', described the underlying cause of the 
rupture as the failure of British policies in China 
and the immediate cause as the need 'to distract public 
attention from the failure of the senseless police 
raid' (3).
With this exchange completed, the Russians 
in Britain prepared to leave within the ten-day deadline. 
After a farewell lunch at the House of Commons, hosted
1. Coates, op .cit. p.278.
2. Xenia Eudin and Harold Fisher, Soviet Russia and 
the West, 1920-1927, (Stanford 1957), pp.377-379.
3. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, pp.212-214.
by some Labour M.P.s, the Russian officials of the 
Mission and the Trade Delegation left London on 3 
and 4 June; Peters and the staff of the British Mission 
left Moscow on 3 June. The Norwegian Government 
consented to take charge of British interests in the 
Soviet Union, while Germany was to do the same for 
Soviet interests in Britain (1).
During the two weeks of uncertainty follow­
ing the start of the Arcos raid, both British and Soviet 
diplomats attempted to assess the probable wider 
diplomatic implications of a rupture of relations .
For both countries, France and Italy, rather than 
Germany, were to be the focus of their attention in 
this period of hiatus. Chamberlain took the opportunity 
of Briand's visit to London to explain to him, on 
18 May, the trend of British policy, although pointing 
out his own reluctance to 'allow things to come to a 
crisis1 (2). Having received assurances about German 
policy earlier in the spring, Chicherin felt that 
France might be the key to any wider anti-Soviet 
action; he went to Paris to talk with the French leaders, 
and was still there when the rupture was announced.
During his talk with Briand on 24 May, Chicherin received 
categoric assurances that France was 'not bound by 
anything, having her own Russian policy' and would
1. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 217; Coates, op.cit. pp.282, 
289-290; I)yck, op.cit. pp. 87-88.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 201.
'not support the English offensive'; Briand was also 
confident that Britain did not have any intentions 
of war (1) .
On 17 and 20 May, Chamberlain had two 
conversations with the Italian Ambassador in London, 
Antonio Bordonaro, in which he referred to the 
possibility of a rupture and made a cautious inquiry 
as to what attitude Italy might take in the event of 
a rupture • The Ambassador was non-committal, and 
although Mussolini did telegraph to his Ambassador later 
expressing his 'genuine satisfaction' at the prospect 
of a breach (2), the Italians seem to have been easily 
diverted from any similar action by tempting Soviet 
proposals to channel orders away from England and 
towards Italy (3). So with regard to Italy too, the 
Russians could feel a certain confidence.
On the Soviet Union';s western borders the 
role of Poland could be crucial, so on 14 May the 
Soviets attempted to revive the flagging Soviet-Polish
1. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .No. 131, See also Doc .No.130.
2. Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, I Documenti Diplomatici 
Italiani, Settima Serie, (Rome 1953 -) (hereafter 
cited as D.D.It) Vol 5, Doc.Nos. 204, 213. I am 
H^ndebted to Dr. E. Breuning for her translations of
the Italian documents used in this thesis.
/
3. Ibid, Doc.No. 288,, On 20 May, Mikoyan informed the 
Italian Ambassador in Moscow of the Soviet desire to 
'extend operations with Italy,’ in particular imports 
from Italy'. S.V. Nikonova, Antisovetskaya Vneshnei 
Politika Angliiskaya Konservatorov, 1924-1927^
(Moscow 1963) p.221.
negotiations by handing the Polish Minister in 
Moscow, Stanislas Patek, a new draft of a pact of 
non-aggression and neutrality, to which an additional 
protocol would countenance Poland's obligations to 
Roumania (one of the stumbling blocks in the 
negotiations) (1). Chicherin also received assurances 
from Briand that Franch 'was restraining and would 
restrain Poland' (2). In the Far Eastern context too, 
in order to prevent any reccurence of an Anglo-Japanese 
alliance, Valerian Dovgalevsky, the Ambassador in 
Tokyo, was instructed to raise again the question of 
a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact; this he did 
in conversation with the Japanese Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister, Tanaka Giichi, on 24 May (3).
As in March 1927 so in May 1927, the Soviet 
leadership responded to the uncertainty of Anglo-Soviet 
relations with tactical diplomatic soundings of other 
major powers in order to frustrate the formation of 
any anti-Soviet bloc. On the economic as well as the 
political level, efforts were made to prevent any 
further isolation.
1. Fischer, op .cit. p.533; D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .No. 125.
2. Ibid, Doc .No . 131.
3. Ibid, note 17; J.F.M.A., file B. 1.0.0.J/R 5,
'Nisso Fukashin Joyaku Kankei Ikken' .
Although continuing to deny any intention 
of joining the League of Nations, during 1926 the 
Soviet Government did express some willingness to 
participate in international discussions on economic 
matters and disarmament. Having taken steps to settle 
the Swiss-Soviet dispute over the Vorovsky Incident of 
1923, a Soviet delegation, which included Khinchuk, 
was attending the World Economic Conference in Geneva 
when the Arcos raid took place. During the Conference, 
which lasted until 23 May, the Soviet delegates 
expressed their desire for peaceful co-existence and, 
stressing the significance of theSoviet economy for 
world markets, endeavoured to break down the Soviet 
Union's comparative isolation in order to obtain 
credits . Although no direct and tangible results 
accrued, contacts with other delegations were establish­
ed and in a general sense 'broke the ice' (1). Khinchuk 
issued a statement on 16 May describing the Arcos raid 
as the 'severest blow' and an 'obstacle* to the 
development of economic co-existence between Soviet 
Russia and the western economies, but, although the claim 
that the Arcos raid was organised for the purpose of
1. Kathryn Davis, The Soviets at Geneva, (Geneva 1934) 
pp. 199-211; Cary, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 
op. cit. Vol 3, p.107; British Delegation to 
Cunliffe-Lister, 24 May 1927, W4891/53/98, FO 411/5.
destroying this rapprochement in Geneva has received 
some credence, it must be considered as speculative 
and undocumented (1).
The revolutionary arm of Soviet foreign 
policy was unable to act to any degree influentially 
through Stalin's chosen instrument, the Anglo-Russian 
Trade Union Committee, even though, as Daniel Calhoun 
has written, 'it was for use in just such circumstances' 
that Stalin had insisted on preserving it (2). There 
were some signs in early 1927 of attempts on both the 
Soviet and British side to patch up the relationship, 
which had suffered from Soviet criticisms of the 
General Council after the General Strike, and, after 
the presentation of the February Note, the General 
Council agreed to convene the Committee in Berlin at 
the end of March. At this meeting there was 'an unexpect­
ed truce', in which both sides, concerned about a 
further deterioration in Anglo-Soviet relations, made 
some concessions. However, this only spurred Trotsky 
to attack once again the existence of the Committee 
during a session of the Party Central Committee in 
mid-April 1927; Tomsky and Bukharin defended the collabor­
ation. The fragile nature of this collaboration was
1. Fischer, op.cit. pp.503-504; Warth, op^cit. p.125;
Francis Delaisi, 'Oil and the Arcos Raid', in Foreign
Affairs, October 1927, p.108.
2. Calhoun, op.cit. p.348.
exposed when Tomsky criticised the General Council's 
ineffective opposition to the Cabinet's Trade 
Disputes Bill in early May, so that when he sent an 
urgent request on 14 May for a meeting of the joint 
Committee to discuss responses to the Arcos raid, 
the British side’s response was more concerned with 
reproaching Tomsky for breaking his pledge given in 
Berlin to refrain from interfering in the Trades 
Union Congress's internal affairs (1). It was a 
rebuff for the Soviet leadership.
In considering the individual views of the 
British Cabinet members on the Arcos raid and the 
decision to break relations, it seems that the group 
of Ministers led by Joynson-Hicks, Churchill and 
Birkenhead, who urged 'positive' action rather than 
protests to deal with Soviet anti-British activities 
and who had been in a minority in Cabinet discussions 
in mid-1926 and early 1927, had gained sufficient 
support from other Cabinet members who had tended to 
lose faith in Chamberlain's 'passive' policy. This 
tendency was partly conditioned by the growth of 
intra-party dissent, the back-bench feeling against 
continuing relations with Soviet Russia. As parliament­
ary and extra-parliamentary opinion was inflamed by
1. Ibid, pp.330-347; Gorodetsky, op .cit. pp.240-244.
the events in China in January and March 1927, the 
pressure on the Cabinet increased and restricted the 
options available for responding to an event such as 
the Arcos raid. The knowledge of continuous Soviet 
activities, proven by the secret material provided 
by Chamberlain rather than by tie Arcos revelations, 
may well have caused the majority of the Cabinet to 
'lose patience' with the Russians.
Given his belief that Britain should not 
suffer from 'the intrusion of alien States whose 
political philosophy might be different' (1), his 
feeling that Chamberlain was being 'indulgent to a fault' 
in dealing with specific breaches of the Trade Agree­
ment, and his knowledge that earlier raids on Soviet 
organisations in other countries had produced 
incriminating evidence of Soviet propaganda and 
espionage activities, Joynson-Hicks would not have 
hesitated to authorise the search for the missing 
document immediately on learning Of the details of the 
case. As one Cabinet member later recalled, it was 
the kind of action which was 'difficult for the Foreign 
Secretary or Prime Minister either to veto in advance 
or to refuse to support afterwards' (2).
1. H.A. Taylor, Jix, Viscount Brentford, (London 1933) 
p.235. A.J.P. Taylor, op.cit. p.242, comments that 
Joynson-Hicks 'saw a communist under every bed'.
2. Percy, op .cit. p.508.
Churchill's views during May 1927 remain 
unknown, but were probably not dissimilar to 
Birkenhead's, as expressed in a letter to the Viceroy 
of India on 26 May: 'At last we have got rid of the 
Bolshevists. Personally I am delighted, though I 
think we ought to have done so the moment the General 
Election was over; and I have been trying to procure 
such a decision ever since' (1).
There seems some likelihood, nevertheless, 
that certain members of the Cabinet, particularly 
Percy and Balfour (judging from their letters to 
Chamberlain after the raid) and also Cecil, were still 
not convinced of the efficacy of breaking of relations (2). 
However, Baldwin was less inclined to take a lead in 
Cabinet discussions than previously and he must have 
concurred with the majority (3).
Louis Fischer has referred to reports that 
Chamberlain 'nearly resigned after the Arcos raid out 
of protest against Joynson-Hicks' action' (4). Although
1. Birkenhead, op.cit. pp.538-539.
2. Schinness, op .cit. p.402. Cecil's comments in his 
memoirs, op.cit. p.183, and Irwin's appeal to him in 
April 1927_^ 'Do not let the Cabinet break with the 
Soviet if you can help it' are suggestive of his 
views. Irwin to Cecil, 6 April 1927, Halifax Papers, 
held in the India Office Library, London, C 152/17.
3. His ill health after April 1927 made 'his indisposition 
to take a lead ... more marked than ever'.
N. Chamberlain Papers, Diary entry, 16 June 1927,NC 2/22
4. Fischer, op.cit. p.508.
he does not seem to have contemplated resignation 
and in public was always careful to maintain Cabinet 
solidarity, deprecating efforts to dissociate him 
from responsibility, he had been placed in a difficult 
position in having to provide an adequate defence of 
the Government's action once the diplomatic implications 
became apparent. His policy of 'drift' had been 
increasingly difficult to maintain in the Cabinet 
from 1924 onwards. His difficulties were compounded 
because on a personal level he found himself in 
conflict with some of his closest friends in the 
Cabinet (1) 9 and because, by 1927, his relative standing 
vis-a-vis his colleagues was declining. As his brother 
NevOLe was to comment in August 1927: 'Austen is 
becoming more and more divorced from Home politics...
He is a sort of Elder Statesman now'; in the words of 
one historian, 'while some prestige and influence might 
accrue from this status, it is scarcely a position of 
power* (2)..
1. Writing to Churchill on 22 February 1927, Chamberlain
described as 'a cruel turn of fate' the differences
which separated them. A. Chamberlain Papers, AC 35/ 
1/19. Cecil wrote to Irwin on 7 June 1927 that he 
was doing his best to prevent Chamberlain 'giving 
way' to Birkenhead and Churchill, who seemed 'really 
insane' on foreign policy questions. Cecil Papers, 
held, in the British Museum, London, Add. 51084.
2. N. Chamberlain to Irwin, 25 August 1927, Halifax 
Papers, C 152/17; Stambrook, op. cit. pp.22-23. 
Chamberlain's health was also deteriorating. Sir 
Charles Petrie, The Life and Letters of Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, (London 1939) Vol II, p.316.
Chamberlain himself was losing patience with 
the unrelenting Soviet anti-British activities, and, 
having prepared the other major European powers to 
a certain extent through his conversations in the 
spring and again immediately after the Arcos raid, 
and having decided that there was no real alternative 
to a rupture in the circumstances, he clearly committed 
himself to making the best possible case for the 
British action in breaking off relations. He was 
trying to regain the initiative from his Cabinet 
colleagues.
Short of repudiating the action taken by 
Joynson-Hicks (a step which would have meant political 
suicide), the Cabinet had no real alternative but to 
make public some or all of the material collected 
during the raid. However, it is doubtful if such a step 
alone would have served to 'assuage anti-Russian 
feelings in the country'. A back-bench revolt had 
been averted in March 1927 at the time of the debate 
on the February Note, but it might not have been 
averted in May 1927 if the Cabinet had decided against 
a rupture of relations.
Chamberlain's earlier reservations about the 
foreign political repercussions carried less weight 
with his colleagues in view of an apparently generally 
calm Europe and a collapse of Soviet policies in China.
Chamberlain was anxious to minimise the impediments 
to trade, but his colleagues, while agreeing that 
Arcos should remain, were less convinced of the value 
of Anglo-Soviet trade to the British economy. They 
would have noted the review prepared by Cunliffe- 
Lister in the spring, in which it was argued that 
the British business world itself was divided in its 
attitude towards trade with the Soviet Union and that 
the absolute and relative trade totals were small.
The Cabinet anticipated that anyway trade would 
'continue on the same basis as it is conducted in the 
United States of America and other countries which have 
no Trade Agreement with the Soviets' (1), without 
fully appreciating the freedom given to the Soviet 
Government by the monopoly of foreign trade to alter 
their trading patterns for purely political reasons 
if desired.
Economic and foreign policy considerations, 
therefore, did not weigh as heavily with the Cabinet 
as domestic policy considerations, which seemed to 
favour a strong line. In April 1927, accompanied by
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 23 May 1927, 33(27)1, CAB 23/55. 
Chamberlain noted on 20 May: 'I have no idea of a 
general expulsion or internment of all Russians 
as in a case of war ... As to Arcos it might be 
run by Englishmen or by Russians'. N2309/209/38,
FO 371/12590.
strong back-bench agitation, the Trades Disputes Bill 
had been introduced; at the end of June, Sir Samuel 
Hoare, the Secretary of State for Air, wrote to the 
Viceroy of India that the Bill and the rupture 
'have strengthened the Party and have prevented the 
Government getting weaker' (1). Certainly the 
Conservative, back-benchers let out a cheer at the 
announcement of the rupture; from then on the Russian 
question lost immediacy as a subject for back-bench 
dissent.
For the Politburo, the break in relations 
came at an unfortunate time in domestic political terms, 
as Stalin was already under attack from Trotsky over 
the developments in China. Trotsky's criticisms at 
the Central Committee plenum in mid-April were repeated 
with more vehemence at the Eighth Plenum of E.C.C.I., 
which opened on 18 May and was still in session when 
the diplomatic break was announced. On 26 May the 
United Opposition submitted the 'Daclaration of the 83', 
drawn up 'under the impulse of the Chinese fiasco and 
the breach of relations with Great Britain', which 
criticised the Stalinist leadership's ability to guide 
the Party in the event of war. Stalin and Bukharin 
were forced on to the defensive; largely avoiding
1. Hoare to Irwin, 22 June 1927, Halifax Papers, C152/17.
reference to the British issue, they concentrated on 
the Comintern's policy in China and the new issue, 
the imminent threat of war. Stalin argued in effect 
that, in these circumstances, there should be a 
closing of the ranks. He concluded that the British 
threat of 'war and intervention' and the Opposition's 
threat of a 'split' meant that 'something like a 
united front from Chamberlain to Trotsky is being 
formed' (1). Stalin, who had made efforts during 
1926 to advance his stature as an international 
communist (despite his reported private criticism 
of the Comintern's effectiveness) and to cultivate 
foreign communists, encountered little support in the 
E.C.C.I. for Trotsky's line.
To the Soviet policy-makers, the conflicting 
signs of British intentions during the fortnight 
between.the raid and the rupture precluded initial 
certainty that a rupture would indeed take place. The 
Narkomindel, judging from a later article in the 
official journal, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, still saw the 
Cabinet .in terms of 'two tendencies' and thought that 
the 'moderates' might still prevent a rupture (2).
1. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op .cit. Vol 2
pp. 25-26, Vol 3, pp. 142-148, 768-773; Degras,
Comintern, op .cit. Vol II, pp .365-39.
2. Article in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, July 1927, pp. 3-13
by I. Taigin (probably Ivan Maisky, Counsellor in 
Soviet Mission, London, 1925-1927) .
The obscurity and uncertainty of the British side's 
discussions on action after the raid is clear from 
the belief of the British Ambassador in Berlin,
Lindsay, as late as 21 May, that there would be no 
break 'unless the Russians chose to take the action 
of breaking off' (1). Soviet responses therefore 
were limited to threatening economic reprisals, to 
trying to activate the Anglo-Russian Trade Union 
Committee and the labour movement against a break, 
and to launching into a series of diplomatic conversa­
tions with other powers to dissuade them from following 
up on any British action. More wide-ranging responses 
had to be considered after the British decision was 
known, and the international horizon appeared more 
threatening to the Soviet Union.
1. Lindsay to Orme Sargent, head of Central Department, 
21 May 1927, N2338/2187/38, FO 371/12603.
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CHAPTER FOUR: WAR SCARES
After the British announcement of the break 
in relations, the Soviet press increased their 
references to the danger of war. On 29 May, the 
Eighth Plenum of E.C.C.I. adopted theses relating 
to the 1 danger of war1, and three days later the 
Plenum of the Moscow Soviet endorsed a report given 
by Rykov, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, 
on the threat of war in the existing international 
situation (1) . Demonstrations and meetings were 
organised throughout the Soviet Union to protest 
against the British action and also to act as a 
stimulant for production from the defence industries, 
under the slogan of ’our answer to Chamberlain' (2). 
Nevertheless, in contrast to these public reactions, 
on 27 May, the day after the rupture, Litvinov told 
a German diplomat that ’although England, undoubtedly, 
will strive for our isolation and even for war, she will 
come up against considerable difficulties and this 
process will take a long time. At the moment we have 
no fears at all’ (3).
1. Degras, Comintern, op.cit. Vol II, pp.377-381; 
Eudin and Fisher, op. cit. pp.379-381.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 198; Allan Monkhouse, 
Moscow 1911-1933, (Boston 1934) p.239.
3. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .No. 137.
Litvinov’s initial confidence was based 
on the assumption that France and Italy were unlikely
to follow Britain in taking action. However, as
tension rose in Europe in the aftermath of the break, 
the Soviet leadership soon displayed signs of nervous­
ness. Chicherin, still abroad, travelled to Germany
to try to confirm that the German link wouJ.d hold.
On 7 June he met Stresemann, who ’categorically and 
very firmly’ assured the Russian that Germany’s 
relations with the Soviet Union would remain unchanged. 
Characterising the rupture as ’absurd from the point 
of view of foreign policy’, Chicherin expressed his 
fears about further action by extremist elements in 
the Conservative Party and suggested that they might 
influence the Poles into provoking a war. Stresemann 
however rejected the idea that the Poles would act 
aggressively (1). Chicherin’s anxiety is understandable, 
given the Soviet Union’s relative isolation, for even 
the better informed Germans, despite Stresemann’s 
assurances to Chicherin, found grounds for doubt as 
to future British policy. Disgruntled at not being as 
closely informed by the British as had the French (and 
indeed the Italians), the Germans tried to analyse the
1. Ibid, Doc .No. 160; Dyck, op.cit. pp.88-91.
conflicting evidence from Britain. A senior German 
Foreign Ministry official concluded ambivalently that, 
although ’it is as unlikely that England will wage 
war on Russia by herself as it is that she will 
succeed in winning over Poland or Rumania for this 
task*, it was 'unlikely that it will be possible to 
keep the conflict localised in this fashion for long' 
and the danger existed that 'the British action may 
bring about a return to the dangerous and thus far 
ineffective policy of forcible intervention' (1).
The idea that Britain would utilise 'other 
hands’ to carry out aggressive plans seems to have 
received credence amongst the Russians. Even Litvinov, 
in his comments to the Germans on 27 May, had added a 
caveat that 'some small states, incapable of resistance, 
may well succumb to the influence of England’ . In this 
respect the Baltic border states were considered crucial. 
At the end of May, instructions were sent to the 
Soviet units guarding the frontiers warning them against 
'attempts to provoke us into frontier clashes’ and the 
probable increase in 'subversive activities, encouraged
1. German Foreign Ministry Archives (hereafter cited as 
G.F.M.A.), Memorandum by Herbert von Dirksen, head 
of the Eastern Department, 3 June 1927, serial 
6698/H106612-18. I am indebted to Dr. E. Breuning 
for her translations of certain unpublished German 
documents used in this thesis.
and subsidised by the English, in the European border 
areas’ (1). Moreover, the assassination of Voikov, 
the Soviet Ambassador in Poland, on 7 June 1927, was 
seen as just such an example of British instigation. 
While an acrimonious exchange of notes took place 
between the Polish and Soviet Governments, the Soviet 
press seized the chance to attack the guiding hand of 
Britain (2) . On the same evening, a bomb exploded 
in the Leningrad Party club, and this too was blamed 
on British agents . Izvestiya described these acts 
as being directly connected with the rupture; they 
were only 'the first link in a chain of criminal 
attacks’ (3). The general fear of war which had been 
expressed at various times, such as early in 1927, was 
heightened by the series of events in May and early 
June 1927 into a ’war scare’ which was probably genuine 
in its essentials (however unwarranted in actuality), 
but in its later stages was utilised and intensified 
for internal purposes .
Other European states showed a marked 
reluctance to follow the British example, and the only 
state to sever relations was Canada, which acted in 
order to avoid confusion as to the exact state of
1. Pogranichnie Voiska, op .cit. pp.240, 537.
2. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .Nos. 153, 154, 159, 177.
3. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 232; Izvestiya, 9 June 1927.
Canadian-Soviet relations (1). E. H. Carr has 
written that ’the British Government, or at any rate 
Chamberlain, had counted on French and German 
sympathy and support’ (2)r but, on the contrary, 
Chamberlain’s contacts with European diplomats and 
politicians, at the March 1927 League meeting in 
Geneva and after the Arcos raid in London, can have 
left him with little doubt that there would be no 
support for a rupture from Europe. His awareness of 
this is clear from his comment to the Italian 
Ambassador in London on 20 May: 'We must follow our 
own course and meet the consequences alone' (3).
Indeed, later in 1927, he was to state that it would 
have been of 'some anxiety' to him if other powers, 
particularly France, had broken relations, as he did 
not want the Russians 'left with no-one to talk to 
except the Germans’ (4). The British side, in fact,
1. The reason was not the unmasking of 'a complete spy 
centre' in Canada as a result of the Arcos raid as 
Newman, op.cit. p.171, asserts, but the uncertain 
constitutional position. Department of External 
Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations, 
(hereafter cited as D.Can.E.R.) (Ottawa 1971 -)
Vol 4, Doc .Nos. 959, 961, 962, 964-966, and 
Aloysius Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations 
between the World Wars, (Toronto 1972) pp. 96-104.
2. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op.cit. Vol 3,
p • 27.
3. D.D.It. Vol V, Doc .No. 218.
4. D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc .No. 111.
strove to depict the rupture as merely an isolated 
act• On 27 May Baldwin explained to a meeting at 
the Albert Hall: ’Our decision was not the result of a 
deep-laid plot to get up a world combination against 
Russia... (it) does not in any way mean or imply war 
against Russia’ (1). Gregory assured the Germans 
that the break was ’in no sense whatever the prelude 
to some wider policy1 (2).
The meeting of the League Council in Geneva 
in mid-June 1927 was an opportunity for Chamberlain 
to impress on foreign diplomats the fact that there 
was no intention of taking any further action, but, 
at the same time, this meeting increased Soviet fears 
of joint anti-Soviet action. This theme, expressed 
forcibly in the Soviet press contemporaneously, has 
received endorsement by some historians, such as 
Litvinov’s biographer, who has written that at this 
Geneva session Chamberlain ’again tried to create a 
united front* (3). However, documentary accounts of 
the meetings show that Chamberlain’s subsequent disclaimer 
to the Commons that ’no proposals were made by anyone 
for a joint conference with Russia, nor for any joint
1. Times, 28 May 1927.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 225.
3. Arthur U. Pope, Maxdm Litvinoff, (New York 1943) 
p.221; Izvestiya, 16 June 1927; Pravda, 15 June 
1927; Bolshevik, 15 June 1927.
action in regard to Russia* was accurate (1). Both 
in a private conversation with Stresemann and in a 
meeting of the Six Powers on 14 June, Chamberlain gave 
explanations of the British action, characterising it 
as an act of ’national defence* which had ’no ulterior 
intentions’. There was little positive support, as 
Briand and Emile Vandervelde, the Belgian Foreign 
Minister, supported Stresemann’s argument that the 
maintenance of diplomatic relations was the first 
condition for turning the Soviet Union into a ’normal 
state*. The German dilemma of being caught In a 
potential conflict between the Locarno and Berlin 
Treaties was apparent when Stresemann reluctantly had 
to agree to the suggestion of Chamberlain (endorsed 
by the others present) to ’make use of his relations 
with Chicherin’ to warn against the danger to peace 
in Europe of a sharpening of the Soviet-Polish dispute(2). 
German representations on this point, however, weakened 
Soviet confidence in the German link of their foreign 
policy and served to increase their apprehensions; 
it was yet another factor in the ’war scare* (3).
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 208, Col 1237.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 240. Other accounts of this 
meeting, in substantial agreement, are by Stresemann 
in E. Sutton, op.cit. Vol III, pp. 161-165; by 
Vittorio Scialoja in D.D.It. Vol V, Doc.No. 274; and 
by Ishii Itaro in J.F.M.A. file A .2.2.0 .C/R 1, Vol 1.
3. Dyck, op.cit. pp.89, 95-96, suggests that this factor 
• was 'more important' than the Voikov case.
Concomitant with the 'war scare1, publicity 
was given in the Soviet press to the activities of 
the staff of the former British Mission in Moscow, 
who were accused of espionage and directing groups
of saboteurs. In the reprisals enacted by the secret
e.
polic^, the O.G.P.U., against suspected terrorists, 
the name of Britain figured large in the indictments 
of the victims (1). After one group was executed in 
June 1927, Hodgson, now attached temporarily to the 
Northern Department, was moved to issue a dementi to 
the press denying the accusations of British 
espionage (2). The executions only served to rouse 
public opinion in the European countries against such 
terror tactics, and, in England, three prominent 
Labour M.P.s took the unprecedented step of sending a 
letter of protest to the Russians (3) . This prompted 
two responses from Moscow: from Rykov, apologetic, 
explaining that they were ’beset by difficulties which 
seem to be underestimated1 in Britain, and from Stalin, 
scathing, describing the M.P.s as 'worse than enemies’ 
because they did not understand that the executions
1. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 232; Pogranichnie Voiska, 
op .cit. p.537; Paul Scheffer, Seven Years in Soviet 
Russia, (London 1931) pp. 247-251.
2. Times, 13 June 1927.
3 .♦ Ibid, 30 June, 14 September 1927; International Press 
Correspondence (hereafter cited as Inprecor), 7 July 
1927. Briand told Stresemann that the executions 
were 'a crazy proceeding' which had 'created a very 
large number of enemies for Russia'. E. Sutton, op. 
cit. Vol III, p.156.
were fa necessary measure for the defense of the 
revolution * (1).
Chamberlain and the Foreign Office, however, 
were determined not to add to this state of nervous­
ness shown by the Soviets. Apart from Chamberlain's 
explanations to his European counterparts in Geneva 
in mid-June, various Government spokesmen made public 
pronouncements designed to dissipate suspicions of 
British policy. Even Birkenhead made a speech at the 
beginning of June in which he declared that he 
envisaged no permanent estrangement between the two 
powers. Questioned in the Commons, the Foreign Office 
spokesman endorsed that statement as Government policy, 
provided that the initiative for improving relations 
came from the Soviet side (2). The Foreign Office also 
strongly opposed, and-gained Baldwin's support, in 
rejecting a suggestion from the Conservative Party 
Chairman, Davidson, that extracts from Hodgson's 
reports, showing the Soviet regime in an unfavourable 
light, should be published in a White Paper (3).
1. Inprecor, 7 July 1927; Degras, Soviet Documents,
op.cit. Vol II, p.237.
2. Coates, op.cit. p.290; H.C.Deb. Vol 207, Cols 977-978.
A month later Birkenhead publicly declared: 'We are 
not so foolish ... as to declare a perpetual edict
of hostility against any people'. Coates, op .cit. 
p.298.
3. Davidson to Baldwin, July 1927, Baldwin Papers,
Vol 113.
The clearest indication of British policy 
came from Chamberlain, in the House of Commons on 
28 July 1927. He reiterated that the door was not 
closed to an approach from the Soviet side. Although 
the 'general policy of hostility' of the Soviet 
Government had made relations impossible to maintain,
'trade may go on. We will do nothing to 
interfere with it, and we have no desire to
push, and no intention of pushing our
differences any farther ... If they make an 
approach, they will no doubt state the
conditions on which it is made, and we can
discuss them, but relations cannot be resumed 
subject to the old abuses' (1).
The Soviet response to Chamberlain's 
statement was enunciated at the Joint Plenum of the 
Central Committee and the'Central Control Commission, 
which opened on 29 July. However, the tone for this 
meeting was set by Stalin's lengthy article in Pravda 
the day before (the same day as Chamberlain's statement). 
He deliberately heightened the 'war scare', by warning 
that there was a 'real and material threat of a new 
war*, stressing the growth of the contradictions 
between the capitalist powers and between these powers 
and the victims of imperialism, and outlining the role 
of Britain in preparing for war. With the United 
Opposition having continued their attacks on Stalin's
1. H.C. Deb. Vol 209, Col 1530.
foreign policy setbacks, Stalin re-emphasised a 
theme he had touched on at the Eighth Plenum of 
E.C.C.I. in May and argued that Party unity was at 
a premium, depicting the dissenters as potential 
traitors: 'Our task consists in strengthening our 
rear and clearing out the rubbish' (1).
At the Plenum itself, Chicherin, who had 
returned to Moscow at the end of June, presented his 
analysis of the international situation, in which he 
reportedly argued that war could be avoided and that 
by using favourable factors, such as the German link 
and the desire of business circles in various 
European countries for greater trade, the British anti- 
Soviet plans could be frustrated and war prevented (2). 
He gave a press interview on 5 August in which he 
specifically replied to Chamberlain, saying that 
Moscow had received 'no proposals whatever, either 
official or semi-official' from the British side about 
resuming relations, but that the Soviet Government 
were ready to start negotiations at any time if Britain 
put forward actual proposals and gave guarantees that
1. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, pp.233-237. 
The Japanese Ambassador in Moscow saw some significance 
in the heightening of the 'war scare' after Stalin's 
return from a rest in the Caucasus. J.F.M.A. file
A.2.2.0.C/R 1, Vol 1.
2. The general lines of Chicherin's report, still 
unpublished, are noted in Gorokhov, Zamyatin and 
Zemskov, op. cit. p.211.
there would be no further raids (1). Despite the
i
moderate tone of ChicherinTs pronouncements, the 
Plenum's resolution on the international situation 
referred to the 'extremely strained relations' 
between the Soviet Union and Britain, which was 
depicted as encircling and preparing for war against 
the former (2) .
The difference in emphasis between Chicherin's 
and Stalin's assessments can be explained by Chicherin's 
concern only with the diplomatic situation in Europe, 
where it seemed that the alleged English threat was 
not so imminent and was being relatively successfully 
counteracted, and Stalin's concern with the internal 
political situation and the use to which the 'danger 
of war' theme could be utilised in the final stages 
of his struggle with the Trotskyist Opposition. This 
had still not been finally resolved, since the Joint 
Plenum agreed only to censure Trotsky and Zinoviev, 
rather than take any more positive action. By August, 
therefore, the Stalinist position on the war danger 
was increasingly showing elements of manipulation.
In domestic economic terms, the fear of 
renewed intervention and nervousness over possible war 
with Britain and/or the limitrophes caused the peasants
1. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .No. 196.
2. Ibid, Doc .No . 197.
to panic and to start hoarding goods, with resultant 
shortages in the cities. In August 1927, Bukharin 
was forced to point out that ^economic dislocation 
such as hoarding and price increases were being 
caused by the foreign threats (1). Foreign diplomats 
noted that the war psychosis was resulting in troop 
movements and increased armament production in the 
summer of 1927, although no large-scale-mobilisation 
seems to have occurred (2). More attention was 
devoted to discussions on solving the immediate needs 
of developing the defence industries and the long-term 
requirements of planning, larger capital investment 
and collectivisation. Differences between Stalin 
and the Bukharinists were to become apparent later in 
1928 as the issues of collectivisation and the tempo 
of industrial growth became the subject of argument 
during the evolution of the drafts of the Five Year 
Plan, which began to come under serious discussion 
towards the end of 1927 (3).
1. E.H.Carr and R.W.Davies, A History of Soviet Russia: 
Foundations of a Planned Economy, (London 1969)
Vol 1, pp. 699-700; Izvestiya, 18 August 1927.
2. Dyck, op. cit. pp.97-98; Jean Herbette, Un Diplomate 
Francais Parle du Peril Bolcheviste, (Paris 1943)
p. 52; John Erickson, The Soviet High Command,
(New York 1962) p.. 285.
3. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 
op. cit. Vol 1, pp. 296-302, 426.
That some elements of genuine fear were 
still operative was clear from the Soviet reaction 
to the 'Rakovsky affair* in France in September 1927.
French right-wing circles had protested strongly 
against Rakovsky, the Ambassador in Paris, signing 
a Trotskyist manifesto calling on the armed forces 
of bourgeois countries to desert in the event of war 
with the Soviet Union, and, although the affair was 
initially smoothed over, early in October the French 
asked for his recall (1) . The Soviet agreement, albeit 
reluctant, to comply with the French request (which 
Izvestiya described as evidence of ’the pressure of 
the war-mongers of English imperialism*) demonstrated 
the genuine anxiety in Moscow about any sign of 
disturbance to the international situation and the 
necessity to prevent Britain and France combining 
together (2).
However, with the Franco-Soviet dispute 
settled and few concrete signs of England gathering 
further support on the international scene, and Stalin's 
victory over the United Opposition becoming all but 
complete (at the end of September Trotsky was expelled
1. Fischer, op. cit. pp. 520-527; Degras, Soviet Documents, 
op. cit. Vol II, pp. 247-254, 270-273.
2. Izvestiya, 14 October 1927; D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc.No. 82.
from E.C.C.I. and in late October Trotsky and 
Zinoviev were expelled from the Central Committee), 
the autumn saw signs of a toning down of the war scare. 
Mikhail Kalinin, the President of the Central Executive 
Committee, speaking in mid-October, emphasised the antagon­
istic attitude of Britain and France, but added: 'When 
we speak about the danger of war this does not mean 
that there will be war tomorrow. No, we only point 
out the systematic continuous preparation for war 
against the U.S.S.R.1 (1). A few days later, Rykov
presented a report on the international situation to the 
Central Executive Committee but without mentioning the 
war danger in any detail (2). In a speech at the end 
of October, Stalin reemphasised the successes of the 
Soviet Union's peaceful policy and shifted ground to 
criticise the 'hysterics' of the Opposition since 'we 
are not at war despite the repeated prophecies of 
Zinoviev and others' (3). This gradual change in the 
atmosphere was noticeable to visitors to Russia, and 
an American businessman told the British press that 
'the idea of war with England...seems to have faded 
away' (4).
1. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .No. 239.
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, op .cit. Vol II, pp.273-274.
3. Stalin, Works, Vol 10, pp.205-206.
4. Manchester Guardian, 4 November 1927.
During the summer the Foreign Office tried 
to asses^, from the limited information available to 
them, the reasons for the war scare. In January 1927, 
Hodgson had written a despatch on the prevalence of 
'war scares' in the Soviet Union, in which he argued 
that this psychosis of the Bolsheviks was caused in 
effect by a guilty conscience, and that 'having made 
up their mind that, objectively, the premises for 
aggression exist, they are industriously seeking for 
symptoms by which to confirm their premises' (1). He 
found no reason to alter his views when he assessed 
the summer war scare, merely adding that the Soviet 
Government were 'obsessed with fears of aggression 
and encirclement' (2). Chamberlain felt that 'the 
Russians were as frightened of us as we are of them,
and were very afraid that we were pursuing a policy
of encirclement... Undoubtedly the Soviet Government 
was nervous, and yet continually played with fire in 
exaggerating the prospects of war. This was done for 
the purpose of home consumption' (3). His analysis 
showed some appreciation of the elements of genuine 
fear and calculation behind the Soviet war scare in 
the summer of 1927.
1. D.B.F.P. IA/II, Doc .No. 428.
2. Defence of India Sub-Committee Minutes, 5 July 1927, 
CAB 16/83 .
3. C.I.D. Minutes, 14 July 1927, CAB 2/5.
As the summer progressed, the general 
impression gained by the Foreign Office from the 
reports forwarded through the Norwegian Government 
(from early September the British Ambassador in 
Oslo was allowed to see some of the despatches from 
the Norwegian Ambassador in Moscow) and from information 
from other sources was of 'anxiety1 on the part of the 
Soviet Government (1). Chamberlain continued, however, 
to try to avoid any action which would unnecessarily 
add to this Soviet anxiety, because, as he explained 
to the Committee of Imperial Defence, 'continual 
reference to an inevitable crisis .. .often tended to 
bring that crisis about'. He therefore urged that the 
'utmost discretion' be observed in any discussions 
regarding possible Soviet aggression (2). Chamberlain 
followed up this cautionary appeal to his Cabinet 
colleagues with a circular to all his diplomatic and 
consular officials abroad on the sensitive question 
of the attitude to be adopted towards Russian emigres 
who plagued British officials with 'plans' for action 
against the Soviet Union. Noting the increase in 
approaches from these circles, and the dangers of
1. Lindley to Chamberlain, 5 September 1927, N4298/ 
309/38, FO 371/12595. The chief diplomatic sources 
of information for Britain were the Poles and the 
Norwegians. The expulsion of the majority of the 
Russians from London and the revelations of the 
interception of Soviet communications (the Russians 
changed their codes and cyphers in turn) must have 
reduced significantly the amount of secret material 
available .
2. C.I.D. Minutes, 14 July 1927, CAB 2/5.
misrepresentation, Chamberlain impressed on his 
diplomats the importance of endeavouring fto avoid 
official and semi-official intercourse with Russian 
emigres' and 'to keep them at arm's length' (1).
As the imminence of war was gradually played 
down in Soviet pronouncements, the British noted a 
corresponding rise in Soviet references to British 
attempts to form an economic or financial blockade 
of the Soviet Union. Soviet efforts to gain credits, 
particularly long-term credits, from the West in order 
to finance machinery imports had had only limited 
success during 1926-1927. Negotiations with Germany 
had produced a credit of 300 million marks (partially 
Government-guaranteed) in July 1926, but in the case 
of Britain, although by 1926-1927 nearly half of all 
Soviet orders were on some kind of credit, the banks 
and companies were reluctant to grant large or long­
term credits. Negotiations did start in January 1927 
between the Midland Bank and the Russians; some headway 
began to be made in early May but the talks were still 
uncompleted when the Arcos raid and the rupture took 
place. (2). Attempts by the Soviet side to characterise
1. Memorandum by Chamberlain, 30 September 1927, N4786/ 
263/38, PO 371/12594.
2. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .Nos. 115, 135; Reginald McKenna, 
Chairman of the Midland Bank, to James Grigg,
Private Secretary to Churchill, 26 May 1927, 
N2554/9/38, FO 371/12581.
the Arcos raid as a deliberate attempt to wreck this 
agreement (a view endorsed by some historians) suffer 
from the lack of any concrete evidence (1). Neverthe­
less, the rupture did have a dampening effect on the 
City's consideration of long-term credits. The 
Midland Bank credit negotiations were never revived (2), 
and the Soviet authorities suspected British industrial­
ists of exerting pressure on European and American 
banks and businessmen not to take part in credit 
transactions with the Russians during the summer and 
autumn of 1927 (3). The Russians responded by 
skilfully trying to play off the British and the 
Germans in an attempt to obtain the necessary credits 
and disrupt any financial blockage, but few credits 
were obtained (4).
1. When Rosengolts referred to the agreement in 
conversation on 13 May, it was the first that 
Chamberlain knew of the negotiations. H.C.Deb.
Vol 206, Cols 2009-2010. Coates, op .cit. p.278,
and Fischer, op .cit. pp.504, 511, support contemporary 
Soviet accusations. The 'oil hypothesis' which 
posits Sir Henry Deterding, head of Royal Dutch 
Shell, as a conspirator behind the scene, is also 
unproven. Glyn Roberts, The Most Powerful Man in 
the World, (New York 1938) pp.271-276; Warth, op .cit • 
p p , 124-125.
2. Bessedovsky, op .cit. pp.229-233, claims that Stalin 
personally vetoed renewing negotiations. Litvinov 
later implied that negotiations were not renewed 
because better terms were found in other countries. 
Degras, Soviet Documents. op.cit. Vol II, p.350. 
Personal enquiry of the Midland Bank Ltd. in October 
1971 failed to elicit any further information on the 
fate of this agreement .
3. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .Nos. 138, 148.
4. D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc .Nos. 65, 73.
With Britain unlikely to be the source of 
badly-needed credits, it was important for the Soviet 
Union to maintain the level of exports to Britain, 
so obtaining useful foreign currency, while diverting 
orders to other countries. On 10 June 1927, the 
Trade Commissar, Mikoyan, stated optimistically 
that 'I think we will successfully solve the problem 
of finding a substitute for the English market, for 
our sales and purchases, in other countries” (1).
This sounded like the full implementation of economic 
reprisals threatened by the Russians prior to the 
rupture of relations.. The British, however, refused 
to take the Soviet threats of retaliation after the 
rupture as anything more than a 'bogey* . A Treasury 
expert summed up:
'It is obvious that a diplomatic rupture 
with Russia must tend to have a depressing 
effect on trade between this country and 
Russia... (but) it will be observed: 1. that 
the totals are not very large, and 2. that 
the balance has always been in favour of 
Russia. In other words, a cessation of 
trade is more likely to damage Russia, both 
relatively and absolutely, than to damage 
this country' (2).
1. Pravda, 15 June 1927. Also, ibid, 26 May and 18 June 
1927.
2. Sir Otto Niemayer, Comptroller of Finance at the 
Treasury, to Walford Selby, Chamberlain’s Private 
Secretary, 25 May 1927, N2451/9/38, FO 371/12581; 
D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .No. 273.
However, contrary to the British projections 
and, indeed, the impression given by Mikoyan’s 
pronouncement, Soviet trade planners were curtailing 
their orders in Britain while working to maintain as 
far as possible the same level of exports, thereby 
shifting the balance of trade further in the Soviet 
Union’s favour. This policy did not become fully 
reflected in the trade figures until 1928, because 
the fulfilment of orders placed before the break and 
seasonal variations obscured the change. The figures 
for British exports to the Soviet Union were only 
slightly lower in the second half of 1927 than in the 
second half of 1926, though there was a drastic 
reduction in the value of the re-export of imported 
merchandise (1).
Aware that Anglo-Soviet trade represented 
only a relatively small percentage of Britain’s foreign 
trade, indeed, British exports to theSoviet Union 
represented only 2% of all British exports in 1926 
(see Appendix Two of this thesis), the Russians 
stressed the potential of the Soviet market. A 
Narkomindel official wrote in July 1927 that ’true, 
Anglo-Soviet trade does not play a particularly large 
role in the general turnover of British foreign trade 
(although for distinct branches of industry, e.g. for
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 210, Cols 2-3, 823-825.
mechanical engineering, the Soviet market already has 
a very high value), however, there are great 
possibilities here* (1). Difficulties not only in 
Britain but also in other countries in obtaining 
credits amplified Soviet feelings of economic isolation; 
these feelings were to form one of the underpinnings 
of the drive to increase domestic industrial machinery 
output under the Five Year Plan and so reduce the 
dependence in the long run on foreign sources.
With the Trade Delegation in London closed 
down, the Arcos offices and staff became the main 
mechanism for Anglo-Soviet trade operations. Sufficient 
numbers of Russians, provided that they were engaged 
in bona fide commercial transactions, were allowed to 
stay in Britain to enable the attenuated Arcos to 
carry on its trading operations (2). Joynson-Hicks 
kept a vigilant eye on the activities of these Russians, 
but, in response to representations from certain British 
industrialists in the autumn of 1927, he showed himself 
prepared to grant visas to Soviet employees for longer 
periods than previously in order to facilitate trade (3) .
1. Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, July 1927.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/III, Doc .Nos. 223, 229. Provisional
arrangements had been made for members of the
Independent Labour Party to become directors of Arcos 
and other Soviet trading organisations in the event 
of mass expulsions of Russians. Fenner Brockway, 
Inside the Left, (London 1942) p.254.
3. Times, 14 November 1927; Joynson-Hicks to Sir Philip
Nash, Chairman of Metro-Vickers Ltd., 14 October 1927, 
Department of Overseas Trade file D.O.T. 17036,
B.T. 60/15/3.
In his statement to the Commons at the 
end of July 1927, Chamberlain had made it clear that 
the British Government would do nothing to interfere 
with Anglo-Soviet trade, and this policy was generally 
adhered to by the Government representatives. One 
minor exception should be noted. A campaign mounted 
in the summer of 1927 by the Daily Mail and Deterding's 
Royal Dutch Shell to boycott Soviet oil imports 
evidently received an unofficial response from Joynson- 
Hicks, who encouraged the leading oil groups ’to agree 
among themselves not to buy Russian oil’, In order 
to make Government policy consistent, Cunliffe-Lister 
brought the question before the Cabinet, which 
endorsed his policy proposal that ’while every British 
subject is j^ree to buy or not as he pleases*, it would 
be the Government’s practice ’to avoid buying goods 
formerly the property of their own nationals which have 
been confiscated without payment* (1). However, with 
no greater measure of Government support, the press 
campaign died out in mid-1928, and Soviet oil exports 
to Britain once again began to increase (2) .
1. Coates, op.cit. pp.291-294; Memorandum by Cunliffe- 
Lister, 22 November 1927, C .P . 289(27), CAB 24/189; 
Cabinet Conclusions, 23 November 1927, 57(27)8,
CAB 23/55. The ban covered the purchases of timber 
as well as oil by Government departments.
2. Deterding abandoned his personal vendetta in February 
1929 when he came to a compromise agreement with the 
Russians. Hans Heymann, ’Oil in Soviet-Western 
Relations in the Inter-War Years’, in American Slavic 
and East European Review, December 1948, p.312.
The difficulties met in the Soviet efforts 
to redirect and rebuild their foreign trade activities 
occasionally surfaced in public. In mid-August Rykov 
told a Communist Party meeting that the break ’brings 
with it great difficulties for our foreign trade’, 
with the result that the expansion of trade in 1927- 
1928 would be less than planned (1). A frank article 
in the Trade Commissariat’s newspaper, Ekonomicheskaya 
Zhizny in November 1927, stated that ’the rupture with 
England created certain difficulties in the sale of 
individual export commodities, in the execution of the 
import plan, and in the matter of credit relations’ (2).
The damage that would be done to Anglo-Soviet 
trade as a result was one of the major reasons for the 
Labour movement’s opposition to the rupture of relations, 
and during the summer of 1927, the Trades Union Congress,
the Co-operatives Congress and the Labour Party
Conference all passed resolutions condemning the rupture 
and its economic consequences (3). However, there was 
a limit to the Labour movement’s sympathy for the Soviet 
Union, in that the urgent telegrams from Tomsky calling 
for a meeting of the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee 
met with a cool response, even after the rupture. An
1. Inprecor, 1 September 1927.
2. Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn, 11 November 1927. Also an 
article by Dimitri Ilinsky in Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i 
Mirovaya politika, September 1927.
3. Coates, op. cit. pp .295-296.
informal meeting between both sides held in Berlin 
in mid-June only produced deadlock, and Stalin, under 
criticism from Trotsky, played down his earlier 
enthusiasm for this Committee, in a speech on 1 August, 
describing it as ’only temporary, subsidiary,,episodic 
and therefore unstable’ (1). His tactics now were to 
goad the British side into breaking up the Committee, 
as it was no longer of any use to the Soviet side.
At the Trades Union Congress in September 1927 the 
General Council resolution to wind up the Committee 
was passed overwhelmingly. Steel-Maitland reported to 
the Cabinet that this decision ’simply means British 
official trade-unionism is coming into line with the 
vast majority of its members, who are in no way 
revolutionists* (2). The rupture of diplomatic relations 
was paralleled by a rupture between the two labour 
movements. After May 1927 it had become apparent that 
the Committee could not act to advance Soviet interests.
It had become an embarrassment to Stalin, who could 
only ward off criticisms by counter-attacking, admonish­
ing the United Opposition for 'wobbling and absence of 
line’ and the British trade union leaders for being 
’outright agents of British imperialism’ (3).
1. Degras, Soviet Documents, op. cit. Vol II, pp.240-242.
2. Memorandum by Steel-Maitland, 18 October 1927,
C.P. 246(27), CAB 24/188.
3. Gorodetsky, op .cit. pp. 246-253; Calhoun, op. cit. 
pp. 348-387.
While the Labour movement moved further 
away from the Russians, at the governmental level 
relations remained static. The Foreign Office rejected 
all attempts by intermediaries, in the shape of 
interested businessmen and journalists, to bring about 
conversations or negotiations, and the Soviet 
Government rejected suggestions for mediation from 
the Germans (1) . Nevertheless, Chamberlain did draft 
a section on policy towards the Soviet Union for 
Baldwin to use in his speech at the Guildhall on 
9 November 1927. Baldwin gave an undertaking that, 
whenever the Russians were prepared 'to observe the 
ordinary decencies of international intercourse, to 
abstain from interference in our domestic affairs and 
from intrigue and hostility elsewhere', they would 
find the British 'ready to meet them in that spirit of 
liberality and goodwill which inspired our whole foreign 
policy' (2).
On 20 November 1927, speaking at the Ukrainian 
Party Congress, Rykov gave the Soviet reply. He 
dismissed Baldwin's speech as part of a pre-election 
campaign, maintained that Soviet diplomats had always
1. Note by Sir Henry Fountain, Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State at the Board of Trade, 14 October 1927,
N4825/4708/38, FO 371/12607; Dyck, op. cit. pp.101-102.
2. Times, 10 November 1927; A. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain 
6 November 1927, A. Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/1/436.
acted correctly, and laid the responsibility for the 
rupture with the British, but stated that relations 
could be renewed on the basis of 'reciprocal 
conditions of non-interference'. The British side 
did not consider this reply to be sufficient to meet 
their desiderata; indeed, Chamberlain told Litvinov 
a fortnight later that it was 'not so much a response 
as a retort' (1) .
However, an opportunity for the two sides 
to meet was provided by the meetings of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Disarmament Conference, which opened 
in Geneva in late November 1927. Although Stalin had 
made it clear in early November 1927 that the Soviet 
Union did not intend 'to be a constituent part of that 
screen for imperialist intrigues', the League of Nations, 
the tentative rapprochement with the League, seen first 
by a delegation's participation in the World Economic 
Conference in the spring of 1927, was carried one step 
further by the participation for the first time of a 
Soviet delegation in the disarmament discussions (2). 
Unofficial reports reached the British that Litvinov, 
who was head of the Soviet delegation, might try to 
approach Chamberlain during the sessions. Chamberlain
1. Izvestiya, 25 November 1927; H.C.Deb. Vol 211, Cols 
264-265; D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc .No.82.
2. Stalin, Works, Vol 10, pp. 212-213.
informed the Cabinet that if Litvinov did make an 
approach he would not refuse an interview, but he would 
be 'most careful not to commit His Majesty's 
Government to any change of policy* (1).
Through the good offices of a Daily Herald 
journalist, George Slocombe, Litvinov did meet and 
talk with Chamberlain at his hotel on 5 December 1927. 
During the one hour conversation there was 'a frank 
exchange of views' but no agreement could be reached (2). 
Propaganda was the focal point of the discussion.
Litvinov said that he did not wish to dwell on past 
events, but he did want to know 'what steps could be 
taken to place our relations upon a better footing'. 
Chamberlain replied that he could not talk about the 
future without clearing up the past problems, and he 
reasserted the British view of the Soviet Government's 
responsibility for the actions of the Comintern and 
the Profintern; Litvinov dissented from this view. 
Chamberlain then referred to Rosengolts' telegrams, as 
published in the White Paper, and Litvinov, although 
he would not recognise the authenticity of the telegrams, 
did make the observation that 'in international history 
there have been many examples of the tactless actions
1. D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc .Nos 74, 77; Cabinet Conclusions, 
30 November 1927, 59(27)2, CAB 23/55.
2. Coates, op. cit. p. 302; George Slocombe, The Tumult 
and the Shouting, (London 1936) pp. 284-292.
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of diplomatic agents1 . The arguments continued on 
predictable lines, but, according to Litvinov's 
account, after the communique had been drawn up, 
Chamberlain relaxed and talked 'in a more friendly 
tone about how reluctantly he had agreed to the 
break and how it was difficult for him to take the 
risk of resuming relations, which inevitably would have 
to be broken off if we (the Russians) did not change 
our tactics' (1).
Convinced that the Soviet Government would 
make no concessions, least of all admit responsibility 
for the Comintern, Chamberlain told the Commons on his 
return that he could see no reason for resuming the 
conversations until the circumstances had changed (2). 
Litvinov concluded that Baldwin's speech had been made 
'solely for internal consumption' and that it did not 
signify in any way a change in the Cabinet's Russian 
policy (3). A state of deadlock had been reached.
While Litvinov was in Geneva, the Fifteenth 
Party Congress, postponed several times while Stalin 
worked to outmanoeuvre his opponents, was firaLly 
convened. With the Congress's condemnation and
1. D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc .No. 82; D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .No. 283.
2. Daily Herald, 10 December 1927; H.C.Deb. Vol 212,
Col 385.
3. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .No. 283; Pope, op. cit. p. 239.
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expulsion from the Party of Trotsky and Zinoviev, and 
Trotsky’s almost immediate deportation from Moscow, 
the third crisis in Party unity had been successfully 
weathered by Stalin (1); next, he was to work towards 
destroying the Bukharinist group within the Politburo, 
by in fact adopting many of the Left Opposition’s 
policies,
Stalin’s report on 3 December set the keynote 
for the lengthy discussions on the Soviet Union’s 
economic problems. He outlined the Party’s tasks as 
being to promote industrialisation, so as to create 
’favourable conditions necessary for overtaking and 
outstripping the advanced capitalist countries’, to 
collectivise agriculture, and to eliminate capitalist 
elements from the economy (2), Directives concerning 
the introduction of a five yearplan were couched in 
vague terms, for as Rykov explained, the plan was not 
nearly ready. However, Voroshilov argued for the 
military necessity of a plan by linking the ’inevitability 
of an armed attack’ on the Soviet Union with the planning 
of industrial construction (3), The changes in policy 
which were implemented during 1928, as the drafts for 
the Plan were continually revised upwards, were
X. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op. cit.
Vol' 2, pp. 26-53.
2. Stalin, Works, Vol 10, pp. 298-321.
3. Eudin and Fisher, op. cit. pp. 402-403.
explained as a means of defending and strengthening 
the Soviet Union against the expected capitalist 
onslaught, although, in fact, in the short term it 
was to render the country more vulnerable than before,
The foreign policy defeats during 1927, on both the 
diplomatic and the revolutionary fronts, increased 
Soviet international isolation, ^his served to 
reinforce those tendencies to withdraw back into 
herself which the Soviet Union had already been 
exhibiting .
At a time of relative Soviet economic and 
military weakness, when ’the threat of war remains in 
force, despite Britain’s temporary setbacks' and when 
’the period of "peaceful co-existence" is receding 
into the past’, Stalin enunciated the tasks for Soviet 
foreign policy on both the diplomatic and revolutionary 
fronts. On the diplomatic front, he noted two tendencies 
amongst the Western countries, one towards ’warlike 
aggression’ (Britain, aided by France, Poland and 
China) and the other towards developing 'peaceful 
relations' (Germany and Near and Middle Eastern countries). 
Soviet policy, therefore, should be to exploit these 
contradictions in the capitalist camp, 'to postpone war 
by "buying off" the capitalists and to take all measures 
to maintain peaceful relations'. On the revolutionary 
front, he argued that there was 'every sign of deepening
crisis and increasing instability1 in the capitalist 
world, which was ’obviously entering a period of new 
revolutionary upsurge’ (1). In such a situation, as 
Bukharin foreshadowed in his speech on 10 December, 
a new militant Comintern line was considered to be 
appropriate (2), although this new line was not to be 
fully implemented until the Sixth World Congress of 
the Comintern in August 1928, Nevertheless, the 
failure of the Stalin-Bukharin line of alliance with 
social-democrats and national bourgeoisie during 1927 
was to be’ cleverly utilised by Stalin as a weapon to 
discredit Bukharin during the coming months (3).
The failure in China, both of the alliance 
with the Kuomintang and the ill-fated communist-led 
uprisings in the autumm and winter of 1927 (4), did 
not cause Stalin at the end of 1927 to turn to another 
Asian country such as India, Even Bukharin, in referring 
to India as 'one of the biggest problems confronting 
the Comintern1 in the future, was careful to warn 
against transferring unchanged to India the tactics
1, Stalin, Works, Vol 10, pp. 277-298.
2 • Inprecor, 29 December 1927.
3. Robert Donaldson, Soviet Policy towards India, 
(Harvard 1974) pp. 26-27, 31-32; Stephen Cohen, 
Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, (London 1974)
ppi 261-267.
4. Jacques Guillermaz, A .History of the Chinese Communist 
Party, 1921-1949, (London 1972) pp. 133-165.
used in China (1).
Despite all the euphoric celebrations of the 
tenth anniversary of the Revolution, the foreign 
policy set-backs, on both the diplomatic and the re­
volutionary fronts, left the Soviet Union at the end 
of 1927 in a position on the international scene 
which, in the words of a member of the Collegium of 
the Narkomindel, was 'far worse1 than in 1924, which 
in retrospect was seen as a high-point of the Soviet 
Union's diplomatic standing (2). Chicherin warned 
his colleagues in mid-1927 that 'we must manoeuvre, 
with the utmost caution and circumspection, between 
the hidden rocks surrounding us on all sides' (3).
To the Moscow leadership, the diplomatic arm must have 
seemed more effective than the revolutionary arm in 
the second half of 1927 in reducing the extensiveness 
of the policy defeats and preventing the events of 
mid-1927 from becoming the starting-point for a 
united capitalist intervention. The worsening of the 
Soviet Union's relations with France and Poland, and 
Japan (all three countries failed to respond to non­
aggression pact proposals), and a slight chilling in
1. Xenia Eudin and R .C. North, Soviet Russia and the 
East, 1920-1927, (Stanford 1957) p. 391.
2. Lionel Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic, 
(Cambridge 1954) pp. 124-125 .
3. A. Alexandrov and L. Sergeyeva, '90th Anniversary 
of Valerian Dovgalevsky's Birth', in International 
Affairs, January 1976, p. 128.
the Soviet-German relationship were only slightly 
recompensed by better relations with Turkey and 
Persia (Soviet-Persian Non-aggression and Trade 
Treaties were signed in October 1927). The revolution­
ary arm had fared even worse, as the collapse of the 
hopes in Britain and China was barely compensated by 
signs of a growing militancy among the Indian 
nationalists (1).
As fears of an armed intervention led or 
sponsored by Britain (fears which were amplified and 
manipulated in the later stages for internal purposes) 
died away in the later months of 1927, Soviet anxiety 
over an economic or financial blockade grew correspond­
ingly, with Britain still seen as the villain of the 
piece. By the end of 1927 the Soviet leadership 
seem to have concluded that no restoration of relations 
under the Conservative Cabinet was likely in the short- 
run, so that future policy should be to try to 
neutralise British political animosity whilst trying 
to maintain some economic benefits from trade with 
Britain. Despite the public utterances of Chamberlain 
and Baldwin that Britain had no intention of carrying 
the dispute any further, Soviet suspicions of British 
policy remained undissipated.
1. Dyck, op. cit. pp. 99-101, 107-109; Harish Kapur, 
Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927, (Geneva 1966) 
pp. 140-141, 206-211; D.V.P. Vol X, note 17.
The difficulties on both the domestic and 
foreign fronts during the second half of 1927, the 
doubts about the viability of the existing policies, 
and the growing divergences between the proposed 
solutions accentuated the differences between Stalin 
and Bukharin into a split in the very beginning of 
1928. Adroit use of the party machinery was to tip 
the balance of power in Stalin's favour. While he 
considered and redrafted plans for a new drive for 
internal reconstruction and a drastic development of 
the Soviet economy, he also worked to destroy the 
Bukharinist opposition.
As for the British side, comparison can be 
made between the situation created in the second half 
of 1927 and the predictions outlined in Chamberlain's 
memorandum of January 1927. As Chamberlain had 
anticipated, no European power followed the break with 
similar action, tension and disturbance had occurred, 
especially in Eastern Europe, and, although the Soviet 
Union's international position had been seriously 
weakened, that had been caused by a combination of 
set-backs not solely the British break, important though 
that had been. Germany had been placed in a difficult 
position in trying to avoid being forced to commit 
herself to either adversary's side, but the break had, 
if anything, made the Germans appreciate that the Soviet
link was a less certain weapon in the anti-Versailles 
struggle .
Although the Labour movement did unite in 
criticism of the rupture, particularly of its 
depressing effects on trade, leadership did not swing 
to the extremists. Rather, the dissolution of the 
Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee showed the 
progressive disinclination of the Labour movement 
to follow Russian advice. Soviet propaganda and 
espionage activities did suffer temporary disruption 
and diminution in Britain, but were not destroyed, 
while communist activities continued unabated in India 
and the Empire.
However, within the Conservative Party, the 
decision had been popular with the back-benchers. It 
reduced unrest against the Conservative leadership and 
quelled the 'Clear Out the Reds' campaign which 
disbanded in July 1927. Parliamentary and extra- 
parliamentary pressure on the Cabinet on the Russian 
question declined markedly, and, although certain 
Ministers continued to take an active if rather ambiguous 
interest in the issue (Joynson-Hicks and the oil 
companies, Churchill and the Baring balances (1),
1. At- Churchill's suggestion, it was decided to offer 
aid.to Baring Brothers, who held £5 million of 
Tsarist funds, if the Soviet Government were to 
enter a claim. Cabinet Conclusions, 15 and 29 June 
1927, 36(27)3 and 37(27)2, CAB 23/55.
Birkenhead in the intermittent discussions of the 
Sub-committee on the defence of India), it ceased 
to occupy the prominent position among foreign policy 
problems that it had occupied during the first half 
of 1927. The Cabinet were content to allow trade 
to continue, without appreciating to the full extent 
how political relations affected economic relations 
in Soviet thinking. Hoare, in writing to Irwin in 
India, at the end of June 1927, noted that once 
having broken off relations it would be a matter of 
considerable difficulty 1 to resume them without 
another great controversy' (1). To the Cabinet 
majority, only when 'Soviet Russia had given, by 
deeds and not merely by words, over an extended period 
of time, of a change in its conception of international 
relations', would it be possible to consider renewing 
relations (2). Thus, the policy statements by Rykov 
and Litvinov in November and December 1927 were not 
considered sufficient to form even the basis of 
negotiations.
Hampered by a reduction in the amount of 
information available on Soviet conditions and policies, 
the Foreign Office found difficulty in evaluating the 
course of Soviet future policies. Nevertheless, a
1. Hoare to Irwin, 22 June 1927, Halifax Papers, C152/17.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 30 November 1927, 59(27)2,
CAB 23/55.
despatch in mid-December 1927 from the British 
Legation in Poland outlining Polish perceptions of 
the Soviet system prompted some discussion in the 
Foreign Office. The Poles, reportedly, had 'long 
ceased to be alarmed by Russian Bolshevism as a real 
social danger, and they are equally unimpressed by 
the skeleton of a united Russia as represented by 
the Soviet Government'. Palairet, head of the 
Northern Department, minuted that 'the danger to us 
is not Russian nationalism, but Russian international­
ism' • He added: 'The Poles are no doubt right in not 
being afraid of Russia just now, but nobody can say
how long this will remain true. The failure of her
Chinese adventure (if failure it remains) may drive 
Russia in on herself and make her a more formidable 
neighbour to the States on her west*. Gregory 
minuted: 'The generally accepted theory is probably 
true, viz that a Russia of any kind devoid of foreign 
guidance or stuffing is not a military danger to anyone, 
but international communism directed from a soil on 
which its organisation can proceed not merely un­
hampered but actively supported and fostered is a 
real danger to susceptible communities' (1). The 
British definition of 'susceptible communities' did not 
cover Britain or Poland, but, as the events of 1928
were to show, it did cover India.
1. D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc .No. 93, and minutes in N6029/ 
1316/55, FO 371/12579.
CHAPTER F IV E : FROM GENEVA TO MEERUT
Whereas the Fifteenth Party Congress marked 
a watershed in Soviet internal politics between Stalin' 
struggle with the 'Left' opposition and that with the 
'Right' opposition, the dividing line for the change 
in Soviet foreign policy is not so marked. There was 
a certain ambiguity about the Comintern policies in 
the first half of 1928, and only at the Sixth World 
Congress was the new militant line enunciated and 
accepted in its final form. On the diplomatic level, 
signs of a new approach were already in evidence in 
the autumn of 1927, with Soviet participation in the 
Geneva disarmament conversations.
Little progress had been made towards 
disarmament in the early 1920s under the aegis of the 
League of Nations, and the fresh initiatives after 
the signature of the Locarno treaties, which resulted 
in the early meetings of the Preparatory Commission, 
failed to solve the concrete problems of disarmament. 
The Soviet delegation's participation for the first 
time was heralded by the speech on 30 November by 
Litvinov, who had drafted disarmament proposals early 
in the 1920s and had been appropriately chosen as 
head of the Soviet delegation. He outlined his
proposal for immediate and universal disarmament, 
but the reaction of the other powers, including 
Britain, was cool, and discussion of the proposal 
was effectively postponed (1). The only decision 
made was to set up a committee on arbitration and 
security, which meant a move towards studying disarma­
ment through security. British policy was to resist 
attempts to link the reduction of armaments with 
further guarantees of security (beyond the Locarno 
obligations), but for the French guaranteed security 
had to come before disarmament. Litvinov's revolution­
ary proposal, however, supported the German thesis 
that disarmament should take priority over security.
The collaboration between the German and 
Soviet delegations was an important feature of the 
Commission's meetings. The Germans had favoured 
Soviet participation, and on his way to Geneva Litvinov 
had discussed with Stresemann in Berlin the line that 
the Soviet delegation would put forward (2) . Litvinov 
afterwards told Stresemann that the collaboration of 
the two delegations was the most significant result 
of the Soviet appearance at Geneva (3). The Germans
1. Orde, op. cit. pp. 206-208; Eudin and Fisher, op. cit. 
pp. 348-352.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc. No. 65.
3. Dyck, op. cit. p. 111. The collaboration at Geneva 
is well-documented in Pauline Helliar-Symons,
'Germany, the Soviet Union and World Disarmament, 
1926-1933', (unpublished M.A. thesis, Wales 1970) 
pp. 41-56.
were interested only in a solution on their own terms,
i.e. the virtual abolition of the Versailles 
restrictions, and, as it became increasingly obvious 
during the following sessions,and years that such a 
solution would not be possible and that no reduction 
of armaments to which the French would agree could 
be satisfactory to themselves, they tried to 
obstruct any other agreement being made. Although 
working from different basic assumptions, the Russians 
were to act as useful allies. The British noted the 
signs of Soviet-German co-ordination, indeed on the 
eve of this session a Cabinet committee had reported 
that 'we have some reason to think that our represent­
atives will be confronted with a combination of German 
and Russian delegates in opposition to France and her 
friends' (1), but it was left to the French to later 
warn the Germans of the baneful consequences of 
Soviet-German solidarity on the disarmament issue (2).
It should be noted that the British seemed 
largely unaware of a further, more secret facet of 
Soviet-German collaboration, namely the military 
collaboration between the two powers, which was 
continuing while the disarmament discussions were 
proceeding. Revelations of this collaboration which
1. D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc .No. 229.
2. Dyck, op. cit. p. 110.
had appeared in the Manchester Guardian in December 
1926 caused no great stir in British official 
quarters, who assumed that such collaboration had 
been liquidated, which was far from the case. At 
the time of the revelations, Hodgson had commented 
that there was 'a certain sub-stratum of fact, but 
not much’, while Hoare, referring to specifically 
aerial matters, wrote that 'the danger is to my way 
of thinking over-stated' (1). The revelations 
actually coincided with the phasing out of one 
aspect of the military collaboration, munitions 
manufacture; on the other hand, during 1927 the 
German Government agreed to the stepping up of the 
exchange of information and the training of tank and 
air warfare experts in Soviet Russia (2).
For the Russians, their disarmament proposals 
and the co-operation with the Germans, were intended 
to enhance the contradictions between the capitalist 
countries and were therefore in tune with Leninist 
maxims. Another intention was that as 'propaganda 
for peace', the proposals would play on the contra­
dictions within the capitalist countries, although
1. Orde, op. cit. p. 186; D.B.F.P. IA/II, Doc .No. 415, 
IA/III, Doc. Nos. 20, 24; Hoare to Cecil, 23 
December 1926, Cecil Papers, Add. 51083.
2. On secret military collaboration see Erickson, op. 
cit. pp. 144-163, 247-282; Hans Gatzke, 'Russo- 
German Military Collaboration during the Weimar 
Republic' in American Historical Review, April 1958 
pp. 565-597.
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detailed analysis of the statements of the Soviet 
leaders, as undertaken by Franklyn Griffiths, suggests 
differences of emphasis on this point. Some leaders 
such as Bukharin and Anatoly Lunacharsky, the deputy 
head of the Soviet delegation at Geneva, still felt 
that the proposals should be utilised to attract 
support amongst Western countries from the 'petty-
p
bourgeois pacifists* and liberals, but Stalin and 
the majority of the Politburo evidently looked to the 
proposals to expose the 1 hypocrisy1 of the capitalist 
powers, and, at the same time, to prevent or ’delay’ 
any warmongering by these same powers by mobilising 
the working-classes to put pressure on the capitalists 
from below; this conformed with the new militant line 
being introduced into the Comintern (1). Stalin's 
philosophy had been expressed succinctly in a speech 
in August 1927, when he said; 'Rather let all those 
liberal pacifist philosophers with their ’’sympathy’’ 
for the U.S.S.R. go to the devil. If only we have 
the sympathy of the vast masses of the working people, 
the rest will follow' (2).
At the next session of the Preparatory 
Commission, in March 1928, Litvinov produced a detailed
1. Franklyn Griffiths, 'Inner Tensions in the Soviet 
Approach to "Disarmament” ’ in International Journal, 
Autumn 1967, pp. 593-600, 612-613.
2. Stalin, Works, Vol 10, p.49.
rdraft convention for total disarmament, but following 
a lead given by the head of the British delegation,
Lord Cushendun, who had been appointed Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster on Cecil’s resignation 
in August 1927, it was rejected by the majority of 
the delegations as impractical and unacceptable.
Prior to this session, the Soviet proposals had been 
subjected to consideration by British civilian and 
military experts. Cushendun himself wrote to 
Chamberlain that the proposals were ’of a quite 
fantastic nature - probably designed for no other 
than propagandist purposes’ (1), but Palairet felt that 
’to reject them without discussion - however unpractical 
they may be - would, it seems to me, put us in the 
wrong* (2). Briand and Chamberlain discussed the 
Soviet proposals in early March, and, although they were 
in agreement that the Soviet scheme should be referred 
for further examination, the British appreciated, on 
reflection, that it was ’not for us, in view of our 
special relations - or absence of relations - with 
Russia to bell the Russian cat’ (3). However, in his 
speech of 20 March, Cushendun, although careful to 
avoid proposing an outright rejection of the Soviet
1. D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc. No. 339.
2. Ibid, Doc .No . 295.
3. Ibid, Doc .Nos. 304, 309, 323.
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proposals, did outspokenly criticise the motives of 
the Soviet leaders, accusing them of fomenting civil 
war abroad, of trying to wreck the League of Nations, 
and of putting forward policies which were merely 
obstacles to the work of disarmament (1).
Litvinov rejected these criticisms, but, 
in view of the opposition to his initial proposals, 
on 23 March he announced a new draft convention for 
partial and gradual reduction of armaments. Against 
Litvinov*s opposition the Commission decided to reserve 
this new Soviet proposal for discussion at the next 
session, which ultimately was not to be held until 
April 1929 (2) . Personal and policy differences 
between Cushendun and Litvinov prevented any real 
likelihood of their meeting even on the lines of the 
Chamberlain-Litvinov meeting in December 1927. An 
official Soviet report on the activities of these two 
sessions declared that the Soviet proposals ’attracted 
the sympathies of the broadest circles of the population 
in capitalist countries, and by this means helped to 
lessen to a certain extent the danger of war’ (3). On
1. Times, 21 March 1928; Zenia Eudin and Robert Slusser, 
Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934, (Pennsylvania 1966) 
Vol 1, pp. 9-10.
2. Ibid, pp. 8-11.
3. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op. cit.
Vol 3, p. 109.
the British side, both the Foreign Office and the 
Chiefs of Staff were in agreement in finding both 
the Soviet proposals ’totally unacceptable’, although 
Chamberlain was still loathe to commit Britain to 
being ’in the forefront of the opposition’ to the 
proposals (1).
The changes in the Comintern policies, of which 
a foretaste had been seen at the Fifteenth Party 
Congress, were elaborated at the Ninth Plenum of 
E.C.C.I. in February 1928 and made obligatory at the 
Sixth World Congress in August 1928. At the Ninth 
Plenum, Bukharin’s analysis of the increasing ’radical- 
isation’ of the working-class in the capitalist 
countries was extended into the special ins tructions
issued to the British Communist Party. The British
Party was instructed to make itself completely 
independent politically of the reformists by adopting 
clearer tactics in the struggle against the Labour
Party and the trade-union leaders (2) . The new tactics
meant that the Communist Party’s main task was to expose 
the ’social fascist’ character of the Labour Party 
and reverse traditional policy by now running
1. D.B.F.P. IA/V, Doc .No. 396; Chiefs of Staff Sub- 
Committee Report, 4 June 1928, C.O.S. 161, CAB 53/16.
2. Eudin and Slusser, op. cit. Vol I, pp. 22-23, 81-82.
communist candidates against Labour Party candidates, 
while the Minority Movement was to be transformed 
from a pressure group within the unions .'into a 
revolutionary union movement in its own right. These 
changes were by no means welcomed by the British 
Party leadership, bedevilled by declining membership 
and strong opposition to their political activities 
from the Labour Party organisation headed by Herbert 
Morrison. The Party was in a state of confusion 
, during 1928 as a result, and the British Party 
Congress in January 1929 finally adopted the new 
policy only by a small majority (1).
Bukharin also presented the main report to 
the Sixth World Congress, but he was forced to accept 
amendments put forward by the Russian delegation, led 
by Stalin, and it was clear that his prestige was on 
the wane (2). The theses introduced the concept of 
the ’third period’ in the development of post-war 
capitalism, in which the partial and temporary stabilis­
ation that capitalism had achieved in the mid-1920s 
disintegrated, with the inevitable approach and 
occurrence of a new round of wars and revolutions.
1. Martin, op. cit. 102-115; Carr, Foundations of a 
Planned Economy, op. cit. Vol 3, pp. 377-384. By 
1928 Morrison felt that Labour was clear of communists, 
Whom he described as a ’wash out’ . Bernard Donoghue 
and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison, (London 1973) 
pp. 98-103.
2. Cohen, op. cit. pp. 291-295.
With the increased danger of the capitalist countries 
preparing for an offensive against the Soviet Union, 
it was important for the proletariat of each country 
to fight for the defeat of its ’own1 government and 
for the victory of the Soviet Union. The sharpening 
of the conflict between Britain and America and the 
general hostility to the Soviet Union were adduced as 
signs of the imminence of the war danger. The main 
enemies of the communists were now described as the 
right-wing reformists within the communist parties 
and the left social-democrats who had tried to exploit 
the earlier collaboration with the communists (1).
The adoption of the new line under Stalin’s 
prompting was evidence of the stricter discipline and 
control exercised by the Stalin-dominated Russian Party . 
As in the domestic context where Stalin worked to 
destroy the Bukharinist group and bring the Russian 
Party finally under his complete control, so in the 
international revolutionary movement Stalin preferred 
to have totally obedient foreign parties rather than 
larger but unreliable ones or links with unreliable 
nationalists and social-democrats, as had been the 
case in China and Britain. The policies and needs of
1. Eudin and Slusser, op. cit. Vol I, pp. 24-31, 
102-147; Degras, Comintern, op .cit. Vol II, pp. 
446-450 .
the foreign parties were to be identified with and 
subordinated to the interests of the Soviet Union.
In a speech on 1 August 1927 Stalin had laid down 
already the criteria on which he was to insist in 
later years, when he defined an ’internationalist1 as 
’one who without reservations, unconditionally, openly, 
honestly, is ready to defend and protect the U.S.S.R., 
because the U.S.S.R. is the base of the revolutionary 
movement* (1).
India, which was to be the focal-point of 
interest when the World Congress came to discuss the 
colonial and semi-colonial countries, was not exempted 
from the new tactical approach, although, as in the 
case of the British Communist Party the new line was 
not accepted without coiintroversy. A split between 
Roy, together with the majority of the British Party 
delegation, and the Comintern leadership over the 
interpretation of the British industrialisation of 
India (the so-called ’decolonisation’ debate) hampered 
the clarification of practical policies, but the 
theses finally adopted reflected the Comintern’s new 
line in coming out in critical opposition to not only 
the Indian National Congress but also the expanding
1. Stalin, Works, Vol 10, pp. 53-54.
Workers’ and Peasants’ Party (1). Zafar Imam has 
suggested that it was ’no accident' that with the 
Soviet hopes of a resumption of diplomatic relations 
fading after the Chamberlain-Litvinov meeting,
Soviet policy towards India 'also entered a decisive 
phase’ (2). However, the doctrinal reassessment of 
the Comintern’s policy towards India was not 
determined primarily by the necessities of the 
Soviet Union's policy towards Britain, because the 
new line was intended to be applied dogmatically 
throughout the world; India was only one, if no doubt 
the most important, of the colonial countries where 
the new line was to be implemented.
Away from the theorising of Moscow, the 
situation in India was changing significantly, as the 
level of communal violence increased. Birkenhead and 
the Viceroy, Irwin, had decided in 1927 to appoint 
Sir John Simon to head the statutory commission set 
up to examine the working of the 1919 Government of 
India Act. The second half of 1927 had seen growing 
nationalist unrest, left-wing groups in the Indian 
National Congress expressing sympathy for the Soviet 
Union in the Anglo-Soviet crisis, and in December 
1927 the Indian National Congress deciding to press
1. Donaldson, op. cit. pp. 30-31; Carr, Foundations of 
a Planned Economy, op. cit. Vol 3, pp. 923-936;
Imam, op. cit. pp. 257-265.
2. Ibid, pp. 247, 252.
for full Indian independence rather than merely 
Dominion status. Almost all sections of nationalist 
opinion decided to boycott the Simon Commission (1).
Not only did the nationalists grow in strength but so 
did the Workers* and Peasants' Party, in which the 
communists had gained a significant degree of 
influence; yet it was these connections that the 
Indian communists (and the British communists assist­
ing them) were now instructed to sever in accordance 
with the decisions in Moscow.
During 1928 the increasing severity of the 
strikes and dislocations in important Indian 
industries, particularly the railways and the cotton 
mills, and the widespread opposition to the Simon 
Commission's investigations led the Government of 
India to be overly-suspicious of links between the 
inter-communal antagonism, the nationalist upsurge 
and the communists’ agitation. The events of that 
year were seen as showing 'the folly of minimising 
the importance and danger of Communist activities in 
India1 (2). To counter-act the breakdown in public 
order, the Government of India tried to introduce a
1. Ibid, pp. 248, 250-252. Jawaharlal Nehru was impressed 
by his first visit to Moscow in late 1927.
2. Government of India Report, 1927-28, p.341.
Public Safety Bill in the autumn of 1928, but, when 
nationalist opposition was too strong, Irwin instead 
promulgated a Public Safety Ordinance in April 1929 (1).
At the same time, the activities of the British 
Communist Party emissaries (Spratt was joined by Ben 
Bradley in September 1927 and by Lester Hutchinson in 
September 1928) in trying to enlarge the incipient 
Indian Communist Party were closely observed by the 
Indian intelligence authorities, and, after learning 
that it was intended to activate the Indian party on 
the Comintern's new lines, the authorities moved 
quickly to arrest thirty-two communist leaders 
(including the three Englishmen) in the second half 
of March 1929, sending them for trial at Meerut in 
April 1929, on charges of conspiring to subvert the 
Government of India in the furtherance of communist 
aims (2) . Irwin wrote to Neville Chamberlain in April 
1929, saying that he was 'very hopeful that this will 
enable us to scotch for some time to come a good 
many of the movements that have been responsible for 
continued industrial disturbances and the sowing of 
many undesirable seeds up and down the country' (3).
1. Judith Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience,
(Cambridge 1977) pp. 60-61.
2. Mahadevaprasad Saha, (editor), India and Communism, 
(Calcutta 1976 - reprint of 1935 Intelligence Bureau 
report) pp. 116-135; Gene Overstreet and Marshall 
Windmiller, Communism in India, (Berkeley 1959)
pp. 135-139.
3. Irwin to N. Chamberlain, 15 April 1929, Halifax 
Papers, C152/18.
In contrast with the hard-line policy 
adopted towards the communists, an approach which in 
June 1929 was judged to be working well, Irwin was 
thinking at the same time of some conciliatory 
gesture towards the nationalist movement (1). The 
Government of India was slowly becoming aware of 
the differences in policies and objectives between 
the communists and the nationalists, and correspondingly 
beginning to adopt different policies. The communist 
movement was thrown into confusion, with the leader­
ship in prison, the Workers' and Peasants' Party 
suffering eclipse, and the new Comintern line 
precluding any collaboration with the rising force in 
India, the National Congress.
The India Office endorsed the Government 
of India's arrests and prosecution, feeling that it 
would expose the Comintern's links with Indian 
communists as well as making 'unmistakably clear the 
determination of the Government not to tolerate the 
revolutionary designs of mischevious organisations 
either inside or outside India' (2). The evidence 
available of Soviet activities in India hardened 
British governmental opinion towards the Soviet Union
1. Brown, op. cit. p. 61.
2. William Peel, Secretary of State for India after 
October 1928, to Irwin, 23 May 1929, Halifax Papers, 
C 152/5.
during 1928-1929, and a Comintern appeal to the 
revolutionary movement in India, issued only a week 
after the Meerut arrests, served only to confirm 
these predelictions. Austen Chamberlain in fact 
referred to this appeal as evidence of the Soviet 
failure to abstain from propaganda (1).
Parallel with the growing concern in 
1928-1929 over the internal Indian situation, the 
British and Indian authorities watched with equal 
anxiety the course of events in Afghanistan. In 
January 1928 the Committee of Imperial Defence 
considered and approved the first report from 
Birkenhead's Defence of India Sub-committee. The 
basic conclusion was that 'the material consequences 
of any substantial Russian encroachment into 
Afghanistan would be no less dangerous to India, and 
no less disastrous to our general interests at the 
present time than they were in the past', but the 
question of the policy to be adopted in the event of 
such an encroachment turned on the military forces
1. Degras, Comintern, op. cit. Vol II, pp. 22-23;
H.C. Deb. Vol 229, Cols 408-410. When the 
Norwegian Minister in Moscow, Urbye, remarked on 
the language of this appeal, Litvinov replied: 
fYou are right. The Comintern is of no advantage 
to us'. Lindley to Arthur Henderson, the new 
Foreign Secretary, 10 June 1929, N2840/55/38,
FO 371/14039.
available. It was proposed that British and Indian 
authorities should draw up a plan for operations in 
‘the event of such a war, but that also, since a 
ffriendly Afghanistan* would be a primary condition 
for military operations, *it is important that any 
opportunities of further improving our relations with 
Afghanistan should be taken if possible* (1). The 
impetus for the reappraisal of the Indian defence 
question had come from the fears arising from the 
Soviet-Afghan tension in early 1926, but, paradoxically, 
in the second half of 1927, when Anglo-Soviet relations 
were virtually non-existant and rumours of war were 
current, the Sub-committee began to reach the con­
clusion that the threat of military action from the 
Soviet side was 'not imminent*. Although the War 
Office produced a memorandum on Soviet military 
development and argued that the main objective of the 
Russians, namely 'to strike at the British Empire 
through India', was 'becoming even more clearly 
defined', the Foreign Office officials disagreed. 
Palairet endorsed the opinion of Orde that 'a military 
attack on India cannot, so far as I can see, possibly 
be more than a vision latent in the Russian mind* (2).
1. First Report of Defence of India Sub-Committee,
19 December 1927, C.I. 158-D, CAB 6/5; C.I.D. 
Minutes, 26 January 1928, CAB 2/5.
2. Memorandum by Worthington-Evans, 7 January 1928,
C.I.D. 853-B, CAB 4/17, and Foreign Office minutes 
in N5630/5630/38, FO 371/12608.
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The evidence given by Hodgson to the Sub-committee, 
specifically his view that the Soviet Government 
’has at the present time neither the will nor the 
capacity to take aggressive action1, seems to have 
carried greater weight with the Sub-committee than 
the War Office’s views, and the report produced at 
the end of the deliberations took as one assumption 
the ’time margin’ available to ’complete our pre­
cautionary measures and perfect our plans’ (1).
The Foreign Office view of the situation 
was expressed cogently in a review in April 1928:
’The dangers to be feared are those of 
Soviet intrigues in Afghanistan, the 
fomentation of hostile activity among 
the frontier tribes of India, and sub­
versive propaganda in India itself, rather 
than the debouching of Russian forces on 
to Indian territory' (2).
Two months later, when the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff brought before the Committee of Imperial 
Defence secret evidence suggesting that the Russians 
were working to promote a war between Afghanistan and 
Britain, Chamberlain said that he was ’not very much 
disturbed by the possibilities envisaged', no doubt 
basing his confidence on the reassurances given by the
1. First Report of Defence of India Sub-Committee, 
19 December 1927, C.I.D. 158-D, CAB 6/5.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/IV, App.
i
Amir Amanullah, during his visit to London in the 
spring, that Afghanistan would never allow herself to 
, co-operate with the Soviet Union in attacking India (1) .
However, the civil war which erupted in 
Afghanistan in the autumn of 1928 after Amanullah 
returned from his extensive European tour (which 
included Moscow as well as London) jolted this confid­
ence. The state of political anarchy caused by 
Amanullah1s abdication in January 1929 was not finally 
removed until Nadir Shah came to power in October 1929. 
During this period, therefore, the British became 
fearful that the political vacuum created had left 
Afghanistan 'very vulnerable to Soviet aggression and 
intrigue', so much so that Afghanistan was 'a greater 
potential danger to the security of India than at any 
time since 1919' (2) . Nevertheless, both Britain and 
the Soviet Union seemed unwilling to intervene and 
become deeply involved in the civil war. The Cabinet 
considered making some informal hint to the Russians 
about British neutrality in the civil war on the 
assumption that all other powers acted similarly, but
decided against any active steps (3) .
1. Imam, op. cit. p. 270; Memorandum by Worthington-Evans, 
16 June 1928, C.I.D. 888-B, CAB 4/17; C.I.D. Minutes,
5 July 1928, CAB 2/5.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/VI, App. I.
3. Cabinet Conclusions, 23 January 1929, 2(29)2, CAB
23/60. The French tried to reassure the Russians 
that Britain had no connection with Afghan events.
D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No. 27. Litvinov reportedly 
said in March 1929: 'I think an agreement with 
England about Afghanistan and the East generally
is possible, but my government takes a different 
view*. Fischer, op. cit. p. xii.
Reviewing the situation again in April 
1929, the Foreign Office concluded that '^fortunately, 
the military and economic condition of the U.S.S.R. 
is likely to deter the Soviet Government from 
military adventures’ into Afghanistan, but, although 
this assessment was endorsed in June 1929 by the 
Chiefs of Staff, they added the caveat that 'the 
threat to India arising from the possibility of 
Russian incursion into Afghanistan remains our chief 
military defence problem' (1). Indeed, only one month 
earlier, the Committee of Imperial Defence had approved 
a 'Plan of Operations in the Event of War with Russia 
in Afghanistan', which formed the second report of the 
Defence of India Sub-committee. Based on the premise 
of a friendly Afghan government and the assumption 
that any encroachment on the northern Afghan frontiers 
would occasion a casus belli, however, it really 
constituted only a general appreciation of the possibil­
ities, with the details to be filled in later through 
further study by the British and Indian military 
authorities. (2).
1. D.B.F.P. IA/VI, App. I; 'Review of Imperial Defence 
1929', 21 June 1929, C.I.D. 948-B, CAB 4/18.
2. Bisheshwar Prasad, Defence of India: Policy and Plans, 
(London 1963) pp. 23-29; India Office Memorandum,
1 June 1930, CAB 21/368.
Nevertheless, financial restraints meant 
that any reorganisation of Indian defences had to be
made within the existing defence budget guidelines.
Another sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence had examined the role of the Persian Gulf 
in Indian defences and had recommended the further 
development of British air-power in that area (1), 
but the implementation of this recommendation too 
was restricted by financial considerations. The 
Treasury had displayed a vested interest in trying 
to cope with the discrepancy between the cost of 
British commitments and the limited financial resources 
during the 1920s; drastic reductions in defence expend­
iture from £604 million in 1920 to £111 million in 
1923, at which level it stayed until the early 1930s, 
had been undertaken. Now it was at the urging of 
Churchill that the Cabinet in July 1928 adopted the 
final formulation of the 'Ten Year Rule', which was 
*a standing assumption that at any given date there 
will be no major war for ten years from that date' . 
Balfour and the Service Chiefs opposed the Rule, but
1. D.B.F.P. IA/VI, App. I. Chicherin told his diplomats 
that a system of airways in the Near East would 
be 'one of the most important components of 
England’s aggressive plans in Asia'. D.V.P.
Vol XI, Doc .No. 167.
Baldwin, Churchill and Austen Chamberlain felt that, 
given the safeguard of yearly scrutiny, this Rule 
would prevent excessive expenditure while ensuring 
security. For Chamberlain, the one area of 
'uncertainty' was Soviet Russia, but he believed 
that the Soviet army was 'incapable of offensive 
operations on a large scale' so that there was no 
imminent danger from that quarter (1). Undoubtedly 
one of the reasons for the British military authorities 
being opposed to the institutionalisation of the Ten 
Year Rule was the concern for India's defences and 
the calls that could be made on Imperial resources 
in the event of war with the Soviet Union in the 
Indian sub-continent, but the Foreign Office view, 
more realistic in the sense that there was no immediate 
Soviet military threat, gained support from Churchill, 
who now put financial considerations above his fears 
of Soviet penetration (he consistently argued for an 
alliance system to balance the Soviet threat), and 
carried the day.
Complementing the careful scrutiny of the 
Soviet policies towards the Indian sub-continent was 
the close surveillance maintained on Soviet activities
1. Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, 
(London 1972) pp. 277-278; Martin Gilbert,
Winston S. Churchill, Vol V (London 1976) pp. 289- 
292; C.I.D. Minutes, 5 July 1928, CAB 2/5.
within the British Isles. In December 1927 a trial 
on espionage charges, connected with the previous 
activities of the Soviet Mission, was held in 
camera (1), and in January 1928, Wilfred Macartney 
was tried and convicted of spying for the Soviet 
Union, with Hogg, the Attorney-General, personally 
handling the prosecution (2). Joynson-Hicks continued 
to receive reports on Soviet activities, as far as 
they could be detected after the Russians changed their 
codes and cyphers and their organs of communication 
after May 1927. On 21 February 1928, he reported to 
the Cabinet on the Russian payment of subsidies to 
the British Communist Party through the Moscow Narodny 
Bank in London. Further reports to the Cabinet the 
following day and the following week were confined 
to statements that he was continuing his investigations 
but that if the Bank were found guilty of illegal 
activities he would deport the directors (3).
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 30 November 1927, 59(27)2,
CAB 23/55.
2. Times, 17, 18, 19 January 1928; Robert Jackson,
The Chief, (London 1959) pp. 191-197; Sir Compton 
Mackenzie, My Life and Times, Octave Six, (London 
1967) pp. 125-127.
3. Cabinet Conclusions, 21 February, 10(28)1,
22 February, 11(28)1, and 29 February 1928, 
12(28)2, all CAB 23/57. Joynson-Hicks resented 
being directed by the Cabinet to confer with 
Hogg on the legal aspects. Joynson-Hicks to Hogg, 
22 February 1928, Baldwin Papers, Vol 115.
While these investigations were con­
tinuing, the Zinoviev Letter controversy was revived 
briefly by the results of a Government inquiry into 
allegations of currency speculation by Foreign Office 
officials. The Commons debate on 19 March was 
dominated by Baldwin's revelations about Donald im 
Thurn, and Labour demands for an inquiry were 
defeated (1). In a press interview a few days later, 
Chicherin described Baldwin's statement as 'pure 
invention from beginning to end'; apart from this 
retort, the issue subsided again (2).
In mid-April Joynson-Hicks revealed to the 
Commons the results of the investigations into the 
Russian Banks, referring to money found on 'Irish 
gunmen' recently arrested in London (3). A Home 
Office inquiry was set in motion to examine these 
transactions. The two Russian banks involved immediate­
ly protested their innocence, offering full facilities 
for their accounts to be checked (4). On 11 June, 
Joynson-Hicks told the Commons that the evidence 
'indicated with absolute certainty that the Moscow
1. Chester, Fay and Young, op. cit. pp. 154-172;
Cabinet Conclusions, 13 March 1928, 14(28)2, CAB 
23/57; H.C.Deb. Vol 215, Cols 47-110. For the 
currency speculation case see Ann Bridge, Permission 
to Resign, (London 1971) .
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, op. cit. Vol II, pp. 296-299.
3. H.C.Deb. Vol 216, Cols 335-337.
4. Times, 20 April 1928.
Narodny Bank was the channel through which during 
the past six or eight months large sums had passed 
to Communist organisations' . The police had 
ascertained that three employees of the Bank had 
paid over nearly £28,000 for communist purposes 
between July 1927 and April 1928. The directors of 
the Bank denied knowledge of these transactions and 
merely dismissed the staff implicated in the affair (1). 
The tone of the limited comments in the Cabinet 
minutes, namely directing Joynson-Hicks not to give 
any undertaking to take action against the Banks 
concerned, suggest doubt's amongst the Cabinet members 
about the legal grounds for further action and the 
political repercussionsof Joynson-Hicks' proposed 
deportations (2). The investigations prompted some 
sections of the British press to urge that all the 
Russians remaining in Britain should be expelled (3), 
but there was no concerted campaign for action such 
as that in the spring of 1927. Soviet press comments 
were scathing, while Chicherin, analysing the question 
in a letter to Valerian Dovgalevsky, the new Soviet 
Ambassador in Paris, saw it as another example of the 
dual tendencies among the British policy-makers. He
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 218, Cols 634-642. A White Paper, Cmd.
*3125, 'Russian Banks and Communist Funds', was issued.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 6 June 1928, 31(28)11, CAB 23/58.
The Soviet Government were not directly implicated.
H.C.Deb. Vol 218, Cols 1146-1147.
3. Daily Mail, 31 May 1928.
felt that Joynson-Hicks* 'abrupt step* was intended 
to hinder the growing tendencies amongst Conservatives 
in the direction of greater friendliness towards the 
Soviet Union (1).
Knowledge of these Soviet activities inside 
Britain coupled with the knowledge of limited and 
suspicion of extensive communist activity in India 
continued to convince the Foreign Office and the 
Cabinet that the first precondition for a resumption 
of relations, the cessation of hostile propaganda, 
was not being met. The British side continued to 
adhere to the conditions set out in Baldwin's 
Guildhall speech of November 1927 (2). Efforts by 
'third parties', such as Alan Marshall, the Chairman 
of Becos Traders Ltd., continued to receive a cool 
rebuff (3). The Soviet side reiterated their willing­
ness to enter into negotiations, but insisted, as ' 
Dovgalevsky told a visiting Liberal peer in March 
1928, that the initiative had to come from the British 
side (4) . This coldness between the two powers was 
reflected in their attitudes to issues on the inter­
national scene where both sides were involved.
1. Izvestiya, 15 June 1928; D.V.P. Vol XI, Doc .No.193.
2. H.C.Deb. Vol 220, Cols 950-951, Vol 222, Cols 853-854,
Vol 223, Cols 2614-2615.
3. D.B.F.P. IA/V, Doc .No. 19.
4. D.V.P. Vol XI, Doc .No. 101 and note 70.
This was the case not only in the Geneva 
discussions over disarmament, but also in the 
negotiations prior to the signature on 27 August 1928 
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to renounce war as an 
instrument of national policy . The absence of 
diplomatic relations with the United States prevented 
the Soviet Union being invited to be an initial 
signatory, an omission which aroused Soviet suspicions 
that the multilateral pact was only a cover for an 
anti-Soviet bloc. There does seem to have been a 
split between Chicherin and Litvinov over the policy 
to adopt; the Politburo decision was in favour of 
adhering if invited (1). An invitation was forthcoming 
and by the end of September 1928 the Soviet Union had 
become the first country to complete by ratification 
the formal procedure for adherence. In explaining 
this step to the Central Executive Committee in 
December 1928, Litvinov argued that the Pact had 'a 
certain though limited significance1 for the Soviet 
leadership as the signatory states 'undertake certain 
moral obligations regarding non-aggression' (2).
1. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op. cit. 
Vol 3, p.Ill; Fischer, op. cit. pp. 569-570.
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, p. 346. 
In May 1929, Rykov told the Fifth Congress of 
Soviets that the Pact would 'even if in the 
slightest degree only, make the psychological 
preparation for war more difficult'. Ibid, p. 373.
The British Government’s reply to the 
American Government’s proposal contained the qual­
ification that their acceptance of the Pact proposal 
was made ’upon the distinct understanding that it 
does not prejudice their freedom of action’ in 
’certain regions of the world the welfare and 
integrity of which constitute a special and vital 
interest for our peace and safety’. These areas were 
never clearly defined publicly, but were meant to 
include Egypt, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and 
probably China. Although the British Government 
publicly pledged themselves to support the proposal 
’to the utmost of their power’, their private reserva­
tions were clear from Chamberlain’s comment to the 
Japanese Ambassador, Baron Matsui, in April 1928, 
that the Pact seemed ’to be a rather platonic 
declaration accompanied by considerable mental reserva­
tions’ (1). Britain also had some reservations about 
the Soviet Union being invited to adhere, but as it 
seemed that little support would be forthcoming from 
other states these objections were not pressed 
publicly. The Soviet note of adherence, however, was 
critical about the British areas of special interests 
and refused to accept these reservations (2).
. 1. Note by Chamberlain, 3 April 1928, A. Chamberlain
Papers, AC 50/437; D.B.F.P. IA/V, Doc .Nos. 349, 358.
2. Ibid, Doc .Nos. 314, 404, 431, D.V.P. Vol XI, Doc.
No. 272.
The danger of war had become a postulate 
of Soviet policy during 1928; the genuine kernel of 
suspicion was greatly exaggerated for internal 
purposes, being used as a justification for the 
internal reconstruction and the new Comintern line 
and being intended to inculcate vigour and vigilance 
in dealing with potential enemies both at home and 
abroad. Nevertheless, the continued suspicion of 
the smaller states on the Soviet Union’s western 
borders and of Poland, which it was thought might be 
made to serve as a base for aggression against the 
Soviet Union, was in evidence in the Soviet proposal 
in December 1928 that the Soviet Union, Poland, and 
Lithuania sign an agreement to bring the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact into immediate force (1). The Polish Government 
suggested including the other limitrophes, so that 
the signatories of the so-called Litvinov Protocol on 
9 February 1929 were the Soviet Union, Ibland, Latvia, 
Estonia and Rumania (2). The Litvinov Protocol 
performed two functions for the Soviet Union: it was 
an expression of and consistent with the theme of a 
’peace policy' being enunciated by the Soviet organs, 
and it was a diplomatic measure designed to forestall
1. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op.cit. Vol 3,
pp. 113-114.
2. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No.38. Lithuania, Turkey, Persia 
and Finland adhered later. The Kellogg-Briand
Pact did not come into force until July 1929.
any possible anti-Soviet combinations amongst the 
Soviet Union’s immediate neighbours. The British 
adopted a non-committal attitude to the negotiations 
leading up to the Protocol. Joseph Addison, the 
British Minister in Riga, suspected purely propaganda 
motives behind Litvinov's proposal, but the Minister 
in Warsaw, Sir William Erskine, believed that there 
was a ’further and more simple motive', namely that 
the 'Soviet Government are genuinely afraid of Poland’. 
However, Erskine and the Northern Department were in 
agreement that the Poles had outmanoeuvred the 
Russians in extending the Protocol to include other 
Baltic states, with a corresponding increase in Polish 
influence (1).
Despite the signature of the Protocol the 
Soviet Union's relations with Poland remained unsatis­
factory during 1928 and into 1929. Relations with 
France were in a 'state of semi animation’, while those 
with Germany suffered a depression, of which the 
Shakhty Incident in March 1928 was symptomatic. Soviet 
commentators were suspicious of British hands behind 
the deterioration in relations with the western powers, 
and in particular much criticism was voiced over
1. D.B.F.P. IA/VI, Doc .Nos. 19, 41, 67; Addison to
Chamberlain, 11 January 1929, N332/13/55, FO 371/ 
14018; Erskine to Chamberlain, 13 February 1929,
N 1087/13/55, FO 371/14019.
Birkenhead’s controversial private visit to Germany 
in April 1928 (1). In the Far East, Soviet relations 
with all parties in China were minimal, and the 
Japanese remained cool to renewed Soviet offers of a 
non-aggression pact (2). Nevertheless, speaking in 
December 1928, Litvinov struck an optimistic pose and 
felt able to say that ’the example set by the 
Conservative Government did not infect other countries, 
and the balance of our external relations, excepting 
with Britain, remains the same as before the break’.
He drew particular consolation from the fact that 
relations with the Near Eastern countries ’have never 
been so good as now’ (3).
The unsatisfactory nature of relations with 
the western powers fed Soviet anxiety over a conspiracy 
against them, particularly tied to perceptions of ’new 
pressures in the economic sphere from a number of 
countries’. Stalin, in April 1928, referred to the 
creation of the ’soil of economic intervention’, and 
Chicherin, writing to the Soviet Ambassador in Rome 
in the spring of 1928, wondered about the results of 
’the tendency towards an intensification of economic
1. D.V.P . Vol XI, Doc .Nos. 141, 145; Lindsay to 
Chamberlain, 25 April, C3215/3158/18, and 3 May 1928, 
C3477/3158/18, both FO 371/12913.
2. Gaimusho-hen, Oakyoku Daiikka, Nisso Koshoshi,
(Tokyo 1969) pp. 284-285.
3. Degras, Soviet Documents, op. cit. Vol II, p.350.
pressures on us’ from a Europe where the powers, 
regardless of different political beliefs, were 
moving towards a rapprochement in the economic sphere 
at least (1). The formation in London in October 
1928 of an international committee for the defence 
of Russian bondholders was also interpreted as 
evidence of a ’united front of European finance 
capital’ (2).
The difficulties in obtaining credits in 
the European financial centres increased Soviet 
suspicions of the West and also affected the trading 
plans being drawn up as part of the Five Year Plan.
The ’minimal variant’ had been based on modest 
foreign borrowing, but later versions tended towards 
a substantial planned increase in foreign borrowing. 
However, with no credit negotiations following up 
the German-Soviet Economic Protocol of December 1928 
and the British Government still set against guarantee­
ing credits, the ’final variant* of the Five Year 
Plan, as adopted in April 1929, played down the reliance 
on foreign credits, unless good terms were available (3).
1. Stalin, Works, Vol 11, pp. 61, 68; D.V.P. Vol XI, 
Doc .No . 85.
2. Dyck, op .cit. pp. 147-148.
3. Michael Dohan, ’The Economic Origins of Soviet 
Autarky, 1927/28-1934’, in Slavic Review,
December 1976, p.611.
Soviet foreign trade problems were 
complicated by the grain marketing crisis in early 
1928, for grain exports played an important role in 
Soviet export policies. The Soviet economic year 
1927-28 ended with a large overall trade deficit, 
since imports continued to increase as the planners 
attempted to meet industrialisation’s demands for 
machinery and raw materials (1). Alarmed by the 
grain supply deficit in early 1928, Stalin supported 
forced procurement from the peasants, at the same 
time advocating increasing the tempo of industrial­
isation. The severity of the grain procurement measures 
provoked opposition from Bukharin; Stalin slowly 
steered towards intensive collectivisation and 
industrialisation, while marshalling his support 
for the struggle with Bukharin (2).
In September 1928 Bukharin published a veiled 
attack on the excessive growth rates, and Stalin moved 
on to the offensive, speaking publicly about the danger 
from the Right for the first time in October. In 
November 1928 Stalin outlined to the Central Committee 
the theoretical foundations of his new policy. He 
argued that the victory of socialism could be assured
1. Ibid, p. 609.
2. Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power,
(London 1968) pp. 214-244; Cohen, op .cit. pp. 276-291.
by ’catching up with and overtaking’ the capitalist 
countries in industrial and economic development, 
whilst security and independence could only be 
ensured by an industrial basis for national defence (1). 
In April 1929, when the final version of the Plan was 
adopted by the Sixteenth Party Conference, rapid 
industrialisation and the collectivisation of 
agriculture had become the order of the day. Stalin 
had outmanoeuvred the Bukharinist group. In February 
1929 Trotsky was expelled from Russia, and two months 
later Bukharin was removed from his post as head of 
the Comintern (2). This period of 1928-29 marked 
the transition from the predominantly overt intra­
party politics of the 1920s to the covert politics 
of the Stalinist party of the 1930s; the Stalin- 
Bukharin controversy was conducted largely in private .
The defeat of the Right opposition by mid- 
1929 (even though they continued to hold some posts 
into 1930) made Stalin the final arbiter in foreign 
policy as in other policy decisions. The basic tenet 
of his policy was that the security of the U.S.S.R., 
the ’base* of international communism, was the crucial
1. Leonard Scapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, (London 1970 - revised ed.) pp. 368-377; 
Cohen, op. cit. pp. 295-301; Stalin, Works, Vol 11, 
pp. 231-248, 255-302.
2. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op.cit.
Vol 2, pp. 82-99; Alec Nove, An Economic History 
of the U.S.S.R., (London 1972 - Penguin ed'.’)
pp . 142-159.
short-term objective of Soviet foreign policy and the 
world ’proletarian1 movement. By concentrating his 
energies on internal reconstruction Stalin adopted 
a line of ’militant isolation’ for the Soviet Union.
As has been noted above, the new Comintern line had 
an air of unreality about it, it was ’indeed engaged 
in a mock fight’ (1). The diplomatic arm of Soviet 
foreign policy was to be used to develop those 
minimum contacts essential for the trade necessary 
for the internal needs of the regime. The lines of 
this policy were detailed by Litvinov to the Central 
Executive Committee in April 1928: ’The primary aim 
of Soviet policy and Soviet diplomacy is to secure 
peaceful conditions for internal creative work, without 
infringing on the national interests of any other 
state’ (2). Rykov was making the same point when a 
year later, in May 1929, he told the Fifth Congress 
of Soviets that ’in international relations we are 
trying for such solidity and firmness in relations 
with individual states that no setback or loss will 
occur from that quarter in carrying out the colossal 
schemes of work laid down in the plan* (3). In sub-
1. Isaac Deutscher, Stalin. A Political Biography, 
(London 1966 - Penguin ed.) p. 400.
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, op. cit. Vol II, p.313.
3. Ibid, p.374.
ordinating Soviet foreign policy to internal policy, 
Stalin1s'withdrawal from external affairs’ meant that 
at times foreign relations were abused for internal 
purposes. An early example of this was the Shakhty 
case in March 1928, and later examples in Anglo-Soviet 
relations will become apparent.
The Foreign Office were not well placed to 
assess the changes being wrought inside Soviet Russia. 
The sources of information available brought contra­
dictory and often misleading information about the 
internal conflicts. Throughout 1928 reports were 
received about the deterioration of life and the 
imminent breakdown and collapse of Soviet power due to 
economic chaos (1). In November 1928 the Poles told the 
British that in their opinion the Soviet economic 
crisis was ’serious' and that the 'only way out will 
be a move to the right on the part of the Soviet 
Government’ (2). Although the Department of Overseas 
Trade gave sufficient credence to these reports to 
suggest, in early 1929, that *a serious economic crisis' 
would occur in the coming spring, the majority of the 
Foreign Office officials remained sceptical of the 
possibility of a collapse (3). The War Office argued
1. D.B.F.P. IA/V, Doc .Nos. 125, 255; Lindley to
Chamberlain, 3 December 1928, N5797/31/38, FO 371/13313.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/V, Doc .No. 244.
3. Ibid. IA/V I, Doc .No. 102.
in October 1928 that the Soviet answer to the 'very 
critical internal situation* might be 'a desperate 
gamble* such as precipitating a war with one of her 
neighbours such as Poland, but the Foreign Office felt 
that, if anything, the internal difficulties would 
prevent such aggressive action and that the Politburo 
had no desire to precipitate an external crisis (1).
As for the power struggle, the Foreign Office review 
in February 1929 came to the following conclusion:
’The utmost apparently for which one can hope is a 
gradual swing to the right •.. For the moment Stalin 
has triumphed; but it seems hardly credible that he 
will be able to maintain his position and carry out 
his policy in the teeth of the formidable opposition 
which has arisen* (2). The Foreign Office, while 
rightly convinced that the Soviet Government were 
’here to stay’ and unlikely to engage in external 
aggression, were nevertheless inaccurate in their 
analysis of the trend of the power struggle within 
the Soviet leadership.
Towards the end of 1928, Soviet observers 
noted some signs of a gradual change in opinions 
amongst British traders and some Conservative back-
1. Ibid. IA/V, Doc. No. 194, and Foreign Office minutes 
on this report in N5111/31/38, FO 371/13312; C.I.D. 
Minutes, 5 July 1928, CAB .2/5.
2. D.B.F.P. IA/VI, Doc .No. 102.
benchers. Daring 1928, the trend established, 
though not reflected in the figures, in 1927 became 
more apparent as British exports and re-exports to 
the Soviet Union declined sharply, while the Soviet side 
took care to maintain the level of their exports to 
Britain at the same level; indee’d, in 1928 the figures 
were marginally better than for 1927. With the 
balance of trade thereby swinging significantly in 
favour of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders hoped 
to pressurise the British into giving better credits, 
with the ultimate expectation that the demands of 
traders might bring about a change of mind in the 
Cabinet over political relations, while, at the lowest, 
even if these hopes were not realised, preserving the 
British markets as a prime source of foreign earnings (1).
Litvinov explained that because the Soviet 
Government ffound better opportunities in other 
countries, and also because the absence of a juridical 
basis and the political uncertainty and disquiet 
compelled us, as a matter of prudence, to avoid any 
long-term contracts with English firms on which our 
planned economic reconstruction depended1, Britain 
was missing economic openings (2) . Some response from
1, See Appendix I of this thesis and Cmd. 3282, 'Final 
Report of the Committee on Industry and Trade1 (1929) 
p.33.
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, p.350.
British business-circles was apparent. In the 
. summer of 1928 discussions began between Bessedovsky, 
now Counsellor to the Soviet Embassy in Paris, and 
Ernest Remnant, editor of the English Review, about 
a possible trip to the Soviet Union by British 
industrialists. One noticeable aspect of the Soviet 
Government's attitude towards visits from foreign 
delegations was a gradual change in this period at 
the end of the 1920s from encouraging labour delegations 
to encouraging groups of businessmen (1).
While these discussions were going on, 
Joynson-Hicks surprised Avramov, the Managing Director 
of Arcos, during an interview in October 1928, by 
assuring him that he wanted to be friendly with the 
Soviet Union and to develop Anglo-Soviet trade, and 
offering to relax some visa regulations. The Russians, 
rightly suspicious of this change of heart, ascribed 
it to the necessities of making political capital for 
the forthcoming election campaign (2). Cushendun, 
acting as Foreign Secretary while Chamberlain rested 
during the autumn of 1928, was plainly not impressed
1. Bessedovsky, op.cit. pp.251-252; Manchester Guardian, 
18 December 1928; Sylvia Marguiles, The Pilgrimage 
to Russia, (London 1968) pp.19-23; D.V.P. Vol XI,
Doc .No. 338.
2. Ibid, Doc .Nos. 333, 338. Joynson-Hicks wrote to 
Cushendun on 23 October 1928 that there were 'various 
political and electoral considerations to be examined' 
regarding the delegation's visit. N5094/11/38,
FO 371/13310.
with the usefulness of either the plan to send a 
delegation or Joynson-Hicks* talk with Avramov (1).
The Foreign Office attitude was one of 
studied indifference, neither encouraging nor dis­
couraging the delegation’s planned visit to Moscow (2). 
As the size and scope of the delegation were expanded, 
the preparations took longer to complete and it was 
not until the end of March 1929 that the delegation, 
consisting of representatives of 85 British firms, 
finally arrived in Moscow. In a speech to the 
delegation on 5 April, Grigori Piatakov, the Chairman 
of the Soviet State Bank, stated that the Soviet 
Government could easily give orders to British 
industry totalling £150-200 million, provided that 
full diplomatic relations were restored and suitable 
credit arranged. He emphasised that the visit coin­
cided with the beginning of the Five Year Plan, in 
which Britain could be given a more important role if
1. Cushendun told Joynson-Hicks that they 'ought to
have nothing to do with the scheme or the delegation*. 
Minute by Cushendun, 1 November 1928, N5094/11/38,
FO 371/13310.
2. Minute by Sir Arthur Willert, head of Press 
Department, 10 August 1928, N4004/11/38, FO 371/13310. 
Chamberlain minuted on 11 March 1929: 'I regard
this visit as purely an affair of the traders 
themselves; it has no political meaning or interest'. 
N1483/18/38, FO 371/14029.
regular relations were restored (1). The Soviet 
tside had expressed considerable doubts, both in 
private and later in public, that this trip might 
be 'used by the Conservatives for party-^electioneer ing 
purposes1, but they considered that even though that 
might be so it could be 'useful* (2). In fact, 
Piatakov's speech and the promises included in it 
were calculated to appeal to the Labour and Liberal 
parties who were advocating the resumption of 
diplomatic relations in the election campaign.
The delegation's report, which called for the 
re-establishment of diplomatic relations was not 
published until after the 1929 general election, but 
many members returned to Britain full of optimistic 
ideas on the prospects for trade (3). The Foreign 
Office took a restrained view of the prospects, 
expressing scepticism as to whether so many orders 
could really be allocated to Britain under the Five 
Year Plan; furthermore, it was thought inconceivable 
that British banks, given the state of the British
1. Coates, op.cit. pp. 318-319; D.V.P. Vol XI,
Doc .No.385, Vol XII, Doc .Nos . 35, 65, 68.
2. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie Otnosheniva. op.cit. p.153; 
Kliment Voroshilov Stati i Rechi, (Moscow 1937)
p.303. The British delegation’s visit does seem 
to have inspired a similar visit by American 
businessmen in July-August 1929.
3. A copy of the report ’Trade with Russia’ is in the 
papers of Lady Astor, held in Reading University 
Library, Mss. 1/1/788.
economy, could give credits of sufficient quantity 
and duration to attract these orders (1) .
The news of the discussions of the industrial­
ists1 visit encouraged greater pressure from the 
Labour Party on the Government in the second half of 
1928 for an extension of Government guarantees to 
credits and other measures to encourage trade.
Churchill maintained in Parliament that it was 'mis­
leading' to expect trade with the Soviet Union to have 
'the slightest effect' on the unemployment situation 
in Britain, but in mid-December, his Parliamentary 
Private Secretary, Robert Boothby, made a speech
i
encouraging visits by industrialists and financiers 
to Soviet Russia and suggesting that provided 'adequate 
quarantees and undertakings* were given 'a large 
amount of credit' was available in the City (2).
Having taken note of some signs of a change 
in parliamentary opinion over relations with Soviet 
Russia, Chamberlain brought the matter before the 
Cabinet in January 1929, not long after his return to 
full time work at the Foreign Office (he was convalescing 
from a bad attack of pneumonia from August to December
1. Minute by Simon Harcourt-Smith, member of Northern 
Department, 21 June 1929, N2975/18/38, FO 371/14030; 
minutes by members of Department of Overseas Trade, 
July 1929, file 276/B, B .T. 60/22/1.
2. H.C.Deb. Vol 222, Col 257; Times, 15 December 1928; 
Izvestiya, 19 December 1928.
1928) . Putting the debts question on one side, 
Chamberlain asked whether his Cabinet colleagues 
still felt that it was undesirable to renew relations 
with Soviet Russia, considering that his own line had 
been that assurances of a cessation of the abuses of 
the relationship preconditioned a change of policy. 
The Cabinet agreed that their 'general attitude' was 
still against a resumption (1).
The Foreign Office reviewed the situation 
in the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Soviet relationship 
in the form of a long memorandum prepared by George 
Villiers, the head of the Northern Department, in 
February 1929, which was later circulated to the 
Cabinet by Chamberlain. He drew a pessimistic picture 
of the Soviet internal situation, based largely on 
information from Polish and German sources:
'The outstanding features of the last six 
months are the shortage in the food supply, 
the internal dissensions in the Communist 
Party, which have resulted in the formation 
of definite parties, and the great aggravation 
of the hostility between the towns and the 
country. The conflicting claims and demands 
of industry and agriculture are the crucial 
questions in Russia today... All the reports 
and information which have reached the Foreign
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 21 January 1929, 1(29)2, 
CAB 23/60; Petrie, op..cit. Vol II, p.328.
Office during the last few months show 
a striking unanimity in regard to the 
marked deterioration which has taken 
place lately in every sphere of public 
and private life in Russia, and it is 
interesting to learn that the Bolsheviks 
themselves date this rapid deterioration 
from the rupture of relations with this 
country1 .
He devoted less space to Soviet foreign policy, but 
he did argue that it 'has not altered one jot or 
tittle'. He summed up:
V
'The imperative need of foreign capital and 
for expert advice, if a complete breakdown 
of the machine is to be averted, may compel 
a change of head if not heart. Meanwhile, 
nothing would delay a change so much as 
overtures from H .M .G. and a resumption of 
diplomatic relations with this country' (1).
The case against any change in British policy 
vis-a-vis Soviet Russia was argued no less strongly 
in the last review of foreign policy prepared under 
the Conservative administration, in April 1929. The 
Foreign Office view was that the British Government 
'remain prepared to consider a resumption of relations, 
conditional upon the full recognition by the Soviet 
of their liabilities towards this country, and upon 
a complete cessation of hostile propaganda on the part 
either of the Soviet Government or of the Communist
1. D.B.F.P. IA/VI, Doc .No. 102.
International. These contingencies are, however, 
so remote as to be negligible1 (1). By the spring 
of 1929, therefore, the Foreign Office line had 
hardened significantly, and almost imperceptibly 
the debts question had been added to the other 
precondition (the cessation of hostile propaganda) 
for any consideration of a resumption of relations.
In the first half of 1929 British politics 
was dominated by the forthcoming election campaign, 
and, contrary to later claims, this period before and 
during the election was dominated not by foreign policy 
issues but by domestic ones, notably the question of 
growing unemployment (2). Both the Labour and Liberal 
Parties included the renewal of relations with the 
Soviet Union amongst the points in their manifestoes, 
but the Conservative Party manifesto contained no 
mention of the subject. In the election on 30 May 
1929 for the first time the Labour Party became the 
strongest party, but still without an overall majority.
Changes in personnel in the Conservative 
Cabinet, due to death and resignation, had no affect 
on the general policy towards the Soviet Union. The
1. Ibid, App.I.
2. Litvinov told the Central Executive Committee in 
December 1929 that ’the rupture of Anglo-Soviet 
relations contributed in no small degree to the 
defeat of the Conservative Party at the last English 
elections'. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, 
p. 419. For the election campaign see Middlemas and 
Barnes, op.cit. pp.507-528; Marquand, op .cit .pp .477-488.
information received from Joynson-Hicks' inquiries 
into the Russian banks as well as the evidence produced 
from Indian sources (and partly made public at the 
Meerut trial) gave no grounds for the Cabinet to 
re-assess their policy, since there were no indications 
to them of a reduction in Soviet hostility towards 
Britain. Only once in the last year and a half of the 
Cabinet did Chamberlain bring up the question of 
general policy towards the Soviet Union, prompted by 
signs of a change in mood amongst some Conservative 
back-benchers and business-circles, but the Cabinet 
attitude, if anything, had hardened.
Chamberlain himself showed no enthusiasm for 
renewing negotiations in the face of Soviet intransi­
gence; indeed, when the Canadian Government fleetingly 
considered restoring consular relations in early 1929 
in order to promote Canadian-Soviet trade, Chamberlain 
minuted: 'I hope the Dominions Office will deprecate 
strongly the resumption of relations. They are of 
course not necessary for trade as the case of the U.S. 
shows' (1). However, American-Soviet trade was rather 
the exception which proved the rule. Litvinov in 
December 1928 had pointed out that there was a 'difference 
between normal relations not having been established,
1. Minute by Chamberlain, February 1929, in N1387/1387/38, 
FO 371/14046. The Canadian Government dropped the 
idea. Balawyder, op.cit. pp. 105-107.
and the cessation of relations where they have 
already existed' (1). As far as was possible 
within the limits of the Soviet economic needs,
Soviet trade planners diverted orders away from 
Britain, while maintaining exports to Britain at an 
unreduced level, so that the trade balance widened 
further in the Soviet Union's favour (see Appendix 
One of this thesis). The Cabinet's encouragement 
of trade with the Soviet Union, in many cases only 
very lukewarm encouragement, was tempered by the 
feeling that with growing signs of economic difficult­
ies inside the Soviet Union that country was not 
promising from either a commercial or a political 
point of view; nevertheless occasionally the Cabinet 
adduced positive support for export endeavours (2) .
1. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, p.353.
2. An example of economic considerations being given
a higher priority than political-strategic 
considerations can be seen in the Cabinet's 
decisions during the 1927-1929 period to sell 
aircraft (civil and military), motor-boats, and 
submarine mines to the Russians. Chamberlain 
described the Cabinet policy as one of selling 
only arms 'useless for attack or obsolete or 
obsolescent'. Minute, 6 January 1928, N6164/1157/38, 
FO 371/12600. Churchill consistently opposed
'the supply of war material to Soviet Russia which
might, in certain circumstances, be used against 
us'. Cabinet Conclusions, 21 November 1928, 52(28)6, 
CAB 23/59. See also Cabinet Conclusions, 13 June 
1928, 35(28)5, CAB 23/58, and 23 January 1929,
2(29)3, CAB 23/60.
Lacking detailed information about Soviet 
policies, both domestic and foreign, the British 
found it difficult to appreciate the changes taking 
place within the Soviet leadership (they under­
estimated the control Stalin had gained of the 
machinery of power) and only gradually did the 
elements of the new Comintern line become understood. 
Suspicions of Soviet intentions at the Geneva dis­
armament discussions and towards the Afghan problem 
were apparent, but other more worrying aspects, such 
as the secret Soviet-German military collaboration, 
were overlooked. In general, the Foreign Office 
adopted a 'watching and waiting' attitude to the Soviet 
Union; the harder line adopted in the first half of 
1929 seems to have been in part a reflection of the 
personal opinion of the new head of the Northern 
Department, Villiers, although of course the guide­
lines for the policy had been settled by Chamberlain 
and the Cabinet •
On the Soviet side too there were signs of 
a policy of waiting, or rather of waiting out the 
Conservative Cabinet, in the hope that a Labour-Liberal 
combination might be returned at a general election.
Even though the new Comintern line was hyper-critical 
of the Labour Party, the election of that party seemed 
the best chance of a restoration of relations. Attempts
to utilise the Soviet ordering policy to influence 
the Cabinet to change track had little influence, and 
continued activity in India had only brought a 
hardening in the Cabinet's attitude.
Apart from occasional fears of aggressive 
action from Poland, the short-term prospect of war 
was receding; the 'danger of war' theme used by the 
Soviet and Comintern organs became more and more an 
artificial construct. Suspicions of united capitalist 
action became seen less in military-political terms 
as in financial and economic terms, but Britain was 
still thought to be the organiser.
After the set-backs of 1927, Stalin forced 
through his policies for the internal reconstruction 
of the Soviet Union. The new Comintern militant left 
line corresponded to the leftward swing in internal 
politics, but was out of touch with the changing 
situation in Britain and the Empire. Stalin seems to 
have had little faith in the revolutionary effusions 
of the Comintern, and though he told a visiting senior 
Japanese politician in January 1928 that he was 'not a 
diplomat but a man of practicalities' (1), he preferred 
to use the diplomatic arm for his purposes of securing 
the minimal contacts necessary for the economic inter­
course vital to his economic planning and of averting
1. Record of conversation between Stalin and Goto
Shinpei, 7 January 1928, Goto Shinpei Papers, held 
in the National Diet Library, Tokyo, reel 52.
any external threats to the Soviet Union during the 
vulnerable period of reorganisation through collect­
ivisation and industrialisation. Soviet diplomacy 
ventured into disarmament talks and multilateral 
pacts, accompanied by the propaganda of 'peace1. 
Chicherin, suffering from recurrent bouts of illness 
and probably increasingly out of sympathy with Stalin's 
opinions, left the Soviet Union for treatment and rest 
in Germany in September 1928 (1), and although Litvinov 
effectively took over the day-to-day running of the 
Narkomindel, the ultimate control and supervision of 
foreign policy remained with Stalin. /
During 1928-1929 the relationship with the 
Soviet Union remained an unsettled and sometimes obscure 
problem in British foreign policy perspectives, and the 
other problems and elements of the malaise of Europe 
seemed to take precedence. The Labour Government, 
however, were determined to try to bring the Soviet 
Union back into the mainstream of European international 
relations. It was to be a story of optimism turning to 
frustration.
1. Gorokhov, Zamyatin and Zemskov, op.cit. pp. 212-213; 
Von Laue, op.cit. p.278.
CHAPTER S IX :  RENEWING RELATIONS
One of the first acts of Arthur Henderson, 
on being appointed Foreign Secretary in MacDonaldfs 
second Cabinet, was to assemble the permanent Foreign 
Office staff and emphasise to them that there could 
be too much ’continuity’ in foreign policy. One of 
the foreign policy issues he had in mind was the 
question of the relationship with the Soviet Union, 
for the Labour Party election manifesto had contained 
the pledge to renew diplomatic and commercial 
relations.
MacDonald, himself unable to meet once again 
the strain of the combined offices of Prime Minister 
and Foreign Secretary, had been forced, reluctantly, 
to choose not his prote'ge, J. H. Thomas, but Henderson 
for the post of Foreign Secretary, after the latter 
had indicated that he would accept no other position (1) . 
Henderson, despite being unable to speak any foreign 
languages, had had experience of foreign affairs through 
his activities for the Socialist International and his 
role in the peace moves of the War Cabinet. It was 
the stature derived from his role in the Socialist 
International coupled with his ability as a Party
1. Marquand, op.cit. pp. 489-91.
administrator (he continued to be General Secretary 
of the Labour Party) that enabled Henderson to force 
MacDonald’s hand. Nevertheless, MacDonald still 
maintained an active interest in foreign affairs, 
indeed announcing that he would keep Anglo-American 
relations under his own personal aegis, so that 
personal and political differences between the two 
leaders were to be reinforced by what Henderson saw 
as MacDonald’s interference (1).
Although the left-wing groups within the 
Labour Party, such as the I.L.P., were unrepresented 
in the new Cabinet, back-bench and extra-parliamentary 
pressure on the emotive issue of relations with Soviet 
Russia had to be considered by Henderson. As Hugh 
Dalton, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs noted, some of these groups urged that 
’nothing short of an immediate exchange of Ambassadors 
will soothe Soviet pride, suspicion and inferiority 
complex’ (2).
However, the Labour Party leadership, although 
committed to the improvement of relations for economic 
and internationalist motives, had undergone *a marked
1. See Carlton, op.cit. pp.23-29; Vansittart, op.cit. 
pp. 392-393.
2. Hugh Dalton, Call Back Yesterday: Memoirs, 1887-1931, 
(London 1953) p.229.
cooling off’ in their feelings by comparison with 
1924 (1), and a line of cautious appraisal seemed 
probable. A further factor was the attitude of the 
Liberal Party, for the MacDonald ministry lacked an 
absolute majority in the Commons, but during 1929, 
at least, the Liberals, substantially in agreement 
with moderate Labour opinion over re-establishing 
relations and unable to afford another early election, 
were, on balance, unlikely to try to bring down the 
Government as they had done in 1924 (2).
The Labour leaders, anxious to avoid any 
repetition of the events of 1924, moved cautiously. 
Henderson asked his officials to draw up a detailed 
memorandum on the state of relations since 1927, 
including suggestions as to the procedure to be adopted 
for resuming relations . The resultant memorandum 
contained several points of importance for the future 
negotiations. Firstly, any moves to re-establish 
relations should be made in consultation with the 
Dominions, as had been promised by the Conservative 
Government in May 1929 (3), a procedure that tended 
to slow down further the renewal of relations. Donald
1. Northedge, op.cit. p.320.
2. Robert Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump, 
(London 1967), p.85.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No .1.
Lammersl has suggested that this commitment might 
have been fa discreditable Conservative manoeuvre to 
harass Labour in the event of an electoral defeat1 (1), 
but it was only fulfilling the requirement, generally 
accepted since the 1923 Imperial Conference, for 
inter-imperial consultation (2). Secondly, the 
Foreign Office staff argued that the renewal should 
be made conditional on a Soviet undertaking to abstain 
from propaganda, leaving the other outstanding issue, 
debts and claims, to be settled by negotiation after 
the resumption of relations (3). It was also pointed 
out, to Henderson’s surprise, that there was no need 
for fresh ’recognition* of the Soviet Government, as 
the suspension of diplomatic relations in 1927 had 
not affected the de jure recognition (4).
On 21 June 1929, the Cabinet discussed this 
memorandum at length, as a result of which it was 
decided to contact the Dominion Governments and to set 
up a small Cabinet Committee to consider the economic
1. Donald N. Lammers, ’The Second Labour Government and 
the Restoration of Relations with Soviet Russia (1929)’ 
in Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research,
May 1964, p.64.
2. It was expected that the British Government should 
* continuously .. .consult Dominion representatives, 
and, where such consultation was impossible, to 
operate within the limits of what they felt the 
Dominions would accept'. D.C. Watt, Personalities 
and Policies, (London 1965), p.148.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No .1.
4. Dalton, op.cit. p.229.
aspects of the re-establishment of relations (1). 
Despite probable opposition within the Cabinet, the 
majority decided in favour of inviting a Soviet 
representative to London to discuss the ’necessary 
preliminaries’ rather than in favour of immediate 
unconditional resumption (2).
In the debate on the King’s Speech, on =
2 July, Baldwin inquired whether the Labour Government 
adhered to the statement of principle as regards 
Russian relations which had been outlined in 
MacDonald’s Note on the Zinoviev Letter in 1924. 
MacDonald replied that his ministry stood by the 
conditions laid down in that despatch (3). This 
statement has been represented as a 'blunder' for 
which MacDonald was solely responsible (4), yet, as
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 21 June 1929, 23(29)1,
CAB 23/61. The Cabinet file on this Committee,
CAB 27/393, contains no record of its activities 
or meetings.
2. From June 1929 the Cabinet Conclusions were recorded 
in a more impersonal manner than previously so no 
expressions of opinion were recorded. The Soviet 
Ambassador in Paris, however, received information 
that in the Cabinet an argument had flared up about 
tactics, and that MacDonald, Henderson, Thomas, and 
Lord Passfield (the Secretary of State for the 
Dominions and Colonies) had carried the day in favour 
of preliminary negotiations. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie 
Otnosheniya, op.cit. p.161.
3. H.C.Deb. Vol 229, Cols 48, 59, 68-69.
4. Coates, op.cit. p.231, cites an unidentified Cabinet 
member as saying: 'Mac’s statement was made impromptu; 
he did not stop to think, and now he has put his foot 
in it with a vengeance’ .
Donald Lammers has pointed out, it was consistent 
both with the policy line taken by MacDonald and 
other Labour leaders in the past and with his desire 
to keep Communism at arm's length and represent the 
Labour Party as a responsible organisation (1). 
Although the majority of the Labour members recognised 
this, MacDonald came under fire from the pro-Russian 
group and from the Soviet press, which ridiculed the 
demands for conditions (2).
MacDonald's statement was endorsed as official 
policy at the Cabinet meeting on 10 July, when, 
concerned about the passing of time and the absence 
of a definite Dominion response (3), the Cabinet 
decided to invite a Soviet representative to London, 
but, in order to placate the Dominion Governments, to
1. Lammers, op.cit. p.65.
2 . Izvestiya, 5 July 1929.
3. Both the Australian and Indian Governments wanted a 
preliminary discussion between the various govern­
ments before any invitation was issued to the Russians, 
and the Governments of Canada, South Africa, and New 
Zealand still had not replied by the time of the 
Cabinet meeting. Foreign Office Memorandum, 8 July 
1929, N3284/18/38, FO 371/14030. Dalton recorded 
that 'we need not take too much notice' of the 
Dominion replies. Dalton Diaries, 10 July 1929. 
(Manuscript diary in the possession of the British 
Library of Political and Economic Science, London).
to make the resumption of relations subject to 'a 
satisfactory undertaking* with regard to 
propaganda (1).
However, before the invitation was made, 
Henderson in turn displayed his caution by making 
use of an unofficial emissary, Frank Wise, a Labour 
M.P. and the head of Centrosoyuz in Britain, to sound 
out the Russians (2). With some knowledge of the draft 
text of the proposed British Note, Wise left to see 
Litvinov, who was resting at the Bavarian resort of 
Bad-Partenkirchen. At a meeting on 12 July, Wise read 
out the text, but Litvinov replied that the Soviet 
Government's attitude remained the same, namely that 
they would not discuss outstanding questions until 
after the resumption of full diplomatic relations (3). 
Despite this unfavourable Soviet reaction, Henderson 
decided to delay no longer and on 15 July authorised 
the Note of invitat ion to be sent. The Note stated
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No.9; Cabinet Conclusions,
10 July 1929, 28(29)3, CAB 23/61.
2. Dalton told Henderson that Wise was 'all right if 
you want him to leak to the Russians, as on this 
occasion, but not otherwise.' Dalton Diaries,
10 July 1929.
3. D.V.P. Vol XII, note 103; Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie 
Otnosheniya, op.cit. pp.163-164. It is clear from 
both Litvinov's account and from Dalton's comments 
(Dalton Diaries, 13 and 15 July 1929) that Wise 
exceeded his brief . Henderson was reportedly 
'vexed at Wise's indiscretions and self-importance’.
that the Labour Government were prepared to resume
relations, to which end they invited the Soviet 
*
Government fto send a responsible representative to 
London in order to discuss with the Foreign Secretary 
direct the most expeditious procedure for reaching as 
rapidly as possible a friendly and mutually satisfactory 
settlement of the outstanding questions' (1).
However, on the same day as Henderson 
authorised the Note of invitation, MacDonald gave an 
undertaking in Parliament that relations would not be 
resumed until the House of Commons had had an opport­
unity of debating the matter (2). MacDonald, in 
exhibiting once more his penchant for open diplomacy 
and his caution over the Russian issue, seems also to 
have misunderstood the Liberal position on this issue (3) 
This statement had the effect of deferring :the actual 
renewal of relations until at least October as the 
summer recess was due shortly. At the Cabinet meeting 
on 17 July, Henderson 'made a row about it* (4), but, 
unwelcome as the delay may have been to him, he reluct­
antly had to agree to MacDonald's statement being
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No .3.
2. H .C.Deb • Vol 230, Cols 18-19.
3. When Dalton explained that the Liberals would have
backed an earlier resumption, MacDonald expressed 
'great astonishment*. Dalton, op.cit. p.230. Doyd 
George had promised Liberal support for an immediate 
resumption at a party caucus on 13 June. The Times,
14 June 1929.
4. Dalton Diaries, 17 July 1929. The Cabinet Conclusions, 
29(29)3, CAB 23/61, are uninformative.
allowed to stand, even when, later the same day, 
MacDonald considered reversing his stand after re­
ceiving a deputation of Labour back-benchers. As 
Henderson explained to Dalton, 'Russia has brought 
us down once. We can't afford to let it happen 
twice' (1).
Although the caution of Henderson and, 
particularly, MacDonald was reflected in the 
circumspect progress towards a resumption of relations, 
the Cabinet also considered two related questions 
which are illuminating as^to the general attitude of 
the Cabinet towards the Soviet Union and also 
indicative of the pressure brought to bear on the 
Cabinet by back-benchers.
Firstly, the rejection of Trotsky's 
application for permission to reside in Britain. In 
February 1929, Trotsky had been exiled to the Turkish 
Prinkipo islands, and, encouraged by a visit he had 
received earlier from the Webbs, he applied for a 
visa to come to Britain immediately after the General 
Election. According to Dalton, the permanent officials 
tried to rush Henderson, on his first day as Foreign 
Secretary, into giving a negative answer, but
1. Dalton, op.cit. pp.230-231. See also Mary Hamilton, 
Arthur Henderson: A Biography, (London 1938)
pp. 310-311.
Henderson instead referred it to the Cabinet (1) . 
However, at the Cabinet discussion on 26 June, the 
Home Secretary, J. R. Clynes, submitted that since 
Trotsky's admission would not only lead to possible 
domestic repercussions, but would also be considered 
as an unfriendly act by the Soviet Government, 'the 
arguments against giving shelter to Trotsky seem to 
me overwhelming'• The Cabinet could only agree on 
no decision (2), but when Clynes brought up the 
matter again on 10 July the Cabinet backed his 
rejection of Trotsky's application, despite represent­
ations on Trotsky's behalf being made to Cabinet 
ministers both by friends of Trotsky and political 
bodies such as the I.L.P. (3). The decisive reason 
for this rejection was due consideration of the Soviet 
Government's attitude and the desire to avoid any 
irritant to the renewal process (4).
1. Dalton, op.cit. p.219.
2. Memorandum by Clynes, 24 June 1929, C.P. 165(29), 
CAB 24/204; Cabinet Conclusions, 26 June 1929, 
24(29)4, CAB 23/61. Probably at least two Cabinet 
members, Passfield (formerly Sidney Webb) and 
George Lansbury, the First Commissioner of Works, 
favoured admitting Trotsky. Isaac Deutscher,
The Prophet Outcast, (London 1963) pp. 20-21.
3. Memorandum by Clynes, 9 July 1929, C.P. 198(29), 
CAB 24/204; Cabinet Conclusions, 10 July 1929, 
28(29)5, CAB 23/61.
4. In his memoirs Clynes admits, in effect, that the 
decision was made to please the Soviet Government. 
J. R. Clynes, Memoirs, (London 1937) p.116.
Secondly, the Cabinet's decision to extend 
the Export Credits Scheme to Soviet Russia. This 
decision was actuated as much by the Cabinet's 
genuine desire to obtain orders for British goods as 
by the desire to show their good faith over resuming 
relations. All Labour Party members subscribed to the 
view that an increased export trade to the Soviet 
Union would be an effective means of reducing un­
employment in Britain. The potentially vast Russian 
market was seen as a salvation for British industry's 
difficulties. After 1927 Germany and the United 
States had become the leading suppliers to Russia.
The statements made by Piatakov, the Chairman of the 
Soviet State Bank, to the British industrial delegation 
in April 1929 about the favourable possibilities for 
English traders had been noted with satisfaction by 
the Labour members . The new Cabinet received many 
requests from traders and back-benchers to re-introduce 
the Trade Facilities Act and to extend the Export 
Credits Act so as to include trade with the Soviet 
Union (1). Although the Cabinet were unsympathetic 
towards a re-introduction of the Trade Facilities Act (2),
1. Dalton Diaries, 29 June 1929; Memorandum by Thomas,
23 July 1929, C.P. 233(29), CAB 24/205.
2. Skidelsky, op.cit .pp. 18-19. A joint committee set 
up by the T.U.C. and the National Executive of the 
Labour Party strongly urged the re-introduction of 
the Act, in the autumn of 1929, but they received 
'a definite refusal' from the Government. Annual 
Report of the Labour Party, 1930 .
they needed little urging over export credits.
Indeed, when the question was brought before the 
Cabinet by Thomas, in his capacity as the Minister 
responsible for employment, the only contentious point 
was whether the promise of an extension of the Export 
Credits Act could be used as a bargaining-counter in 
the forthcoming negotiations. The Cabinet v/ere not 
very impressed with the efficacy of bargaining in 
this way, and decided, as 'an earnest of good faith', 
to extend the Act to include Soviet Russia with effect 
from 1 August 1929 (1). However, as Donald Lammers 
has pointed out, 'this was hardly a triumph for the 
left wing,... for the moderates had long had this 
step in contemplation* (2).
To the Soviet Union, these two Cabinet 
decisions were undoubtedly welcome; the Trotsky 
decision for political reasons and the export credit 
decision for economic and financial reasons. Tet, it 
is not unlikely that the Soviet leadership interpreted 
these moves as signs of 'weakness' on the part of the
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 24 July 1929, 30(29)2, CAB 23/61. 
Henderson told Soviet negotiator Dovgalevsky that
the decision had been made in order to create a 
favourable atmosphere for the negotiations and to 
develop trade. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No .234. Also 
Times, 10 August 1929.
2. Lammers, op.cit. p.65.
Labour Government which could be exploited further.
The Soviet authorities had welcomed the inauguration 
of MacDonald’s Cabinet, for as Litvinov explained to 
Herbette, the French Ambassador in Moscow, a few days 
after the election, the defeat of the Conservatives 
had ’really created calmer conditions in the inter­
national situation, all the more so because one could 
expect the quick resumption of Anglo-Soviet relations’ (1) .
The Soviet press, while continuing to attack 
Labour leaders as 'reformist flunkeys’, toned down 
the virulence of these condemnations in the immediate 
aftermath of the election. However, the Labour 
Cabinet’s delay in making a positive move, followed 
by MacDonald’s two statements in Parliament, caused 
irritated criticism in the Soviet press. Litvinov 
later claimed that the Soviet Government were ’not a 
little surprised when the new British Government, 
instead of directly advising us of their readiness to 
resume normal relations at once, proposed that we send 
an envoy to London for negotiations’ (2) .
David Carlton has suggested that MacDonald’s 
two statements ’may have had a salutary effect in 
bringing about a more realistic attitude in Moscow,
1. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No. 192.
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, p.419.
where it had originally been hoped that a Labour 
Government would resume relations immediately and 
unconditionally1 (1), but there is evidence to 
suggest that, whatever Litvinov later claimed, the 
Narkomindel had correctly anticipated probable Labour 
policy even before MacDonald’s statements. The June 
1929 edition of the Narkomindel1s authoritative journal 
Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn contained an article pointing 
out that it was ’inconceivable that the MacDonald 
Government would simply make a declaration on the 
lines of the 1924 one, about re-establishing relations 
and the exchange of Ambassadors'. The article 
speculated that the new Government 'will try to 
guarantee the interests of the creditors and make a 
gesture to protect its calm country from Comintern's 
subversive work, before giving us satisfaction for 
the insult made against us (2). The Narkomindel had 
not expected an unconditional or immediate resumption, 
and their objective in the subsequent negotiations was 
to minimise as far as possible the conditions that 
would have to be fulfilled before resumption.
This objective was apparent in the Soviet 
reply to the British Note a week later, in which,
1. Carlton, op .cit. p.150.
2. Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, June 1929, pp.75-80
although agreeing to despatch a negotiator, use was 
made of the word procedure* in the British Note to 
restrict the proposed scope of the negotiations (1).
In his initial instructions from Narkomindel, 
Dovgalevsky, Ambassador in Paris and designated 
negotiator, was instructed to inform Henderson that 
the quickest procedure for settling the outstanding 
questions was for an immediate exchange of Ambassadors, 
after which theSoviet Ambassador in London and 
Henderson, aided by their experts, could discuss the 
outstanding questions. He was told to parry firmly 
any attempt by Henderson to start a discussion on the 
existing points at issue, although he could state that 
’by and large the Soviet Government adhere to the 
1924 Treaties’. (2).
Having received information that the Soviets 
were likely to accept the British invitation, Henderson 
brought the matter before the Cabinet, which decided 
to adhere to the policy of exchanging ambassadors only 
after Parliamentary approval, despite the pressure that 
Henderson was still under from some back-benchers to
to
1. According -fee the Soviet Note the British Government 
’aims at preliminary exchange of views exclusively 
regarding procedure to be followed in subsequent 
discussion of disputed questions and not at an 
actual discussion of these questions’. D.B.F.P. 
II/VII, Doc .No.5.
2 . D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No. 229.
agree to an immediate exchange (1). The text of the 
Soviet acceptance, when.'\it was received later the 
same day, 24 July, caused some uneasiness in the 
Foreign Office, where the.officials were agreed that 
the limited nature of the talks envisaged by the 
Soviets could well result in an impasse in the future 
conversations. However, at Dalton's insistence it was 
decided simply to invite Dovgalevsky to London, without 
questioning his terms of reference (2).
In his first meeting with Henderson on 
29 July, Dovgalevsky, following exactly his instructions 
(as, so far as can be determined from the published 
documents, he was to do throughout the negotiations, 
rarely taking any step without authorisation) indicated 
that the first point of procedure to be discussed should 
be the resumption of relations and the exchange of 
ambassadors. Henderson explained that the commitment 
to Parliamentary approval meant that relations could 
not be resumed before late October, and that 'in the 
meanwhile there was plenty of work to be done, and the 
interval could usefully be occupied in defining clearly 
the principles to be observed for the settlement of
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 24 July 1929, 30(29)1, CAB 23/61. 
The following day Henderson received a deputation 
from the engineering industry requesting a resumption 
before the recess. Manchester Guardian, 26 July 1929.
2. Dalton, op .cit. p.231; minutes in N3416/18/38, 
FO 371/14031.
outstanding questions; it might even be possible to 
make some concrete advance in certain of the questions 
for discussion1 . It was a well-intentioned move by 
Henderson to put the available time to good use, but 
Dovgalevsky, whose knowledge of’English was imperfect 
(1), misunderstood the sense of Henderson's statement. 
In his report to Moscow, the Ambassador records 
Henderson as proposing 'in order not to waste time, 
starting negotiations today on the substance of all 
outstanding questions, namely debts, claims and 
propaganda* (2). Dovgalevsky replied that he would 
have to report Henderson's statement to Moscow and ask 
for instructions.
Dalton thought that 'a good start' had been 
made at this first meeting (3), but the text of the 
Note of protest that Dovgalevsky handed over to 
Henderson at the next meeting on 31 July showed that, 
on the contrary, the talks were about to break down 
before having hardly started. The Note alleged that 
the British side 'do not desire or are unable to 
bring about the resumption of relations. If such were 
not the case, the British Government would not have
1. Dovgalevsky admitted that he spoke English badly; 
but, although interpreters were standing by, they 
were not used. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No. 234.
2. Ibid, Henderson's account is D.B.F.P. II/VII,
Doc .No . 10 .
3. Dalton, op .cit. p.231.
proposed, as a preliminary condition for the re­
establishment of normal relations, the solution of 
questions so complicated and contentious as the 
mutual claims and counter-claims' (1). Dovgalevsky 
stated that he had been instructed to return to 
Paris and that the Narkomindel would be compelled to 
ask for fresh instructions from the Presidium of the 
Central Executive Committee. Henderson objected to 
this interpretation of his views, and a heated exchange 
followed; the differences were not resolved (2), and 
Dovgalevsky left for Paris.
Henderson implied in Parliament later and
also explained to Horace Seymour, the new head of the
Northern Department, that the hitch in the negotiations
occurred because the British Government, owing to
Parliamentary commitments, were unable to agree to the
immediate exchange of Ambassadors (3). On the basis
of the available Soviet documents, it seems that the
Narkomindel, however, decided on the basis of
Dovgalevsky’s account of the conversation that
Henderson was trying to force preliminary conditions
on to the Soviet side, a move that they were determined 
L___________________________________________________________
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No.11.
2. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No. 237.
3. Minute by Seymour in N3356/18/38, FO 371/14031;
H.C.Deb. Vol 231, Col 896.
to avoid if possible. Certainly, even the British 
side had not intended to obtain any settlement of 
the claims issue before a resumption of relations (1). 
Aware of his own officials^advice, Henderson was 
unlikely to have proposed a claims settlement as a 
pre-condition for resumption. On balance it seems that 
it was, as Dalton claimed, Ta misrepresentation, no 
doubt quite well-intentioned, but, still a misrepresent­
ation' of Henderson's words by Dovgalevsky that led 
to the breakdown (2).
This result does not support Henderson's 
biographer's assertion that 'a good start was made... 
quickly and efficiently followed up' (3). One Soviet 
historian has written that the Labour Government's 
tactics were 'to drag out the negotiations until the 
opening of- Parliament, forcing the Soviet side to make 
concessions in the negotiations' (4). The following 
month of manoeuvering was, however, a period during 
which the British side endeavoured to re-establish 
contact with the Russians. Moreover, the delay worked
1. In mid-June 1929, Henderson's officials pointed out 
that, for an early resumption of relations, 'the 
conditions laid down should not include any reference 
to claims or confiscated properties, on which 
agreement cannot be looked for'. D.B.F.P. II/VII,
Doc .No . 1.
2. H.C.Deb. Vol 231, Col 1002.
3. Hamilton, op .cit. p.311.
4. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie Otnosheniya, op .cit. p.166.
to the Soviet advantage to the extent that the 
British Cabinet came under greater pressure from 
the Labour back-benchers .
While uncertain moves were being made on the 
diplomatic front, the other arm of Soviet foreign 
policy, the Comintern, continued to vilify the 
Labour leaders. The Tenth Plenum of E.C.C.I. opened 
on 3 July 1929, and was primarily concerned with 
completing the change in tactics introduced a year 
earlier at the Sixth Congress. Stalin's success in 
the internal party struggle was emphasised by 
Bukharin's removal from the Presidium and the absence 
of any serious challenge to the official policy line (1). 
The Labour Government typified the political bodies 
that the new Comintern line so violently opposed, and 
the plenum forecast that the British workers' illusions 
about the new Labour Government would soon be 
shattered. Otto Kuusinen, in his report to the plenum, 
argued that MacDonald, like the Conservatives, would 
try to plan for a war against the Soviet Union, but by 
using more roundabout methods (2). Despite these 
ritualistic attacks on the Labour leaders, it was
1. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op .cit.
Vol 3, pp.247-257.
2. Degras, Comintern, op .cit. Vol III, pp.45-46; Otto 
Kuusinen, Izbranniye Proizvedenniya, (Moscow 1966) 
pp. 137-138.
noticeable that at this pbnum the pride of place as 
leader of the anti-Soviet bloc was given to France, 
a tendency which was to become more pronounced as 
the Depression deepened and theSoviet leadership’s 
evaluation of the European situation altered. Although 
Lozovsky, the head of Profintern, told the Plenum that 
the coming to power of the Labour Government presented 
'splendid opportunities to the British Communist Party 
of developing into a mass party', the poor showing 
in the May 1929 election when official Labour candidates 
were opposed for the first time, continued low member­
ship figures and disagreements among the party leader­
ship did not augur well for the future prospects of 
the British Party committed to the new tactical line (1).
The Tenth Plenum devoted little attention 
to the colonial situation and the brief discussion 
of the Indian question assumed more of the character 
of a post-mortem, since the Meerut trial had 'obliter­
ated* the erstwhile Indian Communist Party as well as 
the Workers' and Peasants' Party. The Soviet and 
Comintern press attitude towards India showed signs 
of a temporary lull in critical comment while the 
London negotiations for a resumption of relations
1. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, op.cit. 
Vol 3, pp. 389-392; Eudin and Slusser, op .cit. 
Vol 1, p.31.
continued. In India itself there was minimal evidence 
of communist activity and the industrial situation 
was comparatively peaceful. With the Indian communist 
movement 'virtually defunct1 there was little that 
could be done to implement Lozovsky's call for 'all- 
out war on the Indian bourgeoisie' (1). In Britain, 
however, Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary of State for 
India, was to come under pressure from Labour left­
wingers to declare an amnesty for the Meerut defend­
ants, but, although the Public Safety Ordinance was 
withdrawn, the Government of India refused to compromise 
over the trial, which was to continue inexorably until 
1933 (2).
The defence aspects of the Russian question 
in relation to India were given only a cursory examin­
ation at the first meeting of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence held under the Labour Government, on 27 June 
1929. The Committee confined themselves to merely 
taking note of the Chiefs of Staff annual review, 
which stated that 'the task of maintaining local and 
internal security in Egypt, India and the Far East is
1. Imam, op .cit. pp. 279-282; Carr, Foundations of a 
Planned Economy, op .cit. Vol 3, pp. 941-944.
2. P. S. Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour 
Movement, 1914-1964, (London 1975) pp. 203-204;
Benn to Irwin, 13 August, and Irwin to Benn,
20 August 1929, India Office Records, L/P&J/6/1978.
the chief preoccupation of our garrisons in those 
countries1 and that 'the Soviet is concentrating 
more and more on British colonial possessions in 
the Far East with a view to creating serious 
embarrassment for us’ (1).
After the breakdown of the initial negotia­
tions in London, the initiatives for a resumption of 
discussions came from the British side, but the 
feelers were put out not through the diplomatic 
channels available, such as through the Foreign Office 
and either the Norwegian or German Governments, but 
through the unofficial channels of the pro-Soviet 
members of the Labour movement. While Henderson was 
attending the Reparations Conference at the Hague in 
the first week of August, MacDonald and Dalton made 
the first attempt to restart negotiations. MacDonald, 
now aware of Labour back-bench feeling (2), sent on 
to Dalton what the latter described as ’a very reason-
I
able version of our requirements on Russian propaganda
1. ’Review of Imperial Defence 1929’, 21 June 1929,
C.I.D. 948-B, CAB 4/18; C.I.D. Minutes, 27 June 1929, 
CAB 2/5.
2. The Russians received information that MacDonald had 
at first expressed ’complete satisfaction' with the 
breakdown in negotiations, and that only after 
Henderson had persuaded a delegation of Labour back­
benchers to remonstrate with MacDonald did the Prime 
Minister agree to leave the Russian question to 
Henderson. Popov, Atlglo-Sovetskie Otnosheniya, op.cit. 
169. Yet MacDonald was clearly not averse to 
attempting to play a role in re-starting negotiations.
and debts' (1). As MacDonald outlined it, 'our 
position is not, * has not been, that propaganda must 
cease before recognition (sic), + that a satisfactory 
debt settlement should be made, but that Moscow should 
give us good evidence that on both subjects it 
recognises its obligations and gives us assurances 
satisfactory to us that it is to face them with a 
genuine desire to settle them' (2) . MacDonald suggested 
that some of the Labour Russophiles should be given 
the substance of this letter, so that it could be 
leaked to the Soviet side.
Dalton chose Wise and George Ewer, the foreign 
affairs editor of the Daily Herald, and, at the same 
time, publicly expressed the Government's readiness to 
meet the Russians half-way (3). Wise, on his way to 
Moscow, had a long talk at the Hague with Henderson, 
who later recounted: 'though I was friendly, I adhered 
firmly to the position I had taken up with Dovgalevsky, 
and told him that, in my opinion, he was not likely to 
help in securing the object he had in view if he gave 
the Russians the impression that we were always ready 
to modify our attitude whenever they presented a 
difficulty real or unreal' (4). Neither Dalton's public 
pronouncement nor Wise's conversations evoked any
1. Dalton, op .cit. p.231.
2. MacDonald to Dalton, 3 August 1929, FO 800/280.
3. Times, 10 August 1929.
4. Henderson to Dalton, 17 August 1929, FO 800/280.
response from the Soviet side.
The Soviet press had been quick to criticise
Henderson’s action during the initial conversations (1),
and Soviet diplomats made the same points during talks
with third parties. Krestinsky, the Soviet Ambassador
in Berlin, explained to Streseman on 4 August that
’we are not making concessions... we are not starting
$
preliminary negotiations on outstanding questions (2) . 
According to Louis Fischer, he was told at this time 
by Litvinov that the Soviets would ’maintain their 
stand even if it meant no relations with England 
during the entire term of office of the MacDonald 
Cabinet’ (3). Soviet obstinacy may well have been 
based on the belief that time (in so far that at least 
two months would elapse before the return of Parliament) 
might work in their favour.
Indeed, a month later, Henderson made another 
attempt to re-start negotiations, by again sending 
an unofficial emissary to Moscow. This agent (probably 
Wise) told the Narkomindel authorities that, although 
Henderson was prepared to renew negotiations on the 
procedural programme for the future discussion of out­
standing questions, the initiative for the renewal of 
the negotiations should come from the Soviet side, as
1. Izvestiya and Pravda, 2 August 1929.
2. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No. 421.
3. Fischer, op .cit. p.604.
they had suspended the talks at the end of July.
The Soviet side rejected this proposal, suggesting 
instead that representatives of both sides should 
give press interviews on prepared lines, after which 
negotiations could begin (1) .
Henderson must have agreed to this Soviet 
proposal, because on 4 September, while he was in 
Geneva attending the General Assembly of the League 
of Nations, he made a statement, stressing that 
although the resumption of relations would not take 
place without Parliamentary approval, the invitation 
to a Soviet representative to discuss ’the most 
expeditious procedure’ still stood (2). The contro­
versial question of pre-conditions for a resumption 
was carefully avoided; as it was in Litvinov’s reply 
two days later (3) . Henderson informed MacDonald 
that as Litvinov’s reply was ’sufficiently satisfactory 
in character’ a note of invitation could be despatched 
to the Russians. On 12 September the Soviet Government
1. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie Otnosheniya, op.cit. pp.169-70.
2. Coates, op .cit. pp.326-7.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No.12. The swift response
of Litvinov, which has surprised both contemporaries 
and historians (e.g. Carlton, op .cit. p.152), is 
explained by the fact that the issue of both state­
ments was pre-arranged, probably without Foreign 
Office fore-knowledge.
agreed to send Dovgalevsky to London to meet 
Henderson on his return from Geneva on 23 September (1).
The question of referring to the Presidium 
of the Central Executive Committee for additional 
instructions (a threat only made to pressurise 
Henderson) was quietly dropped (2) . Nevertheless, the 
Soviet Government were at pains publicly to reiterate 
their position during the period prior to the opening 
of the second round of negotiations. Rykov, addressing 
a congress of Moscow Soviets, declared that Dovgalevsky’s 
authority was strictly limited to discussing procedural 
questions (3). Molotov affirmed that it was ’only 
after the re-establishment of normal diplomatic 
relations that negotiations can commence regarding 
the essential points at issue, regarding claims and 
counter-claims’ (4). Clearly hard bargaining lay 
ahead.
The course of the negotiations, as far as 
can be ascertained from the available Soviet and 
British documents, bear out Gordon Craig’s observation
1. Ibid, Doc .Nos. 13, 16, 17.
2. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No. 280.
3. Daily Herald, 23 September 1929; Izvestiya, 
28 September 1929.
4 . Inprecor, 4 October 1929.
that 'negotiations with the Soviets have generally 
been marked by an almost automatic Soviet opposition 
at the outset to all proposals from the other side 
of the table, followed by persistent and uncompromis­
ing advocacy of the Soviet point of view1 (1).
Moreover, Dovgalevsky was bound by rigid directives 
that allowed him little flexibility (2).
At the first meeting on the morning of 
24 September, Henderson pointed out to Dovgalevsky 
'the great advantage of carrying matters as far as 
possible at the present stage1 and handed him a list 
of questions for discussion. The questions listed 
were propaganda; arrangements regarding diplomatic 
and consular missions; debts and claims; fisheries; 
commercial treaties and allied questions; and the 
application of previous treaties and conventions . 
Dovgalevsky laid stress on 'the difficulty of deciding 
details at this stage', but after further discussion 
it was agreed that the following day Henderson should 
hand over a memorandum elaborating his proposals in 
detail*(3) .
1. Gordon A. Craig, 'Totalitarian Approaches to Diplomatic 
Negotiation' in A .0. Sarkissian, editor, Studies in 
Diplomatic History and Historiography in honour of
G .P . Gooch, (London 1961), p.120.
2. His instructions, as quoted in Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie 
0 tnosheniya, op.cit. p.171, stated: ’Comrade 
Dovgalevsky must not make any proposals on his own 
initiative about procedure and the agenda, since
we consider that even discussion of these questions 
could be postponed until the exchange of Ambassadors'.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No.18; D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No.290.
The following morning Henderson brought 
this proposed memorandum before the Cabinet. The 
discussion revolved around the questions of propaganda 
and debts. The Cabinet agreed finally to Henderson's 
suggestion that Article 16 of the 1924 Treaty be used 
as the basis of the general commitment to refrain from 
propaganda, with the proviso that this formula covered 
the Comintern (1) . The Cabinet also approved 
Henderson's suggestion to reserve inter-governmental 
claims for later discussion, while other debts and 
claims should be considered by a special joint 
committee (2). In the afternoon, Henderson handed 
over the final text of the memorandum, but no discuss­
ion of its contents took place (3).
At the meeting the following morning, 26 
September, Henderson and Dovgalevsky considered the 
list which had been handed over by Henderson at their 
first meeting. Following the receipt of telegraphic 
instructions from Litvinov, Dovgalevsky handed over a 
revised list of questions, in which propaganda was 
relegated from first to fifth place, a new item, 'the 
attitude of both Governments towards the 1924 Treaties', 
now came top of the list, and the item regarding
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 25 September 1929, 34(29)1,
CAB 23/61. •
2. Memorandum by Henderson, 24 September 1929, C.P.259(29), 
CAB 24/206.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No.19; D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No .294 .
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diplomatic missions was omitted (1). The most 
contentious point was the propaganda issue. Henderson 
explained that it was the British intention 1 to ask 
for the guarantee about propaganda at the moment of 
the exchange of Ambassadors1, but since no agreement 
could be reached the.discussion of that issue was 
postponed for the time being (2) . Although when 
talking to Henderson Dovgalevsky had proved obdurate, 
in his telegram to the Narkomindel he suggested that 
he might 1 accept as a concession HendersonTs proposal 
about the timing of the declaration on propaganda on 
the condition that propaganda does not occupy first 
place on the list* (3).
When the two met again that afternoon, 
Henderson handed over a revised list of questions in 
which a distinction had been made between those matters 
to be dealt with at the time of the exchange of
1. Litvinov seems to have interpreted this last item 
as referring to the Ambassadors themselves, and 
instructed Dovgalevsky to deliver a strong protest 
that negotiations could not proceed without the 
removal of this item. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No. 293. 
As Dovgalevsky realised from Henderson's memorandum, 
the item in fact referred to the establishment of 
consular posts and a request for the release of 
certain Soviet citizens formerly employed at the 
British Mission in Moscow in 1927 and believed to 
have been exiled as a result.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No.20.
3. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No .295.
i
Ambassadors and those to be considered subsequently.
Into the first category fell the question of propaganda, 
diplomatic missions and the revival of the 1923 
Fisheries Agreement . Into the second category fell 
all the other points on the original British list, 
with the addition of the Soviet item regarding the 
attitude towards the 1924 Treaties. Dovgalevsky, 
still awaiting Moscow's comments on the British memo­
randum and on the propaganda guarantee, confined 
himself to accepting the second part of the revised 
list. By mutual consent, discussion of the propaganda 
item was postponed until the following day, but no 
agreement could be reached either on the two remaining 
items on the first part of the list, and the meeting 
broke up inconclusively, after two stormy hours.
According to DovgalevskyTs account, 'Henderson's 
arguments mainly reproached me for my unwillingness 
to ease his position in Parliament, which, he said, 
would not allow diplomatic relations to be re-established 
without our adoption of the three conditions of the 
f irst part' (1) .
At the next meeting, on the morning of 
27 September, Henderson started by explaining that 
instead of two lists, he was reverting to theidea of 
one list, based on the Soviet list of the previous day,
1. Ibid, Doc .No . 296; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No .20 .
with the addition of the word 'debts' to the claims 
item and the omission of the propaganda item. The 
long argument over the propaganda item reduced 
itself to Henderson's proposal that both countries make 
mutual pledges, reproducing Article 16 of the 1924 
Treaty, 'immediately on the exchange of Ambassadors, 
and not later than the same day as that on which the 
respective Ambassadors present their credentials'. 
According to Dovgalevsky's report to Moscow,
Henderson declared that this was 'the furthest extent 
of his concessions'; the Soviet negotiator recognised 
that no further concessions could be extracted from 
Henderson, and that the Soviet side should make this 
concession to Henderson (1).
The Soviet side had anticipated that, with 
the annual Labour Party Conference due to open on 
30 September in Brighton, Henderson would propose an 
interruption in the negotiations (2), but, instead,
1. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc.No.297; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc.No.21.
2. Before the opening of negotiations, on 22 September
the Soviet Embassy in Paris received a telephone
call from Wise, who said that the negotiations might 
have to be suspended during the Labour Party Conference 
and could not be completed until October. Popov, 
Anglo-Sovetskie Otnosheniya, op .cit. pp.171-172. 
Dovgalevsky was careful not to tell Henderson about 
his foreknowledge of a possible interruption.
D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No.290.
Henderson suggested that they meet somewhere near 
Brighton on 1 October; a suggestion that Dovgalevsky 
‘was happy to fall in with (1). While Henderson had 
consistently tried to re-start and conclude the 
negotiations over resumption of relations, there was 
undoubtedly some truth in his critics' charges later 
that he was influenced by the prospect of being able 
to announce a successful conclusion to the negotiations 
during the Labour Party Conference (2).
The final meeting therefore took place at 
the White Hart Inn, Lewes, and lasted over five hours, 
as the two negotiators argued over the text of the 
proposed protocol drafted by Dovgalevsky to replace 
Henderson's original memorandum. David Carlton has 
written that the drawing up of the formal protocol was 
•achieved without very much difficulty', but the length 
of the meeting and Dovgalevsky's report that 'the
discussion was very difficult; more than once the word
' Jo
"break" was mentioned' show that it was otherwise. 
Although Henderson reluctantly accepted most of the 
Soviet draft, he did win his point over the inclusion 
of the word 'debts' and, more crucial, over the exchange 
of the propaganda guarantees. However, when Henderson,
1. Ibid.Doc'. Nos. 291, 297. Dovgalevsky noted: 'one 
must admit that Henderson is not dragging out the 
negotiations'. Ibid. Doc .No . 294.
2. Carlton, op .cit. p.154.
in line with Foreign Office advice and Cabinet 
policy, pointed out that the British Government 
, regarded Article 16 of the 1924 Treaty as covering 
propaganda by the Comintern, Dovgalevsky avoided 
any comment other than that the Soviet Government had 
more than once explained that they were unconnected 
with the Comintern (1).
On his return to London, Henderson discussed 
with his officials whether the Soviet Government 
accepted the propaganda clause in the Protocol as 
covering the Comintern. The permanent officials 
felt that although the Sovet Government would agree 
neither to the words 'the Comintern' being inserted 
in the clause nor even that the sense of the clause 
covered the Comintern, nevertheless, from the British 
point of view, the statement that the British Govern­
ment considered the clause as covering the Comintern 
should be sufficient (2). The Cabinet came to a 
similar conclusion when the Protocol was discussed 
and approved on 7 October (3). It was obviously felt 
that a clear statement of the British interpretation 
might have some value as a form of deterrent; with 
Cabinet approval, Henderson specifically detailed the
1. Ibid, p.155; D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No. 301; D.B.F.P. 
II/VII, Doc .No.22. A memorandum by Seymour, head 
of the Northern Department, referring to this 
interpretation, had been submitted to Henderson the 
day before. Memorandum by Seymour, 30 September 
1929, N4853/18/38, FO 371/14033.
2. Memorandum by Seymour, 4 October 1929, N4631/18/38, 
FO 371/14032.
3. The Protocol had been signed on 3 October. Cabinet 
Conclusions, 7 October 1929, 36(29)1, CAB 23/62.
British interpretation during the debate in the 
House of Commons on 5 November (1). This was the 
public reiteration of Henderson's statement to 
Dovgalevsky. Nevertheless, neither the Cabinet nor 
the Foreign Office officials were particularly 
sanguine about the prospects of propaganda ceasing (2). 
However, it was recognised that if relations were 
seriously intended to be resumed, further concessions 
from the Soviet side on this point were not practical 
politics .
After approval by the British Cabinet on 
7 October and by the Council of People's Commissars 
on 11 October, the Protocol was brought before 
Parliament. In reply to the Conservative Party attacks, 
led by Baldwin who accused Henderson of making 'a most 
humiliating surrender', Henderson and Dalton maintained 
that they had fulfilled the conditions laid down 
earlier in the summer. Lloyd George and the Liberals 
supported the resumption of relations, and the Labour 
Government’s policy was endorsed by 326 votes to 201 (3).
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 231, Col 901.
2. In July 1929 the Foreign Office had noted that 'there 
is no real expectation or possibility that Communist 
propaganda and intrigue will stop, whatever promises 
may be given to the contrary'. D.B.F.P. II/VII,
Doc.No .9.
3. H.C.Deb. Vol 231, Cols 895-1010. See also Dalton, 
op.cit. pp.232-233. Three Conservatives voted 
for the resumption of relations.
Although the Conservatives gained a pyrrhic victory 
when the House of Lords voted against the Government's 
•policy, only the House of Commons' approval was 
necessary as this was not a legislative act (1).
Problems still remained. Henderson had 
insisted from the very start of the negotiations on 
the appointment of Ambassadors rather than any other 
rank (2), and, despite a number of personal applications, 
he chose, at MacDonald's 'strong insistence' and with 
Cabinet approval, a career diplomat: Sir Esmond Ovey, 
who had been on the Foreign Office 'short list' 
because he was a good Russian speaker (3). Although 
the Soviet Government gave their agreement to Ovey, 
the British found themselves unable to do the same 
for the first Soviet choice, Lev Kamenev, who had been 
expelled from Britain by Lloyd George in 1920 for 
propagandistic activities, so the Soviet Government 
substituted Grigori Sokolnikov, another repentant 
opponent of Stalin (4).
1. H.L.Deb. Vol 75, Cols 867-922.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 25 September 1929, 34(29)1,
CAB 23/61. Henderson's private secretary, Walford 
Selby, told Lord Stamfordham, private secretary to 
the King (who objected to an Ambassador), that if 
Henderson had refused to appoint Ambassadors 'the 
negotiations would have unquestionably broken down'. 
Letter of 1 October 1929, FO 800/280.
3. Carlton, op .cit .pp .156-157; Dalton Diaries, 31 
October and 1 November 1929; Hamilton, op .cit .pp .312-313
4. Memorandum by Henderson, 12 November 1929, C.P.318(29), 
CAB 24/207; Cabinet Conclusions, 13 November 1929, 
47(29)5, CAB 23/62. For Kamenev's 1920 mission see 
Ullman, op.cit.p,193ff• Dalton, op .cit .pp .233-234, 
claims credit for Sokolnikov's appointment.
The arrival of Ovey in Moscow on 8 December 
and Sokolnikov in London a few days later did facilitate 
the settlement of the problem of relations of the 
Dominions with the Soviet Union, a matter of constitu­
tional and international law which proved surprisingly 
difficult to solve. The Foreign Office took their 
stand on the fact that Article 16 of the 1924 Treaty 
referred to the 'British Empire', thereby including 
the Dominions, and theSoviet Government eventually 
accepted this in a note verbale, in which they 
observed that the propaganda pledge extended to the 
Dominions and that if or when normal relations were 
resumed between the Dominions and the Sovet Government 
there would be a separate, reciprocal, exchange of 
the propaganda pledge (1).
Although the Soviet Government objected
tp
initially to exchanging pledges/cover the Dominions, 
there was no objection to the Government of India 
being made a party in their own right to the propaganda 
pledges and being specifically mentioned in the Anglo- 
Soviet Notes. This policy, suggested by the India 
Office, had been adopted, as Zafar Imam has noted,
'for the first time in the history of Anglo-Soviet 
relations' (2). The Labour Cabinet were no less
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 33, 35, 36, 38-40, 42, 43, 
48; D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .Nos . 368, 374; Dalton 
Diaries, 16 and 18 December 1929.
2. Imam, op .cit. p.288.
concerned than the Conservative Cabinet about 
propaganda, but this innovation also was consistent 
with the Labour Partyfs policy of moving towards 
dominion status for India (after consultations in 
London, Irwin made a gesture towards the nationalists 
in his statement of October 1929 affirming that 
status as the ’natural issue’ of India’s constitu­
tional progress). In June 1929 the India Office had 
enquired of the Government of India’s attitude to a 
resumption of relations, and Irwin had replied that 
renewing contact ’would present many advantages’ 
particularly apropos Afghanistan, but that the ’all­
essential consideration is the securing of adequate 
safeguards against propagandist and other hostile 
activities'. The India Office had initially favoured 
a specific reference to Afghanistan in the propaganda 
clauses, on the lines of the 1923 agreement, but later 
supported the Viceroy’s opinion that 'a general and 
comprehensive form of undertaking' on the lines of the 
1924 agreement would be preferable. Nevertheless, the 
India Office did refer the question of the desirability 
of a reciprocal declaration of non-intervention in 
Afghanistan’s internal affairs to the Foreign Office, 
but, with Henderson not wishing to compound the 
difficulties of the other Anglo-Soviet negotiations and 
with signs of the Afghan internal situation settling
down, the idea was shelved in the spring of 1930 (1) .
The exchange of notes took place when 
Sokolnikov presented his credentials to the Prince 
of Wales on 20 December and Ovey presented his to the 
Soviet President, Kalinin, the following day (2) .
However, even before the exchange of the propaganda 
pledges, the contradictions in the respective 
interpretations had come to the surface. On 10 
November Izvestiya ridiculed the interpretation
given by Henderson to the House of Commons and
/
asserted that the Soviet Government disclaimed any 
responsibility for the Comintern (3). While not men­
tioning the Comintern by name, Litvinov clearly was 
repeating this disclaimer in his speech to the Central 
Executive Committee on 4 December (4). When the 
Izvestiya article was discussed in the Cabinet, the 
consensus was for letting sleeping dogs lie, but 
explicitly reserving the right to act if that were 
judged necessary (5) . As Henderson telegraphed to Ovey
1. Irwin to Benn, 28 June and 16 July 1929, and Note by 
Jack Walton, Secretary of Political Department of 
India Office, 29 June 1929, all I .0. Records, 
L/P&S/12/4018; Note by Walton, 17 February 1930, and 
India Office to Foreign Office, 21 March 1930, both 
L/P&S/12/4021.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc.Nos.45, 46, 47; Harold Nicolson, 
King George the Fifth, (London 1952) p.438.
3. Izvestiya, 10 November 1929; D.B.F.P. II/VI I, Doc .No .32 .
4. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, p.426.
5. Cabinet Conclusions, 13 November 1929, 47(29)5, 
CAB 23/62.
in early January 1930: 'there appears to be no 
prospect of reconciling divergent views of His 
Majesty's Government and Soviet Government on propa­
ganda issue and I think it unnecessary for Your 
Excellency to initiate any discussions on the subject 
at present' (1). Nevertheless, as Donald Lammers 
has written, 'the contradictory interpretations of 
the guarantee promptly became a fertile source of 
Conservative attacks which discomfited the government 
in all its subsequent dealings with the Russians' (2).
In 1929 both Henderson and Dalton saw the
main problem of British foreign policy as 'the
removal of the political antagonism that stood in the 
way of a peaceful international order' (3); closer 
relations with Soviet Russia was an integral component 
of their policy . Although neither Henderson nor the 
mainstream of Labour leaders had any real enthusiasm 
for the extremist experiments being conducted in the 
Soviet Union, they did feel that no useful purpose 
could be served by a policy of boycott (4). Henderson,
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII. Doc .No.54.
2. Lammers, op.cit. p.70.
3. Henry R. Winkler, 'Arthur Henderson' in Craig and 
Gilbert op.cit. p.324.
4. For Henderson's earlier views on Russia and the 
Bolsheviks see J. M. Winter, 'Arthur Henderson, 
the Russian Revolution and the Reconstruction of 
the Labour Party' in Historical Journal, December 
1972, pp.753-773.
in common with other European socialists, felt that 
'Russia, with its vast population, cannot be 
permanently ignored; only by diplomatic and other 
intercourse with her will it be possible to bring 
her once more into the family of nations' (1). In 
contrast to Austen Chamberlain's belief that an 
attitude of studied reserve would 'moderate' the 
Soviet Union's attitude to the West, Henderson 
believed that the same result could be achieved 
through greater contact .
The chief tenet of Labour's advocacy of a 
resumption of relations was the trade advantages 
which could accrue; it was seen as the palliative 
for the problem of unemployment, which, with the 
trade revival of mid-1929 fading away, had started 
to worsen again at the end of 1929. But, for Henderson, 
and for his immediate circle of Labour advisers, at 
least as compelling a reason was the desire to increase 
international amity, most particularly through dis­
armament, in which it was felt that the Soviet Govern­
ment had a crucial role to play (not least, it was 
thought, where Central and Eastern Europe were 
concerned (2)). The following years were to show
1. Hamilton, op.cit. p.309.
2. Henderson's Parliamentary Private Secretary, Philip 
Noel-Baker, exhibiting naivety over Russian realities, 
said: 'the first step, vital to British interests, 
which must be taken, is to do everything to promote
a policy of world disarmament and to exorcise this 
spirit of hatred against us which exists among the 
younger generation in Russia'. H.C.Deb. Vol 231,
Col 921.
that Henderson's optimism was unjustified.
Sir Robert Vansittart, who became 
Permanent Under-Secretary in early 1930, was to 
criticise Henderson's failing as fdlows: 'he believed 
in all that we wish to hold without evidence - brother­
hood, peace and goodwill... he thought too well of the 
Soviets... and I could only diminish his optimism 
by fractions' (1). Yet, even the course of the 
negotiations must have dampened Henderson's optimism 
to a certain extent. While Dovgalevsky tried tenacious­
ly to follow the guidelines of his instructions, 
Henderson was reduced to bursts of irritability as 
his opposite number quibbled over relatively minor 
points. Dovgalevsky reported to Moscow that Henderson 
'frequently lost his self-control' and, on another 
occasion, that 'Henderson angrily complained that his 
numberous concessions had not met with any reciprocal 
ones from my side' (2). Moreover, 'the agreement 
reached left Henderson, at least to all appearances, 
not only dissatisfied but the more disappointed in 
that he could not say anything against it' (3).
1. Vansittart, op.cit. p.398.
2. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .No .301.
3. V.I. Popov, 'Vosstanovlenie diplomaticheskikh 
otnoshenii mezhdu SSSR i Angliya v 1929 godu', in 
Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya, 1957, No. 3, p. 108.
Henderson undoubtedly was sensitive about 
the Parliamentary situation throughout the negotiations. 
As he made clear to a stormy meeting of the Parliament­
ary Labour Party, 'Russia is not the only pebble on 
the beach' (1). He even tried to make use of this 
factor to his advantage in the negotiations;
Dovgalevsky reported that Henderson 'particularly 
stressed the importance, from a predominantly parlia­
mentary point of view, of the questions of debts and 
propaganda... I had to listen to a monotonous repetition 
of this theme a dozen times a day' (2). The Russians, 
calculating that Liberal support would probably be 
forthcoming for a renewal of relations, seem to have 
taken Henderson's words as merely a negotiating tactic, 
and apart from the propaganda pledge made only minimal 
concessions (3).
The problem of participation by the Dominions 
also complicated Henderson's attempts to renew relations. 
Arthur Ponsonby, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
for Dominion Affairs, who had been the leading British 
negotiator in 1924, was critical about the extent to 
which consultation with the Dominions had grown during
1. Hamilton, op.cit. p.311.
2. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie Otnosheniya, op.cit. p.174.
3. D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .Nos . 295, 296, 301.
the intervening years. He argued that while 'no 
objection need be taken to the interchange of 
telegrams' with the Dominions on foreign policy 
questions, 'there seems to be a tendency on our part 
to be over-cautious with regard to the susceptibilities 
of the Dominions' (1).
The Soviet side did gain one point even 
before the negotiations began, namely the extension 
of the Export Credits scheme (in 1924 this was to have 
been accorded only under the terms of the Treaties), 
and, with other credit negotiations being postponed 
by the Germans at the beginning of 1929, an alternative 
source of credit was particularly welcome. The Russians 
then proceeded during the following months and years 
to urge improved terms and durations for these credits 
as the Soviet economy became progressively and 
excessively reliant on short-term and medium-term 
credits (2). Having gained an important point, the 
Russians were less amenable in the subsequent negotiations
Moreover, the year 1929 saw a slowly growing 
self-confidence exhibited in the international arena 
by the still relatively isolated Soviet Union; this
1. Paper entitled 'The Dominions and Foreign Affairs', 
(December ?) 1929, in Ponsonby Papers, held in the 
Bodleian Library, Oxford, box c.671.
2. Dohan, op.cit. p.611.
found expression in the other major foreign policy 
issue of the second half of 1929, the dispute with 
* China, which smouldered on during the summer until 
the Soviet army undertook a vigorous but limited 
invasion of Manchuria in mid-November and brought 
about Chinese capitulation in less than a month (1).
The pattern of Soviet foreign relations on the 
diplomatic level, apart from relations with Britain 
and China, remained at a standstill in the second 
half of 1929, so tha$, despite the coolness shown 
towards an agreement with Britain, the resumption 
nevertheless was hailed as 'by itself .. .sufficient 
proof of our importance in international relations' (2). 
In the long-term too, the Russians could hope that 
the British move might prove an encouragement to 
American recognition of the Soviet Union, although 
they continued to remain suspicious of signs of an 
intimate Anglo-American relationship (this relation­
ship had publicly been much improved by MacDonald's 
visit to America in October 1929).
The change of government in Britain, rather 
than any change in Soviet diplomatic policy, had 
resulted in the ending of the two-year break in
1. George Lensen, The Damned Inheritance (Tallahassee 
1974) pp.30-124”. The British Note in early December 
1929 supporting the American reminder to the two 
powers of the Kellogg-Briand Pact obligations was 
not received favourably by the Russians. Degras, 
Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, p .427.
2. M.I. Kalinin, Voprosi Sovetskogo Stroitelstvo,
(Moscow 1958) p.448.
relations, but the reduced enthusiasm on both sides 
(as compared with 1924) was to be reflected not only 
in the course of the negotiations leading to the 
resumption in 1929 but also in the subsequent 
relationship during the life of the Labour Cabinet.
CHAPTER SEVEN -  DISCORDANT NOTES
With the Protocol signed and diplomatic 
relations resumed, both sides began to work out in 
detail their attitudes to the outstanding questions, 
using the two unratified Treaties of 1924 as the 
starting point. The unpublished Foreign Office 
papers show that there was a lack of unanimity on the 
British side as to the approach to be adopted in the 
forthcoming negotiations. While there was general 
agreement that certain sections of the 1924 General 
Treaty, such as the articles covering fisheries and 
former treaties, could be used as the basis of a 
suitable agreement, the Foreign Office and the Board 
of Trade held differing views on the Commercial 
Treaty. Provided that the article covering diplomatic 
immunity for the Trade Delegation was tightened up, 
the Foreign Office were prepared to sign a full treaty, 
but the Board of Trade advocated a temporary modus 
vivendi only, leaving the full treaty 'until some 
reasonably satisfactory progress had been made towards 
settling the questions of debts and claims'. The 
Foreign Office officials felt that it was only con­
sistent with the renewal of relations to try for a 
full commercial treaty and that to defer such negotia­
tions to await progress on the debts issue would, at
best, postpone them for some months, and, at worst, 
mean shelving them altogether (1).
Despite representations from the Foreign 
Office, the Board of Trade officials remained adamant, 
so the memorandum defining the British position, which 
Henderson handed over to Ambassador Sokolnikov on 
6 January 1930, proposed concluding a temporary 
agreement with the definitive treaty deferred runtil 
'the negotiations for the settlement of other matters... 
have made substantial progress’. Sokolnikov argued 
that such an arrangement would be 'undesirable' and 
tfould 'tend to impede the development of trade'; 
so Henderson suggested that the Russians get into 
direct contact with the Board of Trade (2).
The Soviet Government preferred a full 
commercial treaty on the lines of the 1924 Treaty (3), 
but the realisation that a refusal to agree to a 
temporary agreement 'would have created a serious 
conflict and would have stood in the way of a con­
tinuation of any negotiations' caused the Soviet
1. Foreign Office Memorandum, 12 November 1929, N5221/18/38 
FO 371/14034; Minute by Dalton, 24 December 1929, 
N6254/18/38, FO 371/14036; Board of Trade to Foreign 
Office, 1 January 1930, N28/28/38, FO 371/14844.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc.No.53.
3. Ibid, Doc .Nos. 53, 55; D.V.P. Vol XII, Doc .Nos .
396, 398.
Government in their reply of 25 January to give 
reluctant agreement to the British proposal, while
expressing the hope that a full treaty would be
t
concluded at the earliest moment (1); Itfhe Russians 
also rejected the idea of any interdependence 
between the commercial treaty and other questions .
On 3 February, having gained Cabinet 
approval, Henderson suggested to Sokolnikov the 
negotiations begin, using the Soviet draft for a 
modus vivendi as the basis, but with two reservations 
from the British side, concerning export credits and 
the Trade Delegation's status (2).
The Soviet side wanted to ensure that there 
would be no discrimination against export credits on 
political grounds, and William Graham, the President 
of the Board of Trade, was prepared, after consultation 
with the Export Credits Guarantee Department, to 
acquiesce in some limited formula to meet this require­
ment, but Philip Snowden, the Chancellor of Exchequer, 
strongly objected to any undertaking whatsoever 
referring to export credits being included in the
1. Ibid, Vol XIII, Doc .No. 63; D.B.F.P. I I/VI I, Doc. 
Nos . 55, 58.
2. Ibid, Doc .No. 60; Cabinet Conclusions, 29 January 
1930, 5(30)1, CAB 23/63; Foreign Office minutes on 
Soviet Draft Agreement, 7 February 1930, N808/28/38, 
FO 371/14845.
agreement. The Cabinet initially tended towards 
Snowden's approach, but after further negotiation
■%
the Cabinet agreed to a protocol attached to the 
final Agreement in which Anglo-Soviet trade was 
given most-favoured-nation treatment as regards 'the 
granting of credits to facilitate such trade' (ljt.
The divergence between the two sides' 
negotiators over the second point, the status of 
the Soviet Trade Delegation, was such as to make it 
the focal point of the negotiations throughout the 
spring of 1930. Prior to the signature of the 
October 1929 Protocol the Cabinet had considered . 
this matter and decided that diplomatic privileges 
should be granted only to the head of the Trade 
Delegation and, if absolutely necessary, to other 
persons, but not to the premises of the Trade Delega­
tion (2). The Soviet side, on the other hand, clearly 
desired diplomatic privileges for all the members of 
the Delegation and their premises (3). As it became
1. Memorandum by Graham, 4 March 1930, C .P. 77 (30), 
CAB 24/210; Cabinet Conclusions, 5 March, 13 (30)3, 
and 26 March, 17(30)1, both CAB 23/63; Seymour to 
Ovey, 7 March 1930, N1493/28/38, FO 371/14846; Cmd. 
3552, 'Temporary Commercial Agreement, 16 April 
1930', p.7.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 25 September 1929, 34(29)1,
CAB 23/61. The Home Office opinion was that only 
very strict limitations would 'cramp the style of 
the Soviet representatives in their illegal work 
here'. Home Office to Foreign Office, 19 September 
1929, N4218/2777/38, FO 371/14049.
3. D.V.P. Vol XIII, Doc .No.19. In early March Litvinov 
told Ovey that it was 'the whole delegation we want 
to protect'. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 74.
apparent to Henderson that some modification of the 
Cabinet's original stand was necessary to prevent a 
breakdown in the whole negotiations, he obtained 
Cabinet authorisation for diplomatic j^mmunity to 
be given to the whole premises of the Soviet Trade 
Delegation, provided that their offices were 
specifically delineated and used exclusively for 
commercial purposes (1) . However, the Soviet side 
had to reduce their demands for the number of persons 
to be granted diplomatic immunity to the head of the 
Delegation and two deputies only (2) .
With the formulas for these two contentious 
points settled, both Governments gave approval for 
the signature, which took place on 16 April 1930 (3), 
although a last minute objection by the South African 
Government, which did not wish to enter into any sort 
of relations with the Soviet Union, required Henderson 
to make a special declaration at the time of the signing
1. Foreign Office Minute, 1 March 1930, N1512/63/38,
FO 371/14857; Cabinet Conclusions, 5 March, 13(30)3, 
and 19 March 1930, 16(30)3, both CAB 23/63.
2. Minute by Seymour, 12 March 1930, N1845/63/38,
FO 371/14857. Initially the Soviet side requested 
diplomatic status for 8 or 9 officials. Soviet 
trade officials with formal diplomatic immunity in 
France, Italy and Germany were respectively none, 
five and ten.
3. D.V.P. Vol XIII, Doc .No. 113; Cabinet Conclusions,
9 April .1930, 21(30)3, CAB 23/63.
exempting South Africa (and also the Irish Free State) 
from the provisions of the modus vivendi (1). Once 
again the difficulties of co-ordinating foreign 
policy where the Dominions were concerned were 
apparent.
Sokolnikov telegraphed back to Moscow that 
he considered the agreement 'completely satisfactory', 
and while on leave in Moscow in the summer of 1930 he 
adumbrated the advantages for the Soviet Union as being 
a definite legal status for the Trade Delegation, and 
the establishment of 'the principle of "nondiscrimination" 
in the trade relations between the U.S.S.R. and England 
and the financial operations connected therewith' (2).
In practice, as the Depression deepened, feelings in 
favour of 'protectionism' grew in Western countries 
(including Britain), and the Soviet 'dumping' of certain 
goods in the West became a sensitive issue, the 
provision which accorded most-favoured-nation treatment 
to Soviet goods in the matter of British import pro­
hibitions and restrictions was of crucial importance
1. The South African objection was based on the Soviet 
Government's breach of the propaganda pledges.
Minute by Charles Bateman, member of Northern 
Department, 5 April 1930, N2401/28/38, FO 371/14848. 
For the Irish objections see D.W. Harkness, The 
Restless Dominion, (London 1969) pp.173-174. The 
whole question of treaty negotiation was raised at 
the Imperial Conference in October 1930. Ibid, 
pp. 216-219
2. Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol I, pp.283-284; D.V.P. 
Vol XIII, Doc .No .113 .
in safeguarding the Russians' available market in 
Britain. The Soviet Government may have calculated 
also that the Agreement would exert an influence on 
other European powers, notably France, in encouraging 
them to make concessions in their economic relations 
with the Soviet Union; however, only Italy, in August 
1930, moved to sign a commercial agreement (1).
The Soviet ability to exploit the most­
favoured-nation clause (the monopoly of foreign trade 
gave the Soviet Union the ability to discriminate 
'invisiblj', which Britain could not do) was not 
appreciated by the British side, who felt that they 
had gained most of the points to which they attached 
importance (2). Besides its political affect in 
acting to a certain extent as a stabilising influence 
in Anglo-Soviet relations, the main consideration for 
the Cabinet undoubtedly was that, by regularising the 
trade position, Anglo-Soviet trade might expand, 
particularly in the area of British exports. Although 
even within the Labour Cabinet fears were expressed 
that the Trade Delegation building 'might become the
1. Ibid, Doc .No.279; Tanaka Tokichi, Japanese
Ambassador in Moscow, to Shidehara Kijuro, Foreign 
Minister, 3 May 1930, J.F.M.A. file B.2.0.0.B/R 1, 
'Eiso tsusho joyaku ikken'.
2. Seymour to Ovey, ; 1 April 1930, N2144/28/38,
FO 371/14847; D.B.F.P. II/VII, App.l.
headquarters of Bolshevik propaganda' (1), the 
Labour movement, and the Liberals, were convinced 
of the economic advantages that would pertain from 
the Agreement (2).
As a corollary to the Commercial Agreement, 
a Temporary Fisheries Agreement was signed on 
22 May 1930 (3). After the rupture of relations 
in May 1927 there had been continual disputes over 
territorial waters and British Navy patrols had been 
introduced to protect the British trawlers (4). As 
the British side required only a temporary commercial 
agreement, so the Narkomindel, with authorisation 
from above (Politburo?), in turn asked for only a 
temporary fisheries agreement, but refused to accept 
any direct linkage between the two agreements, so that 
serious discussion of the drafts did not begin until 
mid-April. The agreement reduced another source of 
Anglo-Soviet friction, and had the advantage for the 
British side that British trawlers could now fish 
without fear of interruption between the disputed 3 - 
mile and 12 mile limits (5).
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 19 March 1930, 16(30)3, CAB 23/63.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 26 March 1930, 17(30)1,
CAB 23/63.
3. Cmd. 3583, 'Temporary Fisheries Agreement; 22 May 1930'.
4. D.B.F.P. IA/V, Doc .Nos. 132, 137, 163, 170.
5. Ibid. I I/VI I, Doc .Nos. 53, 55, 70, 76; D.V.P.
Vol XIII, Doc .No.63; Minutes of Inter-departmental 
Meeting, 5 March 1930, N1499/5/38, FO 371/14834;
Foreign Office Minute, 10 March 1930, ^2036/28/38 
FO 371/14847. ' ’
The focal point of controversy in 1924, 
the clauses of the General Treaty concerning debts, 
claims and a loan, once again proved impossible to 
solve easily. The leading figures in the Labour 
Cabinet and the officials of the departments concerned 
were agreed that this time the British Government 
could not guarantee any loan raised by the Soviet 
Government, and an announcement was made to that effect 
in the House of Commons on 5 November 1929 (1). This 
decision has been criticised by some historians as 
the root cause of all subsequent failure to solve 
the outstanding debts and claims issues (2), but it 
was a political necessity for the Labour Cabinet 
(with memories of 1924 still fresh) to make their 
position clear from the start, even if that were to
VI
prejudice the claims settlement.
The issue was further complicated by the 
British decision made at the insistence of Snowden, 
who over-ruled Henderson and the Foreign Office
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 231, Col 899. Dalton claimed primary 
responsibility for this step, advocating it 'partly 
because, if we didn't make our position clear now, 
we might be embarrassed in the House later; partly, 
and even more, because, in my view, this was our 
cardinal error in 1924'. Dalton, op.cit. pp.232-233.
2. Carfrton, op.cit. p.156; Coates, op.cit. p.332; 
Fischer, op.cit. p.605.
officials' opinions and reversed a Cabinet decision 
of September 1929, that inter-governmental claims 
should not be put into 'cold storage' (1). When 
this was put to the Russians, the only acceptable 
solution was to appoint one main committee with 
several sub-committees, one of which would discuss 
inter-governmental debts and claims alone (2). The 
spring and summer of 1930 saw lengthy wrangling 
between the two sides over the composition, number 
and competence of the proposed sub-committees, and 
these disputed points were still not settled when the 
members of the Main Committee had their first meeting 
on 2 October 1930 (3). By comparison with the 
approach in 1924, Henderson's intention from the 
start was that 'the non-official character of the 
British committee should be preponderent' (hence 
representatives of industry, banks, bondholders and
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 25 September 1929, 34(29)1,
CAB 23/61; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 21. The Treasury 
opinion changed in November 1929, to the surprise 
and annoyance of the Foreign Office. Treasury to 
Foreign Office, 16 November 1929, N5312/18/38,
FO 371/14034; Minutes of an Inter-departmental 
Meeting, 31 January 1930, N635/28/38, FO 371/14845.
In February 1930, Snowden went further in laying down 
that no agreement on private debts was to be ratified 
until an arrangement was concluded on inter-government­
al debts. Minute by Seymour, 11 March 1930, 
N2036/28/38, FO 371/14847. Snowden's intransigence 
on other inter-governmental debts had been seen at 
the Hague Conference in August 1929. See Carlton, 
op.cit.p.33 ff.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos . 60,70,78; D.V.P. Vol XIII,
Doc .Nos. 107, 110.
3. A summary is D.B.F.P. II/VII, App. II(i).
other claimants), and the procedure was reversed 
so that the claims were to be calculated first and 
then a formula would be found for implementing this 
agreement (1).
To counter-act for this lack of progress 
during 1930, the Cabinet in mid-May 1930 endorsed the 
attitude of Snowden and Graham, who argued that the 
full commercial treaty negotiations should be held 
back as an inducement to the Russians to settle the 
debts question (2), and in July 1930 Dalton gave a 
public hint that if the Soviets were to show 'a 
disposition to make a commonsense settlement' then 
the City would surely give greater credit (3).
However, the Soviet side had achieved their 
main objective in obtaining a commercial agreement 
in writing, even if only 'temporary', and were not 
unduly concerned about the full treaty, while their 
approach to the debt question was the reverse of the
1. Minute by Seymour, 5 October 1929, N4501/18/38,
FO 371/14032, Litvinov wrote to Sokolnikov that 
since the calculation and examination of the 
claims would take a relatively long time, an early 
breakdown in the negotiations, embarrassing to both 
sides, could be avoided. D.V.P. Vol XIII, Doc .No.110.
2. Snowden to Henderson, 2 May 1930, FO 800/281; 
Memorandum by Graham, 16 May 1930, C.P. 162(30),
CAB 24/212; Cabinet Conclusions, 21 May 1930, 28(30)4, 
CAB 23/64; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 53.
3. H.C.Deb• Vol 242, Col 403.
the British line, in that they argued that if the 
British granted credits first then some settlement 
might be arranged. This approach was clearly 
enunciated by Stalin in June 1930: f0n condition 
that we are given credits we agree to pay a small 
part of the pre-war debts, regarding them as addition­
al interest on the credits. Without that condition, 
we cannot and must not pay’ (1). During the follow­
ing two years the British side were to give credits 
of increasingly greater length, for reasons largely 
unconnected with the debts issue; the Soviet side 
were to accept these without showing any greater 
disposition to settle.
Following on Stalin’s article in November 
1929 on the 'great change' whereby Soviet Russia 
would advance 'full steam ahead along the path of 
industrialisation to socialism', the winter of 1929-30 
saw dramatic increases in the tempo of the Five Year 
Plan, as Stalin ordered upward amendments of the 
1929-30 plan and instituted forced collectivisation, 
with its corollary of the liquidation of the kulaks (2). 
In the foreign trade sector, further increases in
1. Pravda, 29 June 1930. See also D.B.F.P. II/VII,
Doc .Nos. 70, 94; Financial Times, 18 July 1930.
2. Nove, op.cit. pp. 161-166, 187-188; Stalin, Works, 
Vol 12, pp.124-141.
imports of machinery were planned (already in 1928-29 
almost half of Soviet imports were machinery or 
related plant), to be financed by exports of mainly 
timber and oil and by further credits. Britain was 
considered to be a promising source for these credits, 
especially in view of the Labour Cabinet’s well-known 
belief that the Russian trade could help significantly 
to solve the unemployment problems in Britain.
In the autumn of 1929, after the signing 
of the Protocol, the Soviet trading authorities re­
activated their trade with Britain by placing orders 
to the tune of £3 million. In early January 1930 
Mikoyan, the Commissar for Trade, told Ovey of the 
Soviet need of machinery of all kinds from Britain, 
and the arrival in March 1930 of Saul Bron, the Soviet 
Trade Representative, gave rise to talk of further 
large orders (1). Throughout the spring of 1930 
Soviet diplomats and commercial officials were active 
in sounding out Labour Cabinet members on the question 
of longer credits for orders as well as trying to 
win back-bench support with appropriate public state­
ments. Bron met Thomas and Sir Oswald Mosley, 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster until May 1930,
1. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, pp.432- 
434; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos . 52, 56; Manchester 
Guardian, 21 March 1930.
who both favoured longer credits, and MacDonald, who 
said that business circles ’usually warned against 
long credits’, while Sokolnikov handed Henderson a 
list of orders totalling £15 million which the Soviet 
Government contemplated placing in Britain if satis­
factory credits could be arranged. Some of these 
orders, for ships, envisaged credits for as long as 
five years (1).
The Cabinet were under pressure on this 
issue not only from the Russians but also from within 
the Labour movement . The Cabinet had agreed in mid- 
December 1929 that credits of a duration longer than 
12 months would not be allowed (2), but even before 
that decision was taken a tripartite committee of 
Labour representatives had approached MacDonald 
arguing for the reintroduction of the Trade Facilities 
Act and the extension of long-term credits. The 
Treasury opposed the reintroduction of the Act as being
1. D.V.P. Vol XIII, Doc .Nos . 48, 112, 168; Daily Herald, 
21 May 1930; Note by Sir Horace Wilson, Chief 
Industrial Adviser to the British Government,
19 March 1930, file CIA/1453, B .T. 56/28.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 17 December 1929, 53(29)7,
CAB 23/62.
’tantamount1 to a loan to a Soviet organisation (1), 
and a small Cabinet committee, headed by Graham, was 
set up to explain the Cabinet’s policy to the 
tripartite committee. After explaining that the 
Export Credits Guarantee Advisory Committee could 
not give undertakings in advance for orders that 
might never materialise, it was agreed to examine a 
’test case* of steel orders (2). At the end of July 
1930 the Cabinet agreed that the Advisory Committee 
could consider extending the period of credit from 
12 to 18 months in the case of large orders; the 
Advisory Committee reluctantly agreed (3). The 
Cabinet, therefore, wanted to do extensive business 
with Soviet Russia from the employment point of view,
1. The tripartite committee consisted of representatives 
of the T.U.C. General Council, the Labour Party 
Executive, and the Parliamentary Labour Party. De­
partmental Report of Treasury, 10 February 1930,
C .P. 55(30), CAB 24/210; Cabinet Conclusions, 26 
February 1930, 12(30)4, CAB 23/63; Annual Report of 
the Labour Party, 1930.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 26 March 1930, 17(30)6, CAB 
23/63; Minutes of Meetings of Joint Committees,
8 April and 22 July 1930, CAB 27/416.
3. Memorandum by Export Credit Guarantee Department,
4 June 1930, file CIA/1453, B.T. 56/28; Report of 
Committee on Economic Consequences of Disarmament,
28 July 1930, C .P . 261(30), CAB 24/316; Cabinet 
Conclusions, 30 July 1930, 46(30) 10b, CAB 23/64.
One member of the Advisory Committee told Parliament 
two years later about 'the grave anxiety we felt 
about extending the credit beyond 12 months'.
H.C.Deb. Vol 262, Cols 1328-1329.
but were a little wary of exerting too much political 
influence on the Advisory Committee and were uncertain 
how far the Russians were genuinely prepared to do 
business (1).
To the British officials, it was of paramount 
importance to be able to evaluate the progress of the 
Five Year Plan and its likely affect on the development 
of the Soviet economy and the future of Anglo-Soviet 
trade. Ovey and his staff in the Embassy in Moscow 
(augmented by the appointment of two commercial 
attaches in February 1930) endeavoured to fill this 
need. Ovey himself was an enthusiast of developing 
trade (2), but his early impressions on reaching 
Moscow were that although there were immediate prospects 
of increasing exports to the Soviet Union, the long-term 
prospects were not likely to be so good, particularly 
if Soviet self-sufficiency were indeed to be attained (3).
1. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee, Colonel Peel, 
told Thomas that the Committee ’dealt with all the 
proposals on their business merits and that their 
judgement was not influenced by political considera­
tions such as unemployment’ . Note by Export Credits 
Guarantee Department, 4 June 1930, CIA/1453, B.T.56/28.
2. Notes on Ovey’s conversation with George Gillett, 
Parliamentary Secretary to Department of Overseas 
Trade, November 1929, in Gillett Papers, in the 
possession of Mr. E. Gillett.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No.52; Ovey to Henderson,
6 January 1930, N188/133/38, FO 371/14869.
However, when he considered the question again in 
June 1930, Ovey felt that Soviet demands for 
machinery had 'small likelihood1 of being met for 
many years, and that even if the Soviet Union did 
become industrialised there would still be, as in the 
case of America, a demand for foreign goods (1).
During the spring and summer of 1930 the 
tempo of industrialisation continued to run high, 
but on the agricultural front the 'chaos, despair and 
coercionT caused by the forced collectivisation 
campaign led Stalin to call a temporary halt with his 
1 dizzy with success' article in March 1930. While 
foodstuffs were being rationed in the towns, in the 
country areas the peasants had reacted to the 'extra­
ordinary measures' by slaughtering their livestock, 
which after a transitory abundance of meat, soon 
aggravated the food shortages. The Politburo were 
keen to resume exports of grain to obtain foreign 
currency to pay for the imports, so new procurement 
targets were drawn up for the 1930 harvest (2) . During 
1929-30 the terms of trade had deteriorated for the
1. Ovey to Henderson, 2 June 1930, N3827/764/38,
FO 371/14876. Dalton minuted: 'I think Sir E. Ovey's 
modified opinions, as set out in this despatch, are 
closer* to reality than his earlier fears' . See also 
D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No.93.
2. Nove, op.cit. pp. 169-173; Stalin, Works, Vol 12, 
pp. 191-199.
Soviet Union, for, although the prices of machinery 
and equipment imports had declined, the prices of 
Soviet export goods such as timber and flax had declined 
even faster. Grain prices on the world market declined 
similarly, so that when the Soviet Union unexpectedly 
re-entered the world grain markets in the late summer 
of 1930 (during 1927-1929 Soviet grain exports had 
been minimal), only the export of excessive quantities 
could ensure adequate returns . This was to cause the 
'dumping' controversy in the second half of 1930. In 
the early part of the summer, Ovey speculated that some 
dumping of Soviet grain might occur but that that 
eventuality depended on the harvest yields; the 
Northern Department did not seem so concerned, and a 
junior member minuted that there was not 'much fear 
of dumping for some time to come' (1). The disruption 
on the agricultural front led the Foreign Office to 
under-estimate the likelihood of dumping of grain (a 
reasonable assumption for a Western economy, but the 
Russians were prepared to 'force' grain out of the 
peasants for export) .
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 83; Ovey to Henderson,
2 June 1930, N3827/764/38, FO 371/14876.
One concomitant of the new drive instigated 
by Stalin was the attacks on 'bourgeois specialists' 
(linked in part with the desire to discredit the 
Bukharinist line of co-operation with non-party 
specialists) and the concessionaires. In the late 
1920s Soviet dissatisfaction with the operation of 
the concessions led to a gradual winding up of their 
activities, and the repercussions were to be felt- by 
the largest British firm, Lena Goldfields (which in 
1928 had produced 35% of all g&d mined in the Soviet 
Union), when in mid-December 1929 its offices were 
raided by the O.G.P.U. and a number of Russian 
employees arrested. During the trial of these employ­
ees in the spring of 1930, British employees and the 
Company itself were implicated in charges of anti- 
Soviet activities, to which the Company responded by 
withdrawing their European employees and repudiating 
further responsibility for the working of the concess­
ion. A Court of Arbitration, meeting in Berlin, 
awarded the Lena Goldfields Company compensation of 
£13 million, to be paid by the Soviet Government .
Owing to the lack of response from the Soviet side, 
the Foreign Office found themselves involved, from 
October 1930 onwards, in trying to persuade the Soviet 
side to pay the compensation; Narkomindel refused to 
accept.that it was a diplomatic question, arguing that
it should be solved directly between the Company and 
the Soviet Chief Concessions Committee. The question 
was still unresolved when Henderson left office in 
August 1931 (1).
The Soviet objective was to speed up the 
liquidation of the various foreign concessions by 
frightening off the concessionaires, and the Soviet 
side remained as intransigent over the claim for 
compensation as they did over the whole claims 
question; as one historian has observed, the treat­
ment of the Lena Goldfields Company became !a minor 
but annoying episode that illustrated the lack of 
Soviet response to Henderson's genuine attempts to 
create goodwill' (2).
The frustrations and friction which bedevilled 
the resolution of the outstanding problems on the 
financial and economic level were paralleled by con­
tinuing altercations on the political level. Indeed, 
such were the difficulties that Ovey had to conclude 
at the end of February 1930 that 'our public relations 
with the Soviet Government are literally worse than
1, Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic 
Development, 1917-1930, (Stanford 1968) pp^ 95-98.
The summary in the present thesis is based on material 
in files FO 371/14867-14869, 15605-15606. For the 
legal aspects see B.A. Wortley, Expropriation in 
.International Law, (Cambridge 1959) p.62.
2. C. F. Brand, The British Labour Party, (London 1965) 
p. 138.
they were before we resumed relations'(1) .
Propaganda proved to be just as much a 
bugbear to the Labour Cabinet as it had been to the 
Conservatives. On 1 January 1930, the British 
Communist Party commenced publication of the Daily 
Worker, the first Communist daily paper in Britain, 
the very first edition of which contained a message 
of greetings from the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. (2). 
The Northern Department realised that this message 
was likely to become the starting point for 
Conservative enquiries after Parliament resumed 
sitting. Seymour commented: 'Its publication certain­
ly is sailing v. near to the wind, but I believe our 
best course will be to take it as not amounting to a 
breach of the letter of the guarantee. In itself the 
article is poor stuff & really hardly deserves notice'; 
Oliphant endorsed this opinion (3).
Henderson, however, took a stronger line.
He told Sokolnikov on 7 January that he regarded the 
message 'as a departure from the letter and the spirit 
of the recent undertaking, and as an action calculated
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 68.
2. For the birth of this paper see William Rust, Story 
of the "Daily Worker" (London 1949).
3. Minutes on extract from Daily Worker, 1 January 1930, 
N33/33/38, FO 371/14852.
to impede that improvement in the relations between 
the two countries which the impending negotiations 
had as their object'. Sokolnikov replied that it 
was a purely Comintern matter, not an inter-govern­
mental one (1) . Henderson must have felt it 
necessary to set out Britain's position firmly from 
the very beginning, while at the same time pre­
empting Conservative criticism.
After a brief discussion of the propaganda 
issue at a Cabinet meeting on 12 February, the 
British position was strongly put by Lord Parmoor, the 
Lord President of the Council, in a House of Lords' 
debate on 20 February. He re-emphasised that the 
Cabinet considered the Soviet Government were respon­
sible for the Comintern's activities, a point from 
which 'there never will be any departure either in 
the form of reservation or limitation', and described 
the Daily Worker article as a 'technical breach' of 
the propaganda pledge, but not such as to justify 
breaking off relations, the step proposed by some 
Conservatives (2) . When Ovey talked with Litvinov
1. Henderson to Ovey, 7 January 1930, N110/33/38,
FO 371/14852.
2. H.L.Deb. Vol 76, Cols 639-678. Before the debate 
the Cabinet agreed that they 'would not hesitate 
to interfere in the event of Soviet propaganda 
in territory under the control of this country, 
but that they themselves must be the judge of what 
constituted propaganda' . Cabinet Conclusions,
12 February 1930, 10(30)2, CAB 23/63.
about this debate he gained theimpression that the 
Russian was ’seriously perturbed’ and ’extremely 
worried at the situation and the possibility of a 
rupture’; Ovey concluded that theSoviet Government 
’have had a fright, and may perhaps proceed for some 
while at least with a little more caution1 (1).
Henderson, however, was in a pessimistic mood 
about the state of relations when he telegraphed to 
Ovey on 26 February:
'I can claim to have done more than any other 
to bring about resumption of relations with 
the Soviet Government in the teeth of 
formidable opposition, and my desire to develop 
and improve those relations continues, 
nevertheless my difficulties have been 
immensely increased by reason of the fact 
that far from campaign of propaganda and 
abuse undergoing some diminution as a 
result of action of His Majesty's Govern­
ment in exchanging Ambassadors, campaign 
would seem to all appearance to have been 
increased in intensity since exchange has 
taken place1 (2).
Hendersonfs difficulties already had been 
compounded by a new issue, that of Soviet religious 
persecution, which aroused strong public reactions 
in Britain and other European countries . The direct 
attack launched on the Church in the early 1920s by
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 66, 67, 68; Ovey to
Henderson, 28 February 1930, N1573/28/38, FO 371/14846.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc.No.69.
the Soviet authorities had failed, but as part of 
the forced pace of industrialisation and collectivisa­
tion and the imposition of strict political controls, 
the vigorous attacks on the kulaks were carried over 
against priests of all denominations in late 1929 (1).
In Britain and other European countries 
Christians of all denominations protested against 
the religious persecution, and in Britain Conservative 
politicians and press subjected the Labour Government 
to a series of enquiries during the first months of 
1930 . As a result Henderson asked Ovey to examine 
the real situation as far as could be ascertained, 
and with this end in view Ovey saw Litvinov on 
31 January 1930. Litvinov made it clear that any 
official representations about Soviet religious policy 
would be regarded as undue interference in the internal 
affairs of the Soviet Union, but he did offer to 
provide information on Soviet religious legislation (2).
On 9 February 1930 the Pope published an 
open letter in which he condemned the religious 
persecution inside Soviet Russia and announced his
1. For the general background, see Walter Kolarz, 
Religion in the Soviet Union, (New York 1966).
See also Schef f er, op.cit. pp .40-46 .
2. Popov, Diplomaticheskie Otnosheniya, op.cit. p.51; 
Ovey to Henderson, 31 January 1930, N630, N631/23/38, 
FO 371/14852.
intention of offering a Mass of expiation and inter­
cession (1) . In Britain a debate was held in the 
House of Lords, with the Archbishop of Canterbury 
leading the critics of Government inaction. Lord 
Parmoor replied that, while fundamentally opposed 
to any form of religious persecution’ and having no 
intention 'to belittle the horrors in Russia', it was 
difficult either to obtain accurate information or to 
interfere in the internal affairs of another state (2).
However, theGovernment did receive some 
more comprehensive information when Ovey's report 
reached the Foreign Office on 3 March. Ovey's survey 
argued that although special legislation controlled 
religious observance and the anti-religious propaganda 
was intense, there was no evidence available to him 
of 'atrocities', there had 'been no return to the 
thumbscrew-and-rack period of religious persecution'. 
Ovey concentrated on the position of the Orthodox 
Church, but noted that there were a large number of
1. Times, 10 February 1930. The Soviet response was an 
interview by the Metropolitan Sergius, head of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, who denied that there was 
any religious persecution. Inprecor, 20 February 
1930. In Ovey's opinion, the staging of the 
interview showed that the Russians were 'definitely 
alarmed'. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 68.
2. H.L. Deb. Vol 76, Cols 574-592.
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and that 'towards all these faiths, the attitude of 
the Soviet authorities is one and the same, viz., 
that they are all equally futile and reactionary; 
their priests and religious leaders are deprived of 
civil rights, and their communities are politically 
suspect'. Ovey concluded:
'I must repeat once again that we are here 
on very delicate ground ...that the present 
Government and its supporters are convinced 
that the material disadvantages of religious 
faith outweigh its spiritual consolations, 
that their policy is to secularise the 
thought of the people, that they unquestion­
ably exert to this end a degree of pressure 
which offends our modern ideas of tolerance, 
but that they stop short on the fringe of 
persecution by violence ... and that any 
interference from abroad in what they regard 
as the internal affairs of the Soviet Union 
would not only be met with very general 
resentment, but might quite possibly tend to 
increase the hardships and sufferings of 
that very class of people whose lot it was 
intended to alleviate' (1).
Prior to the arrival of Ovey's report, the 
Cabinet had had an open mind on the question of possible 
publication of the report, but after reading it both 
Henderson and Dalton favoured publication, as they felt 
that it would to a certain extent deflate the campaign 
in Britain. However, Vansittart, the newly-appointed
1. Ovey to Henderson, 24 February 1930, N1390/23/38, 
FO 371/14842.
Permanent Under-Secretary of State, strongly opposed 
publication as it would 'set a very bad precedent, 
and would make Ovey's position in Moscow almost 
untenable'; Ovey himself opposed publication on 
similar grounds. These arguments convinced Henderson 
and the Cabinet against publication (1).
Henderson therefore resisted Conservative 
back-bench pressure in Parliament to publish this 
report, and, although the Labour Government's decision 
to allow no member of the British Services to be 
compulsorily paraded at the church services on 
19 March when intercessionary prayers were to be said 
for the 'persecuted peoples of Russia' provoked con­
troversy (2), in the late spring the campaign began 
to die down. At a final debate on the subject in the 
Lords on 2 April, the Archbishop of Canterbury detailed 
instances of cruelty and persecution in the Soviet 
treatment of believers, but the Government spokesmen 
rejected the idea of protests being made to Moscow (3).
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 19 February, 11(30)3, and 5 March 
1930, 13(30)2, both CAB 23/63; Ovey to Henderson,
1 March 1930, included in C.P.74 (30), CAB 24/210:
Dalton Diaries, 3 March 1930. Dalton described it 
as 'a first-class document, blowing up all the 
atrocity stories, but allowing that priests, like 
kulaks, have a thin time'.
2. Coates, op.cit. pp.344-345; Cabinet Conclusions,
12 March 1930, 15(30)5, CAB 23/63; Henderson to Ovey,
13 March 1930, N1649/23/38, FO 371/14843.
3. H.L.Deb. Vol76, Cols 1131-1181; Popov, Diplomaticheskie 
Otnosheniya,op.cit.p.59. Ovey thought the Archbishop's 
account represented a 'fair picture'. Ovey to Henderson, 
19 May 1930, N3470/23/38, FO 371/14843. In August 1930 
the White Paper on Soviet religious legislation was 
published as Cmd. 3641.
A recent Soviet commentary asserts that 
'the English Labour Government's evasive position 
in regard to the developing campaign, including 
sometimes even direct support, helped it to become 
more active' (1). The Labour Cabinet (as indeed were 
the German Government) were caught in a dilemma 
which resulted in a rather ambivalent attitude. As 
Henderson explained to Ovey, the Cabinet did 'not 
accept much of what passes for evidence of religious 
persecution', but they did not want to dissociate 
themselves from the view that the Soviet Government 
'in striving to secure the universal acceptance of 
beliefs which they have every right to hold and 
propagate, employ methods of discrimination which 
British and other opinion regard as substantially 
unjust' (2). Sensitive to being accused of interfer­
ence in Soviet internal affairs, the Cabinet relied on 
hints to the Russians about the strength of feeling 
amongst public opinion and tried to prevent adverse 
repercussions on relations in general (3) .
1. D.V.P. Vol XIII, note 22. See also Popov, Diplomatichesk 
Otnosheniya, op.cit. p.56.
2. Henderson to Ovey, 11 April 1930, N2238/23/38,
FO 371/14843.
3. After 1917 British policy had been to avoid official 
representations over Soviet religious questions, 
with the notable exception of the firm protests in 
1923 .
The Soviet Government depicted the movement 
as part of a world-wide conspiracy, particularly as 
the protest movements in both Britain and Germany 
were very vocal. Soviet diplomats worked during 
the spring of 1930 to counter any united capitalist 
action (1), but of more significance in the dampening 
down of the protest campaign by the summer of 1930 
was the change in Soviet policy, for Stalin's 
temporary halt to the collectivisation campaign was 
complemented by the virtual admission of failure in 
the new anti-religious campaign in the Central 
Committee's decree of 14 March 1930 and the substitu­
tion of the indirect for the direct method of attack 
on religion (2).
As the issue of religious persecution died 
down, the Labour Cabinet found themselves once again 
having to consider action over propaganda. Consistent 
with the line introduced at the Sixth Comintern 
Congress, the Comintern organs and the British Communist 
Party continued to criticise the Labour Government's
1. Popov, Diplomaticheskie Otnosheniya, op.cit. p.59; 
D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 66, 77; D.V.P. Vol XIII, 
Doc .No .84. For the German situation, see Dyck, op. 
cit. pp. 162-174, 191-195.
2. Schapiro, op.cit. p.477. Ovey hoped that the Soviet 
pronouncements would result in 'at least temporary 
alleviation of the situation, both as regards the 
faithful and the peasants'. Ovey to Henderson,
19 May 1930, N3470/22/38V FO 371/14843 .
policies, with which the workers were said to be 
increasingly disillusioned. To the Enlarged 
Presidium of E.C.C.I., meeting in February 1930, 
this meant favourable conditions for the growth of 
the British Communist Party into a mass party (1) .
In reality, the Daily Worker's circulation was 
small, the Party's membership continued to fall, 
and Labour leaders were scathing about its effect­
iveness (2) . At the Sixteenth Party Congress in July 
1930, Molotov had to admit that the difficulties of 
the British Party had still not been solved and that 
it was weak and out of touch with the masses (3).
While Henderson and the Cabinet were con­
temptuous of the Comintern pronouncements and 
activities in Britain, Comintern activities in India 
continued to be subjected to careful examination. 
Communal tension revived in mid-March 1930, when 
Mahatma Gandhi inaugurated the civil disobedience 
campaign through his march to the sea to take salt 
illegally. By May it was clear to the British and 
Indian authorities that this movement was 'a formidable 
menace to constituted Government', but it was not a
1. Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol I, pp.246-247; Degras, 
Comintern, op.cit. Vol III, p. 100.
2. H.C.Deb. Vol 238, Col 939; H.L.Deb. Vol 76, Col 761, 
Vol 79, Col 125. In the spring of 1930 the Labour 
Party proscribed several communist-controlled organ­
isations such as the League Against Imperialism.
3. Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol I, p.63.
communist-inspired movement (1). Indeed, the Comintern 
continued to criticise the Indian nationalist movement 
and Gandhi himself (2).
Although these Comintern pronouncements 
were out of touch with Indian realities, statements 
such as the article published in the Daily Worker, 
on 8 May, congratulating an Indian regiment on having 
mutinied and urging British regiments to do the same, 
touched British sensitivities. The Northern Department 
officials agreed that because of the increasing 
vituperation of the articles, the previous policy of 
treating with contempt should be abandoned in favour 
of prosecuting the Daily Worker. Senior officials 
agreed, although Vansittart and Dalton added the rider 
that ’a prosecution should only be undertaken if we 
are sure of conviction' (3). However, MacDonald, 
haunted by visions of a repetition of the Campbell 
Case, was reluctant to embark on prosecution; the 
final decision was left to the Attorney-General, Sir 
William Jowitt, who evidently on further legal advice 
decided against prosecution (4).
1. Brown, op.cit. pp. 80-152; Saha, op.cit. pp.156-157.
2. Donaldson, op.cit. pp. 41-42; Imam, op.cit. pp.303-308.
3. Foreign Office Minute, 9 May 1930, N3178/33/38,
FO 371/14854; Dalton Diaries, 12 May 1930.
4. Ibid, 12 and 19 May 1930. Jowitt sat in on the 
Cabinet discussions on 21 May, but the Cabinet records 
make no mention of a prosecution.
On his return from Geneva, Henderson saw 
Sokolnikov and impressed on him the graveness of 
the situation, referring to the Daily Worker articles 
and to 'circumstantial reports' that Soviet officials, 
not necessarily in Britain, might be involved in 
activities of an 'indefensible character'. Sokolnikov 
protested the innocence of his officials, but 
Henderson warned him that investigations might have 
to be made (1); he then suggested at the Cabinet 
meeting the following day, 21 May, that the available 
evidence be examined to determine the extent and 
nature of the Soviet propaganda activities. A special 
Cabinet committee was set up under Lord Sankey, the 
Lord Chancellor (2). Copies of the wide-ranging 
secret material submitted to the committee are not 
available, but the general nature can be deduced from 
contemporaneous departmental papers and from the brief 
final report of the Cabinet committee.
1. Henderson to Ovey, 20 May 1930, N3513/33/38, FO 
371/14854.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 21 May 1930, 28(30)1, CAB 23/64; 
Sankey Papers, held in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, 
e .284, Diary entry, 21 May 1930. An 'influential 
Labour politician' told Sokolnikov that the Cabinet 
forced Henderson, who strongly objected, to set up 
the enquiry. D.V.P. Vol XIII, Doc.No. 381. However, 
when seeing Sokolnikov the day before the Cabinet 
meeting, Henderson had hinted about an enquiry.
A Home Office report at the end of May 
1930 on the internal security aspects of national
%
defence was cautiously confident that, whatever 
attempts were being made by communist and seditious 
elements to aggravate strikes and other industrial 
disputes, these efforts were relatively ineffective, 
with a 'remote1 chance of success (1).
It was the propaganda in the Empire that, 
as earlier, proved the area of greatest concern. A 
Foreign Office minute early in June 1930 noted the 
growth in communist press articles denouncing British 
actions in India during the unrest there, but stated 
that no evidence was available to directly link Moscow 
with the disturbances (2). An India Office report in 
June highlighted the Meerut Trial as being responsible 
for completely disorganising the communist movement 
inside India. However, although 'the actual communist 
movement is for the moment at a discount, it would be 
unsafe to underestimate the importance of the propaganda 
which is being disseminated* through organisations such 
as the British Communist Party and the League Against
1. Home Office Memorandum, 30 May 1930, C.I.D. 1008-B, 
CAB 4/20. Clynes had told the Commons that he 
did not consider communist leaflets to be a danger 
to the public interest. H.C.Deb. Vol 238, Cols 
1035-1036.
2. Foreign Office Minute, 4 June 1930, N3870/28/38,
FO 371/14850.
Imperialism (1). Another Cabinet committee which 
had been set up in April 1930 to examine the specific 
' question of Indian unrest also endorsed the general 
opinion that the disturbances had been initiated and 
carried out by the Indian National Congress, which 
was itself increasingly vilified by the communists (2).
More damning than the evidence of the 
Comintern’s propaganda inside India seems to have been 
information supplied by the British secret service 
of breaches of the propaganda pledge by Soviet officials. 
The committee saw a ’photographic copy of a letter 
signed by a Soviet official’ and ’a considerable 
number of typewritten copies, made by agents, of 
instructions for propaganda issued by the Comintern 
or ,an affiliated body and transmitted by Soviet 
officials to their destination’; senior departmental
1. India Office Report, June 1930, N3392/132/38, FO 
371/16325. This report, based on secret information 
and forwarded to the Foreign Office for their 
information only in May 1932, may have formed part 
of the India Office’s submission to the Cabinet 
committee•
2. Defence of India Sub-Committee, ’Indian Unrest’, 
papers in Air Ministry file AIR 8/122. MacDonald 
minuted on one memorandum that Bolshevik propaganda 
in the East was ’surprisingly subtle’. MacDonald 
Papers, held in the Public Record Office, London,
Minute by MacDonald, 2 September 1930, PRO 30/69/1/266.
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officials were called in to judge their authenticity (1) .
On the basis of this secret information, the 
Cabinet committee concluded in their report on 
20 October 1930 that ’the Soviet Government has not 
fulfilled the terms of its obligation’, but did not 
recommend any action such as a rupture of relations 
but rather a ’remonstrance’ by Henderson to the 
Ambassador. The Cabinet endorsed this recommendation (2).
The investigation had continued throughout 
the summer, and by October Henderson felt that, since 
the agitation in Parliament and the press had died 
down, it might be preferable to leave matters as they 
were, but the Foreign Office officials pointed out 
that with the resumption of Parliament questions were 
bound to be asked. Vansittart supported the opinion 
of the other senior officials that any action should 
be in the form of a verbal representation but without 
giving any evidence (3). In contrast with the protests 
of 1923 and 1927, both Foreign Office officials and 
the Cabinet were opposed to the use of the secret 
information in support of the British case.
1. Cabinet Committee Report, 20 October 1930, \
C.P.349(30), CAB 24/215.
2. Ibid; Cabinet Conclusions, 28 October 1930, 64(30)1, 
CAB 23/65.
3. Minutes by Seymour, Oliphant, Vansittart and Selby, 
24-27 October 1930, N7437/33/38, FO 371/14855.
With the use of this secret material 
excluded, Henderson’s representations to Sokolnikov 
on 29 October centred on the Comintern’s activities 
(in particular in India as Henderson hinted), and the 
varying interpretations placed on the propaganda pledge 
by the two Governments. Henderson stated that a 
continuation of propaganda 'could not but endanger the 
good relations’, but Sokolnikov reiterated the Soviet 
Government’s divorce from the Comintern (1). Both 
sides in effect agreed to differ, and Henderson 
admitted this to the House of Commons later the same 
day (2). The following week Litvinov told Julius 
Curtius, the German Foreign Minister, that Henderson 
had ’only spoken formally to the Russian Ambassador 
in order to reassure his public opinion' (3); the 
Russians did not anticipate any further action from 
the British side.
1. D.V.P. Vo). XIII, Doc .Nos . 374, 381; Henderson to 
Ovey, 6 November 1930, N7605/33/38, FO 371/14855.
2. H.C.Deb. Vol 244, Cols 37-38. The Soviet interpret­
ation was strongly affirmed in an editorial in 
Izvestiya, 3 November 1930.
3. Memorandum by Curtius, 3 November 1930, G.F.M. 
Archives, Serial 2860/D561876-82. According to 
Litvinov, Henderson said that he had 'no cause 
for real complaint', but this is not substantiated 
by the records by Henderson and Sokolnikov.
In the early summer of 1930, as the 
propaganda issue once more came to the fore, another 
issue began to be raised by Conservative back-benchers. 
The question of forced or slave labour in the Soviet 
timber industry was, like the religious persecution 
problem, to place the Labour Government in an awkward 
position in their relations with the Soviet Government. 
During the first half of 1930, various groups in 
Britain and the Dominions, notably Canada, began to 
protest against the Soviet dumping of raw materials, 
of which timber was the major item (not until the 
late summer did the Soviets start to export grain in 
large quantities). In 1930 imports of timber from 
the Soviet Union were to form 25% of all British 
timber imports (see Appendix Four of this thesis); 
the Canadians opposed mainly the price of these imports, 
whereas the British opposition movement turned more 
on the conditions under which the timber was produced.
One of the basic tenets of the drive for 
cdlectivisation in the winter of 1929-30 was the 
liquidation of the rich peasants, the kulaks (although 
by implication the term 'kulak1 came to mean any 
peasant who tried to evade the procurements), if 
necessary by deportation to distant regions of Soviet 
Russia and incarceration in labour camps. At the same 
time, Soviet planning agencies received orders to use 
the inmates of the corrective labour camps for certain
projects in inhospitable areas, such as timber 
production in the far north. During the spring and 
summer of 1930 a few fugitives escaped abroad and 
their stories of conditions provoked a press campaign 
in Britain and other Western countries (1).
With questions being asked in Parliament 
in April and May 1930, the Foreign Office appreciated 
that a situation similar to that regarding religious 
persecution could arise, namely a demand for publica­
tion of reports from Ovey. At Henderson’s request,
Ovey did submit a report on 10 June regarding the 
labour situation, including details of Soviet labour 
legislation. Ovey pointed out that ’compulsory 
labour1 existed as regards ’prisoners and transportees, 
and in certain cases of national emergency’, but ’it 
is theoretically never unpaid’; he did not think that 
’slavery* existed. He concluded that since he was in 
no position to investigate individual cases of abuse 
it was difficult to give a more comprehensive assess­
ment (2). No further action was taken by the Foreign 
Office officials, who decided to wait out the 
opposition. In July 1930, Snowden informed the Commons
1. For the background see David Dallin and Boris 
Nicolaevsky, Forced Labour in the Soviet Union, 
(London 1948) pp.149-190; Robert Conquest, The Great 
Terror, (London 1971 - Penguin Rev.ed.), pp.453-454; 
Coates, op.cit. pp.362-364.
2. Seymour to Ovey, 24 May, N3414, and Ovey to Henderson, 
10 June 1930, N4022/1459/38, both FO 371/14879.
that the Foreign Prison-made Goods Act could not 
be invoked for the purpose of prohibiting Russian timber 
imports unless definite evidence existed that any 
particular consignment had been partially or wholly 
made under prison conditions (1) . The campaign abated 
slightly during the autumn, but was to be revived 
during the winter of 1930-31.
In this way, the continuing bugbear of 
propaganda and ’new’ issues such as religious 
persecution and forced labour clouded political 
relations and hampered Henderson’s attempts to improve 
the general relationship, particularly on the economic 
level.
The first half of 1930 saw a general deter­
ioration in the relations of the major European powers 
with the Soviet Union, particularly in the case of 
France and Germany. A long editorial in Izvestiya, on 
1 May 1930, outlined the numerous instances of the 
aggressive plans of the capitalist countries for ’future 
anti-Soviet action’ (2). This theme continued to be 
displayed in Soviet pronouncements, but it was increas­
ingly apparent to outside observers that it was being 
used only for internal purposes, to promote greater 
dedication to the economic reconstruction.
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 241, Col 1913.
2. Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol I, pp.41-42.
At the Sixteenth Party Congress in June 
1930, Stalin explained Soviet foreign policy as one 
of ’peace and the strengthening of trading relations 
with all countries’. He said that the mere absence 
of war was not enough for Soviet reconstruction, for 
economic ties with other countries were still needed. 
The keynote of his speech was as follows: ’We do not 
want a single foot of foreign territory. But we will 
not give up a single inch of our territory either, to 
anyone’ (1). Voroshilov also addressed the Congress, 
linking the acceleration in the tempo of industrial­
isation with the need to guarantee the defence of the 
Soviet Union (2) . The Foreign Office se^m to have 
accepted that the Soviet Union was not likely to 
desire anything other than peace for the purposes of 
carrying on the economic reconstruction. In May 1930, 
in the first of his ’Old Adam’ memoranda, Vansittart 
concluded that ’the Five Year Plan, and all that 
depends upon it, is likely to act as a brake so far 
as external adventures are concerned’ (3).
Despite the bitter condemnation of the 
capitalist countries expressed by the Soviet press and 
the Comintern, it was necessary for the Soviet Union 
to maintain economic and diplomatic relations with
1. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, pp.260-264.
2. Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol I, pp .284-288.
3. D.B.F.P. IA/VII, App.
these same powers. Commenting on Litvinov's 
appointment as Foreign Commissar in July 1930,
Izvestiya pointed out that the Five Year Plan was 
neither a preparation for war nor a reflection of 
Soviet isolationism, adding: ’We are striving to 
make our country economically strong and independent.
But the independence of even the strongest governments 
in the economic sense does not mean that they are not 
in need of economic connections with other countries ’(1).
Litvinov informed press correspondents that 
his appointment to succeed Chicherin did not imply 
any change in Soviet foreign policy because for ten 
years he had been a close associate of Chicherin and 
because Soviet foreign policy, determined by the will 
of the masses, was not subject to fluctuations (2).
Of more relevance was the fact that Stalin and the 
Politburo’s control over the major decision-making 
processes ensured a continuity in the diplomatic arm. 
Chicherin, dogged by ill-health, had returned from his 
convalescence abroad in January 1930, but he did not
1. Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol I, pp.41-42.
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, pp. 449- 
451; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 92.
resume active work (1), and Litvinov’s appointment 
only made official the unofficial practice of the 
previous year. Litvinov, temperamentally different 
to Chicherin, was evidently more in tune with Stalin’s 
ideas on foreign policy . However, the role of the 
Narkomindel in the Soviet foreign policy structure 
did not alter significantly, and Litvinov, like 
Chicherin, continued to act as an executor of Stalin 
and the Politburo’s decisions on the major issues. 
Litvinov, who had an English wife, was thought by 
Dirksen, the German Ambassador in Moscow, to be more 
pro-British than Chicherin (2).
Polish and British diplomats in Moscow had 
interpreted Stalin’s ’dizzy with success' article as 
a sign of Stalin’s loss of influence at the top (3).
1. S.V.Zarnitskii and A. Sergeev, Chicherin, (Moscow 
1966) p .249 ff . The Foreign Office were surprised 
at Litvinov's appointment because,since the autumn 
of 1929, they had considered his position as rather 
insecure. Sir George Clerk, Ambassador at Angora, 
to Henderson, 3 November 1929, N5149/280/38,
FO 371/14041; Ovey to Henderson, 19 April 1930, 
N2720/75/38, FO 371/14860; Ovey to Henderson, 22 
jruly 1930, N5159/75/38, FO 371/14862; D.B.F.P.
II/VII, Doc .Nos. 91, 92.
2. Herbert von Dirksen, Moscow, Tokyo, London,
(Oklahoma 1952) p.80. Dalton, on the other hand, 
felt that Litvinov 'bears a grudge against this 
country for turning him out with little justification, 
during the war'. Minute on Clerk to Henderson,
N5149/280/38, FO 371/14041.
3. Ovey to Henderson, 15 April 1930, N2566/75/38, 
FO 371/14860.
However, the Sixteenth Party Congress gave the lie 
to this belief, as Tomsky was removed from the 
* Politburo (Bukharin had already been removed in 
November 1929) and three Stalinists were elected.
After a brief respite, Rykov was removed in December 
1930 and replaced as Chairman of the Council of 
People’s Commissars by Molotov (1). The evidence 
from the Foreign Office files is that despite the 
presence of the Embassy staff in Moscow the inner 
workings of the Soviet hierarchy, such as Stalin’s 
position and Litvinov’s standing, were relatively 
obscured from accurate assessment by outside observers.
Like their Soviet counterparts, the British 
Government were forced to devote most of their 
attention to internal problems. The shock waves of 
the collapse of the American economy were making them­
selves felt in Britain. During 1930 the unemployment 
figures progressively worsened, reaching 1,912,000 in 
June and 2,500,000 in December 1930. The most marked 
symptoms of the depression were to be found in the 
indicators relating to foreign trade, as world 
commodity prices collapsed and the British export value 
and volume decreased. The severe world-wide trade
1. Cohen, op.cit. pp. 347-352.
depression was therefore superimposed on Britain’s 
* special national difficulties’ . The Government 
believed that only a trade revival could ’mop up’ 
the unemployment, but the Labour Party was split over 
economic policy (as seen from Mosley’s resignation 
and the arguments at the Labour Party Conference in 
October 1930). In turn, hopes that the Soviet 
market might prove part of the solution increased (1).
Although the Conservative Party in 1930 
was ’divided, disgruntled and confused’, relations 
with Soviet Russia was one issue on which it could 
be relied to reunite. In the year after the signing 
of the October Protocol it was the prompting of 
Conservative back-benchers which brought issues such 
as religious persecution and forced labour (and also 
dumping later) into prominence. While concerned on 
humanitarian grounds about the conditions inside the 
Soviet Union, the Cabinet in practice took elaborate 
care to try not to ’offend Soviet susceptibilities’, 
since they feared repercussions on the development of 
relations and possibly a rupture from the Soviet side (2),
1. Marquand, op.cit. pp. 518-570. The Russians felt 
that the growing unemployment would make the 
Cabinet more active in seeking orders. D.V.P.
Vol XIII, Doc .No. 361.
2. Memorandum by Henderson, 3 March 1930, C .P. 74(30), 
CAB 24/210.
by avoiding any action which could be interpreted 
as interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet 
Union. On the propaganda issue, Henderson took a 
firm line initially, but the constant repetition of 
Soviet breaches of the propaganda obligations and 
British representations became the norm (1).
Henderson’s efforts to ’persuade’ the 
Russians that their policies were endangering Anglo- 
Soviet relations and placing him in an awkward 
political position elicited little response. Always 
mindful of the 1924 precedents, the Cabinet were not 
in general prepared to risk their political survival 
on the issue of Soviet Russia. A comment by Dalton, 
although specifically referring to the religious 
persecution issue, has a more general application:
’In the last resort, he (Henderson) and I agree, we 
may have to choose between sending Sokolnikoff away 
or.seeing the Government go down. If that wretched 
choice comes, we shan’t willingly choose the latter (2).
The signature of the Temporary Commercial 
and Fisheries Agreements represented an improved 
relationship, but the difficulties over debts and
1. Passfield told the Russians that the Labour Cabinet’s 
attitude towards propaganda was not so different 
from the Conservative Cabinet's. Popov, Diplomat- 
icheskie Otnosheniya, op.cit. p.35.
2. Dalton Diaries, 18 February 1930.
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claims negotiations and the Soviet insistence on 
credits before any significant increase in orders 
could be placed meant that, as far as the British 
were concerned, the moderate advances on the economic 
level did not adequately compensate for the continued 
difficulties on the political level.
The Soviet side looked to exploit the 
British market as protectionist sentiment grew in the 
West and the Depression deepened. Relations with 
France began to deteriorate, and the French pre­
dominancy in the political action of the Pan-Europe 
plan and the economic anti-dumpting action made 
Britain, along with Germany, seem to the Russians as 
constituting a break in the capitalist ranks. Despite 
the publicly-expressed suspicions of the Labour 
Government (1), the Soviet Government must have felt 
greater confidence than previously vis-a-vis Britain 
and, having obtained the main treaty requirements, 
they displayed no real inclination to settle the other 
outstanding questions.
1. The Comintern line dictated criticism of the
Labour leadership, but Kalinin also explained to 
Ovey that ’the Bolsheviks naturally disliked most 
those people whose policy was nearer to theirs 
than that of the reactionaries and therefore more 
dangerous’. D.B.F.P. I I/VI I, Doc .No . 49.
An apt comment on the state of the 
relationship was that of Lazar Kaganovich, a candidate 
member of the Politburo, in June 1930: fAt present 
our relations with England are, I would not say 
flourishing, but they are not at any rate as strained 
as they were * (1).
1. Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol I, p.269.
CHAPTER EIGHT: DISILLUSIONMENT
During the second half of 1930 the issue 
of Soviet dumping, through both its economic and 
political ramifications, dominated the Soviet Union’s 
relations with the West. Partially as a result of 
the excellent harvest of 1930 and partially as a 
result of the intensification of the ’forcing’ of 
exports, the Soviet economic planners were able to 
override market forces and domestic shortages and to 
shift resources to the higher priority sectors such 
as foreign trade (1). With apparent disregard for 
either selling price abroad or scarcity at home, the 
Russians expanded their grain exports; this in turn 
further depressed prices on the world market, since 
the surpluses of all the major grain-producing countries 
had already provoked a slump in prices.
The re-emergence of Russian wheat on the 
British market provoked criticism from politicians 
and businessmen concerned about the price and volume 
of these imports. In the light of this domestic 
interest, in mid-October 1930 William Strang, the 
acting Charge d ’Affaires in Moscow, sent a long despatch
1. Dohan, op.cit. pp. 612-613.
in which he analysed theSoviet grain exporting 
policy. He noted that the fall in world prices of 
raw materials, coupled with a reduction in the 
amount of non-cereal foodstuffs available for export 
and a short-fall in timber production, made it 'all 
the more vital to develop grain export to the highest 
possible point'. He concluded that 'the action of 
the Soviet Government, whatever its results, was 
dictated by economic necessity, and the present 
situation is explicable by that hypothesis alone'.
This despatch served to confirm the general view 
already formed in the Foreign Office that 'in this 
case at least, the Soviet Government "dumps" because 
they must, merely to secure foreign currency, and 
without any deep laid plans for the future' (1).
The Soviet Government denied the accusations 
of dumping in Britain and Europe; Ambassador Sokolnikov 
told a British newspaper correspondent in November 
1930 that Soviet Russia was not dumping 'simply re­
establishing her exports of agricultural produce' 
which in turn made it possible to import machinery (2).
3.. Strang to Henderson, 14 October 1930, N7181/6924/38, 
FO 371/14886. See also D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No . 94. 
The German Government too concluded that Soviet 
dumping was only a means to earn foreign currency . 
Dyck, op.cit. p.221.
2. Manchester Guardian, 21 November 1930. See also 
Daily Herald, 23 October 1930.
However, in the case of Britain, the Cabinet had no 
inclination to take any action against the Soviet 
dumping of grain. As Graham explained to one
Conservative questioner: ’The only way in which we
can take action is by tariffs, prohibition and 
licences. We are perfectly satisfied that the loss 
to our trade from any action of that kind would be
greater than any gain' (1). Not only were the
majority of the Cabinet, led by Snowden and Graham, 
deeply wedded to the philosophy of Free Trade (in 
September 1930 the Cabinet had decided to ratify a 
convention signed at Geneva in February 1930 by which 
eleven countries committed themselves not to increase 
their tariffs until April 1931), but also the terms 
of the Temporary Commercial Agreement signed in April 
1930 precluded Britain from discriminating against 
Russian goods, whether by duties, licences or pro­
hibitions; moreover the agreement could only be 
denounced at six months notice, with the consequent 
risk of forestalling and of Soviet retaliatory action 
against British exports.
In Parliament throughout the autumn and 
winter of 1930 Conservative politicians continued to
1. H.C.Deb . Vol 244, Col 636.
press for some action against the Soviet dumping, 
demands supported by the interested business-circles 
inside Britain, but strong pressure was also brought 
to bear on the Labour Cabinet by the Dominions, 
notably Canada, which felt that Soviet raw materials 
were seriously undercutting their own products on 
the British market. The Imperial Conference held in 
London in October 1930, provided the scene for a 
clash over this issue between Richard Bennett, the new 
Canadian Prime Minister, and the British delegation, 
headed by Snowden .
In the 1920s Imperial trade still followed 
the general patterns of nineteenth century trading, 
whereby Britain was a large importer of food and 
raw materials, and Empire products competed with 
foreign products on equal terms in the British market (1). 
With the depression in world trade, the Dominions’ 
dissatisfaction with this situation increased; Bennett, 
who had been elected on a largely protectionist plat­
form, led the demands at the Imperial Conference for 
preferential concessions, which basically meant a 10% 
increase in duties on all goods imported from outside 
the Empire .
1. See Ian M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the 
Empire, 1919-1939, (London 1972) pp. 17-25 and passim.
However, it was clear from a meeting of 
the heads of the delegations on 9 October 1930 that one 
of Bennett’s major concerns was the dumping of Soviet 
wheat and barley (Russian wheat was hard wheat similar 
to Canadian wheat) (1). Snowden sympathised with the 
aim of increasing Imperial trade, but considered that 
stories of Soviet dumping of wheat were 'grossly 
exaggerated1 and opposed tariffs as a means of stimu­
lating trade. However, the meeting agreed to set up 
a small sub-committee to examine the questions of 
wheat and Soviet dumping (2). On 13 October the heads 
of the delegations returned to the subject, but 
Graham rejected Canadian demands for action against 
Soviet wheat on the grounds that the quantities were 
not as large as had been suggested and that discrimination 
’would invoke a rupture of the commercial relations with 
Russia’ and merely send Soviet wheat to markets else­
where (3). The special sub-committee’s report, produced 
only after considerable argument, noted the concern 
of the Dominions about Soviet wheat but contained no 
definite recommendations; the heads of the delegations
1. Ernest Watkins, R.B. Bennett, (London 1963), p.150, 
while highlighting the difficulties of the Canadians 
in trying to obtain preferences from the Free Trade 
Labour Cabinet, notes timber as the keypoint of 
Canadian opposition. However, Canadian and British 
documentary sources show that wheat was the focus
of Canadian attention.
2. D.Can.E.R. Vol 4, Doc .No. 175.
3. Ibid. Doc.No.176.
meeting on 13 November could only agree to ’receive’ 
this report, rather than ’accept’ it (1). With other 
inter-Imperial economic problems also unsolved, it 
was agreed,,at Bennett’s suggestion,to reconvene the 
following year at Ottawa for a specifically economic 
Imperial Conference (although the British financial 
crisis caused its postponement until 1932).
Therefore, the British delegation had 
resisted the pressure of the Dominions'on this issue.
In mid-December 1930, Graham raised the whole question 
with the Cabinet, reviewing the evidence regarding 
imports of not only wheat but also timber, cotton goods 
and furs from Soviet Russia. He noted that with the 
exception of wheat and timber ’no substantial imports’ 
had taken place, that ’with regard to price, definite 
and reliable information is difficult to obtain’, and 
concluded that he did not propose ’to take any powers 
to prohibit or restrict the importation of goods into 
this country on the grounds of the prices at which they 
are offered’. The Cabinet endorsed his line (2).
1. Report of Committee on Economic Co-operation,
5 November 1930, E.E.(30) 62, and Minutes of Meeting 
of Heads of Delegations, 13 November 1930, P.M. (30)28, 
both CAB 32/99; D.Can.E.R. Vol 4, Doc .No.193.
2. Memorandum by Graham, 9 December 1930, C.P.416(30)
CAB 24/217; Cabinet Conclusions, 17 December 1930, 
73(30)9, CAB 23/65.
Throughout the winter and spring of 1930-31, this 
line was maintained in response to Conservative 
questions. In the spring of 1931 the Cabinet was 
split over the general application of a wheat quota, 
with deadlock as the result (1), and the specific 
question of Soviet dumping was referred to a Cabinet 
Committee which was surveying the trade position. At 
the end of May 1931, Graham submitted to this sub­
committee a further review on imports from the Soviet 
Union in which he reached similar conclusions to his 
earlier memorandum, namely the disadvantages out­
weighed the advantages of abrogating the April 1930 
Agreement and taking action against Soviet goods.
Due to the illnesses of leading members and then the 
financial crisis, this review was considered by 
neither the Cabinet sub-committee nor the full Cabinet 
(2), but it seems probable that the majority of Cabinet 
opinion would have endorsed these conclusions.
Bennett and his Cabinet, forced reluctantly 
to accept that neither Britain nor even the United 
States was prepared to impose an unlimited embargo on 
Soviet products, made the decision for unilateral 
action. In February 1931, an Order-in-Council was
1. Marquand, op.cit. p.596.
2. Minutes of Meetings of Trade Survey Committee, 15 May 
and 21 July 1931, both CAB 27/451; Note by Graham,
27 May 1931, T.S.C.(31)6, CAB 27/451.
passed, prohibiting all imports of coal, timber and 
furs from the Soviet Union (1). This policy followed 
the line of several other countries, led by France, 
which had introduced special restrictions on Soviet 
goods earlier, in 1930. On becoming Foreign Commissar 
in July 1930, Litvinov had hinted that any countries 
enforcing a boycott on Soviet goods would suffer 
retaliatory measures, and, when ,the French restrictions 
were introduced in early October 1930, the Soviet 
Government reacted swiftly by passing a decree ’to 
stop absolutely or reduce to a minimum orders and 
purchases’ in those countries imposing restrictions 
on Soviet goods (2).
There was a marked similarity in the thinking 
of Briand and Bennett, who both saw the Soviet dumping 
not only in purely economic terms but also as an attempt 
to dislocate the capitalist world and destroy Western 
civilisation (3). Arguments such as these were used 
by the French in trying to induce German, and by the 
Canadians in trying to induce British support and co­
operation. However, both the Germans and the British,
1. Balawyder, op.cit. pp.118-148. These restrictions 
remained in force until 1936.
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, pp.450, 459; 
D.B.F.P. II/VII Doc .No. 92.
3. For Briand’s comments to the German Ambassador in Paris 
in this vein, see Dyck, op.cit. p.214. At the Imperial 
Conference Bennett said that ’dumped Russian goods 
were a menace to our civilisation, which would be 
overwhelmed if nothing were done*. D.Can.E.R. Vol 4, 
Doc.No .176.
tied by commercial treaties (France had no such treaty 
with the Soviet Union) and tempted by the prospects 
of Soviet orders which would alleviate the worsening 
unemployment situation, refused to join in any anti­
dumping action (1).
To the Soviet Union there were clear signs 
of the formation of an economic front; Molotov, speaking 
to the Sixth Congress of Soviets in March 1931, 
described the efforts to form an ’economic blockade?, 
but also drew solace from the existence of certain 
countries (by implication Britain and Germany) where 
the desire to come to terms with the Soviet Union on 
a number of economic questions survived (2). At inter­
national conferences during the spring of 1931, such as 
the World Grain Conference in Rome in March 1931 and 
the Wheat Conference in London in May 1931, the Soviet 
delegates were at pains to justify their policies (3).
By the summer of 1931 the anti-dumping campaign had lost 
much of its impetus; symptomatic was the French decision 
in July 1931 to withdraw their restrictions.
1. Dyck, op.cit. pp.214-215. Snowden told Bennett that 
he thought ’Russia would be suffering from her own 
action before the rest of the world was overwhelmed’. 
D.Can.E.R. Vol 4, Doc .No.176.
2. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, pp.473-479.
3. Coates, op.cit. pp.377-378; Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. 
Vol II, p.57. In February 1931 Sokolnikov asked 
Henderson about the British attitude to these forth­
coming conferences. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No. 53.
As the anti-dumping campaign reached a 
peak in the winter of 1930-31, at the same time a revival 
of the campaign against forced labour in the Soviet 
timber industry occurred. A Conservative politician 
sent MacDonald signed statements by escaped prisoners 
about the slave conditions in the Russian timber 
industry. MacDonald's reply in January 1931, drafted 
after consultation with the Foreign Office, stated 
that, since Soviet timber was handled by both com­
pulsory and free labour, it could not be legally proved 
that any one consignment contravened the Foreign 
Prison-made Goods Act. As to the prohibition of Soviet 
timber, ’after careful consideration of its bearing on 
our commercial relations, I am not in the present 
circumstances satisfied that such a measure is prac­
ticable ' (1) .
MacDonald, however, privately favoured making 
an overture to the Soviet Government with a view to 
making an investigation into the timber situation, 
but both the Foreign Office officials and Ambassador 
Ovey felt that a direct request for an investigation 
would be resented by Moscow (2). However, on 21 January
1. Times, 20 January 1931; Foreign Office Minute,
6 January 1931, N 105/1/38, FO 371/15587.
2. Minute by Oliph&nt, 17 January, and Henderson to 
Ovey, 20 January 1931, N199/1/38, FO 371/15587.
1931 during the course of an argumentative conversa­
tion with Litvinov, Ovey referred to the growing feel­
ing in Britain on the subject and attempted to secure 
’some form of enquiry by impartial investigators’; 
a proposal totally rejected by Litvinov, who replied 
that ’neither prison labour, nor, in general, the 
labour of sentenced persons is employed in the branches 
of the timber industry which produce for export, 
including the work at the ports’. Litvinov followed 
up this carefully-worded reply by adding that any 
wavering by the Labour Cabinet would only encourage 
the Conservatives’ campaign, which would otherwise 
soon dry up (1) .
Having rejected the idea of an embargo or 
boycott, MacDonald’s plan for an enquiry turned more 
on the desire to placate public opinion than on the 
conviction that the result would be effective in 
extracting any concessions from the Soviet side. In 
the light of Litvinov’s cold response, MacDonald had 
to tell the Commons that, as an enquiry was inappropriate, 
the Government had confined themselves to making known 
to the Russians the strength of feeling in Britain and 
to publishing as a White Paper some of the official
1. Ovey to Henderson, 21 January 1931, N460/1/38,
FO 371/15588; Popov, Diplomaticheskiye Otnosheniya, 
op.cit. pp.68-69.
Soviet labour legislation (1). On 11 February 1931, 
Henderson brought the question before the Cabinet 
again and he was authorised to see Sokolnikov and 
’impress upon him once more the seriousness of the 
situation which was growing up, for Anglo-Russian 
trade’ (2). Six days later, Henderson brought 
Sokolnikov’s attention to the growing number of 
Parliamentary questions, impressing on him that 
’this agitation was growing more serious and was 
producing real feeling both in political and non? 
political circles*. He pointed out that, although the 
Soviet Government were ’no doubt within their rights’ 
in not permitting actual conditions to be investigated 
by an outside enquiry, the Soviet attitude made ’it 
impossible to deal with the accusations in an 
authoritative manner’ (3).
No doubt anticipating further aggravation 
of this issue in their relations with the Western 
powers, above all Britain, the Soviet Government made 
a slight concession, as during the religious persecu­
tion issue. Molotov, during his address to the Sixth
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 247, Cols 163-165, 585-587. The White 
Paper was Cmd. 3775, 'Selection ofDocuments Relative 
to the Labour Legislation in force in the U.S.S.R.’
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 11 February 1931, 13(31)3, CAB
23/66. Graham was instructed to investigate whether 
the question could be brought within the scope of
the Foreign Prison-made Goods Act.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 135; D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No.
Congress of Soviets on 8 March 1931, invited 
representatives and journalists from foreign countries 
to visit the timber regions (1). Ovey telegraphed to 
the Foreign Office that he was prepared to send a 
member of his staff if necessary, but he was worried 
over the repercussions from publishing the reports .
The Foreign Office officials were unanimous in con­
sidering that the disadvantages far outweighed the 
advantages of taking up this offer officially; in the 
words of Vansittart, ’we cannot now afford to be 
deliberate dupes*. The Foreign Office therefpre 
decided to leave this matter well alone, as they right­
ly suspected that the Soviet Government ’have had ample 
time to cover up their tracks* (2).
The subject continued to be raised in 
questions and debates in the Houses of Commons and 
Lords during the spring and summer of 1931, and in May 
Lord Phillimore introduced a Bill to prevent imports 
of the products of convict or forced labour (3).
1. Manchester Guardian, 9 March 1931; Ovey to Henderson,
12 March 1931, N1760/1/38, FO 371/15589. The Soviet 
English-language paper, Moscow News, contained a series 
of interviews and reports of Russians and foreigners 
refuting 'forced labour' accusations, during the 
period January to April 1931.
2. Ovey to Henderson, 19 March 1931, N1920/1/38, FO 371/ 
15589; H.C.Deb. Vol 250, Cols 725-727; Dallin and 
Nicolaevsky, op.cit. p.224.
3. H.C.Deb. Vol 250, Cols 421-488; H.L.Deb. Vol 81, Cols 
320-352. The Bill received a Third Reading in July 
1931, but made no further progress due to the political 
crisis. The Duchess of Atholl continued to campaign 
against dumping and forced labour throughout 1931-32. 
See her autobiography, Working Partnership, (London 
1958) pp. 182-184.
Labour spokesmen consistently refused to countenance 
any form of restriction on Soviet imports, while 
admitting that the balance of evidence suggested that 
forced labour did exist within the Soviet timber 
trade. As Lord Ponsonby explained to the House of 
Lords in June 1931: 'Judging by all the reports that 
have come in from various quarters, with a bias 
one way or the other, there is no question that 
forced labour and convict labour exist in the timber 
trade in Russia... (but) we cannot make investigations 
and reports in a foreign country that will not submit 
to have the reports made* (1). As in the case of 
the campaign over religious persecution, the Labour 
Cabinet were concerned on humanitarian grounds over 
the conditions inside Soviet Russia, but the desire 
to avoid being accused of interference in the internal 
affairs of the Soviet Union and the desire to avoid 
any steps which could bring down Soviet retaliatory 
action on British exports to the Soviet Union (the 
increase of which was an article of faith for the 
Labour Cabinet) inhibited them. British policy there­
fore amounted to little more than attempting to impress 
on the Russians the strength of feeling in Britain, 
hoping thereby to take some of the steam out of the 
Conservative campaign and also to moderate Soviet
1. H.L.Deb.Vol 81, Cols 348-349.
practices in the lumber industry. In both respects 
success was limited.
This policy was maintained until the end 
of the life of the Cabinet; the campaigns against 
dumping and forced labour slowly died out during 
the summer of 1931, and Britain continued to import 
Soviet wheat and timber (see Appendix Four of this 
thesis). However, even at depressed prices, the 
considerable volume of these goods represented a 
significant factbr in the balance of Anglo-Soviet trade 
during 1930 and 1931; in fact in 1930 accounting for 
nearly half of the value of British imports from the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, although the value of British 
exports to the Soviet Union increased by nearly half 
during 1930, the increase in British imports from 
the Soviet Union ensured not only that the balance 
of trade remained favourable to the Soviet Union but 
also that the gap widened (see Appendix One).
As Parmoor explained to the Lords in November 
1930, British exports to Soviet Russia were believed 
to be an important factor in the unemployment question, 
indeed, ’that really has been the basis on which the 
whole of our policy towards Russia has been based*(1), 
but the disappointing results, in terms of the growth
of exports, led to renewed efforts during the winter 
of 1930-31 to gain further Soviet orders. In mid- 
October 1930, while attending a dinner at the Soviet 
Embassy, Henderson reproached Sokolnikov for the 
Soviet Uniorfs failure to realise the promises of a 
large turnover in trade; Sokolnikov1s reply was that 
the fault lay with the Export Credits Guarantee 
Advisory Committee and he urged a Cabinet initiative 
on this issue (1) . Sokolnikov followed up these 
comments with a letter which attempted to play off 
Britain against Germany and the United States, by 
references to possible £5 million orders if two years 
credit could be arranged and by the threat that if 
there were to be ’no change in the unfavourable credit 
conditions which are now ruling in Anglo-Soviet trade, 
the possibility of a substantial decrease in the 
Soviet orders placed in Great Britain is not excluded’ 
(2). It was precisely in November 1930, with the 
introduction of embargoes on Soviet goods by France 
and to a limited extent by the United States, that 
the Soviet trade planners revised their ordering 
policies so as to concentrate more on those countries 
in ’friendly relations*. The approach to Britain had 
elements of both ’stick* and ’carrot’, but it was not 
initially successful.
1. D.V.P. Vol XIII, Doc .No. 361.
2. Sokolnikov to Henderson, 23 October 1930, N7346/423/ 
38, FO 371/14875. See also Dyck, op.cit. pp.220-221.
When Sokolnikov1s letter was brought 
before the Panel of Ministers on Unemployment in 
late November 1930, there was general agreement that 
no changes should be made in the credit policy in 
force. Opinion in the City was said to be that 
the Soviet financial situation was deteriorating, 
although the Russians would strain hard to avoid 
default. Henderson, considering the unemployment 
situation, argued that there was ’much to be said 
for doing as much business as possible with Russia 
provided that we are satisfied as to her financial 
position’, but MacDonald felt that Britain was 
being ’squeezed’ for poorer terms than Germany, and 
Graham, supported by Snowden, advised against pushing 
the Advisory Committee into considering credits to 
Soviet Russia on any basis other than ’purely 
business considerations’ (1).
Nevertheless, continually rising unemployment 
and the failure of the Government-sponsored trade 
delegations during the autumn of 1930 to open up any 
significant new export outlets in other parts of the 
world refocused attention on the Soviet market.
Unofficial contact made with the Germans and the
1. Conclusions of Unemployment Panel Meeting, 28 November 
1930, U,P.(30), 17th Meeting, CAB 27/438. Graham 
made no attempt to press the Advisory Committee 
to give better terms . Export Credit Guarantee 
Advisory Committee Minutes, 3 December 1930, E .C .G. 
1/14.
Americans (at MacDonald’s suggestion) showed that 
German and British credit terms did not differ ’so 
widely* as to ’account for the enormous difference 
in German and British exports to Russia’ (1).
Vansittart’s conclusion was that ’it can do nothing 
but good to let M. Sokolnikov know plainly that we 
are most dissatisfied with the figures both 
absolutely and relatively to other countries’ (2).
This point was made by Henderson and Graham 
in conversations with Sokolnikov in February and 
March 1931; the Soviet response was to put the blame 
on the ’inadequate’ duration of British credits and 
the lack of competitiveness in British prices and to 
dispute the British trade figures (3). Sokolnikov’s 
impression was that there would be no change in the 
basic credit terms in the immediate future, and this 
may well have been a factor behind the Soviet courting 
of the Germans, resulting in the Piatakov Agreement 
(for orders for 300 million marks, approximately 
£14,700,000, between April and August 1931) and the 
Italians, resulting in an Italo-Soviet credit agree-
1. Memorandum by Charles Bateman, member of Northern 
Department, 17 February 1931, N968/85/38, FO 371/ 
15602. The balance of Soviet-German trade was in 
Germany’s favour.
2. Minute by Vansittart, 12 February 1931, N1219/324/
38, FO 371/15610.
3. D.B.F.P. I I/VI I, Doc .No . 135; D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .Nos . 
53, 67; Soviet Embassy to Foreign Office, 13 March 
1931, N 1788/324/38, FO 371/15611. Soviet figures for 
1929-30 were £15 million of imports from Britain,
and invisibles at £8 million for 1930. The Soviet 
figures included orders placed in Britain for goods 
shipped direct from the Empire to the Soviet Union.
ment (for orders for 350 million lira, approximately 
£3,800,000, during 1931), both in April 1931 (1).
At the end of March 1931, Clynes brought 
before the Cabinet a specific case of a proposed 
Soviet order for textile machinery from an English 
firm which seemed likely to fail (and consequently 
create further unemployment) through the lack of 
long-term credits. The Cabinet decided to set up a 
sub-committee, consisting of Clynes, Graham and Thomas 
Johnston, the new Lord Privy Seal, to examine the 
whole question of credits to Soviet Russia (2).
Johnston, who had a 'lively interest* in extending 
trade with the Soviet Union, immediately contacted 
Bron, who put forward proposals for orders for ships 
(on credit up to 5 years) and heavy engineering 
machinery (more than 2 years credit). These proposals 
were discussed with various departmental officials 
and with Colonel Peel of the Export Credit Advisory 
Committee. Both Snowden, who objected to any long­
term credit as being in effect a loan, and Graham, 
who felt that further tonnage was just not necessary, 
opposed the shipping order credit, but the sub­
1. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .Nos.54, 67, 135; Dyck, op.cit. 
pp. 223-224; Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol 
II, pp. 490-492, 495-497.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 25 March 1931, 19(31)6, CAB 23/66.
committee did feel that 'more elasticity should be 
introduced into the terms for heavy engineering 
material so that credits extending to 30 months 
from the date of the order could be guaranteed' (1).
The Cabinet, annoyed by the Russians' 
actions in trying to pressurise them, agreed on 
1 July 1931 to the sub-committee's recommendations, 
but subject to a cessation of Bron's 'propaganda 
campaign' (2). Johnston and Moisei Gurevitch, head 
of the Soviet delegation to the debts negotiations,-/ 
worked out the details, for £6 million of orders, 
which were agreed on at the end of July . Discussions 
continued over orders for iron and steel, but no 
further definite agreement had been reached when the 
Labour Cabinet left office (3).
1. Treasury to Board of Trade, 30 March 1931, E.C.01X3, 
and Memorandum by Graham, 13 April 1931, E.C.(31)5, 
both CAB 27/449; Memorandum by Clynes, 26 June 1931, 
C.P. 95 (31), CAB 24/220.
2. Memorandum by Graham, 29 June 1931, C.P. 161(31),
CAB 24/222; Cabinet Conclusions, 1 July 1931, 
36(31)4, CAB 23/67; Export Credit Guarantee Advisory 
Committee Minutes, 8 July 1931, E.C.G. 1/14. The 
Advisory Committee agreed provided no further con­
cessions would be required of them.
3. Tom Johnston, Memories, (London 1952) p.98; H.C.Deb. 
Vol 255, Col 1546. Graham praised Johnston's ’very 
valuable work by taking over the Russian credit 
negotiations’ . Graham to MacDonald, 20 July 1931, 
MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/2/11.
A Foreign Office memorandum credited the 
main inspiration for this new departure to Johnston 
himself, 'largely due to the long credits obtainable 
by the Soviet Government in Germany*(1). The Cabinet 
endorsed the opinion of the Cabinet sub-committee 
that it was 'highly paradoxical' that at a time when 
Britain and other countries had 'come to the 
financial rescue of Germany', such large German credits 
should be granted to the Soviet Union, and, again 
reviving MacDonald's suggestion of the previous 
November, talks with the Germans were initiated (2). 
Graham had in fact mentioned the subject in passing 
to Curtius, the German Foreign Minister, on the latter's 
visit to Chequers in early June 1931 (3). Careful to 
avoid any suspicion of these talks reaching the Russians, 
a member of the Export Credit Guarantee Department did 
visit Berlin later in the summer of 1931, but the 
respective viewpoints were difficult to reconcile (4) .
1. Foreign Office Memorandum, 19 October 1931, N6954/
63/38, FO 371/15600.
2. Memorandum by Clynes, 26 June 1931, C.P. 95(31),
CAB 24/220; Cabinet Conclusions, 1 July 1931, 
36(31)4, CAB 23/67.
3. D.B.F.P. II/II, Doc.Nos. 51, 228.
4. Foreign Office Memorandum, 19 October 1931, N6954/
63/38, FO 371/15600.
The Johnston-Gurevitch agreement did much 
to ease the back-bench pressure on the Cabinet, but 
provoked criticism from the Conservatives, with some 
justification, that the Cabinet had brought political 
pressure to bear on the Advisory Committee (1). The 
credits granted for trade with the Soviet Union came 
to occupy a significant proportion of all the credits 
granted under the Export Credit scheme, in 1930 over 
50% and in 1931 over 75%; moreover well over half of 
all the British exports to the Soviet Union were 
financed by the credit system, at a time when the 
Russians were selling large quantities in Britain for 
cash (see Appendices One and Three). This situation
ft
was to be closely examined by the incoming National 
Government.
During the second year of the Labour Cabinet's 
life, the issue of credits became increasingly inter­
woven also with the debts and claims negotiations. The 
joint Main Committee held its first meeting on 2 October 
1930, and then followed three months of tortuous 
negotiations about the allocation of the British and 
Soviet claims amongst the sub-committees and the 
procedures to be adopted (2). Agreement was reached
1. The issue was fully explored in a debate on 22 July 
1931, see H.C.Deb. Vol 255, Cols 1515-1644.
2. The details are in files in FO 371/14837, 14838, 
15594. A brief summary is in D.B.F.P. I I/VI I,
App. II (ii).
on setting up two extra sub-committees to deal with 
claims and counter-claims arising from the British 
intervention, but no agreement could be reached over 
the allocation of a Soviet claim for the return of 
£60 million of gold transferred during the War (1). 
Subsequently, work could only start in two sub­
committees, fB*, the claims of the bondholders, and 
'C', miscellaneous claims, but even with these sub­
committees the series of meetings between January 
and May 1931 produced no real progress. When the 
matter was referred to the Main Committee on 1 June 
1931, Gurevitch, the head of the Soviet delegation, 
stated that the payment of claims was dependent on 
the grant of credits, a principle unacceptable to 
Lord Goschen, the head of the British delegation (2) .
The question was referred back to the 
ministerial level, but Henderson, during a conversation
1. Henderson agreed with a Soviet suggestion for a 
separate seventh sub-committee to discuss the gold 
deposit claim, but Snowden and the Treasury officials 
refused to allow this claim to be separated from
the War debt question to be dealt with by sub­
committee ’ D' .
2. Details of the two sub-committees' meetings and 
the Main Committee meeting of 1 June 1931 are in 
FO 371/15594-15597.
with Litvinov in Geneva on 22 May 1931, had already 
been told that any debts settlement could 'only be made 
on the condition of appropriate credit operations' (1). 
The British side were clearly close to losing patience 
with the Soviet tactics of playing for time and trying 
to link the claims with credits. This frustration 
had been expressed by Henderson in November 1930, 
when he told Sokolnikov that 'the whole course of our 
relations since the signing of the protocol at Lewes... 
has been a series of procrastinations, especially in 
this matter of the debt negotiations' (2). Finally, 
on 24 July 1931, Henderson, Dalton, and Sokolnikov 
met together with the heads of the two delegations 
to resolve the deadlock. Henderson stated that a con­
tinuation of the negotiations was pointless unless a 
definite offer in writing was received (Sokolnikov 
offered partial compensation of the bondholders in 
return for long-term credits), to which Sokolnikov 
replied that no definite offer could be made without 
an assurance that it would not be rejected because of 
the principle on which it was based. Henderson angrily
1. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No.170.
2. Henderson to Ovey, 25 November 1930, N8154/12/38,
FO 371/14838. MacDonald minuted on the record of 
one meeting: 'Isn't this getting a farce. Aren't 
they playing with us?'. Minute by MacDonald,
21 April 1931, PRO 30/69/1/266.
replied that he could not give an answer about a 
scheme which he had not yet seen, and the meeting 
broke up inconclusively with Sokolnikov stating that 
he would inform Moscow (1).
Henderson was justified in his criticisms 
of diliatory Soviet negotiating techniques. At the 
meeting of 24 July, Henderson in his frustration came 
close to accepting the Soviet criteria of a definite 
link between the claims and credits; however, there 
is some evidence from the Soviet side that ’concrete 
proposals' were drawn up (2), but never transmitted 
to the British, probably due to the change in Britain's 
political and financial situation in the summer of 
1931.
After the opening of the debts negotiations 
in October 1930, the Narkomindel instructed Sokolnikov 
to raise the question of starting negotiations for a
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, App.II(ii); D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No. 
216. Litvinov had told a senior Treasury representa­
tive in May 1931 that in return for credits they 
might pay 15% of the bondholders' claims. Memorandum 
by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, 22 May 1931, N3657/51/38, 
FO 371/15596.
2. On 26 July Litvinov telegraphed to Sokolnikov that 
he should put forward 'concrete proposals, without 
an unequivocal undertaking from Henderson' and the 
Soviet Embassy did draw up a memorandum. D.V.P.
Vol. XIV, Doc .No. 381 and note 148.
full trade treaty to replace the April 1930 Temporary 
Agreement (1). The Foreign Office officials were in 
agreement with Henderson’s personal view that, though 
the debt negotiations were not proceeding very 
satisfactorily, negotiations for a full trade treaty 
could begin, but Henderson was forced ’reluctantly* 
to accept the views of Graham and Snowden, who 
opposed entering into trade treaty negotiations until 
fa much greater degree of substantial progress' had 
been made in the debt negotiations. The Russians 
contested the linkage of the two sets of negotiations, 
but the trade treaty question went back into cold 
storage (2) .
In addition to trade relations and the debts 
and claims issue, Henderson also found cause to comphin 
about the lack of Soviet response on the issue of 
propaganda.
1. Ibid, Vol XIII, Doc .No. 422.
2. Ibid, Doc .No. 455; Foreign Office to Board of Trade,
19 November, N7900/28/38, and Board of Trade to 
Foreign Office, 25 November 1930, N8173/28/38, both 
FO 371/14852; Henderson to Ovey, 25 November 1930, 
N8154/12/38, FO 371/14838; Memorandum by Treasury,
27 November 1930, F10070/05/2, T 160/384. In May 
1930 the Cabinet had decided that no trade treaty 
negotiations should begin 'until the debt negotiations 
have made some progress or have at least begun'.
During 1930 a number of secret trials 
took place in’ which Russians involved in the economic 
field were implicated in counter-revolutionary 
activities, and the arrest of one group, connected 
with the food industry, in September 1930, led to 
accusations against the Union Cold Storage Company, 
a British firm. Determined to avoid a fate similar 
to that which had befallen the Lena Goldfields 
Company, the directors asked the Foreign Office to 
protest on their behalf against the allegations; 
this was done at the end of November, and no Soviet 
recriminations resulted (1).
The first show trial to take place after 
the Shakhty case in 1928 was the trial in late November 
1930 of the so-called 'Industrial Party' on charges 
not only of sabotage but also of directly attempting 
to secure foreign armed intervention, especially from 
France and Britain. The initial reaction of the 
Foreign Office officials was to advise against any 
protest as the accusations against Britain appeared to 
be contained only in the depositions of the accused, 
but examination of the full text showed that the
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 104; A Sutton, op.cit.
pp. 124-125; Foreign Office Memorandum, 15 October 
1930, N7304/75/38, FO 371/14863; Ovey to Henderson, 
20 December 1930, N9165/75/38, FO 371/14865.
indictment by the Soviet Public Prosecuter, Nikolai 
Krylenko, contained two charges against the British 
Government, one concerning the Baldwin Cabinet, the 
other the British Army and Government without 
specification of date (1). With parliamentary 
questions being laid on this matter, the Northern 
Department officials as well as Dalton were in favour 
of making a protest fstraight away1. Accordingly, on
r
30 November, Ovey infcyined the Narkomindel that the 
British took exception to the statements by Krylenko, 
which reflected ’adversely and without reason’ on 
the British Government (2).
Further examination of the text of the 
indictment showed other passages to which the Foreign 
Office objected and Ovey was instructed on 2 December 
to obtain an explanation from the Soviet Government as 
to the reason for these ’baseless charges’(3). However, 
before he could arrange a meeting with Litvinov, a further 
development complicated the issue. A Soviet radio
1. Inprecor, 20 November 1930; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 
105, 106; Foreign Office Minute, 28 November 1930, 
N8305/75/38, FO 371/14864. For the trial see Conquest, 
op.cit. pp.733-734.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 107, 108. Herbette, the 
French Ambassador in Moscow, protested on 11 and 
29 November about the specific references to the 
French Government.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 111.
broadcast in English on 2 December, dealing with 
the trial and quoting from an open letter by 
* Maxim Gorky to British workers about the trial, was 
referred to in the Commons the following day, 
Henderson and Dalton *hiad words* over the action 
to be taken over this broadcast. Dalton recorded:
’Russia is a bloody hair s h i r t . T h e  
officials, I think,all agree with me 
in not wanting another protest. But 
Uncle (Henderson) has got a Soviet 
complex at the moment. We shall see 
the result of giving way to it’. ’ (1)
Exasperated at the repeated breaches of the propaganda 
pledge, as well as at the general Soviet attitude 
on the debts and other issues, Henderson instructed 
Ovey to lodge a ’strong protest* with the Soviet 
Government on the grounds that ’no effort whatsoever 
is being made to abide by the propaganda pledge’ (2).
Consequently, when Ovey met Litvinov on 
5 December he protested about both Krylenko’s states 
ments and the wireless broadcast, but was dissatisfied 
with Litvinov’s answers that Krylenko ’could not have 
done otherwise than incorporate in his indictment 
evidence of witnesses’ and that the broadcast might
1. Dalton Diaries, 3 December 1930, The fullest text 
of the broadcast is in British Broadcasting 
Company to Foreign Office, 3 December 1930, 
N8492/33/38, FO 371/14856.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 118.
have been made from ’some private station’ (1).
However, two days later Litvinov handed Ovey a 
* written explanation that the broadcasts had emanated 
not from a Government-controlled station but from a 
private trade union station, but that ’the undesirab­
ility of such broadcast messages in future will be 
impressed upon the All-Union Central Council of 
Trade Unions’. Henderson decided to drop the matter 
in view of this assurance (2).
However, Henderson wanted a more concrete 
reply over Krylenko’s comments, for which the Soviet 
Government ’cannot refuse responsibility’ (3). 
Conversations with Litvinov on 6 and 9 December 
produced only a written version of the earlier verbal 
disclaimer of the Soviet Government’s responsibility (4).
1. Ibid, Doc .No. 120.
2. H.C.Deb. Vol 246, Cols 12-13; Ovey to Henderson,
6 December 1930, N8546/75/38, FO 371/14856. The
G.P.O. continued to monitor Moscow radio broadcasts 
until September 1931. In 1933 the British once 
again protested against broadcasts and the Narkomindel 
reaffirmed their 1930 pledge. Strang to Sir John 
Simon, Foreign Secretary, 28 September 1933, N7463/ 
46/38, FO 371/17248.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 121.
4. Ibid. Doc .Nos. 122, 123, 127, 128.
With a marked diminution of the anti^British 
references in the later stages of the trial and the 
possibility of any further retreat by the Soviet 
side considered unlikely, the Foreign Office favoured 
winding up the dispute, for, as Vansittart minuted,
'we should have the credit of sticking to our point, 
and meanwhile interest here will tend to evaporate, 
since we have clearly made some impression' (1).
The incident was then wound up by Ovey's 
'long and difficult1 conversation with Litvinov on 
24 December. Ovey formally expressed the British 
Government's 'profound dissatisfaction ...at the 
attitude of the Soviet Government in this matter'. 
Although Litvinov appeared 'hurt and angry', Ovey 
felt that 'with a little patience matter will blow 
over and incident be closed* (2).
The trial, arranged for internal purposes 
in order to keep the tempo of the Five Year Plan at 
a high level, played on the constant theme of 
capitalist intervention. With relations with France 
already at a very unsatisfactory level, the Politburo 
probably calculated that Franco-Soviet relations could
1. Minute by Vansittart on Ovey to Henderson, 6 
December 1930, N8648/75/38, FO 371/14865.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 129, 130, 132, 133, 134.
not get much worse anyway, but miscalculated on 
the strength of feeling that might be aroused in 
Britain. It can be seen as another example of 
Stalin abusing relations with a Western power (in 
this case notably a socialist government to whom 
the Comintern line was most vociferously opposed) 
for the sake of domestic purposes. Nevertheless, 
Litvinov himself did not disagree with Ovey's 
suggestion that the anti-British accusations were 
unfounded (1), and, more significantly, while talking 
with the Italian Ambassador in Moscow on 1 December, 
Litvinov included Britain among the powers 'friendly' 
to the Soviet Union (along with Germany and Italy)
(2) . The next show trial, the March 1931 trial of the 
Mensheviks, was notable for the absence of Britain's 
name amongst the foreign countries accused of inter­
vention (3) .
Nevertheless, the propaganda issue continued
L
to be an ^ rritant to the Labour Cabinet and a source 
of Conservative back-bench questioning. When 
Parliament reassembled in mid-January, questions were
1. Ibid, Doc .No . 120.
2. D.D.It. Vol IX, Doc .No. 431.
3. Ovey to Henderson, 3 March 1931, N1523/84/38,
FO 371/15601. For details of the trial see Naum 
Jasny, Soviet Economists of the Twenties, (Cambridge 
1972), pp.61-86.
asked about a programme of action adopted by the 
Profintern which called for propaganda amongst the 
British armed forces. The Northern Department 
officials were in agreement that this constituted a 
breach of the propaganda pledge, but felt that an 
ineffective protest would be 'worse than useless*. 
Dalton therefore explained to the Commons that the 
matter was being 'carefully watched' (1). For the 
rest of 1931 the Labour Cabinet's policy, worked 
out in agreement with the Foreign Office, was to 
abandon the idea of protesting at every breach of the 
pledge. The Foreign Office analysis was that 'in 
practice.. .representations to the Soviet Government 
on this subject produce little or no effect' and so 
'continued protests were not only useless, but 
became progressively more undignified' (2).
Vansittart, in a memorandum which he drew 
up in mid-April 1931, reviewed evidence available 
regarding instructions from the Comintern and the 
Profintern to the British Communist Party designed 
to increase espionage amongst the British armed forces 
and to stir up revolutionary activities in the Empire.
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 247, Cols 582-584; Foreign Office
Minute, 22 January 1931, N628/4/38, FO 371/15592.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, App.I.
He noted:
'since the beginning of October 1930 there 
have been no less than 10 cases brought 
to the notice of the Foreign Office through 
confidential channels tending to show that 
little or no effort is being made to restrain 
those subversive elements in the Soviet 
Union that are responsible for breaches of 
the propaganda agreement.... It is for con­
sideration whether the time has now arrived 
for a further remonstrance to the Soviet 
Ambassador on this question of propaganda' (1) .
An open letter from the Profintern to the Minority 
Movement, calling on trade unionists to abandon legal 
methods, had prompted Vansittart's review, but other 
senior officials and Henderson were against taking 
any action (2). When the Daily Worker published the 
Comintern's May Day manifesto, which contained 
inflammatory attacks on the Government, Vansittart 
and Henderson considered (as they had in May 1930) 
the possibility of prosecuting the newspaper rather 
than making .representations to the Russians, but 
although the matter was referred to Sankey again, 
caution again militated against action (3).
1. Memorandum by Vansittart, 15 April 1931, N2655/4/38, 
FO 371/15592.
2. Foreign Office minutes on ibid; Daily Worker,
11 April 1931.
3. Daily Worker, 1 May 1931; Minute by Henderson,
13 May 1931, N3583/4/38, FO 371/15592.
While Henderson was in Geneva he met 
Litvinov, on 23 May 1931, and complained to him 
* that propaganda was not ceasing, to which Litvinov 
replied with the usual disclaimer that the Comintern 
was not an instrument of the Soviet Government (1).
The Foreign Office therefore concluded that the 
Soviet Government would ’give no satisfaction.. .in 
this matter’ (2), but, in fact, apart from a brief 
flurry of interest over Bukharin’s visit to Britain 
to attend an international congress in late June 
1931 (3), the propaganda question was quiescent during 
the last few months of the Labour Cabinet.
In recommending a line to be taken during 
a Commons debate on 18 May on the propaganda issue, 
Vansittart argued that communism in Britain was ’a 
negligible force’, but he did have private reservations 
about Soviet propaganda in other parts of the world, 
including India; a point on which the India Office
1. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No. 170.
2. Foreign Office memorandum, 2 June 1931, C.P.317(31), 
CAB 24/225.
3. Colin Holmes, ’Bukharin in England1 in Soviet 
Studies, July 1972, pp.86-90, and a letter by 
N. Lampert, ibid, January 1973, pp. 467-468.
agreed (1). The Comintern approach to India was 
still faithful to the line set out by the Sixth 
‘ Comintern Congress, particularly in the sharp 
criticism of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress . 
The 'Draft Platform of Action of the Communist Party 
of India', published in December 1930, called for 
the forcible overthrow of British rule, for agrarian 
revolution and for the creation of a mass, centralised 
communist party, but such a party was far from being 
established, with the leaders still in prison and 
even Roy, who after being expelled from the Comintern 
in November 1929 returned to India in December 1930 
to form a splinter group in contact with radical 
nationalists, being arrested in July 1931 (2).
Indian intelligence authorities watched carefully
£
signed of growing Soviet contact with subversive groups 
in the areas bordering on India (Afghanistan, Sinkiang, 
Burma) and in South-east Asia, but the discovery of 
the Comintern Far Eastern Bureau's headquarters in 
Shanghai in June 1931 and the information thereby
1. H.C.Deb. Vol 252, Cds 1619-1688; India Office to 
Foreign Office, 26 May 1931, N3704/1970/38, FO 
371/15619. Amongst the countries where Vansittart 
thought communist propaganda 'very active and 
effective' were Peru, China, India, Germany and 
Spain. Minute on same file.
2. Imam, op.cit. pp. 309-312, 319-322; Saha, op.cit. 
pp. 158-164.
provided effectively destroyed the Cominternfs 
organisation in South-east Asia for at least a 
year (1) .
At the same time, the Labour Cabinet’s 
conciliatory Indian policy, as evidenced by the 
Round Table Conference in London from November 1930 
to January 1931 and the Irwin-Gandhi Pact in April 
1931, decreased the effectiveness of the appeal of 
the communists to Indian opinion (2) .
During 1930 the stabilisation of the Afghan
internal situation under Nadir Shah reassured the British
(ia
but they were put in/awkward position in early 1931
A
when the Afghans, anxious about Soviet moves to forge 
closer links, were prompted to enquire as to the 
British attitude in the event of Soviet aggression 
on Afghanistan. It had been the assumption of the 
1927-28 discussions on the defence of India that Soviet 
encroachment into Afghanistan would be a casus belli, 
but care had been taken not to make any such commit­
ment to the Afghans themselves. The formula finally 
approved by Henderson in July 1931 stated that Britain 
’could not regard with indifference unprovoked
1. Ibid, pp. 36-51, 60-64.
2. Brown, op.cit. pp. 168-191; Gupta, op.cit. pp .209-215
aggression’ on Afghanistan but reserved the right 
to decide on a response depending on the ’circumstances 
of the moment’. However, before this cautious reply 
was transmitted to the Afghans, they had already 
proceeded with a Non-aggression Treaty with the 
Soviet Union, signed in June 1931 (1).
The Eleventh Plenum of E.C.C.I., held in 
late March-early April 1931, did not devote much 
attention to the colonial world, concentrating instead 
on the world economic crisis, the menace of French- 
inspired intervention, and the role of the social- 
democrats in betraying the workers. The British 
Communist Party was again criticised for its failure 
to make better progress, and it was urged to make 
greater efforts among the unemployed movements (2).
The Plenum continued to single out France 
as the ’champion of the most aggressive anti-Soviet 
policy’, the main theme of Soviet pronouncements 
throughout 1930-31. During 1930, on both an economic 
level, because of the French advocacy of anti-dumping
1. Irwin to Benn, 22 March 1931, Sir Richard Maconachie, 
Minister in Kabul, to Henderson, 23 April, and 
Henderson to Maconachie, 24 July 1931, all 1 .0. 
Records, R/12/1/89.
2. Degras, Comintern, op.cit. Vol III, pp. 149-167.
measures and attempts to enlist German support in 
a restriction of Soviet goods, and on the political 
leve^., because of Briand's plan for a united Europe 
which once again raised the spectre of a united 
capitalist front, the Soviet Union were genuinely 
nervous of French intentions.
In September 1929, Briand had first publicly 
mentioned his idea of a federation of European states, 
emphasising economic links, but when the promised 
French plan was formalised in May 1930, the emphasis 
had changed to political aspects. The British response 
was cautious in public, but in private Henderson 
argued that the French proposals 'in their present form, 
are unacceptable’ and ’would be detrimental to the 
satisfactory development of the League of Nations' (1). 
From the start the Soviet Government were hostile, 
and as Litvinov explained to his diplomats abroad in 
June 1930: 'We see the meaning of this venture as 
being largely an attempt by France to increase her 
influence on the policy of other European countries,
1. Carlton, op.cit. pp.83-86. A senior Foreign Office 
official wrote: 'Briand’s proposal to rationalise 
Europe is probably impracticable; nor is it necess­
arily desirable in the interests of peace to see a 
pan-European politico-economic unit evolve in 
rivalry with the American, British Empire and 
Russian groups'. Memorandum by Wellesley, 1 December 
1930, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1/286.
and even to establish her own hegemony* (1). 
Determination to frustrate this plan, in which the 
Soviet Union had not been invited to participate, 
proved another cause for renewed Soviet-German 
co-operation.
With European opinion moving against him, 
in September 1930 Briand called for a League 
commission of enquiry to examine his proposals. Max 
Beloff has written that the inclusion of the Soviet 
Union was ’strongly pressed by Germany and Italy, 
with rather lukewarm support from Great Britain', 
but, in fact, from the start Henderson strongly 
favoured Soviet participation in the proposed 
Commission’s discussions on economic issues. The 
Soviet Government promptly accepted the invitation to 
join in the discussions on the economic aspects issued 
by the League Secretary in January 1931 (2).
As a result, on 18 May 1931, Litvinov made 
his first speech to the League Commission, claiming 
that he represented the only country not going through 
an economic crisis, refuting accusations of Soviet 
dumping and ending by putting forward a proposal for
1. D.V.P. Vol XIII, Doc .No. 209, Also Litvinov's 
comments to Dirksen, the German Ambassador in Moscow, 
ibid, Doc .No . 227.
2. Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 
1929-1941, (London 1U4T) "Vol I,"’p .43 ;' Davis," “op . 
cit. pp.223-229; Memorandum by Sir Alexander Cadogan, 
Adviser on League of Nations Affairs, March 1931,
W *.2076/7/98, FO 371/15694.
a pact of economic non-aggression. This entailed a 
re-affirmation of the declarations of the 1927 
World Economic Conference about the co-existence of 
two different economic systems, coupled with a pledge 
of non-discrimination in economic relations with 
participating countries (1). In attempting fto 
declare economic war illegal1, the Soviet Government 
were clearly showing that, despite all the protest­
ations during the Industrial Party trial about inter­
vention, their real fear was economic blockade; their 
policy was directed to the end of nullifying France's 
policy and discouraging other countries from following 
in France’s footsteps. Litvinov's proposal was 
referred for further discussion at the September and 
November 1931 sessions and although approval was given 
to the 'general idea* of the pact proposal, this 
Commission never met again after 1931 and the plan 
disappeared into obscurity (2). It should be noted 
that Sokolnikov, speaking before the Commission in 
November 1931, described the 1930 Anglo-Soviet Trade 
Agreement as embodying the principle of non-discrimina­
tion as its basis and argued that the pact of economic 
non-aggression proposal was only a multilateral 
extension of that bilateral agreement (3).
1. Degras, Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, pp. 499- 
502; Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol I, pp.55-56.
2. Ibid, pp. 341-343; Davis, op.cit. pp. 235-243.
3. Minutes of Commission of Enquiry for European 
Union, 4 November 1931, W13890/7/98, FO 371/15699.
The Soviet Union and Germany also found 
points in common in their attitudes to the sixth 
and final session of the Preparatory Commission for 
the Disarmament Conference, held in November- 
December 1930, and the Soviet side held out hopes 
also for some co-operation with Britain. At the 
beginning of November 1930, Sokolnikov suggested to 
both Henderson and Dalton that the delegations of 
the two countries should get together at Geneva (1), 
but, although both Litvinov, head of the Soviet 
delegation, and Cecil, attached to the Foreign 
Office as an adviser on League of Nations affairs, 
were given instructions to that effect by their 
respective Governments and some initial agreement in 
practice over attempts to renegotiate points already 
decided at the previous session in April 1929 was in 
evidence, the divergences in approach soon became 
obvious. Litvinov later criticised Cecil’s 'zig­
zag course', for 'in general it needs to be said that 
Cecil, by his conduct, helped the French group to ruin 
the most important of our proposals for disarmament, 
for in the majority of cases he sided with this group 
against the Soviet-German-Italian group' (2). On
1. D.V.P. Vol XIII, Doc .No. 381. Also ibid, Doc .Nos .
380, 384.
2. Ibid, Doc .No . 460.
the other hand, Cecil wrote that *1 have done my 
best to get into relations with the Russians as far 
‘ as I can bring myself to do so, but I must say they 
give me a shiver down my back*, and that Litvinov 
'as a practical force...only exists to obstruct and 
to make propaganda speeches on every possible 
occasion1 (1). Contacts were stilted, and the 
British attitude towards the Draft Convention adopted 
at the end of the session was closer to the French 
than to the German and Soviet line (2). Nevertheless, 
in February 1931, Sokolnikov did express the Soviet 
Government's appreciation of the British attitude at 
Geneva, and Dalton, for one, still believed that 'we 
must not leave the Soviet outside our field of 
preparatory manoeuvres' (3).
During the winter of 1930-31, the French 
Government viewed with disquiet signs from Germany 
such as the successes of the Nazis ’ in the September 
1930 elections and the proposal for an Austro-German 
Customs Union in March 1931, while the tariff war with
1. Cecil to Noel-Baker, 11 and 17 November 1930, both 
in Cecil Papers, Add. 51107.
2. On British policy see Carlton, op.cit. pp. 94-98.
On Soviet-German collaboration see Helliar-Symons, 
op.cit. pp. 136-151.
3. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No. 53; Minute by Dalton on Note 
by Cecil, March 1931, W2845/47/98, FO 371/15703.
the Soviet Union had merely made the balance of trade 
even more unfavourable for France, so tentative 
soundings were made to the Russians for trade talks 
in the late spring of 1931. As France was now 
regarded as a 'stable* power in Europe, the Soviet 
Union moved away from trying to organise formations 
against France and towards accomodation. Negotiations 
were begun simultaneously for a non?aggression pact. 
Some progress was made with the commercial talks from 
June onwards so that in July the two Governments 
announced the abrogation of their restrictive trade 
decrees (1). In the Soviet Union's cautious re­
appraisal of the diplomatic alignments in Europe 
Britain did not play a crucial role, lacking the 
political importance of France or Germany.
On the British side, in assessing the general 
European situation during the early months of 1931, 
the military authorities, Vansittart and MacDonald 
expressed a common concern about the 'militarist 
spirit' which was once again becoming paramount in 
Europe. Neither Vansittart nor the service chiefs 
thought of the Soviet Union as anything other than a 
'negative influence' or a 'colossal unsolved problem'
1. Dyc£, op.cit. pp. 236-240; William Scott, Alliance 
against Hitler, (Durham 1962) pp.7-12.
in European politics, while the development of 
Soviet military strength only added to the 1 feeling 
of tension and insecurity’ in Eastern Europe.
Henderson, on the other haiid, would not support the 
view that the European political situation was 
deteriorating, and, under his influence, the 
Committee of Imperial Defence agreed in June 1931 
to the extension of the Ten Year Rule, though with 
the rider that the situation should be ’thoroughly 
re-examined* the following year (1).
A general sense of uneasiness over the 
European economic and political situation was justified. 
Easing of the German financial crisis of June-July 
1931 only led to pressure being put on London. The 
publication at the end of July of the May Committee 
Report, which forecast a £120 million budget deficit, 
caused a crisis of confidence in the Labour Cabinet.
A political crisis was added to the financial crisis, 
and, with the Cabinet opposed to abandoning the gold 
standard, the issue revolved around whether they would 
agree to a cut in the unemployment benefit to restore 
confidence. The Cabinet was split over the proposed 
cuts, but MacDonald, after meetings with the King and
1. Barnett, op.cit. p.298; Memorandum by War Office, 
January 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1/284; 
Memorandum by Tom Shaw, Secretary of State for War, 
March 1931, C«P. 96(31), and Memorandum by Albert 
Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, 14 April 
1931, C.P. 100 (31), both CAB 24/220; Memorandum by 
Vansittart, May 1931, C .P. 317(31), CAB 24/225.
opposition leaders, took the difficult decision to 
form a National Government, and the Labour Cabinet 
resigned on 24 August 1931 (1) .
The political situation in the Soviet 
Union, with Stalin in firm control after defeating the 
Bukharinists, seemed fairly stable to British 
observers, but the economic situation was the subject 
of conflicting reports and assessments. In the 
winter of 1930-31 a renewed drive towards collectiv­
isation was implemented, while on the industrial 
front emphasis was increasingly directed towards 
heavy industry. On 4 February 1931, Stalin made his 
impassioned speech for quickening the pace, appealing 
to Russian traditions and ending with the exhortation: 
’We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced 
countries. We must make good this lag in ten years. 
Either we do it or we will go under’ (2). The British 
were justifiably doubtful whether such successes could 
be achieved ’overnight as it were’, but ;the general 
conclusion was that despite the difficulties caused 
by the harshness of the collectivisation campaigns
1. Carlton, op.cit. pp. 185-217; Marquand, op.cit. 
pp. 604-643; Skidelsky, op.cit. pp. 281^395.
2. Stalin, Works, Vol 13, pp. 40-41.
and by the world slump, ’substantial progress is 
being made towards the realisation of the plan’ (1). 
The more pronounced military overtones of the later 
stages of the Plan were noted by the British, but 
they did not consider the Soviet army as logistically 
yet able to conduct an aggressive war, in addition 
to which the internal disruption brought about by the 
’premature acceleration’ of the Plan made military 
action ’still more improbable’ than previously (2).
For the Labour Cabinet the experience of 
’left speaking to left' was a disappointing one. A 
thread of disillusion and frustration ran through 
their attempts to establish amicable relations with 
the Soviet Union on both the economic and the political 
levels .
Trade and fisheries agreements were signed, 
but the expansion of British exports to the Soviet 
Union which did occur was not sufficient even to reach
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 100, 101, 103, 126, 137; 
Strang to Henderson, 8 September 1930, N6308/75/38,
FO 371/14862; Memorandum by Wellesley, 1 December 
1930, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1/286; Foreign 
Office Memorandum, 2 June 1931, C.P.317(31), CAB 
24/225.
2. Memorandum by Vansittart, May 1931, C.P.317(31),
CAB 24/225. Although some information about 
continued Soviet-German military contacts was 
obtained, this collaboration was still underestimated 
and not considered ’serious’. D.B.F.P. IA/VII, Doc. 
Nos. 151, 265; Rumbold to Henderson, N6315/6315/38,
FO 371/14885; Rumbold to Henderson, 15 January 1931, 
C396/396/18, FO 371/15223.
the 1925-27 levels and moreover it was largely 
financed by credits, whereas Soviet exports to 
Britain increased even more, so that the balance of 
trade in favour of the Soviet Union actually increased. 
With growing protectionist sentiments and the erection 
of tariff barriers in the West, the British market 
acted as an important source of foreign currency 
for the Russians. On the credit issue, as indeed on 
other issues, the Cabinet found themselves falling 
between two stools, their own left wing and the 
Conservative opposition. Without complying with 
the unrealistic demands of their left wing, the 
Labour Government did gradually allow extensions in 
credits because of their overwhelming desire to reduce 
unemployment (a motive which the Russians tried to 
exploit as far as possible).
The Comintern line of strong criticism of 
the Labour Cabinet was maintained throughout the two 
years, even though this line was increasingly ineffect­
ive in terms of the communist movement’s prospects 
inside Britain and only served to exacerbate relations 
at the inter-governmental level. Repeated failures 
to obtain any satisfaction from the Soviet side over 
propaganda led Henderson in 1931 to abandon the policy 
of remonstrances. Memories of 1924 and Conservative 
pressure dictated that the Labour Cabinet would be 
sensitive about Soviet propaganda throughout the Empire.
Without an absolute majority in the 
Commons, the Labour Cabinet were made aware of the 
strength of Conservative feeling on a number of 
issues, such as religious persecution, forced labour, 
and dumping. Despite the Labour movement’s human­
itarian traditions, the Cabinet were reluctant to 
actively intervene over the coercive methods used to 
implement the Stalinist transformation of Soviet 
society for fear of criticism and retaliatory action 
from the Soviet side. With- dumping, the Government’s 
predominant economic philosophy militated against any 
action. Nevertheless, on certain issues, such as the 
debts and claims negotiations, which were not always 
popular with the Labour back-benchers, Henderson did 
make serious efforts to reach a solution, but was 
met with a lack of accomodation from Moscow (1).
As under the Conservative Government, the 
Russian question came within the purview of other 
Ministers, and, although MacDonald and Henderson did 
have some differences of opinion, it was the interven­
tion by Snowden and Graham which were to cause the
1. The evidence from the British archives does not 
support the contention of Kennan, op.cit. p.238, 
that under the second Labour Government 'nobody 
bothered any more about the issue of debts and 
claims'.
greatest intra-governmental differences and occasion­
ally were to give Britain the appearance of speaking 
with more than one voice.
Henderson found the resolution of the 
bilateral problems personally frustrating. He com­
plained to Dalton in December 1930 that 'if only it 
weren^t for Russia, we should be having quite a good 
time at the F.O.* (1), and when he met Litvinov in 
May 1931 he felt it necessary to adumbrate the reasons 
(the debt negotiations, propaganda, trade turnover, 
and the Lena Goldfields affair) why he was ’extremely 
disappointed with the results of the re-establishment 
of relations’ (2). The Foreign Office officials 
concurred, for Vansittart wrote in the same month:
'Russia is a hostile Power with which we wish to 
pursue friendly relations. It is a difficult task, 
and she goes out of her way to unake it harder’ (3).
The friction and frustration at the bilateral 
level did not auger well for co-operation and understand­
ing at the international level, and there was never any
1. Dalton Diaries, 3 December 1930.
2. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No. 170. He made these complaints 
even though he had ’a warm place in my heart for 
Russia’ •
3. Memorandum by Vansittart, May 1931, C.P.317(31), 
CAB 24/225.
real contact of an enduring kind at the international 
conferences in which the two countries participated; 
the convergence of opinion on some issues, such as 
disarmament and the Pan-Europe Plan, was more 
apparent than real. To the Soviet Union, Britain 
was counted amongst the 'friendly1 powers (1), in a 
Europe where France emerged as the main threat in the 
Soviet leadership's view. The decline in Britain’s 
economic position was matched by a downward evaluation 
of Britain’s political irfluence as France became the 
focus of Soviet interest. On the other hand,to 
Britain, caught between the widening chasm of France 
and Germany, the Soviet Union’s ’negative influence’ 
seemed hardly diminished.
After the fall of the Labour Government,
Dalton summed up the experiences of the two years:
'No atmosphere of mutual understanding was created.... 
Yet, after making full allowance for our disappointments 
...at the lowest, we succeeded in making Anglo-Soviet 
relations less unsatisfactory than they would otherwise 
have been' (2).
1. See Litvinov’s comments to the Italians, D.D.It. 
Vol IX, Doc .Nos. 411, 431. Molotov declared 
publicly in January 1931 that relations 'have 
developed normally with .. .England' . Degras, 
Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, p .466.
2. Hugh Dalton, ’British Foreign Policy, 1929-1931’ 
in Political Quarterly, II, 1931, pp. 499-500.
CHAPTER N IN E: CHANGING ALIGNMENTS
In reviewing the international situation 
in May 1931 for the second of his ’old Adam’ 
memoranda, Vansittart noted that 'above all, the 
worldwide economic depression of the last year has 
had all over the world its political repercussions’ (1). 
This was to be no less true of Britain than of any 
other country. Moreover, the newly-formed National 
Government could find no radical solutions to the 
continuing financial and economic crisis. While the 
Cabinet spent 'days and nights of terrible anxiety’ (2) 
attempting to solve these problems, little time was 
left for the consideration of policy questions not of 
immediate relevance to the purpose of the Government.
In the new administration, the post of 
Foreign Secretary was given to the Liberal Marquess 
of Reading, a noted lawyer and former Viceroy of India
(3), but his term of office, which lasted barely two 
months, gave him little opportunity to master the
1. Memorandum by Vansittart, May 1931, C .P. 317(31),
CAB 24/225.
2. Comment by Sankey, who was still Lord Chancellor, 
Diary Entry, 1 January 1932, Sankey Papers e.235.
See also Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign 
Policy, (London 1973 - paperback ed. ), p .90 .
3. For his earlier career see Marquess of Reading,
Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of Reading, (London
1945). Austen Chamberlain was disappointed at not 
receiving the Foreign Office. Petrie, op.cit. p.382.
onerous details of the Foreign Office work or to 
stamp his mark on British foreign policy. Moreover, 
with the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis in mid- 
September 1931, he was forced to apportion a large 
measure of his attention to the Far Eastern develop­
ments .
In these circumstances neither Reading nor 
the Cabinet in general had any time or inclination 
to introduce any major new departures into Britain's 
Russian policy. Reading, sympathising in general 
with Henderson's beliefs that good relations with 
the Soviet Union could bring trade advantages as well 
as contribute to the general pacification of Europe, 
was prepared to leave the general lines of Henderson's 
Russian policy unchanged (1).
Despite the installation of the new Govern­
ment, withdrawals of gold and foreign currency from 
London continued, and, with the news of the unrest 
at Invergordon, a renewed crisis of confidence in 
sterling occurred. The Bank of England was unable to 
maintain the gold parity, and on 21 September 1931
1. He described the 1927 rupture as a 'mistake'.
Reading Papers (held in the India Office Library), 
Reading to Irwin, 27 October 1927, F118/107. He 
supported the 1929 resumption of relations. H.L. 
Deb. Vol 75, Cols 893-897.
Britain was forced to leave the gold standard, in 
effect causing a 30% depreciation of the pound as 
expressed in terms of gold or non-depreciated 
currencies. Although a devaluing country would 
expect an improvement in the overall balance of 
trade, principally through greater exports and 
fewer imports, in fact depreciation had 'little 
effect on the trade balance one way or another in 
1931f and the benefits which did appear in 1932 
were both temporary and slight (1). Nevertheless 
in the particular circumstances of Anglo-Soviet 
trade, the assessment of the British authorities 
immediately after devaluation was that the balance 
of trade should move towards Britain. Strang, in 
Moscow, argued that the Soviet Government were 
'likely to have on their hands a balance of sterling 
bills which they will find both difficult and un­
profitable to use for purchases outside Great Britain 
...the result can hardly be other than substantially 
to increase the volume of Soviet purchases in England 
on a cash or credit basis' (2). When questioned on 
these points, Soviet diplomats admitted that there
1. Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter-War Economy: Britain 
1919-1939, (London "1970"), pp .269-285 .
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 145.
were difficulties for the Soviet foreign trade plans, 
but emphasised that an increase in orders placed in 
Britain was 'perfectly possible, if there were to 
be no more obstacles as regards credit terms* (1).
However, the specific question of credits 
to the Soviet Union was in the process of being 
examined as part of the Cabinet's reappraisal of 
Britain's financial commitments. On 6 October,
Cunliffe-Lister, the President of the Board of Trade, 
explained to the Cabinet his misgivings over the 
large export credit commitments assumed by the 
Treasury, in view of doubts about the Soviet balance 
of payments situation. He suggested that once the 
Johnston-Gurevitch agreement had been completed (to 
date approximately £4 million out of £6 million had 
been utilised), 'in view of the world financial and 
economic situation, the length of credit to be given 
to any country should not exceed 12 months'. The 
deteriorating world economic situation served only 
to confirm the predisposition of Snowden, still 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, against long credits to 
the Soviet Union. After a short discussion the 
Cabinet approved Cunliffe-Lister's proposal for limit-
1. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No. 275; Strang to Reading, 
17 October 1931, N7036/167/38, FO 371/15607.
ing the duration to twelve months and the Export 
Credit Guarantee Advisory Committee were so 
informed (1). Although the Cabinet decision was that 
the limitation should apply to credits for all 
countries, it was obvious that the impact would be 
greatest on trade with Soviet Russia, which was by 
far the largest beneficiary of the credit scheme 
(see Appendix Three).
Although not brought before the Cabinet, 
further attempts to follow up thetentative moves 
by the Labour Government to get into closer communica­
tion with the Germans over credit terms were made, 
but no tangible agreement resulted, mainly because 
the Germans feared that any equalisation of the credit 
terms, such as duration or insurance premiums, would 
only result in more orders from the Soviet Union 
being diverted from Germany to Britain (2). The 
British were still aggrieved that for credit such as 
those under the Piatakov agreement 'the guarantees of 
the German Government are given largely on the strength
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 6 October 1931, 71(31)7, CAB 
23/68; Minutes of Export Credit Guarantee Advisory 
Committee, 3 November 1931, E.C.G. 1/14.
2. Foreign Office Memorandum, 19 October 1931,
C7829/694/18, FO 371/15224.
of borrowed, and partly British, money1 (1). Northern 
Department officials favoured extending these 
enquiries to other Western countries on a more official 
level, but both Vansittart and Reading disapproved, 
feeling that these enquiries could be open to mis­
representation, with political consequences for 
Anglo-Soviet relations (2).
Reading was not prepared to let the debts 
and claims negotiations drop out of consideration, 
and Bogomolov, the Counsellor to the Embassy, was 
told of Reading's hope that Sokolnikov, on his return, 
from leave in Moscow, would bring back a scheme for a 
debts settlement (3), but the Russian made no mention 
of the scheme already drawn up; the Soviet side were 
playing for time, waiting to assess the effect of 
the financial situation on the new Government's 
credit policy, since credits were inextricably linked 
to a debts settlement in Soviet eyes.
In a period dominated by Britain's financial 
and economic difficulties the political dimensions of 
Anglo-Soviet relations were subordinate. The Labour
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, App.I. Conservative back-bench 
opinion on this point is expressed in Harold 
MacSillan, Winds of Change, 1914-1939, (London 1966) 
p .327.
2. Minutes on Memorandum cited in footnote 2, page 357.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, App. Il(iii).
Cabinet's later policy of no representations over 
propaganda was continued, but a close watch was kept on
i
communist activity within Britain. The Invergordon 
Mutiny in mid-September 1931, when naval ratings 
mutinied against proposed pay cuts, was depicted by 
some Conservative politicians and newspapers as the 
result of communist agitation (1). However, when 
Austen Chamberlain, now First Lord of the Admiralty, 
outlined to the Cabinet on 21 September the results 
of his investigations, he stated that 'the outbreak 
was purely naval and the Communists had been rather 
taken by surprise* (2). The Foreign Office had. been 
considering the possibility that any evidence of 
Moscow's involvement might make representations 
necessary, and the Admiralty and the Home Office were 
asked whether any such evidence existed. The answers 
did not contradict Chamberlain's earlier assessment, 
and Vansittart noted that 'it is even now certain 
that the Communists were taken as much by surprise as 
everyone else, although they have of course done all 
they could to exploit that disastrous episode, once it 
had happened' (3).
1. For details see David Divine, Mutiny at Invergordon, 
(London 1970), and Stephen Roskill, Hankey, Man of 
Secrets, (London 1972) Vol II, pp. 554-559.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 21 September 1931, CAB 23/90B.
3. Foreign Office Minute, 20 October 1931, N7109/4/38, 
rFO 371/15593; Minute by Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, 
February 1932, file 87/31, ADM 1/8747.
For several days following the unrest 
in Invergordon the Daily Worker carried extravagant 
articles on the issue, until the Special Branch raided 
the offices of the newspaper on 25 September, arrested 
the printer and censored parts of the subsequent days' 
issues. The printer was given a sentence of nine 
months for breaking the Incitement to Mutiny Act,
1797 (1) . The policy of prosecution, which had been 
seriously considered but ultimately rejected twice by 
the Labour Government, in May 1930 and May 1931, was 
now considered to be the 'most effective, indeed the 
only effective, weapon* available to check this organ's 
activities (2). However, even while the printer's 
trial was still in progress a member of the Northern 
Department noted that 'the Daily Worker is following 
closely the orders issued from Moscow, and sailing as 
near the wind as possible' (3).
1. Rust, op.cit. pp.22-23.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, App.I. In the Campbell Case in 
1924 the Attorney-General favoured prosecuting the 
editor not the printer. The Labour Cabinet then 
decided that no prosecution of a political nature 
should be undertaken without Cabinet sanction,
but this ruling was rescinded by the Baldwin Cabinet. 
The 1931 prosecution is not referred to in the 
Cabinet Conclusions . In June 1930 Ovey reported 
a conversation with Sokolnikov and Litvinov, who 
'indicated that we, of course, had every right to 
treat a paper like the ’’Daily Worker” with as much 
firmness as we liked* . Ovey to Henderson, 7 June 
1930, N4019/33/38, FO 371/14855.
3. Foreign Office Minute, 20 October 1931, N7109/4/38, 
FO 371/15593.
However, the Soviet press was notably 
, restrained in its criticisms of the National 
Government; it was a period of marking time, as 
the publicly stated 'temporary' nature of the new 
Government, as well as the participation of 
Conservative politicians, inhibited Soviet policy­
makers from making long-term predictions as to the 
course of Anglo-Soviet relations.
During the summer of 1931, while the 
main orientation of Soviet policy was still towards the 
Germans (a Protocol was signed in June extending the 
Treaty of Berlin) and relations with Britain remained 
in a state of 'suspended animation', the Soviet Union 
moved towards a limited rapprochement with France.
To the Soviet Union, France had become a more formid­
able power than Britain by 1931; the effects of the 
world economic crisis had come later and with less 
severity in France than in Britain, Briand's activities 
over the anti-dumping front and the Pan-Europe Plan 
had shown him to be a 'strong man' in foreign policy, 
and France was the key to a possible Soviet-Franco- 
Polish settlement (1). The Franco-Soviet trade talks
1. Dyck, op.cit. pp.236-238. The head of the Western 
Department of Narkomindel told Strang that France 
was a 'more powerful influence in world affairs' 
than America, Britain or Germany. Strang to Reading, 
16 September 1931, N6477/6477/38, FO 371/15625.
had soon brought an abrogation of the import restrict­
ions, but had then foundered over plans to link credits 
with a repayment of debts, the crucial point in the 
Anglo-Soviet negotiations as well. However, a 
Non-aggression pact was initialled on 10 August 1931, 
but with the signature dependent on progress in Soviet 
negotiations with France's allies, Poland and 
Roumania (1).
A further important factor behind the Soviet 
decision to enter into negotiations with Poland in 
October 1931 was, as a Narkomindel official admitted 
to the Germans, a fear of complications in the Far 
East after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 
mid-September 1931 (2). In contrast to the Soviet 
decision to undertake military action against the 
Chinese troops in 1929, on this occasion the military 
option was ruled out. So far as the exigencies of 
the Five Year Plan would allow, a defensive build-up 
of forces in the Soviet Far East was implemented; 
the Soviet press inveighed against the collusion of 
the major Western powers with Japan, whilst Soviet 
diplomacy was directed towards maintaining an attitude 
of neutrality towards the dispute (3).
1. Scott, op.cit. pp.10-18; J. NeW, The Foreign Policy
of France from 1914 to 1945, (London 1975), pp. 155-157.
2. Dyck, op.cit. p.243.
3. Lensen, op.cit. pp.181-200; Nisso Koshoshi, op.cit.
pp. 239-241.
In Britain, the political balance of the 
National Government was to be altered as MacDonald 
reluctantly agreed to Conservative requests for an 
election, in which the Government parties gained a 
landslide victory (1). In the reconstructed Cabinet, 
MacDonald endeavoured to retain a 'really national 
touch' by giving posts to the two major Liberal 
factions; Sir John Simon, like his predecessor a 
Liberal with a legal background, became Foreign 
Secretary • By no means as strong a personality as 
Chamberlain, Henderson or even Reading, his role in 
the Cabinet became more than of an agent to be given 
instructions rather than that of an initiator of 
policies, particularly as MacDonald maintained an 
active interest in foreign affairs (2). However,
Neville Chamberlain, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
also was to play an important role in foreign policy 
decision-making, often if only in a negative sense, as 
financial and economic aspects of Anglo-Soviet relations
1. Snowden denouced the Labour Party programme as 
'Bolshevism run mad' . The National Government won 
556 seats to the Labour Party's 52, and both 
Henderson and Dalton were defeated. Marquand, 
op.cit. pp. 662-670.
2. Middlemas and Barnes, op.cit. pp. 654-655; Marquand, 
op.cit. pp. 703-705; Thorne, op.cit. p.95.
remained important. Although Conservative-dominated,
. the Cabinet contained a broad spectrum of opinion, 
as was to become evident on the Russian question.
Soon after the Cabinet was formed,
Chamberlain warned his colleagues that the already 
unhealthy trade balance was rapidly deteriorating, 
and the Cabinet, not without objections from the free­
traders, began to implement piece-meal duties on 
various goods in order to reduce imports. Only the 
notorious agreement-to-differ kept the Cabinet 
together after a Cabinet committee, examining the 
balance of trade question, reported, in mid-January 
1932, in favour of a general 10% ad valorem tariff on 
all imports except staple foodstuffs, principal raw 
materials and imports from the Dominions (1).
The Cabinet committee had specifically 
referred to Russian trade in relation to the overall 
balance of trade and this aspect was considered 
separately by the Cabinet on 27 January, together with 
Simon's report on the lack of progress in the debts 
negotiations. Simon had raised that issue with 
Sokolnikov in early December 1931, but the conversation 
had revolved fruitlessly around the content of the
1. Marquand, op.cit. pp.709-713; Cabinet Conclusions,
11 December 1931, 88(31)4, CAB 23/69; Report of 
Committee on Balance of Trade, 19 January 1932,
C.P.25(32), CAB 24/227.
last Henderson-Sokolnikov meeting in July 1931, as the 
Russians tried to shift the onus for an initiative 
onto the British. After consultation with Walter 
Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, Simon 
informed the Russians that he was reluctantly forced 
to conclude that 'it would be better not to continue 
the negotiations at the present time' (1). The 
Cabinet decided on further investigations into the 
Russian trade question (2).
The Russian trade question broke down into 
two different but inter-connected aspects: export 
credits and the fate of the 1930 Trade Agreement.
In the late autumn of 1931, European and American 
observers began to question the Soviet Union's ability 
to service the growing foreign debt, as the retirement 
of maturing debts became difficult because of the 
decline in receipts from Soviet exports and of the 
unwillingness of current lenders, such as Britain and
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, App .II (iv), (v), (vi); D.V.P.
Vol XIV, Doc .Nos. 368, 372. Litvinov wrote to 
Sokolnikov in December 1931 that 'the first word 
remains with Simon, who must either propose recommenc­
ing work in the committee of experts or announce
the Government's agreement to linking debts with 
credits'. Ibid, Doc .No. 381. Simon chose a third 
course of action.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 27 January 1932, 9(32)7,
CAB 23/70.
Germany, to renew or expand existing credits.
Against this background, however, there was some 
disagreement amongst the British experts as to the 
actual state of the Soviet Union's solvency. Picton 
Bagge, representing the Department of Overseas Trade, 
suggested that a Soviet default was 'fairly imminent’, 
but Frank Nixon, from the Export Credit Guarantee 
Department, basing his opinions on his discussions 
in theCity and in Berlin, was more optimistic that a 
default was unlikely in the immediate future (1).
The Foreign Office tended to be rather apprehensive 
about the situation, on the grounds of the considered 
opinion of the Embassy staff in Moscow that 'although 
there may be no immediate danger of Russia defaulting, 
the risk of granting credit to this country has 
increased appreciably in the past few months' (2).
On the other side of the problem, Seymour 
told an inter-departmental meeting that the Foreign 
Office welcomed 'any sound scheme for increasing 
British exports', but warned that any restrictions on 
imports from Soviet Russia or the cancellation of the 
Trade Agreement might lead to a reduction in Russian -j
1. Minutes of Inter-Departmental Meeting, 9 December 
1931, N7939/324/38, FO 371/15612. For German views 
see D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 146, 148.
2. Ovey to Simon, 24 November 1931, N7648/167/38,
FO 371/15607.
trade altogether. Fountain, from the Board of Trade, 
however, speculated that decisions at the forthcoming 
Ottawa Conference might 'very possibly mean that the 
Trade Agreement would have to be denounced* (1).
These two aspects of the Russian trade 
question also became the subject of some public 
debate during the autumn and winter of 1931, but 
Government representatives in the Commons refused to 
support any ideas of further restricting export credits 
or of denouncing the Temporary Trade Agreement (2).
Soviet diplomats noted the growth in interest amongst 
Conservative back-benchers in these trade questions, 
but drew some comfort from the fact that these 
politicians, by way of contrast with a year or two 
earlier, argued only for an adjustment in the trade 
balance rather than for a rupture of relations (3).
The 1931 harvest in the Soviet Union was 
poor and significantly decreased the amount of grain 
available for export, even given the coercive collect­
ion methods; supply difficulties in the timber and 
petroleum industries compounded the difficulties.
With export volume and export prices falling, the
1. Minutes of Inter-Departmental Meeting, 9 December 
1931, N7939/324/38, FO 371/15612.
2. Coates, op.cit. p.411; H.C.Deb. Vol 259, Cols 89-90, 
260, 478, 486-487.
3. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .Nos. 367, 373, VoJ. XV, Doc .No.88.
Soviet planners had no option but to reduce overall 
imports commensurately at the end of 1931 (1). In 
the autumn and winter of 1931, apart from using up 
the remaining amounts of the Johnston-Gurevitch 
credits, ’practically no Russian orders’ were placed 
in Britain under the shorter credit terms delineated 
by the Cabinet (2), but, at the same time, the 
Politburo were considering increasing the proportion 
of British goods under the restricted import plan (3).
c~>
The course of their deliberations was 
influenced, no doubt, by signs of further develop­
ments in the British Cabinet’s attitude. At the 
meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Trade with 
Russia a difference of opinion emerged between 
Cunliffe-Lister, now Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, who thought that the denunciation of the 
Trade Agreement, which he thought had ’few advantages’, 
would make little difference to trade, and Runciman 
and Seymour (who represented the Foreign Office in 
Simon’s absence), who felt that the Agreement had
1. Dohan, op.cit. pp.622-625, 628-630. Litvinov wrote to 
Sokolnikov in December 1931: ’Both Narkomindel and 
Narkomvneshtorg are insisting on the greatest possible 
increase in the amount of orders for England, but you 
should take into consideration the general contraction 
in our import plan for 1932’. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No .381.
2. Interim Report of Committee on Trade with Russia,
2 February 1932, C.P.61(32), CAB 24/228.
3. Litvinov wrote that the directives on economic 
relations with Britain would be issued only ’after 
confirmation at the highest level’ of the proposals 
put forward by the interested Commissariats. D.V.P.
Vol XIV, Doc .No. 381.
certain advantages and that its denunciation might 
’adversely affect our relations with Russia’ • At 
Neville Chamberlain’s suggestion no mention of the 
controversial question of denunciation was made in 
the committee’s Interim Report, which recommended 
that suggestions should be invited from the Soviet 
Ambassador for ’remedying* the adverse trade balance, 
such as by utilising the sterling balances available 
(1).
With Cabinet approval given, Simon saw 
Bogomolov on 5 February 1932 and outlined the British 
viewpoint as detailed in the Cabinet committee’s report, 
concluding that, in view of parliamentary and public 
criticism, the Cabinet could ’not continue to 
acquiesce indefinitely in the present state of 
affairs’ and might be forced into ’taking steps ' to . 
attain the ends desired’ . Bogomolov confined himself 
to saying that invisible exports and exports from the 
Dominions in fact considerably evened out the balance 
(2).
In the light of this conversation, Sokolnikov 
sent a long appreciation to Moscow* He noted growing
1. Minutes of Committee on Trade with Russia, 28 January 
and 1 February 1932, CAB 27/480; Interim Report of 
this Committee, 2 February 1932, C.P.61(32), CAB 
24/228 .
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 151; Cabinet Conclusions,
3 February 1932, 11(32)7, CAB 23/70; D.V.P. Vol XV, 
Doc .No . 68.
pressure on the Cabinet from Conservative newspapers 
and politicians, who were urging the denunciation of 
the Trade Agreement. Although even within the 
Cabinet there was a small group of ’Die-hards’ who 
are ’generally striving to push Anglo-Soviet trade 
and political relations onto a sharply deteriorating 
path*, such a policy was ’not at present accepted or 
approved by the Cabinet as a whole' . He assumed that 
the question of denouncing the Trade Agreement had 
been discussed, but that the threat of that action 
was being kept 'in reserve as a means of putting 
pressure on us’ . His conclusion* was that it was 
essential to prevent any 'straining' of Anglo-Soviet 
relations, by 'trying to find a basis for agreement 
with the government majority*; this could best be 
done by an increase in the orders being placed (1).
These considerations carried some weight, 
for at the end of February 1932, Nikolai Krestinsky, 
the Deputy Foreign Commissar, informed Sokolnikov 
that it had been decided 'to come to an agreement with 
the English over the whole range of our trade relations’, 
and, following closely figures proposed by Sokolnikov, 
to place orders for £20 million of goods (of which
1. Ibid, note 67. Also Popov, Diplomaticheskie 
Otnosheniya, op.cit. pp. 21-22.
£5 million would be re-exports from the Dominions) 
provided that the British introduced no restrictions 
on the import of Soviet products and that credits for 
heavy machinery returned to their former duration (1).
On 3 March, Sokolnikov visited the Foreign 
Office, handed over a breakdown of the Soviet figures on 
Anglo-Soviet trade and stated the Soviet desire for 
’a definite and substantial improvement in Soviet-British 
trade in both directions1 (2). This response to Simon’s 
representations was received with some satisfaction 
both by the Northern Department officials and by Ovey, 
who had made several personal representations to 
Narkomindel officials about altering the balance of 
trade (3) .
The following week talks began between Nixon 
and Alexander Ozersky, the Soviet Trade Representative, 
who asked for approximately £12 million of credit for 
varying periods and accepted ’in principle* the idea 
of providing some security. After consultation with 
the Export Credit Advisory Committee, Nixon decided
1. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .No. 96. Credit of two years was 
wanted for £9 million of heavy machinery orders.
2. Ibid, Doc .No. 110; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 153.
The Soviet estimate of invisible exports was
£7 million, but the British were thinking in 
terms of £5 million.
3. Ibid, Doc .Nos . 152, 155; minutes on ibid, Doc .No.
153, in N1395/22/38, FO 371/15593; Popov,
Diplomaticheskie Otnosheniya, op.cit. p.69.
on a 'temporary expedient1 whereby during the follow- 
•* ing six months orders for £4 million should be 
guaranteed. As the Soviet bills falling due during 
that period amounted to £1,600,000, that amount 
would in effect be 'revolved*, with the remaining 
£2,400,000 being given on orders up to one year's 
duration (1). This proposal was approved by Major 
John Colville, the Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Department of Overseas Trade, and by Runciman, and 
was brought before the Cabinet on 20 April.
MacDonald spoke in its favour, in view of its import­
ance for the machine-tool industry, but a Cabinet 
decision was deferred because Chamberlain had not 
had time to study the proposal in depth. (2).
1. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .Nos 88, 110, and notes 61, 78; 
Note by Runciman, 16 April 1932, C.P.134(32),
CAB 24/229.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 20 April 1932, 24(32)1, CAB 
23/71. The Russians speculated that the delay of 
over a month in the British reply to their proposal 
was due to the absence of leading Cabinet members, 
such as MacDonald and Simon. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc. 
No. 195. MacDonald had an eye operation in early 
February and did not return to full Cabinet work 
until mid-April. Marquand, op.cit. pp.693-694.
Both Runciman and Simon were abroad in early April, 
and had requested that the matter be deferred until 
their return. Memorandum by David Waley, member
of Overseas Finance Section of Treasury, 9 April 
1932, file F12930/1, T 160/446. However, the need 
to wait for Chamberlain, preoccupied with budget 
planning, to examine the proposals was the main 
reason for the delay.
The Cabinet Committee on Trade with Russia 
discussed the question again, but could reach no 
‘agreement other than that the credit issue and the 
denunciation of the Trade Agreement should be treated 
separately (1). On 27 April, therefore, the full 
Cabinet discussed the question again; the general 
mood of the Cabinet moved away from Runciman's 
proposals for the £4 million credit and towards 
-Chamberlain's compromise proposal of replacing the 
expiring credits of £1,600,000 with 'fresh bills up 
to 18 months* . Runciman agreed to this proposal, but 
on the condition that he could bring up his wider 
proposals later. Even this cautious approach was 
unacceptable to Viscount Hailsham (formerly Sir Douglas 
Hogg), the Secretary of State for War, who objected on 
financial and industrial grounds against sanctioning 
these credits; only with his noted dissent did the 
Cabinet authorise the Treasury proposal (2) .
The Soviet Embassy saw this limited British 
agreement to credits of only £1,600,000 (£900,000 for 
up to 18 months and £700,000 for up to 12 months) as 
evidence of two tendencies in the Cabinet, one wishing 
to denounce the Trade Agreement immediately, the other
1. Minutes of Committee on Trade with Russia, 26 April 
1932, CAB 27/480.
2„ Cabinet Conclusions, 27 April 1932, 25(32)7,
CAB 23/71.
wishing to retain some freedom of action by post­
poning any decision on the trade question until after 
the Ottawa Conference scheduled for July 1932. The 
Russians derived some comfort from their assessment 
that the second tendency still predominated (1).
British records suggest that opinion in the Cabinet 
was more diversified than a simple two-way split.
Views ranged from that of Hailsham, who 'felt a strong 
objection on moral grounds to trading with what was 
virtually a slave State', through those of Runciman and 
Chamberlain, who differed over credits but who both 
hoped to bring about adjustments to the balance of 
trade through a re-negotiation of the Trade Agreement, 
to those of the Samuelite Liberals and MacDonald, who 
were definitely opposed to the denunciation of the 
Trade Agreement (2).
Outside the Cabinet, pressure for action over 
the Anglo-Soviet trade balance was growing during the 
spring of 1932. Colville received representations from 
several trading organisations, and in mid-February a 
meeting of Conservative back-benchers unanimously passed
1. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc.Nos. 207, 215.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 27 April 1932, 25(32)7, CAB 23/71;
Minutes by MacDonald, June 1932, PRO 30/69/1/266,
and by Sir Herbert Samuel, Home Secretary, 1 June
1932, PRO 30/69/2/12, both MacDonald Papers.
a resolution urging that 'immediate steps' be taken 
to end the Trade Agreement (1).
However, during the spring of 1932 the trade 
balance did very nearly even out as far as monthly 
totals were concerned; indeed, in April 1932 British 
exports to the Soviet Union totalled more than imports 
from the Soviet Union (2). A significant decrease in 
imports from the Soviet Union accounted for this 
change in the balance. With grain reserves depleted 
due to the high export levels of 1930-31, with a 
rapid growth of urban population and with the diversion 
of resources to a build-up in the Soviet Far East, the 
rural economy was 'squeezed' by coercive methods, but 
the poor harvest, disorganised supply systems and 
peasant opposition reduced the export totals. The 
excesses of the grain-procuring system were to lead to 
famine in several areas of Soviet Russia, notably in 
the Ukraine and the Caucasus, during the spring of 
1932 (3) . These internal difficulties rather than
1. Coates, op.cit. p.420; D.V.P. Vol XV, note 60; 
Resolution of Parliamentary Committee on Trade and 
Industry, 23 February 1932, N1247/22/38, FO 371/16313.
2. After adverse balances of £422,000 in January,
£77,000 in February, and £104,000 in March, Britain 
had a favourable balance of £86,000 in April. 
Memorandum by Runciman, 6 June 1932, C.P. 190 (32),
CAB 24/230.
3. Nove, op.cit. pp.174-181; Dohan, op.cit. pp.625-626; 
Dana Dalrymple, 'The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934', in 
Soviet Studies, January 1964, pp .252-253, 264-265. 
Imports of Soviet oil and timber also decreased but 
not as drastically as grain imports.
deliberate policy decisions caused the reduction of 
Soviet exports to Britain in the early part of 1932.
An element of deliberate design in Soviet policy 
(which undoubtedly did desire to prevent any deter­
ioration in Anglo-Soviet political and economic 
relations which could result in the denunciation of 
the Trade Agreement) was apparent rather in the plans 
to increase orders in Britain.
A clear example of orders being placed for 
political effect was the increased Soviet purchases 
of Scottish herrings. Tsarist Russia had been an 
important market for the British herring industry, but, 
despite the endeavours of the herring industry in the 
1920s, Soviet purchases had remained small. Only after 
the formation of the National Government did the 
Cabinet come to endorse the efforts made previously, 
largely through private approaches to the Russians 
from British M.P.s, to re-open the Russian market (1). 
Following up a small Soviet order in January 1932, 
which Sokolnikov had urged in order to ensure Liberal 
support, negotiations between Colville and Ozersky 
resulted in a larger order for 100,000 barrels of cured 
herrings in mid-June 1932 (2). Not without foundation,
1. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .Nos. 54, 328; Report of Economic 
Advisory Council, 27 December 1931, C.P.1(32),CAB 24/227
2. The Conservative M .P. Boothby told the Russians that 
the January order had 'produced a favourable impression 
in political circles' D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No.373, Vol 
XV, Doc .Nos .88, 262, and note 184 ; Memorandum by 
Colville, 13 May 1932, file F12930/2, T 160/446.
the Foreign Office saw these purchases as the result 
of serious Soviet alarm at the possibility of a 
denunciation of the Trade Agreement (1).
On the level of political relations, 
propaganda continued as an irritant though not, except 
in the Indian context, to the extent of former years. 
The British felt that the policy of prosecuting the 
communist press was more effective than repeated 
protests to Moscow; the India Office considered that 
that was the reason for the 'noticeable restraint in 
the tone of the articles appearing in the "Daily 
Worker'" during 1931 (2), while Ovey, looking back 
over that year, wrote: 'The volume of propaganda was 
apparently reduced to a considerable extent, while in 
all cases which might have appeared prima facie to 
call for a protest, the Soviet Government were in a 
position technically to disclaim all responsibility (3) .
In Britain, the Communist Party had failed 
to capitalise to any significant extent on the growing 
unpopularity of the Labour Party during 1930-31, but, 
after the fall of the Labour Cabinet, party membership
1. Foreign Office Minute, 4 July 1932, N4134/1/38,
FO 371/16317.
2. India Office Report, March 1932, included in 
N3392/132/38, FO 371/16325.
3. Ovey to Simon, 1 March 1932, N1423/1423/38, FO 371/ 
16337.
rapidly doubled. Nevertheless, the general election 
of November 1931 was another disaster for the Party, 
which was severely criticised by E.C.C.I. during 
the winter of 1931-32 for its failures (1) . The 
National Government's line in their answers in 
Parliament was to continue to disparage the effective­
ness of the communist movement inside Britain (2).
However, the role of communists in the 
Indian disturbances continued to come under careful 
surveillance by the authorities in Delhi and London.
Gandhi had attended the Second Round-Table Conference 
in London from September to December 1931 and some 
progress appeared to have been made, but back in 
India the National Congress resumed the civil dis­
obedience campaign, to which the Indian Government 
responded with a much harsher crackdown than in 1930 (3).
The Indian authorities felt that 'communism as an 
organised movement has obtained no appreciable footing 
in India' (due, it was argued, to Government action 
such as the Meerut trial, the interception of communist
1. Degras, Comintern, op.cit. Vol III, pp.219-220; John 
Stevenson and Chris Cook, The Slump, Society and 
Politics during the Depression, (London 1977) pp.
127-136; J .T. Murphy, New Horizons, (London 1941) 
pp. 297-304.
2. H.C.Deb. Vol 263, Cols 1163-1164; H.L.Deb. Vol 84,
Cols 104-105.
3. Brown, op.cit. pp.282-304; Marquand, op.cit. pp.706-709.
newspapers and mail, and the deportation of foreign 
agitators rather than to 'any deliberate weakening 
of effort on the part of Moscow'), and they were 
aware that the Comintern propaganda was now character­
ised by 'persistent and unqualified condemnation' of 
the Indian nationalists (1), but, in the tense 
situation in the spring of 1932, the authorities were 
sensitive to any suggestion of communist involvement.
Consequently, Hoare, now Secretary of State 
for India, wrote to Simon about an article in Inprecor 
in March 1932 advocating armed insurrection in India.
He considered this a 'flagrant breach' of the propaganda 
pledge; the Foreign Office officials were in agreement, 
but were reluctant to press the matter. Seymour summed 
up the view of the Northern Department:
'It may be desirable, for Parliamentary 
reasons, especially in view of the present 
state of affairs in India, that protests 
should be made, but we must realise in 
advance that it will have no effect unless 
we are prepared to threaten drastic action'.
Oliphant noted the wider considerations of British 
foreign policy:
1. Imam, op.cit. pp.337-340; Hoare to Simon, 11 May 
1932, and enclosed India Office Report, March 
1932, N3392/132/38, FO 371/16325.
'My submission is that the present moment 
when Disarmament, China, etc. are up, and 
Ottawa is in the offing, is not the time 
to embark on a real set-to with the Soviet 
and a possible break involving as it might 
a series of developments' (1).
Simon decided to refer the question to the 
Cabinet, as he did not want to 'accept the sole 
responsibility' for the future course of action (2), 
but because of his commitments in Geneva, it was not 
until early May that the Cabinet discussion took place. 
The Cabinet, after considering the three possible 
courses of action suggested by Simon (to protest and 
receive the usual Soviet disclaimer of responsibility; 
to protest and, in default of satisfaction, to continue 
protesting up to a point at which a severance of 
relations might become unavoidable; to ignore present 
and future publications), were inclined to link the 
propaganda question with the wider question of trade 
relations, so they decided on representations to the 
Soviet Ambassador but with the problem of future action
1. Inprecor, 10 March 1932; India Office to Foreign 
Office, 26 March 1932, N1917/132/38, FO 371/16325, 
and minutes on same.
2. Memorandum by Simon, 7 May 1932, C.P. 154(32), CAB 
24/230. Anthony Eden, Parliamentary Under­
secretary to the Foreign Office, later wrote: 
'Simon's brilliant, analytical mind hated to take 
decisions' . Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs. 
Facing the Dictators, (London 1962) p.28, passim.
to be examined by the Cabinet Committee on Trade 
with Russia |(1).
When he saw Bogomolov on 24 May 1932 
Simon reiteroated the British view that the Soviet 
Government could not be dissociated • from the 
Comintern's activities, and took the opportunity to 
express the Government's dissatisfaction over the 
state of Anglo-Soviet trade and over the Soviet 
attitude to the Lena Goldfields affair. He maintained 
that 'the atmosphere in Parliament was deteriorating' 
as regards these issues, and that there was 'an ever­
growing belief that the resumption of relations in 
1929 was a mistake'. Bogomolov replied on predictable 
lines, rejecting the idea of any connection between 
the Soviet Government and the Comintern, pointing out 
that the £1,600,000 credits resulting from the 
Colville-Ozersky negotiations would be 'used up in 
only a few weeks', and placing the blame for compensa­
tion difficulties on the 'unfounded claims* of the 
Company (2).
1. Memorandum by Simon, 7 May 1932, C.P. 154 (32), CAB 
24/230; Cabinet Conclusions, 11 May 1932, 27(32)2,
CAB 23/71.
2. D.B.F.p.II/VII, Doc .No.156; D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .No.228. 
MacDonald minuted on Simon's report: 'They are playing 
with us but stick to them' . MacDonald Papers,
PRO 30/69/1/325. In November 1931, on Reading's 
instructions, Ovey suggested £3§million as a 
compensation figure to settle the Lena claim, but 
not until April 1932 did the Soviet side make a 
counter-proposal of £1 million. D.V.P. Vol XIV,
Doc .No. 337; Foreign Office Memorandum, 28 June 1932, 
N3943/149/38, FO 371/16326.
Although the policy of representations had 
been reintroduced, no further steps were contemplated. 
The Cabinet committee devoted relatively little 
attention to the propaganda issue, and then only in 
relation to a possible denunciation of the Trade 
Agreement. It was argued that a denunciation could 
not 1worsen1 the position as regards propaganda and 
might indeed enable the British *by threats of 
economic pressure, to induce the Soviet Government 
to exercise more effective control over organisations 
such as the Third International1 (1). MacDonald, the 
Cabinet member with the greatest experience of Soviet 
affairs, however, disagreed, arguing that *whoever 
knows these men can have no doubt that it will 
greatly increase & not decrease the activities of the 
Illrd. Int (ernational)1 (2).
However, MacDonald*s objections to the 
report of the Cabinet committee were not confined to 
its conclusions about propaganda but covered the 
general approach of the whole report. The committee 
recommended the immediate denunciation of the Temporary
1. Third Report of Committee on Trade with Russia,
30 May 1932, C .P. 169(32), CAB 24/230.
2. Minute by MacDonald, June 1932, MacDonald Papers, 
PRO 30/69/1/266.
Trade Agreement under the terms of the six-month 
. notice required (rejecting the submission of the 
Foreign Office and the Board of Trade that it should 
be allowed to run on from month to month, subject 
to one month’s notice) and the negotiation of a 
fresh treaty ’if and when opportunity offers’ .
Guided only by commercial considerations, the commit­
tee felt that, despite the Board of Trade’s warnings 
as to the ’possible effects of restriction of Soviet 
imports’, denunciation would
’by freeing our hands for negotiation 
with a monopolist purchaser, enable us 
to secure an adjustment of the trade 
balance, and this in the direction of 
increased exports from this country’ (1).
A preliminary discussion of this report took 
place at the Cabinet meeting on 1 June, but in the 
absence of Chamberlain and MacDonald (convalescing 
after a second eye operation), MacDonald’s reported 
’serious apprehension’ about the report's recommend­
ations was sufficient to secure postponement of 
detailed discussions until the following week (2).
1. Third Report of Committee on Trade with Russia, 30 
May 1932, C .P. 169(32), CAB 24/230; Foreign Office 
Memorandum, 28 April 1932, N2925/22/38, and Memorandum 
by Board of Trade, 3 May 1932, N2717/22/38, both 
FO 371/16319; Minutes of Committee on Trade with 
Russia, 24 May 1932, CAB 27/480.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 1 June 1932, 30(32)5, CAB 23/71; 
Samuel to MacDonald, 1 June 1932, MacDonald Papers, 
PRO 30/69/2/12.
In the interval Runciman circulated a memorandum which 
pointed out the favourable change in the balance of 
trade during April 1932 (1).
At the Cabinet meeting on 8 June there was 
a considerable split of opinion over whether the 
moment was ’opportune’ for a denunciation, with 
MacDonald and the Samuelite Liberals having the 
’gravest objections* to any denunciation at all. No 
agreement could be reached, and 'in the light of the 
improvement in the balance of trade with Russia, the 
possible effects on trade and employment of giving 
notice of the termination of the Agreement, as well 
as the bearing of the question on the Ottawa Conference’, 
the Cabinet accepted MacDonald's suggestion to refer 
the matter back to the Cabinet committee to be care­
fully watched and raised again when it was deemed 
advisable (2).
The Cabinet Committee on Trade with Russia 
had noted that a separate Cabinet committee, dealing 
with the policies to be adopted at the Ottawa
1. Memorandum by Runciman, 6 June 1932, C.P. 190(32),
CAB 24/230 .
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 8 June 1932, 32(32)5 and 33(32)1, 
CAB 23/71. The only personal expression of opinion 
recorded was that of Hailsham, who was 'opposed to 
all Trade Agreements with Soviet Russia’, but other 
views are clear from Minute by MacDonald, June 1932, 
PRO 30/69/1/266, and Samuel to MacDonald, 1 June 
1932, PRO 30/69/2/12, both MacDonald Papers.
Conference, had examined the question of the Empire 
Wheat quota; ’quantitative restriction or complete 
prohibition’, in that context, of imports of Russian 
wheat could only be enforced after the Trade Agree­
ment had been denounced (1) . However, MacDonald 
had induced the Cabinet not to make any decision on 
the denunciation of the Trade Agreement before the 
Ottawa Conference opened. Nevertheless, the prelimin­
aries to the Ottawa Conference had made it clear that 
Russia would be one of the issues under discussion.
The Canadians and the Australians gave notice that 
they would press for a boycott of Soviet wheat and 
timber entering Britain, and, it was only by agreeing 
that the question should be discussed, that the 
British managed to get the Canadians to omit the word 
'Russia' from the published agenda (2).
By the spring of 1932, however, the Soviet 
side seem to have begun to realise that the Ottawa 
Conference might result in measures affecting Soviet 
exports to Britain, through the introduction of a 
system of quotas and preferences, and possibly through 
the denunciation of the Trade Agreement. The British
1. Third Report of Committee on Trade with Russia,
30 May 1932, C.P.169(32), CAB 24/230.
2. Drummond, op.cit. pp.90-94; Thomas to Bennett,
30 May 1932, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
file SS 10836, MAF 40/25.
decision on credits in April was seen as evidence of 
a British desire to avoid a definite decision on the 
trade question until after the Ottawa Conference (1).
When Ozersky visited the Department of Overseas Trade 
in early July to enquire as to the likely situation 
after the £1,600,000 credit was used up, Colville and 
Nixon replied that they could give no definite answer 
and warned the Russian that he 'would be surprised 
probably to know how frequently the name of Russia 
appeared in oonnection with the preparatory work of 
the Ottawa Conference' (2). Soviet diplomats did not 
refer to the forthcoming conference in conversation 
with their British counterparts but some signs of 
apprehension and suspicion were apparent in the line 
adopted by the Soviet press, which came to concentrate 
on denouncing the imperialist aims of the Ottawa 
Conference (3). To the Russians, signs of greater 
collaboration between Britain and the Empire in the 
economic sphere, with probable repercussions for Anglo- 
Soviet trade, seemed to be the beginning of the construc­
tion of an anti-Soviet economic front.
1. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .Nos. 195, 207, 215.
2. Memorandum by Department of Overseas Trade, 12 July 
1932, N4209/22/38, FO 371/16320.
3. Izvestiya, 13 May 1932; articles in Inprecor, 
June-July 1932.
A conversation between Simon and Litvinov 
in Geneva on the very eve of the Ottawa Conference 
had the nature of shadow-boxing, since it revolved 
around two points of Anglo-Soviet friction, the 
balance of trade (which Litvinov said could be 
altered by increasing British exports by longer 
credits) and the Lena Goldfields claim (which Simon 
described as a fthorn* which it should be possible 
to remove quickly before domestic pressure on him 
became overwhelming), without any mention being made 
of the Ottawa Conference and its possible effect on 
Anglo-Soviet relations (1).
By the summer of 1932 there was an atmosphere 
of expectation of change in Anglo-Soviet relations, 
but as yet no concrete developments. However, develop­
ments in the international arena during the first half 
of 1932 did affect the interests of both powers, but 
did not bring them significantly closer together.
In the Far East, the Soviet Union continued 
to strengthen her defences while pursuing a conciliatory 
diplomatic line, but Soviet-Japanese tension rose during 
the late spring of 1932 (2). The Soviet leadership
1. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .No . 299; D.B .F .P . II/VI I, Doc.No.158.
2. Lensen, op.cit. pp. 362-380; Yoshizawa Kenkichi,
*Nisso Fukashin Joyaku, Manshu Jihen ni Kansuru 
Kaisodan’, in Kokusai Seiji, No.33 (1966), pp.105-111.
maintained a suspicious attitude to the other 
Western powers, criticising France and Britain for 
•participation in and development of the attack against 
China, jointly with Japan, preparing for a struggle 
against the U.S.S.R.*, and refusing to assist in the 
work of the Lytton Commission, which had been set up 
by the League of Nations to investigate the Manchurian 
dispute (1). Although the possibility of a resurgence 
of the *old bugaboo of Soviet policy in the Far East, 
an Anglo-Japanese alliance* could not be discounted 
by the Russians (2), they were, with some reason, 
more concerned about French rather than British links 
with the Japanese (3). The Manchurian situation was 
referred to in conversations between British and 
Soviet diplomats, but the level of contact did not
1. Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol I, pp.345-351; Degras, 
Soviet Documents, op.cit. Vol II, pp.529-530.
2. Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, (London 1968), 
p.203.
3. For Soviet suspicions of Franco-Japanese links, see 
Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol I, pp. 348-349,
Vol II, pp. 363-364; D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .Nos . 76, 80. 
For Japanese soundings of France see Ndr^, op.cit. 
p. 158; Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Documents 
Diplomatiques Franqais, Serie I, (Paris 1964 -) 
(hereafter cited as D.D.F.), Vol I, Doc .Nos. 8, 168; 
reports from Nagaoka Harukazo, Japanese Ambassador 
in Paris, to Tokyo, in J.F.M.A. file A .1.1.0 .21-12-1-5
exceed polite enquiry as to the other*s attitude 
towards the dispute (1).
In the same way as the Japanese action 
forced the Soviet leadership to re-examine their 
defences, so too were the British forced to re­
consider the relevance of the Ten Year Rule. In 
February 1932, theChiefs of Staff argued that *the 
whole of our territory in the Far East, as well as 
the coastline of India and the Dominions and our 
vast trade and shipping, lie open to attack* (2). 
Whereas in the 1920s the question of Imperial defence, 
above all the defence of India, had been considered 
in terms of a threat from Soviet Russia, now it was 
the sudden emergence of the Japanese threat that 
prompted the British decision to cancel the Ten Year 
Rule limitation. Paradoxically, the direct Soviet 
threat to Afghanistan and India was considered to 
have decreased; as Vansittart noted: fI think we shall 
certainly be able to reassure the Afghans in regard 
to the inability of the Soviet Government to exercise 
real pressure now (a) because of the internal situation
1. D.V.P. Vol XIV, Doc .No. 275; D.B.F.P. II/IX, Doc .Nos. 
2, 86, 309, 593, II/X, Doc.Nos. 72, 149, 381.
2. The Chiefs of Staff added: 'What the political 
reactions in India and the various colonies would 
be, we leave it to the experts to determine'.
Cited in Howard, op.cit. pp.97-99.
in Russia, (b) because of their preoccupations in 
the Far East* (1). Although the Chiefs of Staff 
recommended a build-up of British defences in the 
Empire, the Treasury felt that more than ever 
financial constraints over-ruled vast military expenditure 
the Cabinet decision in March 1932 to cancel the Ten 
Year Rule was tempered by the proviso that only strictly 
justifiable expenditure would be authorised (2).
j The developments in the Far East were an 
unsatisfactory backcloth to the opening of the 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva in February 1932.
The differences between the various powers were shown 
to be as intractable as ever. The Soviet Union again 
supported the German line, although there were signs 
that the policies of the two countries were no longer 
so well co-ordinated. There was little common ground 
between the British and Soviet delegations, although 
the Soviet delegation, in order to avoid charges of 
obstruction, ultimately agreed to a British proposal 
to proceed on the basis of the draft convention approved 
by the Preparatory Commission. In general little 
progress had been made when the Conference adjourned
1. Minute by Vansittart,on Maconachie to Simon,
29 March 1932, N2579/713/38, FO 371/16277.
2. Barnett, op.cit. pp.342-343; Note by Treasury,
11 March 1932, C.I.D. 1087-B, CAB 4/21.
in July 1932 (1) . Franco-German differences could 
not be reconciled (at the end of the session the 
Germans threatened to withdraw unless the equality of 
rights was recognised), despite MacDonald's efforts 
in bringing about a limited settlement at the 
Lausanne Conference through the virtual abolition of 
reparations.
In this unstable European situation, the 
Soviet Union showed signs of moving slowly towards 
the French thesis of security. There was a distinct 
push in the June-July 1932 period to obtain a revival 
of the Franco-Soviet negotiations over commercial and 
non-aggression treaties (which received a favourable 
response from French Premier Eduoard Herriot in early 
August), and in late July a Soviet-Polish Non-aggress­
ion Pact was signed (2). The Soviet Union moved to 
conclude a succession of Non-aggression Pacts in the 
early part of 1932, with Finland in January Latvia in 
February, and Estonia in May 1932 (3). The general 
opinion within the Foreign Office was that the conclu­
sion of these pacts was a sign that the Russians ’are 
prepared to go to very great lengths to preserve peace, 
in order to retain complete liberty of action in the
1. Beloff, op.cit. pp .49-51; Helliar-Symons, op.cit.
pp. 173-182.
2. Scott, op.cit. pp.56-64; D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc.Nos.
244, 298, 300, 301.
3 . Ibid, Doc .Nos. 32, 41, 67, 201.
in the internal reconstruction of their country1 (1).
. The deteriorating state of Soviet-German relations 
was shown in Stalin's interview with a German author 
in December 1931, and the succession of Franz von 
Papen to the German Chancellorship in June 1932 increased 
Soviet distrust, but the Russians still tried to promote 
economic links (a further Soviet-German credit agree­
ment was signed in June); one motive was to keep 
German-Soviet trade continuing even though Anglo- 
Soviet trade might be affected by developments at 
Ottawa (2). Although Ovey took one abstruse remark 
by Litvinov during a conversation in January 1932 to 
be possibly a hint about an Anglo-Soviet non-aggression 
pact (3), no definite proposal of this nature was put 
forward by the Soviet side.
During his conversation with Litvinov in 
July 1932, Simon had emphasised that he wanted to 
'preserve friendly relations' with the Soviet Union, 
but that unless certain outstanding issues were ’cleaned 
up', pressure on him from both Parliament and the Cabinet
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos . 149, 154; Ovey to Simon,
21 June 1932, N3841/1089/38, FO 371/16334.
2. Kochan, op.cit. p.159; Dyck, op.cit. 242-251; D.V.P. 
Vol XV, Doc .Nos. 106, 168, 178 , 200 , 247 , 250.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 147, 149.
would only increase (1). The period from the 
, inauguration of the National Government until the 
eve of the Ottawa Conference was marked by a growing 
pressure for a re-adjustment of Anglo-Soviet relations 
on the economic level. Dissatisfaction with the Soviet 
exploitation of the Temporary Trade Agreement was 
amplified by the feelings of frustration and mistrust 
aroused by the Soviet attitude to other questions in 
Anglo-Soviet relations. Propaganda continued as an 
irritant, the debts and claims negotiations reached 
complete deadlock, no progress was made in settling 
the Lena Goldfields claim, and contact was limited in 
the discussion of the international problems of dis­
armament, the Manchurian crisis, and European stability.
To the National Government, preoccupations 
with domestic recovery reduced foreign affairs to a 
secondary role (2), and even amongst Britain’s foreign 
policy problems Anglo-Soviet relations did not occupy 
a major position. The Cabinet were chiefly concerned 
with the economic aspects of the relationship on the 
occasions when they did discuss policies towards the 
Soviet Union. However, in contrast to the comparative 
unity over policy towards the Far Eastern crisis, *.
1. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .No.299.
2. Even the most important Of foreign policy issues, 
the Far East, was only discussed once by the 
Cabinet between mid-September and mid-November 1931.
divisions in the Cabinet were clearly apparent over 
, the Russian policy, and the opinions of both 
MacDonald and Neville Chamberlain carried weight in 
these discussions, the more so as Simon was more 
hesitant than his predecessors as Foreign Secretary 
in putting forward policy recommendations to the 
Cabinet •
The Russians watched with suspicion the 
role of the Conservatives in the Cabinet, especially 
after the November 1931 elections, but the lack of 
unanimity within the Cabinet was regarded as a factor 
likely to inhibit an open anti-Soviet policy. In 
Soviet eyes, the financial crisis lowered Britain's 
political importance in international terms, but 
relations with Britain still had an importance for 
the economic benefits which could be derived. For 
this reason, the Russians did make some limited 
proposals for orders to try to prevent adverse reper­
cussions on their trading policies from possible 
British action. Faced with increasing social and 
economic disruption at home and with signs of growing 
instability in the international environment, in the 
Far East and in Europe, which seemed more likely to 
threaten the Soviet Union than bring about a revolution­
ary upsurge, Stalin moved slowly towards a limited
rapprochement with France and her allies, earlier 
. the focus of Soviet enmity, rather than towards 
Britain. In the early summer of 1932 the Anglo- 
Soviet relationship had an atmosphere of 'marking 
time* •
CHAPTER TEN: OTTAWA AND DENUNCIATION
The composition of the British delegation, 
headed by Baldwin, the Lord President of the Council, 
which set sail for Canada in July 1932, reflected the 
growing tendency within the Cabinet to regard protect­
ionism as the answer to Britain!s economic ills, but 
nevertheless the delegation was still committed to 
granting Imperial preference through the reduction 
of tariff barriers amongst the members of the Empire 
rather than through increasing tariffs against imports 
from other countries. However, the Dominions had 
continued to suffer since the previous Imperial 
Conference in 1930, the more so as their economies 
relied on the export of raw materials whose prices 
had fallen considerably. The result was ’hard-headed 
horse-trading between the delegations’, with the 
difficulties compounded by the Canadian Prime Minister, 
Bennett, who was not only head of the Canadian delega­
tion but insisted on acting as Chairman of the 
Conference, from which position ’he operated in a 
dictatorial and somewhat brow-beating fashion’ (1).
1. Balawyder, op.cit. pp.151-152; Watkins, op.cit. p.159; 
Lester Pearson, Mike, (Toronto 1972), p. 79. In the 
British delegation, ’the sole free-trader was 
Runciman, whose free-trade convictions by now looked 
distinctly battered’. Marquand, op.cit. p. 725.
Bennett regarded a flourishing Imperial 
trade as an antidote to dumping practices by other 
‘ countries, and before the Conference opened he had 
served notice that he was opposed primarily to 
Soviet trading practices. This was reiterated in his 
opening speech to the Conference; it was a thinly- 
veiled denunciation of the unfair trading practices 
of certain foreign countries (unnamed but by 
implication primarily the Soviet Union) (1). The 
following day, at a meeting of one of the established 
committees, the Committee on Promotion of Trade within 
the Commonwealth, Bennett outlined his proposal that 
Britain should prohibit all imports from Soviet
Russia. It was decided to refer to this problem
again at the next meeting three days later (2).
During the interval the Dominions Office in 
London were informed that Bennett had raised the 
Russian trade question. The result was a hastily-
convened inter-departmental meeting at the Board of
Trade and a series of telephone calls to MacDonald,
1. Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office observer at 
the Conference, to Vansittart, 27 July 1932, W8898/ 
1167/50, FO 371/16408. The Foreign Office was not 
officially represented.
2. D.Can.E.R. Vol 5, Doc .No. 62.
on holiday in Lossiemouth. Referring to the Cabinet 
decisions of early June, MacDonald said, fSome of us 
‘ will not agree to an old fashioned view of Russian 
trade, and at Ottawa there certainly can be no final 
decision on this subject, as it must be a Cabinet 
decision here’ . A telegram to this effect was 
dispatched to Ottawa, and the reply received that ’it 
can be safely assumed that without further consultation 
no commitment affecting the previous (Cabinet) decision 
will be made* (1).
A full-scale discussion of the Russian 
trade question was held on 25 July. Bennett opened 
by enunciating the three aspects of the question as 
the Canadians saw it, namely, Soviet propaganda in 
Canada was being partially financed by sales of Soviet 
produce to Britain; ’labour conditions prevailing in 
Russia were tantamount to slavery*; and ’if 
preferential arrangements within the Empire were to 
succeed, it was essential to discover some method of 
safe-guarding inter-imperial trade against unfair 
competition from Russia’. He received a considerable 
measure of support from Stanley Bruce, Australian High
1. Notes by Rose Rosenberg, MacDonald’s Private Secretary 
24, 25, and 26 July 1932, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/ 
69/1/594 ;
Commissioner in London aid head of the Australian
delegation, who said that he would support ’any
' action to ensure that the Russian menace did not
bring about disastrous results’. On behalf of the
British delegation, Chamberlain endorsed the opinion
that they should prevent Soviet Russia from ’spoiling
(the) plan of preference or stopping a rise in prices
by breaking markets’, but he entered a caveat that
the British did not wish to go further than was
necessary, on the grounds that if they ’ruined
Russia’s export trade she might default on her debts
*
to Germany as well as ourselves and so throw all 
Europe into chaos again’ . At Bruce’s suggestion a 
small sub-committee was set up to give further consider­
ation to the question (1).
However, before this decision was implemented, 
the Russian issue became the subject of direct 
negotiation between the British and Canadian delegations. 
After talks with their advisers, the British delegation 
approved Chamberlain’s idea for ’some very elastic 
arrangement’ which would restore Britain's freedom 
of action and enable ’dumping and similar evils, whether 
practised by Russia or any other country’ to be dealt 
with. Making it clear that no total prohibition on
1. D.Can.E.R. Vol 5, Doc .No. 64.
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imports from Soviet Russia was feasible (in line 
with the June Cabinet decision), the British delega­
tion presented their proposals to the Canadians (1). 
However, when a week later, on 4 August, the 
Canadians presented their counter-proposals, which 
were really only a slightly modified version of 
Bennett’s original demand for an embargo on Soviet, 
goods, the differences between the two delegations 
became more apparent. According to Chamberlain's 
diary, Bennett ’adopted a very aggressive tone... 
declaring that we had amongst our official advisers 
persons who were interested in the import of Russian 
fish and timber1 (2).
Both sides retired to consider redrafting 
their proposals. From further talks between the two 
sides on 11 and 13 August, mainly about the import of 
Soviet timber, it became apparent to the British 
delegation that no trade agreement with Canada would 
be possible unless Bennett was satisfied about Russia, 
but also that the draft clause, by which ’special duties’ 
would be imposed on any country trying to break the 
market, ’in effect meant that the Government would have
1. Minutes of Meetings of British Delegation, 26 and 28 
July 1932, CAB 32/101; N. Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/17, 
Diary Entry, 4 August 1932.
2. Ashton-Gwatkin to Wellesley, 11 August 1932, W9507/ 
1167/50, FO 371/16408; N. Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/17, 
Diary entry, 4 August 1932.
to fix a minimum price for timber*, an impracticable 
.and objectionable* suggestion (1).
At a meeting of the British delegation on 
14 August, it was consequently decided to change the 
line of approach and press for a means of checking 
unfair competition by prohibiting the entry of 
particular classes of goods from any country pursuing 
deliberate 'price wrecking* • Although reference was 
made to MacDonald's views on Russian trade, the 
delegation apparently ignored the obligation to consult 
with the truncated Cabinet in London and agreed that 
Bennett
'should be informed that we should be 
prepared to exchange letters in which it 
would, in effect, be stated that in view 
of our treaty obligations we are not 
prepared to denounce our commercial treaties 
with other countries, that the only country 
to which he had referred as regards dumping 
was Russia,....and that we propose to take 
steps to denounce the agreement forthwith’,
provided that no public statement was made (2). In his 
telegram to MacDonald the following day, Thomas 
explained: 'Notice to Russia to terminate existing 
agreement would be entailed but we should propose at 
the same time that new agreement should be negotiated
1. Minutes of Meeting of British Delegation, 13 August 
1932, CAB 32/102; N. Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/17, 
Diary entries, 11, 12, and 13 August 1932.
2. Ibid, Diary entry, 14 August 1932; Minutes of Meeting 
of British Delegation, 14 August 1932, CAB 32/102.
in substitution for old1, but without mentioning 
the plan for exchanging letters (1) . There was no 
* request for Cabinet approval and no Cabinet meeting 
was held in London (2).
For the following three days Chamberlain 
and Hailsham met with the Canadians to endeavour to 
settle the wording of the Russian formula. Although 
pleased with the idea behind the draft, the Canadians 
felt that 'it appeared to allow the present situation 
to be stabilised, i .e . that unless the Russians 
actually lowered the price we could not act, whereas 
present prices were impossibly low' . Bennett added 
that some of his Cabinet were 'suspicious' of 
Mac Donald and doubted whether the British delegates 
'would in fact be in a position to carry out their 
undertakings on the subject when they returned home'(3). 
Subsequently, Hailsham and two Canadian Ministers 
stayed behind to thrash out the text of the formula. 
Agreement was reached, but the very next day, 18 August, 
Bennett sent the British delegation a new redraft of
1. Thomas to MacDonald, 15 August 1932, MacDonald Papers, 
PRO 30/69/1/594. A copy was sent through the 
Dominions Office to the Foreign Office, and was seen 
by Simon .
2. The Cabinet did not meet between August 4 and 27. 
MacDonald minuted on his copy of Thomas's telegram 
(which he read on the morning of 16 August) only
'how handled?'.
3. N. Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/17, Diary entries, 15,16 
and 17 August 1932; Minutes of Meetings of British 
Delegates, 15, 16, and 17 August 1932, CAB 32/102.
the formula. At an argumentative meeting that 
.afternoon the two delegations finally reached agree­
ment on a suitable formula, which was incorporated 
into the Anglo-Canadian Agreement as Article 21(1). 
The text read:
'This Agreement is made on the express 
condition that, if either Government is 
satisfied that any preference hereby 
granted in respect of any particular class 
of commodities are likely to be frustrated 
in whole or in part by reason of the creation 
or maintenance directly or indirectly of 
prices for such class of commodities through 
State action on the part of any foreign 
country, that Government hereby declares that 
it will exercise the powers which it now has 
or will hereafter take to prohibit the entry 
from such foreign country directly or indirect­
ly of such commodities into its country for 
such time as may be necessary to make'effect­
ive and to maintain the preferences hereby 
granted by it1 .
Although the Article contains no specific 
reference to the Soviet Union, it was intended, as the 
Canadians were informed, that it should apply to that 
country alone (2). Canadian pressure had forced 
British concessions on two phrases which made the 
final Article tougher and broader in scope than the 
formula devised by Hailsham and the two Canadians the
1. Minutes of Meetings of British Delegation, 17 and 18 
August 1932, CAB 32/102; N. Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/17, 
Diary entries, 17 and 18 August 1932; Minutes of 
Meeting of British and Canadian Delegations, 18 August 
1932, CAB 32/102.
2. Minutes of Meeting of British Delegation, 14 August 
1932, CAB 32/102; Note of Inter-Departmental Conference, 
7 September 1932, C .P . 297(32), CAB 24/232.
previous day. The final formula omitted the words 
'unduly low1 in front of 'prices' and substituted 
merely 'prohibit* for 'regulate, restrict or 
prohibit* (1). The British pointed out that they 
could not guarantee that the Soviet Union would not 
evade the prohibition by selling timber through 
Finland. Bennett argued that the six months notice 
required for the termination of the Anglo-Soviet 
Trade Agreement would allow forestalling which could 
only be dealt with by a high temporary duty. The 
British rejected this 'preposterous proposal', and 
Runciman pointed out that the freezing of the north 
Russian ports in winter would effectively prevent 
forestalling (2).
Of the various inter-imperial agreements 
signed on 20 August 1932, only the Anglo-Canadian 
Agreement contained a provision to prohibit low-priced 
goods, although the Australians later complained that 
a similar provision should have been included in the 
Anglo-Australian Agreement (3). The other Dominions
1. Minutes of Meeting of British Delegation, 17 August 
1932, CAB 32/102.
2. Minutes of Meeting of British and Canadian Delegations, 
18 August 1932, CAB 32/102; N. Chamberlain Papers,
NC 2/17, Diary entry, 18 August 1932.
3. Bruce to Thomas, 10 March 1933, file C.R.T .4279/33,
B.T. 11/211.
do not seem to have been interested in the Russian 
trade question to the same extent as the Canadians and 
Australians; Sir Atul Chatterjee, head of the Indian 
delegation, told Chamberlain that 1 India was anxious 
to avoid a quarrel with Russia which might have 
awkward political results for her while die had little 
or no interest in Russian trade* (1). The series of 
bilateral agreements concluded revealed the Empire 
to be at cross-purposes. Since the Dominions had been 
specifically exempted from the tariffs introduced by 
Britain in February 1932, preference could only be 
extended to the Dominions by raising still further 
the tariffs on Britain's foreign imports. In return, 
British exports to the Dominions were granted preference, 
though largely by increasing tariffs against foreign 
goods rather than by reducing those on British goods.
Thus, and this was the point that the Free-traders in 
the British Cabinet were to buck against, the greater 
liberalisation of inter-Empire trade meant an increase 
in restrictions against the rest of the world (2).
On their return to London, Baldwin was to say that the 
British delegation 'worked with perfect unanimity
1. N. Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/17, Diary entry, 24 July 
1932. For comments of other Dominion representatives 
see D.Can.E.R. Vol 5, Doc .No. 64.
2. Drummond, op.cit. p.103; Watkins, op.cit. pp. 151-153; 
Aldcroft, op.cit. p.293.
throughout1, but there are indications from Neville 
.Chamberlain's diary that Runciman in particular only 
grudgingly accepted some of the tariff measures (1).
There also appears to have been some 
differences of opinion amongst the British delegation 
over the specifically Russian trade question, with 
Chamberlain and Baldwin holding the centre-ground 
against Runciman and Hailsham on the opposing flanks. 
Chamberlain devoted a considerable amount of time and 
effort to the drafting and redrafting of the Russian 
formula, and the burden of negotiating with the 
Canadians fell on him and Hailsham; Baldwin recounted 
later: 'in my simple way I chose them because if they 
failed the Die-hards at home would know that it was 
not from'half-hearted trying' (2). As it became 
apparent that the Russian trade issue could be the 
stumbling-block to an Anglo-Canadian agreement,'the 
dangerous factor' as Chamberlain described it, the 
British delegation felt themselves under more and more 
pressure to concede points to the Canadians. As Baldwin 
reminded his colleagues on 28 July, agreement on the
1. On 12 August Chamberlain noted: 'Throughout this 
discussion W,R. (unciman), was obviously ill at ease 
& the sense of disunity for the first time was 
oppressive'. Also entry for 4 August. N. Chamberlain 
Papers, NC 2/17, Thomas Jones, A Diary with Letters, 
1931-1950, (London 1954), p .50.
2. N. Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/17, Diary entries, 26 and 
28 July, ,3, 4, 11, 14, 15, 17 and 18 August 1932; 
Jones, op.cit. p.50.
Russian problem 'probably would do more to assist the 
success of the Conference than anything else', and asi 
again on 13 August, 'it would be a serious matter if 
we failed to reach agreement with Canada on this 
particular issue' (1).
The patience of the British participants 
was strained to the limit by Bennett's behaviour. 
Chamberlain noted in his diary:
'I have no doubt now that Bennett is a 
sharper or a crook. I believe he has 
deliberately kept open the Russian question 
to the end because he believes that we dare 
not break with him on it.. .He is therefore 
under cover of this threat able to bluster 
defiance at every plea we put up and with­
draw concessions already granted us' (2).
Although Bennett was known to be under strong pressure 
from protectionist elements in his party and from 
Canadian timber interests, he had consistently held 
strong views on the subject of Soviet Russia (as had 
been seen at the 1930 Imperial Conference) and 'attached 
great importance to action against Russia' (3).
Considerations such as these accounted for 
the desperate activity in the final days of the 
Conference and the concessions made by the British to 
the Canadians.
1. Minutes of Meetings of British Delegation, 28 July 
and 13 August 1932, CAB 32/102.
2. N. Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/17, Diary entry, 17 
August 1932; Jones, op.cit. p .50.
3. Balawyder, op.cit. pp. 138-139; Watkins, op.cit.
pp. 162-164.
While the fate of the Trade Agreement was 
being decided in Ottawa, the depleted Cabinet in 
London reconsidered the question of export credits.
At the end of July, Colville, aware of the falling 
off in British exports to the Soviet Union during May 
and June and having received representations from a 
few Conservative back-benchers and the Federation of 
British Industries urging an extension of credit 
facilities, proposed that credits for £2,400,000 be 
granted to make up the total of £4 million originally 
proposed in April 1932 (1). Although Sir Henry 
Betterton, the Minister of Labour, endorsed the proposal 
and brought it before the Cabinet on 4 August, Treasury 
opposition to more than £1,200,000 (of which most of 
the credit was to be for less than 12 months) over­
ruled those Cabinet members who favoured Colville’s 
suggestion for employment reasons (2).
While the Ottawa Conference was in progress 
the Soviet Government and even the Soviet press kept a 
very low profile in their comments, adopting what
1. Memorandum by Colville, 29 July 1932, C .P. 267(32),
CAB 24/232; Minutes of Export Credit Guarantee 
Advisory Committee, 28 July 1932, E .C .G. 1/15.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 4 August 1932, 45(32)9, CAB 23/72. 
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Walter 
Elliott, refused to commit the Treasury to more than 
the lower figure, in the absence of Chamberlain.
Sankey noted in his diary on 16 August the difficulty 
of getting ’united decisions’ with the Cabinet split 
between London and Ottawa. Sankey Papers, e. 286.
Strang described as an 'attitude of expectancy and 
reserve’ . Similarly, in a conversation on 8 August, 
when Strang and Krestinsky covered several subjects, 
including the Lena Goldfields dispute, all mention of 
Ottawa was studiously avoided (1). However, a week 
after the conclusion of the Conference, Litvinov 
expressed some of the concern of the Soviet leadership 
about the ’ anti-dumping clause in the'. Canadian agree­
ment, which was of course aimed at the Soviet Union’ 
and the’preferential duties against wheat, timber 
and dairy produce (which) would obviously hit Soviet 
exports’. Nevertheless, Strang's general impression 
from this conversation and from information from other 
diplomats was that the Soviet authorities expected 
restrictions on British imports from the Soviet Union, 
but that they were ’not greatly perturbed for the 
immediate future’ (2).
On the surface there may have been the 
'little apparent anxiety* recorded by Strang, but, in 
reality the Soviet leadership were bound to be suspicious 
of the aims and results of the Ottawa Conference, 
especially as British and Canadian newspapers carried
1. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .No. 310; Strang to Simon,
29 August 1932, N5089/22/38, FO 371/16320.
2. Strang to Simon, 28 August, N5006/22/38, and 29 
August 1932, N5089/22/38, both FO 371/16320;
Inprecor, 8 September 1932.
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rumours about a 'deal1 over Soviet dumping. Soviet 
. diplomacy was therefore called into action to forestall 
any wider affects from British possible action. Further 
courting of France and Germany was in evidence. In 
early August, the Russians received the French agree­
ment to re-open the trade negotiations as had been 
requested by Moscow (although not until October did 
actual talks begin), and in late August the Soviet 
Ambassador in Berlin urged on the Germans an expansion 
of Soviet-German trade because the Ottawa Conference 
could cause an alteration in the balance of Anglo- 
Soviet trade (1) . For the Soviet leadership there 
was always the preconception that action by the 
capitalist powers on the economic level could be comple­
mented by action on the political level, and so any 
embryonic economic anti-Soviet front had to be 
disrupted.
Soviet foreign trade planning, however, 
was suffering from the dislocations in the Soviet 
domestic economy. By the late summer of 1932 famine 
had started to re-appear in rural areas, especially 
in the North Caucasus and Ukraine where the harvest
1. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .Nos. 308, 337, 346, 348.
yields were poorer than usual. Pilfering and conceal- 
. ment of crops occurred, stricter laws threatening the 
death penalty for pilfering and failure to deliver 
the grain for procurements were introduced, peasants 
and local party officials were arrested or purged, 
but there was an extensive failure to deliver the 
required grain and foodstuffs for export despite the 
coercive methods utilised (1). The extent of the 
famine and its toll in human and animal life was 
suppressed as far as possible by the Soviet authorities 
and was indeed to a large extent successfully concealed 
not only from world opinion but also from foreign 
diplomats in Soviet Russia and foreign visitors there .
By 1932, the British diplomats were aware that the 
1931 Soviet grain exports had been 'effected at the 
expense of the rank and file in Russia', but although 
the reports sent back from Moscow during the summer 
of 1932 talk of the 'shortage of food' and refer to 
stories of 'semi-starvation', the travel and informa­
tion-gathering restrictions on theBritish Embassy staff 
hindered an accurate assessment of the situation (2).
1. Nove, op.cit. pp. 174-181; Conquest, op.cit. pp.45-47.
2. Dalrymple, op.cit. pp .277-278; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc. 
No.159; Memorandum by George Paton, Commercial 
Counsellor to Embassy in Moscow, 13 July 1932, 
N4390/39/38, FO 371/16323; Ovey to Simon, 18 July 
1932, N4398/38/38, FO 371/16322. Only later were 
certain foreigners, such as the journalist W. H. 
Chamberlain and Malcolm Muggeridge, able to visit 
the famine areas and provide more reliable estimates 
of the suffering during 1932-33.
Above noting that it would be a 'lean* year for 
Soviet grain exports, the British do not seem to have 
considered this domestic economic situation as a 
significant factor in assessing future Soviet trading 
policies and responses to action taken by themselves.
The return of the British delegation from 
Ottawa prompted discussion of the Russian trade 
question at both the Cabinet and departmental level.
At a Cabinet meeting on 27 August, Betterton raised 
again the credit question, explaining the difficulties 
of working under the restriction that the majority of 
new credits should be for 12 months or less. Although 
during the discussion there was an incidental remark 
that the prolongation of credit guarantees would hardly 
be consistent with a denunciation of the Trade Agree­
ment, the Cabinet agreed with MacDonald's call for a 
review of the credit situation. Subsequently, early 
in September, Runciman, with the approval of MacDonald 
and Chamberlain, agreed that the restriction by waived 
so that guarantees could be given for up to 18 months (1).
At an inter-departmental meeting on 30 August 
officials went through the details of the legislation
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 27 August 1932, 46(32)1 and
46(32)4, CAB 23/72; Note by Export Credits Guarantee 
Department, 9 September 1932; PREM 1/124; Note by 
Runciman, 19 September 1932, C.P. 306(32), CAB 24/233.
for introducing the Ottawa Agreements and decided 
> that the immediate denunciation of the Anglo-Soviet 
Temporary Trade Agreement was necessary to comply 
with Article 21 of the Anglo-Canadian Agreement (1). 
Despite the remark made by a colleague at the Cabinet 
meeting on 27 August and various press comments, 
apparently it was not until he read the report of this 
inter-departmental meeting that MacDonald ’fully 
realised that this Article of the Canadian Agreement 
involved the immediate denunciation of the Russian 
Treaty*. He told a meeting of senior officials on 
7 September that he felt ’very uneasy' about Article 
21, as 'the prospect of negotiating a new treaty that 
would give us satisfactory commercial terms while 
providing for the fulfilment of the Canadian Agreement 
was not encouraging' (2). Later the same day he 
received the approval of Chamberlain and Runciman that 
steps could be taken towards the denunciation of the 
Trade Agreement, but, refusing to be rushed, he asked 
the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade to prepare 
reviews of the possible repercussions of such a step,
1. Note of an Inter-Departmental Meeting, 30 August 1932,
C.P. 297(32), CAB 24/232.
2. Note of a Conference, 7 September 1932, C.P. 297(32), 
CAB 24/232. After reading the references to 
denunciation in this report, Snowden wrote to Samuel: 
'It is clear that there had been agreement with 
Bennett that this (denunciation) should be done'. 
Snowden to Samuel, 13 September 1932, Samuel Papers 
(held in the House of Lords Record Office, London) 
A/89.
which would be 'in substance and in effect a complete 
change in our economic relations with Russia' (1).
Before the question was brought before the 
Cabinet for a final decision, MacDonald was to lose 
from the Cabinet the small group (Snowden and the 
Samuelite Liberals) who were also reluctant to sanction 
a denunciation. This group of free-traders found that 
they could no longer reconcile their membership of 
the Cabinet with the policies encompassed within the 
Ottawa Agreements, and, to MacDonald's regret, their 
resignation was announced at the Cabinet meeting on 
28 September 1932 (2) . Although not a decisive issue, 
this group's dissatisfaction with the trend in the 
Cabinet's Russian policy was symptomatic of the 
differences between them and the rest of the Cabinet.
In his resignation letter to MacDonald, Samuel explained 
that the Liberals regarded the proposed denunciation of 
the Trade Agreement with 'great anxiety', as 'it is 
likely to lead to still further loss to our export trade
1. Note by Sir Warren Fisher, Permanent Under-Secretary 
to the Treasury, 31 August 1932, file C .R .T .5200/32, 
B .T. 11/102; Minute by MacDonald, 7 "September 1932, 
PREM 1/138.
2. Marquand, op.cit. pp. 725-730; Jones, op.cit. pp. 
52-54; Cabinet Conclusions, 28 September 1932, 
47(32)1, CAB 23/72; Sankey Papers, e .286, Diary 
entries, 28, 29 September 1932.
and increase in unemployment' (1). The publication 
of the letters of resignation and the subsequent 
broadcasts by the three ex-Ministers made it apparent 
to the general public and to the Soviet authorities 
that there was substance to the rumours that had been 
circulating since the end of the Ottawa Conference. 
Moreover, Sokolnikov was told by Snowden himself that 
'the British delegation in Ottawa had taken on an 
obligation to denounce the Anglo-Soviet trade treaty 
immediately on their return* (2).
The statements made by the resigning Cabinet 
Ministers prompted Sokolnikov, in his final meeting 
with Simon on 6 October 1932 on the eve of his return 
to Moscow, to inquire as to their meaning. Simon said 
that the Government should not be held responsible for 
these statements, but admitted that the question of the 
denunciation of the Trade Agreement was now being 
'carefully'considered. He urged that, in the meantime, 
a more favourable balance of Anglo-Soviet trade and a 
prompt settlement of the Lena Goldfields dispute would 
'improve the situation*. From what is known of 
Sokolnikov*s report to the Narkomindel, his impression
1. Samuel to MacDonald, 16 September 1932, C.P. 312(32), 
CAB 24/233.
2. The resignation letters were published in Manchester 
Guardian, 29 September 1932, and Snowden's radio 
broadcast is in ibid, 1 October 1932. Also Popov, 
Diplomaticheskiye Otnosheniya, op.cit. p.69.
from Simon's words was that the denunciation was not 
.an imminent possibility; furthermore, Simon apparently 
stated: 'Samuel and Snowden are misinterpreting Article 
21. The abrogation of the present agreement in order 
to work out a new one in connection with Article 21 
was not pledged' (1). This was another case of mis­
understanding (or possibly of Simon being non-committal 
to the point of being misleading), but subsequent events 
showed that the Narkomindel attached importance to 
this report from Sokolnikov.
Litvinov's questions and comments to Ovey a 
fortnight later showed that the Russians interpreted 
the Simon-Sokolnikov conversation as signifying that 
the issue of the denunciation of the Trade Agreement 
was still open (2). There seem to have been signs of 
some confidence about the future in Litvinov's briefings 
to the new Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, 
before his departure. Litvinov told Maisky that there 
were 'no serious difficulties between England and Soviet 
Russia - neither territorial, political nor economic'
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 163; D.V.P. Vol XV, note 275. 
At the Cabinet meeting on 28 September, MacDonald
had asked for the question of denunciation to be 
brought up 'at an early meeting'.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 166, 171; D.V.P. Vol XV,
Doc .No. 411.
and that the two countries were 'even mutually 
, complementary' as regards trade. He added that, 
although friction and misunderstandings occurred, these 
were minor problems, for 'on the level of purely 
governmental relations, England and the U.S.S.R. have 
hothing to argue about' (1). Ovey later reported that 
when Rosengolts, the Commissar for Foreign Trade, 
warned Litvinov about the difficulties in placing 
orders in Britain in view of the imminent possibility 
of the denunciation of the Trade Agreement, the Foreign 
Affairs Commissar reportedly had replied that this was 
only a 'threat' and that he should carry on as usual (2).
However, the Cabinet were giving the question 
active consideration. Only two days after Simon's talk 
with Sokolnikov, Runciman circulated to his Cabinet 
colleagues a long memorandum, based on an amalgamation
1. Ivan M. Maisky, Vospominaniya Sovetskogo Posla v . 
Anglii, (Moscow 1960), pp .11-12, Ovey thought the 
reason for Sokolnikov's withdrawal was that his 
'somewhat cold and reserved nature prevented him 
from getting into any close touch with governing 
circles in the United Kingdom and was thus detriment­
al to his country's interests'. Ovey to Simon,
20 October 1932, N6160/5131/38, FO 371/16339.
Beatrice Webb described Maisky, who was in Britain 
in exile in 1912-1917 and as Counsellor to the Soviet 
Mission in 1925-1927, as 'a more accomplished diplomat 
and less ardent Communist than Sokolnikoff'. Webb 
Diaries, 24 November 1932, 1.46.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 171.
of drafts prepared by the Board of Trade and the
.Foreign Office. Noting that the Cabinet Committee 
on Trade with Russia had recommended in May 1932 that 
the Trade Agreement be denounced and that action had 
been deferred until after the Ottawa Conference, the 
results of which now made a decision imperative, 
Runciman continued:
1 In view of the commitment in the Ottawa 
agreement, we must denounce the Commercial 
Agreement of 1930, and it need not be 
anticipated that such action would necessarily 
have serious consequences for our trade. As 
to the next step, it is suggested... .by the 
Foreign Office that we could offer to replace 
the present agreement by an exchange of notes 
continuing the provisions of the Fisheries 
Agreement and giving the Soviet Government 
the right to maintain a Trade Delegation in 
London, which is in the interests of both 
countries. On the basis of such a modus 
vivendi we could allow matters to develop 
for the time being, trusting that self-interest 
and the fear of restrictions on their exports 
will make the Soviet Government continue to take 
our goods to the same extent as in the past, 
viz: insofar as the prices and credit facilities 
offered make purchases here convenient*.
The Board of Trade's confidence was based on apparent 
Soviet dependence on the British market as an important 
source of exchange, on which the Soviets were reliant 
for meeting their maturing obligations. Runciman 
therefore proposed denouncing the Trade Agreement and 
offering to 'enter into negotiations.. .as to the 
situation thus arising', as it was certain that the
Soviet side would ask for a fresh agreement, so 
.giving the British side an initial tactical advantage 
which could be utilisedin the subsequent negotiations 
to secure ’some improvement* in the balance of trade. 
Failing any wider arrangement, the British side could 
fall back on the temporary arrangement proposed by 
the Foreign Office (1).
The Cabinet agreed on 12 October 1932 to the 
policy advocated by Runciman, with the only recorded 
expression of opinion being that of MacDonald himself:
'The Prime Minister, who did not conceal 
his suspicions of Bolshevik activities, never­
theless felt some reluctance in denouncing 
the Agreement in the present very serious 
economic condition of the country... .He was 
only able to agree to the denunciation of 
the Russian Trade Agreement on the grounds 
that he was given to understand it was 
essential from the point of view of the 
Ottawa Agreements, by which he intended to 
stand'.
He may well have been a lonely voice in the Cabinet (2). 
It was intended that the denunciation should take place 
before the House of Commons debate on the Ottawa Agree­
ments on 18 October, but Colville requested that it be 
delayed as long as possible as he was hoping to conclude
1. Memorandum by Runciman, 8 October 1932, C.P. 337(32), 
CAB 24/233.
2. Cabinet Conclusions, 12 October 1932, 52(32)4,
CAB 23/72.
a deal with the Russians over Scottish herrings, so 
it was not until 17 October that the formal note 
denouncing the Trade Agreement with effect as from 
April 1933 was handed to Bogomolov. In the final 
paragraph of the note, the Foreign Office draft of 
'are prepared to enter into negotiations for a new 
agreement1 was altered by the Board of Trade to comply 
with the Cabinet decision by reading:
'His Majesty's Government....remain anxious 
for the furtherance of trade between the 
two countries, and are prepared with this 
object to enter into discussions upon the 
situation created by the denunciation of 
the temporary commercial agreement at the 
earliest moment convenient to theGovernment 
of the Soviet Union1 (1).
The first public explanation of this decision 
was unfortunate in that Thomas used particularly 
emotive language in describing the necessity for 
Britain to be * in a position to discriminate by pro­
hibition* against imports from certain countries, 
against the dumping of sweated goods' (2). So, two 
days later, Baldwin had to explain to the Commons that 
it was not the British intention to stop trade with the 
Soviet Union, rather to rectify the defects in a 'one­
sided' agreement, for which a new agreement could be 
substituted (3).
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc.No.165; H.C.Deb. Vol 269, Cols 
1680-1687; Foreign Office Minute, 14 October 1932, 
N5821/22/38, FO 371/16320.
2. H.C.Deb. Vol 269, Cols 10-12.
3. Ibid, Cols 449-450.
In Moscow, Ovey had conversations with 
. Maisky, two days before his departure for London, 
on 18 October, and Litvinov on 19 and 22 October, 
Maisky saw the British action as hampering his task 
in London, while Litvinov, evidently surprised at 
the timing of the denunciation, was ’depressed and 
pessimistic*. Even though Ovey referred reassuring­
ly to Baldwin’s House of Commons statement, Litvinov 
remained pessimistic during their second meeting. He 
suspected that there were political motives for the 
British action and said that he felt sure that a 
diminution of trade would result. He ended by saying 
that his comments were *a pale reflection* of the 
feelings of the Soviet Government (1) . Inspired 
critical comment was noticeable in the Soviet press, 
which depicted the denunciation as being caused by 
’Die-hard’ influences and stressed that the Soviet 
side would not readily make concessions (2).
In fact, despite the loud propaganda outcry 
against the denunciation, there were signs of ’a
1. Maisky, op.cit. pp. 5-6; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 
166, 169, 171; D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .Nos. 411, 415.
2. Izvestiya, 21 October 1932; Pravda, 21 October 1932; 
D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 167, 170.
paralysis of leadership* on the Soviet side (1). The 
limited evidence available suggests that in October 
1932 the Politburo was split over how to deal with a 
group, the Ryutin group, which was in opposition to 
Stalin’s demand for Ryutin’s execution, which would 
have meant the introduction of policy terror into 
the ranks of the Party itself. This conflict, in 
which Stalin seems to have been outnumbered, may well 
have slowed down the Soviet decision-making process (2).
Only on 3 November did Deputy Foreign 
Commissar Krestinsky write to Maisky informing^of 
the Soviet Government’s decision, which was merely 
that no reply would be given to the British note.
The basis of this decision was the feeling that the 
British Government, under pressure from industrialists 
and their own economic needs, would be forced after 
an interval of time to repeat the proposal about 
negotiations ’in a more definite and appropriate form*. 
Although well aware of Baldwin’s Commons statement, 
Krestinsky explained that ’if we were now to declare
1. G .R. Owen, ’The Metro-Vickers Crisis: Anglo-Soviet 
Relations between the Trade Agreements, 1932-1934’, 
in Slavonic and East European Review, January 1971, 
p. 96; D.B.F .P . II/VII, Doc .No. 172 .
2. Schapiro, op.cit. p.29; Conquest, op.cit. pp.51-57.
our readiness to begin negotiations, then this would 
create the impression that we so valued trade with 
England that we would quietly swallow the denunciation 
of the trade treaty and Thomas’s infamous comment on 
the denunciation’. The Russians assumed that time 
would work in their favour; meanwhile Maisky and 
Ozersky were to utilise this ’waiting’ period to 
sound out opinion amongst British governmental and 
business circles (1) . The initial Soviet response 
was not that anticipated by the Cabinet, for there
was no request for a new agreement.
Just a week after the British notice of 
denunciation there arose an issue which, while not 
exclusively an Anglo-Soviet problem, demonstrated 
the tension in the relationship in the aftermath of
the British action. The sudden transfer of the
provisioning of foodstuffs and other necessities for 
the diplomatic corps in Moscow from the special Isnab 
shops to the Torgsin organisation, which accepted 
payment only in foreign currency, prompted both 
Dirksen, the doyen of the diplomatic corps in Moscow,
1. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .No. 425. Ozersky, who had been 
on leave in Moscow from August until 12 October, 
suddenly returned to Moscow on 24 October, returning 
to England again on 7 November.
and Ovey to make representations to the Soviet 
authoritites. This change was prompted by the Soviet
%
desire to obtain more foreign currency to help ease 
balance of payments problems, but the friction caused 
by the protects from Ovey, who was personally very 
annoyed about the matter, and Litvinov’s subbornness 
in reply was symptomatic of the disturbed state of 
Anglo-Soviet relations (1).
Soon after his arrival in England Maisky 
began carrying out his instructions to widen contacts 
with interested British circles. On 11 November he 
visited Simon and pointed out the vagueness of the 
terms ’discussion' and ’situation’ in the British 
note . Simon replied that no discrimination against 
the Soviet Union was intended, that the denunciation 
was the result of British dissatisfaction with the 
most-favoured-nation clause in its existing form and 
of the British desire to achieve a better balance in 
Anglo-Soviet trade, and that, in fact, the British 
Government were proposing beginning ’negotiations’ 
for a new trade agreement (2). In this statement, 
therefore, Simon, confident of the British position
1. Dirksen, op.cit. p.126; Beloff, op.cit. p.29; D.V.P.
Vol XV, Doc .Nos. 431, 434, 471.
2. Ibid, Doc .No. 434; Maisky, op.cit. pp.26-29;
D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc.No.176.
vis-a-vis the Russians but at the same time concerned 
to reassure them about British intentions, abandoned 
RuncimanTs recommended tactics (to force the Soviet 
side to propose negotiations) and made a more definite 
proposal to the Soviet side.
British confidence at that time was expressed 
fully in a long memorandum prepared by Strang in early 
November 1932. He argued that the denunciation must 
have been disturbing to the Russians because not only 
had they lost an advantageous and model agreement but 
also repercussions would be felt in their commercial 
negotiations with France and the United States. He 
concluded:
'Orders in Great Britain might, quite apart 
from the question of America, be reduced for 
a time, both as a result of financial string­
ency and as a demonstration against the de­
nunciation of the treaty. But in the end our 
position as the Soviet Union's best customer 
would probably prove decisive, if used in the 
right way, and orders would begin to be placed 
with us again*.
i/1
Ovey tad Moscow and the officials in the Foreign Office 
endorsed this assessment. The British side felt that 
economic leverage could be successful in obtaining 
their objectives (1).
1. Ibid, Doc .No . 173.
On 15 November Maisky visited MacDonald and 
Runciman, who both expounded the British viewpoint 
‘on the balance of trade and the most-favoured-nation 
clause; Runciman added that he was prepared to use 
the existing Trade Agreement as a basis for negotiation
(1) • The following day Maisky met Chamberlain, who 
described Canadian pressure on Britain at the Ottawa 
Conference and said that a modification rather than 
abolition of the most-favoured-nation clause might be 
acceptable. He repeatedly emphasised that the denun­
ciation had been motivated entirely by commercial not 
political considerations (2).
However, on reading the report of this con­
versation, the Foreign Office officials were far from 
satisfied with the line taken by Chamberlain, and, in 
the absence of Simon in Geneva, Vansittart authorised 
the circulation to the appropriate Cabinet Ministers 
of the Foreign Office's counter-considerations, which 
endeavoured to make it clear that 'while the Ottawa 
pledge was the immediate cause of our action, we had 
long been dissatisfied with the agreement because our 
experience had shown that the whole idea of a most­
favoured-nation agreement was out of place'. The
1. Memorandum by MacDonald, 15 November, N6617/22/38, 
and Memorandum by Runciman, 15 November 1932, N6806/ 
22/38, both FO 371/16321; D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .No.
440; Maisky, op.cit. pp. 29-32.
2. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc.No. 441; Maisky, op.cit. pp. 
32-39; Note by Chamberlain, 16 November 1932, 
N6619/22/38, FO 371/16321.
Foreign Office argued that 'the threat of exclusion 
from the British market, indeed, is the one effective 
weapon at the disposal of H.M.G. in the negotiations; 
but it must be a threat of complete exclusion... .and 
not merely a statement that the most-favoured-nation 
clause must be modified' (1) . Having made it clear 
to the Russians that they were genuinely prepared to 
enter into new negotiations, the Foreign Office 
officials now, however, were determined to adopt a 
strong stance in the future. Although the British 
endeavoured to keep these economic matters separate 
from the political relationship, repercussions were 
felt on that level too with a revival of the propaganda 
issue .
At the Twelfth Plenum of E.C.C.I., which 
opened in Moscow on 27 August 1932, Kuusinen had made 
the keynote speech, in whidi he stated that the relative 
stabilisation of capitalism had ended but noted that 
'there is not yet an immediate revolutionary situation 
in the most important and decisive capitalist countries'. 
Although Britain was later described as a 'living 
example of the bankruptcy of the idea of prosperity for 
a country pursuing an imperialist, predatory policy',
1. Foreign Office Minute, 22 November 1932, N6973/22/38, 
FO 371/16321; Minute by Chamberlain, 28 November 
1932, Treasury file T 172/1792.
the British Communist Party was attacked for its 
sectarian approach and lack of success. It was 
instructed by the Plenum to intensify its efforts 
amongst the trade unions and the unemployed movements
(1). The growth of unemployed movements in Britain, 
especially the National Unemployed Workers Movement, 
had been particularly noticeable during 1931, and 
continued during 1932 as 'hunger marches’ were organised
(2). By way of contrast, the membership of the British 
Communist Party declined during 1932, and although 
communists were involved in the leadership of several 
of the unemployed movements, the Cabinet's enquiries 
during the autumn of 1932 did not lead them to alter 
their earlier conclusions that the communist danger 
inside Britain was on the wane (3).
The Twelfth Plenum paid less attention to 
the Comintern’s activities in the East than usual, 
although the situation in India was characterised as 
one of ’an increase in revolutionary unrest in the 
towns and villages' and tasks were set out for the
1. Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol II, pp. 379-385, 486- 
488, 499-503; Degras, Comintern, Vol III, p.229.
2. Stevenson and Cook, op.cit. pp. 145-153, 166-181.
3. H.C.Deb. Vol 269, Cols 274-280; H.L.Deb. Vol 86,
Col 411; Stevenson and Cook, op.cit. pp .220-223, 
227-233; Minutes of Cabinet Committee on Hunger 
Marchers, 29 November, 7 and 14 December 1932, CAB 
27/497.
communists in India (1). However, the action of the 
Indian authorities had restored law and order in India, 
so that, speaking in the House of Lords in December 
1932, the Marquess of Londonderry, the Secretary of 
State for Air, was able to state that ’the recent 
improvement in conditions in India give(s) grounds 
for the belief that the measures taken to prevent 
this propaganda from having serious results have not 
been ineffective’ (2).
Inter-governmental controversy, therefore, 
was not revived by the Plenum’s pronouncements as such, 
but by a speech by Manuilsky to the Moscow branch of 
the Communist Party, in which, during his analysis of 
the Plenum’s decisions, he made references to Stalin 
as the leader of the Comintern and predicted civil 
war in India. These comments were picked up in the 
British press, and, when on 9 November a Conservative 
peer gave notice that he would raise the matter in the 
Lords, Simon telegraphed to Ovey, asking for details 
of the speech and ’particularly whether it contains 
more than usual evidence of connexion between Comintern
1. Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol II, pp.492, 497; 
McLane, op.cit. pp. 144-146.
2. H.L.Deb. Vol 86, Col 412; Brown, op.cit. pp. 
290-291.
and Soviet Government1 (1). Ovey's telegraphed 
summary, on 11 November, showed that Manuilsky's 
speech was not untypical; as such, as MacDonald 
later told the Cabinet, * I would not have proposed 
that special notice should be taken of it, had it 
remained an isolated phenomenon* (2).
While the appropriate course of action was 
still under discussion by the Foreign Office, the 
tenor of the response was altered by a report and 
editorial in 13 November issue of Izvestiya, which 
purported to be information from its London correspond­
ent outlining the Foreign Office's demands to British 
agents to provide documentary 'fabrications' to 
support British claims about the Comintern. Both 
the report and the editorial were clearly based on a 
'garbled reading' of Simon's telegram of 9 November 
(sent in a non-confidential code) to Ovey (3).
In Moscow, Ovey had immediately telephoned 
to the Narkomindel and spoken to a senior Narkomindel 
official who stated that although the Narkomindel were 
convinced that neither the British Government nor Ovey
1. Pravda, 2 November 1932, Times, 8 November 1932; 
D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 174, 175.
2. Memorandum by MacDonald, 21 November 1932, C .P. 
405(32), CAB 24/235; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 175 
and minutes in N6478/470/38, FO 371/16332.
3. Izvestiya, 13 November 1932; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc. 
Nos. 177, 178.
himself could possibly stoop to falsifying reports, 
the Soviet Government could not control Izvestiya and 
would not exercise any influence on it (1). Ovey 
decided to await instructions from London before 
going to see Litvinov personally, but his suggestion 
was that a 'strong initial protest' was essential, 
together with 'one further categorical assurance' 
that Britain's policy was to promote stable economic 
relations (2).
The Soviet decision to intensify the propa­
ganda campaign through the Soviet press was counter­
productive, as it worsened the atmosphere of Anglo- 
Soviet relations at a time when the British were 
taking particular care not to escalate the disputed 
issue beyond that of simply expediting commercial 
negotiations. Stalin's personal crisis at this period 
is one possible explanation for the miscalculations 
in Soviet policy (3) .
The British line hardened by comparison with 
the May 1932 protest, and when MacDonald brought the
1. Ibid, Doc .No . 180.
2. Ibid, Doc.No. 183. Simon was absent in Geneva from
13 to 26 November, so MacDonald and Vansittart played
the leading roles in determining the British responses.
3. On 7 November 1932, Stalin's wife, Nadia Alliluyeva,
committed suicide. For several days after the event, 
Stalin 'was in a state of shock...He had sporadic 
fits of rage'. Svetlana Alliluyeva, 20 Letters to
a Friend, (London 1968 - Penguin ed.)~ p .102.
issue before the Cabinet on 23 November he endorsed 
Ovey1s opinion that a strong protest, linked with an 
assurance about trade relations, should be made. 
MacDonald advocated that the Soviet Government should 
be required to 'take steps to ensure that no further 
remarks of the kind made by Manuilsky are made in the 
future' and to 'apologise for the language of Izvestiya, 
which was quite unprovoked* (1).
The Cabinet agreed to this policy, and on 
28 November, after his return from Geneva, Simon saw 
Maisky and outlined to him the nature of the two 
statements required from the Soviet side, adding that 
if the Soviet Government wished the trade questions 
'to be discussed in the usual manner as between 
Governments in friendly relations' they must comply 
with the British requests (2).
Simon's conversation with Maisky and Ovey's 
stormy conversation with Litvinov, on 3 December, 
dispelled any illusions the Soviet side had that the 
British would be content merely with an official 
protest against the anti-British campaign. Ovey
1. Memorandum by MacDonald, 21 November 1932, C .P.
405(32), CAB 24/235.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 193; Cabinet Conclusions,
23 November 1932, 63(32)5, CAB 23/73.
enumerated all the recent unfavourable incidents in 
.Anglo-Soviet relations, including the provisioning 
question, but Litvinov strongly rejected any Soviet 
governmental responsibility for either Izvestiya or 
the Comintern, so thatwhile he could express his 
regret over the press articles he could not apologise. 
Ovey pointed out to the Foreign Office that satisfaction 
over Manuilsky*s remarks would 'be difficult to acquire 
without strong display of force' (1). The Foreign 
Office too recognised this point, and appreciating that 
little change could be got out of the Soviet Government 
over the Comintern they did not return to that charge 
again.
The British stood firm on the other issue 
though, and Vansittart made it clear to Maisky on 
5 December that the refusal of the Soviet Government 
to apologise for the Izvestiya article was 'profoundly 
disappointing and exceedingly foolish' (2). The Soviet 
side therefore gave ground. The following day Litvinov 
instructed Maisky to deliver a note to the Foreign 
Office (handed over on 7 December), referring to the 
British note of 17 October and Simon's comments of
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .Nos. 186, 187, 189, 195; D.V.P.
Vol XV, Doc .No. 471.
2. Ibid; D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 200.
11 November and stating that the Soviet Government 
were 'prepared to commence negotiations for a new 
commercial treaty (1). Further, on 9 December,
Maisky again visited Vansittart, repeated that they 
Soviet Government were not responsible for Izvestiya 
but stated that they dissociated themselves from 
the paper's allegations and added that he 'had 
communicated himself with the editor of Izvestiya, 
who had now replied that he had been misled by one of 
his correspondents, and he recognised that the state­
ments published concerning the Foreign Office were 
inaccurate, and he, the editor, wished to express 
regret for this'. Afterwards Vansittart minuted: 'I 
certainly feel that we should accept this repudiation 
on the one hand and apology on the other, for I feel 
that it is a far more satisfactory ending than has 
usually been reached in our controversies with the 
Soviet Government'. Simon, by telephone from Geneva, 
and MacDonald both concurred, and it was announced to 
the House of Commons on 13 December that the incident 
was regarded as closed (2).
1. D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .No. 474, and note 318.
2. Note by Vansittart, 9 December 1932, N7307/22/38, 
FO 371/16321; H.C.Deb. Vol 273, Cols 196-198.
With the way now open for a start in the 
commercial negotiations, the two sides met for the first 
time on 15 December 1932. On 29 December 1932, the 
British side set out the fundamental points for 
discussion, which were a modification of the most­
favoured-nation position with special reference to 
the Ottawa obligations, an adjustment of the Anglo- 
Soviet trade balance especially by using Soviet sterling 
balances available in Britain, and the greater use of 
British shipping (1). These points were further 
elaborated in a British memorandum, dated 26 January 
1933, to which the Soviet side replied on 17 February, 
agreeing to these three points as a general basis for 
discussion, on condition that the new commercial treaty 
should provide for non-discriminatory treatment and 
that more favourable credits should be given for Soviet 
trade. Two commissions, one dealing with the new trade 
agreement and the other with the trade balance and 
credits were set up and began work before the end of 
February 1933. (2).
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 535; Foreign Office to
Soviet Embassy, 14 December 1932, N7321/22/38, 
FO 371/16321; Memorandum by British Delegation, 
29 December 1932, N1181/5/38, FO 418/77.
2. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 535; D.V.P. Vol XVI,
Doc .Nos . 36, 42 and note 27.
British confidence was still noticeable 
as the negotiations began. A memorandum prepared 
in mid-December by the Commercial Counsellor in 
Moscow, Paton, argued that Britain should 'drive 
as hard a bargain as we can... .No sympathy of a 
financial nature should be wasted', and that Britain 
should not give concessions just because of a fear 
of Soviet default. Ovey's covering comments were to 
the effect that although Britain should indeed drive 
a hard bargain it should also be a just one, with a 
reasonable amount of generosity to help Russia not 
to weaken her. On this point he was out of line with 
Foreign Office thinking, which favoured Paton's 
conclusions (1).
This determination to drive a hard bargain 
was further exemplified by the British decision to 
raise other outstanding questions in early February 
1933, when memoranda were handed over to the Russians 
setting out the British position on the debts and 
claims issue, the Lena Goldfields claim and the 
provisioning issue. At the start of the negotiations, 
Simon brought the debts and claims issue before the 
Cabinet, when he stated: 'While I demur to making the 
negotiations dependent on the satisfaction of the
X. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 201, and minutes on same 
in FO 371/16321.
claimants or even to pressing the claims in the 
course of the negotiations, I do not suggest that
' the existence of the claims and our expectation of
')
their eventual settlement should go by default'.
As a result it was made clear to the Russians that 
the British Government still maintained the claims, 
the satisfactory settlement of which would be a pre­
requisite of the signature of a permanent trade 
agreement (1). No progress had been made during 
the second half of 1932 on the settlement of the 
Lena Goldfields case, with the Foreign Office becoming 
increasingly frustrated with the attitude of both 
the Company and the Russians; so it was suggested to 
the Russians that an 'early and satisfactory settlement' 
would 'effectively contribute* to the spirit of the 
commercial negotiations (2).
However, in neither case did a satisfactory 
settlement come about. The debts and claims issue 
defied settlement at all, and after the signature of 
the Temporary Trade Agreement on 16 February 1934 both 
sides merely exchanged notes stating that they reserved
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, App. Il(viii); Memorandum by Simon,
16 December 1932, C.P.440(32), CAB 24/235.
2. Memorandum by Collier, 14 December 1932, N7375/149/38, 
FO 371/16327; Coates, op.cit. pp. 468-469.
the right to press their respective claims at any 
time in the future. In 'November 1934 an agreement 
was signed whereby the Russians agreed to pay £3 
million compensation to the Lena Goldfields Company 
over a period of 20 years (1).
During 1932 the favourable balance of trade 
which the Soviet Union possessed vis-sf-vis Britain 
declined considerably in value, as British exports 
to the Soviet Union increased slightly and Soviet 
exports to Britain decreased considerably (see 
Appendix One of this thesis) • The Soviet Union actually 
drew a larger proportion of her imports from Britain 
at a time when a sizable reduction in the overall 
Soviet import plan was being implemented (largely 
through drastically reducing imports from the United 
States) but the second half of the year saw orders 
going to Germany rather than to Britain. The Foreign 
Office remained critical of German credit policy, but 
other Government departments were becoming more inclined 
to obtain more orders 1 by making as stiff a bargain as 
possible with the Russians rather than by criticising 
the Germans1 and by establishing greater ContinuityT
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, App. II(ix), (x), (xi); D.V.P.
Vol XVII, Doc.No. 380 and note 290.
in British credit policy (1) . As a result on 21 
. December 1932, the Cabinet, with the noted dissent of 
Hailsham, approved proposals from Runciman that the 
export credits for trade with the Soviet Union be 
put on a revolving basis, to the value of £4,600,000 
a year with a duration of 18 months (2).
For the Soviet Union, the period of late 
1932-early 1933 was a crucial one as regards the 
retirement of existing debts to foreign creditors; 
the large amount of debt maturing indeed again raised 
fears abroad, even on the basis of the imperfect 
information available to foreigners, that a Soviet , 
default was possible. Default was avoided by a 
number of devices: exporting gold, utilising foreign 
currency shop^ earnings, reducing machinery import 
orders, and continuing to export foodstuffs regardless 
of the human cost (3). In the Anglo-Soviet bilateral 
context, after the British denunciation of the Trade 
Agreement there was a reduction in the orders being
1. Ashton-Gwatkin to Leith-Ross, 27 September 1932,
N5373/158/38, FO 371/16328; Nixon to Collier, 10 
October 1932, N5764/22/38, FO 371/16320; Memorandum 
by Export Credit Guarantee Department, 30 June 1933, 
N4928/748/38, FO 371/17261.
2. Memorandum by Runciman, 19 December 1932, C.P.443(32), 
CAB 24/235; Cabinet Conclusions, 21 December 1932, 
68(32)7, CAB 23/73.
3. Owen, op.cit. p.98; Dohan, op.cit. pp. 629, 632.
placed by the Russians, except where credit was 
available, and British exports to the Soviet Union 
in the first quarter of 1933 were at an insignificant 
level (1). This political act of retaliation 
reinforced the tendency towards a slight reduction 
in Soviet orders in the second half of 1932 due to 
the absence of credit, and meant that the general trend 
of British exports to the Soviet Union in 1932 (a 
slight increase, with machinery exports significantly 
increasing - see Appendix Five of this thesis) against 
the overall swing in the Soviet Union’s importing 
policy was not continued into 1933. From the spring 
of 1933, of course, Anglo-Soviet trade patterns were 
to be disjointed more severely by the embargo and 
counter-embargo.
At a time when Anglo-Soviet relations were 
undergoing some tension, the Soviet Union was moving 
further towards rapprochement with France. In the 
autumn of 1932, both Poland and France decided to 
disregard the Rumanians, who showed no signs of coming 
to a Rumano-Soviet agreement, and on 26 November 1932 
the Poles ratified their Non-aggression Pact and the 
French, three days later, signed their Non-aggression 
Pact with the Soviet Union. It was not a ’reversal of
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc.Nos. 440, 477.
alliances', but for the French it had a negative 
, value in that the Soviet Union would be neutral in any 
Franco-German conflict, while for the Soviet Union, 
the pledge 'not to become a party to any international 
agreement' directed against the other's foreign trade 
ensured that France would not again join an economic 
boycott of Soviet goods (1) . Soviet concern about 
economic action against them was still in evidence, 
such as in Litvinov's attempts early in October 1932 
to disinter the proposal for a pact of economic non­
aggression, so that at a time when Britain was 
endeavouring to obtain freedom for economic action 
the Franco-Soviet Pact had an economic significance.
The British felt that the French had been 'rather rash' 
in signing away their only effective weapon and 
rejected a French approach for co-operation in future 
commercial negotiations with the Soviet Union (Franco- 
Soviet trade negotiations recommenced a month before 
the Pact's signature) (2).
1. Nere, op.cit. pp.159-160; Scott, op.cit. pp. 58-73; 
D.D.F. Vol II, Doc.No. 29. An 'economic boycott' 
clause had been first included in the Treaty of 
Berlin in 1926. The Franco-Soviet Pact also included 
a propaganda clause, as the French were particularly 
concerned about communist activity in Morocco. D.V.P. 
Vol XV, Doc .No. 409.
2. Note by Oliphant, 1 December 1932, N7059/1159/38,
FO 371/16334; Memorandum by Northern Department,
30 December 1932, N340/130/63, FO 371/17215..
To the Soviet Union the Pact had political 
advantages as well, in that it appeared to separate 
France both from Japan (there was still comment in 
the Soviet press about Franco-Japanese contacts) and 
from Germany (Soviet suspicions of Papen's approach to 
Herriot for a military alliance seem to have had some 
substance (1)). The Soviet leadership appear to have 
failed to appreciate the nature of the changing 
situation inside Germany attaching inflated significance 
to the German communist gains in the elections in 1932, 
continuing to be suspicious of Papen and to criticise 
the social-democrats, and underestimating the significance 
of the rise of Adolf Hitler and the gains made by the 
Nazi Party (2). Even after the accession of Hitler to 
the Chancellorship on 30 January 1933, there was a 
period of cautious reassessment by the Soviet side, and 
it was nearly a year before German-Soviet relations were 
reduced to their lowest level (3).
However, neither in the European nor in the 
Far Eastern context did Britain and the Soviet Union 
find ground for real co-operation or a thorough exchange
1. Scott, op.cit. pp.67, 73; Dyck, op.cit. pp .252-253; 
D.V.P. Vol XV, Doc .No .409.
2. Laqueur,. op.cit. p p .216-218; Ulam, op.cit. pp.191-196. 
However, D.V.P. Vol XV contains some reports from the 
Soviet Embassy about the rising strength of the anti- 
Soviet Nazi Party (e.g. Doc .Nos. 193, 263, and 444), 
but their evaluation by Moscow is not known.
3. James McSherry, Stalin, Hitler, and Europe: The 
Origins of World War II, (New York 1968), pp. 23-34; 
Ulam, op.cit. pp.192-197 .
of views. Throughout the discussions in the autumn 
of 1932 on ways of bringing back Germany to the 
Disarmament Conference, the official British line 
seemed nearer to Germany than to France and the 
informal talks in December 1932 (which did result in 
German participation in the next session of the 
Conference in February 1933) excluded the Russians, 
who even before Hitler's accession to power were 
showing signs of sympathy for France's 'security* 
plan announced in November 1932; Britain and the 
Soviet Union were no closer together (1). Analysing 
the Soviet Union's policy of negotiating pacts during 
1931-1932, the Foreign Office considered that the 
chief object was 'to acquire security from political 
intervention of financial and economic boycott, and 
to gain time for the carrying through of their "Five 
Year Plan'", but described the resultant treaties as 
'largely meaningless and illusory' (2).
In the Far East, the Soviet Union's relative 
military weakness and diplomatic isolation led to a 
continued military build-up, renewed efforts (unsuccess­
ful) to persuade Japan to accept a non-aggression pact, 
tentative soundings with the United States, and the 
renewal of Soviet-Chinese relations in December 1932. 
However, continued misunderstanding of Britain, the
1. Thorne, op.cit. pp. 310-324; Beloff, op.cit. pp.51-52.
2. Memorandum by Northern Department, 30 December 1932, 
N340/130/38, FO 371/17215.
suspicion that Britain was eager to deflect Japan from 
British interests in south China and South-east Asia 
towards the north, governed Soviet thinking. The 
Russians also continued to see the 'hand* of Britain 
working against them in the Baltic states, Persia 
and Afghanistan (1).
To the British, 'the great gravity owing to 
the exposed position of our bases and the danger to 
our trade' meant a policy based on the need to avoid 
* trouble with Japan* • Although Japanese attempts to 
portray themselves as saving China from communism 
evoked little positive support outside of some 
Conservative back-benchers and certain newspapers (2), 
suspicions of past and present Soviet policies led 
-the Cabinet to discount close co-operation with the 
Soviet Union as a viable policy. Although Japanese 
military activity had forced a re-consideration of
1. Nisso Koshoshi, op.cit. pp. 270-274, 288-290, 293-294,* 
Eudin and Slusser, op.cit. Vol II, pp. 504-505; D.V.P. 
Vol XVI, Doc .No .52; Popov, Diplomat icheskie 
Otnosheniya, op.cit. pp. 87-91,
2. Reginald Bassett, Democracy and Foreign Policy (London 
1952) pp.589-590; Louis, op.cit. pp.199-205. One 
British report stated: 'Though we do not wish and
in fact are morally unable to condone Japan's dis­
regard of her obligations .. .it must remain beyond 
dispute that the extension of Japanese control in 
Manchuria would be less inimical to the British 
Empire than the inevitable alternative - an increase 
of Soviet influence'. Memorandum by Chief of 
Imperial General Staff, October 1932, C.P. 367(32),
CAB 24/234. This line of thinking was not a major 
consideration in Cabinet policy. Ann Trotter,
Britain and East Asia (London 1975) p.216.
British defence planning with a new priority for the 
%Far East, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
argued in October 1932 that 'it must not be forgotten 
that Russia is our one declared enemy and that while 
she is preparing primarily for war on her western 
frontiers, she will not hesitate to strike at us 
through Afghanistan should the situation be favourable' . 
The Foreign Office and the India Office disagreed with 
that view as a short-term assessment, indeed informing 
the Cabinet the same month that 'there is little likeli­
hood of the Soviet attacking Afghanistan in the near 
future', but the British fear of an extension of 
communist influence into India and the Empire, whether 
by subversive or by military means, still ranked as a 
consideration in British foreign and defence policies, 
even though the main threat to the Empire now came 
from a different direction, Japan (1).
In this context, in the summer of 1932, the 
British had to consider a renewed request from the 
Afghan Government for a concrete definition of the 
British attitude to a Soviet-Afghan war. The new 
Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, argued that there had been
1. Memorandum by Chief of Imperial General Staff,
October 1932, C.P. 367(32), CAB 24/234; Memorandum 
by Hoare and Simon, 3 October 1932, C .P. 300(32), 
CAB 24/232.
no fundamental changes* vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 
which called for any revision of the 1927 assumptions,
* and firmly emphasised that fwe regard the re-establish- 
ment of Russian influence in Afghanistan as a most 
serious threat not only to the security of India and 
the peace of the frontier but even to the stability 
of the Empire* . Simon and Hoare consulted with the 
Cabinet and decided in October 1932 that the Afghans 
could be informed that an unprovoked Soviet invasion 
could lead to the British undertaking * diplomatic 
intervention* followed by * economic pressure* if 
necessary (1). It was a more definite commitment than 
any previous assurance to the Afghans.
The First Five Year Plan officially came to 
an end on 31 December 1932, instead of in September 
1933, nine months ahead of schedule, amid fanfares 
over the successes achieved. However, in most of the 
important industrial sectors and agriculture the short­
falls were significant and the economy was over-strained 
and disorganised. Stalin, speaking at a Party Plenum 
in January 1933, admitted a slight shortfall in output, 
which he blamed on the necessity to switch industrial
1. Walton to Herbert Metcalfe, Foreign Secretary to the 
Government of India, 11 August, Willingdon to Hoare, 
10 September, Simon to Maconachie, 17 October, and 
Maconachie to Simon, 2 December 1932, all I .0. 
Records, R/12/1/89; Memorandum by Hoare and Simon,
3 October 1932, C.P.300(32), CAB 24/232.
production to armament production as a result of the 
Far Eastern complications (1). At the end of 1932, 
Ovey reviewed the Soviet internal situation. In his 
own notes he wrote that the Russian experiment was 
* the execution, the putting into force of a pure 
theory* (2), while in his report to London he argued 
that although recent despatches had presented ’a 
somewhat gloomy picture of the Russian economic and 
political situation* he saw signs of a more rapid 
evolution so that the ’most likely future* was ’the 
continuance of the present regime with the same 
dominant features, and in practice a gradually more 
reasonable and less theoretical policy*. Although 
sceptical of Soviet statistics regarding the Five 
Year Plan’s progress, the British Embassy staff felt 
that * in spite of all the mess that undoubtedly exists, 
largely because the country is peopled by Russians, 
something tangible is being accomplished’ (3).
Trade questions were dominant in the Anglo- 
Soviet relationship in the second half of 1932. One 
of the major issues of the Ottawa Conference was the
1. Stalin, Works, Vol 13, pp.174-183; Nove, op.cit.
pp. 187 TT~.
2. Record dated ’31 December (? 1932, from internal
evidence) by Ovey, in Ovey Papers, held by
Mrs. D. Woodrow.
3. -D.B.F.P. I I/VI I, Doc .No. 201.
struggle to find a settlement between the Canadian and 
British delegations over trade with the Soviet Union.
i
Under Canadian pressure the British committed them­
selves to denouncing the Trade Agreement, but not to
any total prohibition of imports from the Soviet
(\ _
Union. The Cabinet was generally guided by economic 
rather than political motives in denouncing the Trade 
Agreement and entering into negotiations for a new 
agreement which it was hoped would rectify the un­
favourable balance of Anglo-Soviet trade. At the 
same time it was also hoped that some progress might 
be made on the unsolved issues of debts and claims 
and the Lena Goldfields claim.
The nature of the issues in dispute gave 
Runciman and, in particular, Chamberlain leading 
roles in the decision-making process, while MacDonald 
too had an important if often out-numbered voice in 
the discussions. Simon played a less decisive role 
than these three Ministers, and his periodic absences 
in Geneva allowed Vansittart to shape Foreign Office 
responses to problems such as the renewal of the 
propaganda dispute •
The new Soviet Ambassador, Maisky, came to 
Britain with a slogan of ’common sense1, but mutual 
suspicions still over-ruled any real development in
political relations. In the changing situations in 
both Europe and the Far East there was no sign of a 
1 meeting of minds1 between the two powers. The Soviet 
Union, in fact, turned to other powers, France, Poland, 
and (every hopefully) to America, Although Litvinov 
became virtually a fcitizen of Geneva1 through his 
frequent visits, Stalin and the R>litburo were still 
pursuing a policy of fisolationism’, of using 
diplomatic methods to gain time for the industrial 
and military development of the Soviet Union. The 
Comintern was more and more out of touch with the 
situation both in Europe (including Britain) and the 
East; although an irritant in Anglo-Soviet relations, 
it was not an effective weapon for Stalin to apply 
pressure on the British. The crisis in the Soviet 
economy, particularly the famine, necessitated re­
organisation in Soviet foreign trade planning and 
efforts were made to avoid a default and reduce depend­
ence on the British market.
Ovey’s own note at the end of 1932 that 
*this time one bright spot I see or think I see is the 
beginning of a better understanding with Russia’ (1), 
was not to be realised, for on 12 March 1933 the Soviet
1. Ovey Papers, Record of 31 December (?1932).
secret police arrested six British engineers and more 
, than twenty Russians employed near Moscow by Metro- 
Vickers Ltd* and in early April brought them to trial 
on grounds of spying and wrecking in what was ’tfre 
last of the great show trials held before the Purge 
proper1, Ovey in particular was completely dis­
illusioned and angered by this ’skit on justice’ and 
’deliberate sabotage of our relations’ and he was 
recalled to London even before the trial opened.
However, the Cabinet felt that ’the threat of commercial 
embargo is more powerful than breach of diplomatic 
contact’, but were not in a bluffing mood, so that 
when the British engineers were convicted a full embargo 
was introduced on all basic Soviet export commodities 
to Britain (with the expiry of the six months' notice 
of denunciation of the Trade Agreement and the suspen­
sion of negotiations for a new agreement this action 
could be taken) on 26 April 1933, The Soviet side 
introduced counter-measures, but then the situation 
relapsed into impasse, until, at the end of June 1933, 
Litvinov’s visit to London to attend the World Economic 
Conference gave the chance for talks with Simon, 
resulting in the lifting of the punitive economic 
measures and the release of the British engineers (1) .
1. D.B.F.P. I I/VI I, Doc .Nos. 204-519; D.V.P. Vol XVI, 
Doc.No. 83, passim; Owen, op.cit. pp. 97-104; Lord 
Strang, Home and Abroad, (London 1956) pp. 78-120.
Negotiations for the trade agreement were resumed,
. but only reached a conclusion on 16 February 1934, 
when a Temporary Trade Agreement was signed; a 
schedule guaranteeing an equalisation in the balance 
of trade over a four-year period and a slight modification 
in the most-favoured-nation clause seemed the only 
satisfactory results for Britain (1).
Despite this agreement, though, the Soviet 
Union continued to have a distinctly favourable balance 
of trade through the 1930s, and the debts and claims 
issue remained in cold storage, but the propaganda 
issue did die down after 1935,and there were some signs 
of closer political relations, as the Soviet Union 
joined the League of Nations and Anthony Eden, then 
Lord Privy Seal, visited Moscow. Elements of mutual 
suspicion and misunderstanding were still strong enough, 
however, to hinder the development of close relations 
in the late 1930s.
1. Coates, op.cit. pp. 513-520; Owen, op.cit. pp. 
104-107.
CONCLUSION
Anglo-Soviet relations during the period 
from 1927 to 1932 retained much of the coldness and 
mutual suspicion which had characterised relations in 
the early 1920s, and, indeed, Anglo-Tsarist relations 
during the nineteenth century.
By 1927 the majority of British informed 
opinion appreciated that the Soviet Government had 
’come to stay’ in that a certain stability in both 
political and economic life had been achieved within 
the area which constituted the largest part of the old 
geopolitical boundaries . In general, the British 
governments felt, even during the periods of internal 
disruption in theSoviet Union as under the First Five 
Year Plan, that there were no grounds for ’wishful 
thinking' (the prerogative of some Conservatives and 
White Russians) about the fate of the Soviet system.
As a corollary of this assessment, the Foreign Office 
consistently argued that any attempted outside inter­
vention would only be counter-productive in that it would 
serve to reunite the Russian people and destroy any 
embryonic fissiparous tendencies.
Having recognised that in Soviet communism 
they were faced with a ’going concern1 and, to use 
the words of Ambassador Ovey, *a fact with which one 
must reckon, and against which one must defend one­
self quietly and confidently1 (1), the British 
policy-makers nevertheless were in disagreement among 
themselves as to the future ’evolution* of the Soviet
Union and its role in world affairs. This reflected
\_
partly the difficulties arising from inadequate 
information about and from misunderstanding of the 
nature and policies of the Soviet Union, including the 
apparent contradictions in the unconventional Soviet 
approach to international relations through the two 
arms of the Narkomindel and the Comintern, and partly 
party-political differences in approaches to inter­
national relations in general and Soviet totalitarianism 
in particular.
Lloyd George’s misconception of Soviet 
Russia’s ’bursting cornbins’ had been based on 
inadequate information as to the real Soviet situation, 
and despite a certain amount of diplomatic and secret 
information obtained during 1920s, Balfour was still 
able to write in July 1927: ’I wish we knew more about 
the internal, as distinguished from the external, policy
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc.No. 88.
of Russia* (1). The break in relations substantially 
reduced the flow of information from all sources,
‘though less drastically in the Indian context. By 
the time relations were renewed in 1929, the closed 
nature of Soviet society (aptly described by a post­
war British Ambassador to Moscow as 'hermetic 
impenetrability* (2)) had become more pronounced under 
Stalin’s control and this compounded the difficulties 
for the British in their efforts at *Kremlinology'. 
Consequently, aspects of the internal power struggle 
were misunderstood; for example, the insecurity of 
Stalin*s position in the Soviet hierarchy was over­
estimated .
However, apart from the problem of insufficient 
information about the Soviet Union, the British were 
hampered by their own failure to understand the nature 
of the Soviet system and Stalin’s policies. In trying 
to explain the Soviet system, the British sought to 
draw comparisons from Western social, political and 
economic experiences. At times, therefore, comparisons 
were drawn with Tsarist imperialism, the French Revolu­
tion and the Napoleonic system, militant Catholicism,
1. Balfour to Harold Bernstein, an American journalist,
8 July 1927, Balfour Papers, held in the British 
Museum, London, Add. 49868.
21. Sir William Hayter, Russia and the World, (London 
1969) p.13.
and Mahometanism. By thinking in Western terms, for 
example, the British failed to appreciate the
Five Year Plan by coercion, as in the case of the 
forcing of grain for export to Britain and the West. 
That such misunderstandings and misperceptions were 
still in evidence at the end of this period is clear 
from the report sent by Paton, the Commercial 
Counsellor to the Moscow Embassy, in December 1932, 
urging: fOne must not measure conditions in Russia 
with an English yardstick* (1).
The question of the inter-relation between 
the Marxist ideology and the national Russian tradition
of ’socialism in one country* seemed to herald a more 
nationalistic policy. Generally it was expected that 
the revolutionary defeats of 1927, particularly in 
China, would drive the Soviet Union on to a more 
nationalistic path, but the increasingly militant 
slogans of the new Comintern line adopted in 1928 con­
fused British observers, who could not understand the
1. D.B.F.P. II/VII, Doc .No. 201. A later example of
the propensity to think in British terms is afforded 
by Simon’s comments to Neville Chamberlain on the 
eve of the Soviet Union's joining the League of 
Nations, in August 1934: 'We can certainly intimate 
that if she is going to join the Club at Geneva we 
expect her to behave according to the best traditions 
of the best clubs'. Ibid, Doc .No. 609, note 1.
sacrifices that could be demanded under the First
loomed large for British observes as Stalin's policy
essential unreality of much of the Comintern's 
policies in relation to the European and colonial 
situation.
During the years from 1928 to 1932, Soviet 
internal and indeed external policies were dominated 
by the exigencies of the First Five Year Plan, and 
the British endeavoured to assess its short-term 
and long-term implications for Soviet trade and foreign 
policies and for the development of Soviet society and 
economy. Ovey's conclusion in 1930 was that Stalin’s 
'plan of industrial organisation is a serious and not 
a fantastic one'; by 1932 the British felt that though 
the improvements in the Soviet economy were 'far short' 
of those planned for, some progress had been made (1).
The British officials' approach to Stalinist 
communism was also conditioned by their opinions of the 
Russian national character, which they saw as one of 
the keys to the success or failure of Stalin's plans. 
Ovey was in general agreement with the 'customary 
criticism...that Russians are useless and feckless 
human beings and can never really govern their own 
country', but believed that that contention 'can no 
longer be held to apply to the extremely active, if
1. Ibid, Doc .Nos. 71, 201.
misguided and over-zealous, minority who rule the 
country with a rod of ironT (1). Some Foreign Office 
‘officials, however, were not very sanguine about the 
abilities either of the Russians as a race or the 
Bolsheviks as rulers, as witness Wellesleyfs comments: 
’Under the present regime no one can do anything in 
Russia.... (and) it is fantastic to suppose that, by 
a stroke of the pen, Russia can achieve, overnight 
as it were, what has taken other nations with far 
greater aptitudes decades to accomplish' (2).
As a potent issue in party-political discuss­
ions, Soviet Russia at times attracted a disproportion­
ate amount of attention as compared with other foreign 
policy issues. The Foreign Office officials themselves 
expressed their frustration at this ’fetter' on British 
foreign policy in a memorandum in November 1931:
’From being a pre-war enigma Russia has 
become a post-war obsession... .So long as 
one section of opinion, even a small one, 
hitches its wagon to the Soviet star, and 
another longs for nothing so much as the 
star's eclipse, the task of reducing Anglo- 
Soviet relations to normal remains hopeless'(3)
1. Ibid, Doc .No. 88.
2. Memorandum by Wellesley, 1 December 1930, MacDonald 
Papers, PRO 30/69/1/286. Some Cabinet members too 
felt certain about the 'inefficiency of the Slav' 
and held that 'the history of Russia showed how 
rarely their plans came to fruition'. Cabinet Con­
clusions, 27 April 1932, 25(32)7, CAB 23/71.
3. D.B.F.P. II/VII, App.I.
The clamour from extra-parliamentary pressure groups, 
such as the creditors1 associations, the chambers of
»
commerce, the churches and the trade unions, and from 
parliamentary back-bench pressure groups notwithstanding, 
the mainstream leaderships of the three major parties 
were not as far apart in their attitudes to the Soviet 
Union as the press and the wilder statements of back­
benchers made it appear. The front-benches had no 
real enthusiasm for the communist experiments being 
conducted inside the^Soviet Union and even less for 
Soviet attempts to spread revolutionary activities into 
Britain and the Empire. Differences were reduced 
largely to arguments over the means of bringing about 
the evolution of Soviet Russia to more ’normal1 
standards of government and international intercourse 
and over the extent to which British interests could 
be promoted and protected through a rapprochement with 
Soviet Russia.
As shown in the first three chapters of this 
thesis, Austen Chamberlain's cautious policy of 'studied 
reserve’ which he had argued for and maintained since 
becoming Foreign Secretary in 1924, was, by 1927, 
becoming increasingly difficult to justify in the face 
of mounting evidence of Soviet intransigence and failure 
to observe the propaganda obligations, and against a
background of growing pressure from Conservative back­
benchers and some Cabinet members for 'positive' action
%
to counter-act the anti-British activities in Britain, 
the Empire and China. The rupture of relations did not 
'suit' Chamberlain's foreign policy (1), for he consist­
ently argued against a break on foreign policy grounds, 
but the Aroos raid changed the situation and tipped the 
balance in the Cabinet in favour of action. Emotion 
may have governed certain members of the Cabinet, but 
for the majority it was a growing sense of frustration 
at Soviet intransigence, a feeling that the repercussions 
on trade would be minimal, and the realisation that 
intra-party dissent was dangerously strong, which carried 
the decisive influences.
As shown in the fourth and fifth chapters of 
this thesis, the suspension of diplomatic relations was 
not the prelude to any wider British action (contrary 
to the alarums of theSoviet 'war scare'); Chamberlain 
was at pains to explain this to his European colleagues. 
Trade did fall off, since the Soviet Government reacted 
by reducing orders; as the British economic situation 
began to deteriorate in 1928-29 this led to some 
agitation for a renewal of relations even amongst
1. A. J. P. Taylor, op.cit. p. 255, claims that 'the
breach with Soviet Russia suited Austen Chamberlain's 
foreign policy'.
Conservatives. However, continued evidence of 
Soviet anti-British activities both in Britain and in
%
India hardened Cabinet opinion against a reconsidera­
tion of their policies . The Soviet appearances on the 
international arena, at the disarmament talks and 
through the adherence to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
were greeted with suspicion by the British.
■ >1
As shown in the sixth, seventh, and eighth 
chapters of this thesis, the Labour Cabinet which took 
office in 1929 were haunted by the experiences of 1924 
in their dealings with the Soviet Union throughout the 
following two years. They resisted the demands of 
their back-benchers for an immediate resumption of 
relations and proceeded with negotiations but this 
cautious approach, however, gained only one concession 
from the Russians, the propaganda pledge. Learning 
from 1924, the Cabinet refused to countenance a loan, 
but did extend export credits in the belief that British 
exports could be stimulated. Some expansion of trade 
did occur, but British export totals only rose significant­
ly as longer credits, culminating in the Johnston- 
Gurevitch agreement of 1931, were granted, while the 
Soviet exports rose further through large grain exports 
to a British market committed to Free Trade . The Labour 
Cabinet came under Conservative criticism not only for
allowing Soviet 'dumping* but also for their non­
committal approach to the Soviet religious persecution 
and forced labour issues. Henderson initially adopted 
a hard line towards propaganda infractions but the 
constantly repeated remonstrances to the Russians 
brought little effect and they were eventually 
abandoned. Frustration was the keynote also of the 
negotiations over debts and claims, the Lena Goldfields 
claim, and the trade balance. There was no real coinci­
dence of interests in the disarmament or other inter­
national discussions.
As the Depression deepened and British 
unemployment figures increased, the pull of the Soviet 
market increased for the British, so that economic 
-relations became of greater importance, especially as 
no real political rapprochement occurred.
As shown in the last two chapters of this 
thesis, relations under the National Government remained 
distant. The First National Cabinet, distracted by the 
paramount problems of the British economy, devoted 
minimal attention to Anglo-Soviet relations, allowing 
them to continue on the general lines of the Labour 
Cabinet's policy, with the exception of a reduction in 
the duration of credits. The reconstituted National
Cabinet after the election was less united on policy 
and disagreements revolved around the unfavourable 
* trade balance with the Soviet Union and the remedies 
for this situation. Many of the outstanding issues 
of the Labour Cabinet period remained unsolved, such 
as propaganda, debts and claims, and the Lena Goldfields 
claim. A decision on the fate of the Temporary Trade 
Agreement was postponed until after the Ottawa 
Conference, where Canada was more successful than at 
the previous Imperial Conference in 1930 and obtained 
British agreement to abrogation of the Trade Agreement. 
Only after another vituperative propaganda exchange 
were the trade negotiations between Britain and the 
Soviet Union opened at the very end of 1932. The 
emergence of the Japanese threat in the Far East after 
September 1931 affected the interests of both powers in 
that area, but there was no real exchange of opinions 
and no co-ordinated response . The Soviets were 
suspicious of British intentions in the Far East vis-a- 
vis Japan, as the British had earlier been suspicious, 
with more justification, of Soviet intentions in China.
The wide-ranging nature of the 'Russian 
question' brought it within the purview of several 
government departments other than the Foreign Office. 
Throughout this period the voices of these other depart­
ments and their political masters made themselves felt
in policy discussions, on occasions even over-ruling 
the Foreign Office's opinions and proposals. By the 
end of the period the Treasury had become the most 
influential of these other departments, which 
reflected partly the strong personalities of the 
three successive Chancellors but also partly the 
Government's increasing preoccupation with the economic 
state of the country,, and the economic aspects of 
Anglo-Soviet relations as the political relations 
stagnated (1). Probably all the three Chancellors, 
with slight differences of emphasis, would have agreed 
with Neville Chamberlain's comment in October 1932 that 
*1 regard her (Russia) as a suspicious character and if 
we do business with her we must exercise the business 
caution appropriate to a rather disreputable customer' (2).
1. The review for 1932 drawn up by the Moscow Embassy 
noted that 'as in previous years, the conditions 
of Anglo-Soviet trade relations remained in fact 
the most important question in Anglo-Soviet 
relations'. Viscount Chilston, Ovey's successor 
as Ambassador, to Simon, 5 December 1933, N8770/ 
3632/38, FO 371/17276.
2. N. Chamberlain to Arthur Chamberlain, 24 October 
1932, N. Chamberlain Papers, NC 7/6/4. Occasionally 
fiscal beliefs over-ruled suspicions of Soviet Russia, 
such as Churchill's advocacy of the Ten Year Rule
at the same time as he was warning of the Soviet 
threat to India, and Snowden's refusal to sacrifice 
his Free Trade beliefs and enact the anti-dumping 
legislation urged by the Canadians, despite his 
having argued with the Webbs that Soviet Russia was 
a 'cruel slave state*. Webb Diaries, 18 August 1931, 
I. 45.
A certain lack of co-ordination in British 
policies towards the Soviet Union emerges from the 
records of the inter-departmental and Cabinet 
discussions, and some of these mutually-conflicting 
elements were apparent to the Russians. The Soviet 
diplomats in their reports to Moscow, and the 
Narkomindel officials themselves, tended to analyse 
these signs in terms of a clash amongst the British 
leadership elite of two 'tendencies', moderate/con­
ciliatory and hard-line/anti-Soviet (1), but the 
decision-making process in Britain was considerably 
more complex than that method of assessment implies. 
Nevertheless, just as these inconsistencies on the 
British side provided opportunities for the Soviet 
side to try to split or play off groups or Ministers 
for their own benefit, as in the case of the attempts 
during the Labour Cabinet's term of office to play off 
Cabinet members in order to gain longer credits, so also 
they did not obviate Soviet misunderstanding and 
suspicion of British intentions, for example, Avramov's 
'confused' state of mind after talking with Joynson- 
Hicks in October 1928.
1. Stalin, in his post-1927 public pronouncements,
either delineated different countries as representing 
these two tendencies (as opposed to two groups 
within the elite of a country) or saw a struggle 
between the masses and the governments of the various 
countries, but the Narkomindel documents contain many 
examples of the continuance of the old analysis 
of two tendencies amongst the elites, with the often 
implied corollary of favouring the moderate group.
Imperial considerations ranked large with 
British policy-makers; the defence of India, in its 
’widest political-strategic sense, despite the 
essentially bi-partisan approach to the 'retreat' from 
India, remained in many ways the 'impulse' of British 
policy, but the Dominions became more individualistic 
in foreign affairs and a common policy towards the 
Soviet Union became increasingly difficult for London 
to obtain.
The nature and the degree of imminence of 
the Soviet threat to India was the subject of considerable 
disagreement amongst British and Indian authorities 
(not least between the Foreign Office and the Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff), but in 1926-27 the majority 
opinion had perceived an external military threat 
through Afghanistan. The consequent re-examination of 
Indian defences reaffirmed the basic assumption of 
nineteenth century British policy, namely that the 
integrity of Afghanistan was vital for Indian security, 
but the drafting and detailed elaboration of plans' over 
the following years became more of an 'academic exercise', 
as the internal communist threat first appeared to 
become paramount, then again receded, partly due to 
strong Government action and partly due to the Comintern's 
unrealistic policies, and later the Afghan internal
situation stabilised and Soviet attention became 
diverted to the Far East.
In fact,.by 1932, the extent of Soviet 
influence in the traditional areas of Anglo-Russian 
conflict, in the Middle East and on the frontiers 
of India, was significantly reduced by comparison 
with the first half of the 1920s.
In" over-ruling the British military authorities 
and imposing the Ten Year Rule, the politicians had 
only one slight reservation, namely, about the Soviet 
military situation, but when, in 1932, the Cabinet 
finally revoked this Rule, the cause was not an 
imminent Soviet threat, but the rise of Japan. The 
first real threat to the Empire, therefore, did not 
come from the direction anticipated by either the 
military or the civilian authorities in the late 1920s.
The difficulties in co-ordination and consult­
ation with the Dominions were just as apparent in Anglo- 
Soviet relations as in other fields of foreign policy, 
raising not only constitutional points as in the case 
of the 1927 severance of relations, the 1929 exchange 
of propaganda pledges and the 1930 Trade Agreement, but 
also fundamental policy divergences, as in the case of 
Canadian attempts to dictate British economic policy 
towards the Soviet 'dumping1 at the 1930 and 1932
Imperial Conferences. The comments in the diary kept 
by Neville Chamberlain, depicting the course of the 
‘arguments over the Russian question at the Ottawa 
Conference, illustrate the obstacles to a united 
Imperial policy (1).
The Foreign Office officials, particularly 
the successive heads of the Northern Department,
Palairet, Villiers, Seymour and Collier, served their 
political masters with sympathy; even the Labour Cabinet, 
prone to doubts about Foreign Office loyalty after the 
events of 1924, found little cause to complain. Amongst 
the more senior permanent officials, Gregory, until 
1928, and Vansittart, after 1930, played significant 
roles in advising on and formulating policy (2). The
1. See Chapter Ten of this thesis. Sankey's rough 
notes on the Cabinet meeting of 27 August 1932 
when Chamberlain reported on the Ottawa Conference, 
Sankey Papers, c .509, include: fN. Chamberlain’s 
conclusions. Very thin the bonds of Empire have 
worn. Growth of nationalist spirit. Conference 
just in time to save unity of Empire... .as to Bennett, 
P.M. of Canada, bluff’.’. mendacity’.’, dishonest
liaf*’.’. can’t believe a word he said’.
2. Gregory has been generally described as ’bitterly 
hostile to the Bolsheviks' by historians (e.g. Carr, 
Socialism in One Country, op.cit. Vol 3, p.31), but 
he did present reasoned memoranda against a breach 
In relations, as shown in the first two chapters of 
this thesis. On looking back through old files,
Dalton was surprised to find that Gregory, in 1926- 
27, had 'expounded the official view of the F .0.' 
against a break. Dalton Diaries, 18 May 1931. 
Vansittart was able to work well even with Henderson, 
despite the 'social and psychological gap' between 
them. Norman Rose, Vansittart. Study of a Diplomat, 
(London 1978) pp. 83, 103-104.
diplomatic representatives in Moscow, Hodgson and 
Ovey, endeavoured to send back objective reports on 
the confusing Soviet situation, but, reflecting a not 
uncommon tendency amongst diplomats accredited abroad, 
over-compensated in their desire to be fair to their 
'hosts’; their reports, which tended to be rather 
sympathetic to Soviet aspirations if not methods, did 
not always meet with the approval of the officials in 
London (1). Ovey’s disillusion with the Soviet 
Government, of which signs were apparent in his reaction 
to the Torgsin dispute in late 1932, was only to come 
over the Metro-Vickers affair in 1933 (2) .
1. Nicholas Reyntiens, an Assistant Director in the 
Department of Overseas Trade, wrote in April 1926: 
'both Sir Robert Hodgson and Mr. Peters are extreme­
ly pro-Russian in their outlook, by which I do not 
mean to suggest that they are pro-Bolshevik, but I 
think that any report that they may be asked to 
write will be coloured by their hope to see Russia 
once more in the foremost rank of great nations’ . 
D.O.T. file 13317/1931, B .T. 60/28/3. Dalton wrote 
about Ovey and his staff: ’It is, I think, a capital 
thing that we now have in Moscow men who are studying 
the "Great Experiment" with hope and enthusiastic 
curiosity. I do not know how some of our officials 
at this end will react*. Dalton to Gillett, 31 March 
1930, Gillett Papers.
2. After returning to London, Ovey told a Cabinet commit­
tee that 'strong measures were necessary in order to 
have any-effect on the Russians5. Cabinet Committee 
Meeting, 3 April 1933, CAB 27/550. After the
Second World War, he wrote: ’We must agree to differ, 
we must cease to try to "get together" with Russia’. 
Draft article, 1949, Ovey Papers.
In pursuing the self-imposed task of 
pacifying and reconciling post-Versailles Europe, 
‘especially the settlement of the ?German problem1, 
Britain did not consider Soviet Russia as a power 
able to offer anything constructive to the solution 
of the European problems, to finding the stability in 
Europe which was essential to enable Britain to con­
centrate on her Imperial responsibilities. Despite 
Henderson’s efforts to draw in the Soviet Union,
Foreign Office opinion, as expressed in VansittartTs 
*01d Adam’ memoranda, still regarded Soviet Russia as 
a ’negative’ factor in European politics, thereby 
echoing the earlier opinions of Nicolson’s 1925 
memorandum•
Anglo-French differences, which found express­
ion in a number of inter-war issues, were visible in the 
approaches of the two powers to relations with the 
Soviet Union; for different reasons both the Germans 
and the Russians endeavoured, not unsuccessfully, to 
exploit these differences. The British noted unhappily 
the signs of Soviet-German friendship on the political 
and economic level, but under-estimated the military
collaboration between these two powers (1).
In the mid-1920s, the Soviet leadership 
regarded Britain as the chief capitalist power, and, 
as such, the main threat to their state. The Soviets’ 
suspicion of British intentions led them to view the 
rupture of relations, taken in connection with a series 
of foreign policy set-backs, in mid-1927, as the 
prelude to wider action by the British or by British- 
inspired smaller powers. Later this threat was 
perceived in terms of British attempts to form an
'i
economic or financial blockade during 1927-1929. Only 
with the deepening Depression and the relative ’decay* 
of Britain’s economic and consequently political stand­
ing in Soviet eyes, did France emerge as the chief 
-capitalist protagonist. Despite the ’confidence* 
which the Soviet Union felt towards Britain under the 
Labour Government, the changes in Britain’s financial 
and political fortunes in 1931 meant that France 
remained a centre of Soviet interest and in turn 
became the object of a Soviet diplomatic push as the 
Far Eastern crisis threatened Soviet security •
1. The British seemed, if anything, more concerned 
about Soviet-Italian contacts, carefully noting 
sales of Italian flying-boats to the Soviet Union 
and receiving secret information about an un­
accepted Soviet offer of a military pact to the 
Italians (in 1931), than about the much more 
substantial Soviet-German military contacts.
C.D.I. Minutes, 19 March 1931, CAB 2/5; Memorandum 
by Vansittart, May 1931, C.P. 317(31), CAB 24/225.
After the collapse of revolutionary hopes 
in China, India seemed to be the most promising 
ground amongst the colonial countries. Paradoxically, 
however, the left turn inaugurated by the Sixth 
Comintern Congress in 1928 enforced a policy on the 
Indian communists which was to be increasingly out 
of touch with the rising nationalist aspirations of 
the Indian population. In conjunction with severe 
measures adopted by the Government of India to 
eradicate subversive activities, this line weakened
the effectiveness of the Comintern both in promoting
communism and in utilising the Indian factor in Anglo- 
Soviet relations.
c
In Britain itself, the collapse of the Anglo- 
Russian Trade Union Committee, an organisation which in 
practice had more importance in the Soviet power struggle 
between Trotsky and Stalin than in British internal 
politics, showed the gap between Soviet expectations
and the realities of the British labour situation.
This was to be made even clearer after the change of 
line imposed on the British Communist Party. The 
Minority Movement died away, and, although unemployed 
movements grew in strength during 1931-32, the British 
Party, in consequence of its sectarian approach of 
denouncing the Labour Party and the T.U.C. as 1 social
fascists1 and its obvious ideological and organisation­
al subservience to Moscow, was never able to be more 
* than a negligible political force.
Stalin and the Politburo pursued relations 
with Britain through the two arms of the Narkomindel 
and the Comintern, but by the end of this period, with 
fhe failure of the British and Indian Communist Parties 
to develop, the diplomatic arm had become the more 
effective means for Stalin to try to obtain the desired 
foreign policy objectives. The reconstitution of 
-Soviet foreign and domestic policies around Stalin's 
conviction that only the fastest possible reorganisation 
and expansion of the Soviet economy could equip the 
Soviet Union for a future conflict with the capitalist 
-world implied the subordination of foreign adventures 
to domestic considerations, but did not rule out the 
necessity for some contacts with the West for trade 
purposes.
The relationship with Britain, as with other 
countries, however, was subjected to abuse for these 
internal purposes, as in the case of the Industrial 
Party Trial in 1930, and the social and economic changes 
in Soviet life as the Stalinist machine forced the 
population into a frenetic drive for industrialisation 
and collectivisation, such as the religious persecution,
the‘increased use of forced labour, the liquidation 
of the kulaks, and the forced exporting of grain and 
timber, became the subject of inter-governmental 
controversy and friction.
The Depression did not stop short at the 
borders of the Soviet Union, as was claimed by the 
Soviet authorities, because the falling prices of raw 
materials and growing protectionism in the West affected 
Soviet foreign trade planning. The shift in the terms 
of trade meant that increased amounts of grain, timber 
and oil had to be exported to buy the contracted 
machinery and service the short-term credits granted 
by Britain and other Western powers. The Soviet 
authorities maintained a favourable balance of trade 
with Britain in order to earn foreign exchange by 
sizeable exports regardless of the domestic hardship 
and by endeavouring to make their machinery purchases 
in Britain by means of increasingly longer credits. It 
also meant that in the absence of British acceptance of 
a debts-for-credits arrangement, the Soviet side adopted 
a tactic of playing for time over the debts and claims 
negotiations, and even over the Lena Goldfields claim.
Soviet propaganda activities remained an 
irritating issue between the Soviet Government and the 
Western countries, and Britain was not alone in protest­
ing against the activities and publications of the 
Comintern and other communist organisations (propaganda 
clauses were insisted on by the French in the Non­
aggression Pact of 1932 and by the Americans on 
Tecognition in 1933). The Soviet diplomats consistently 
disclaimed governmental responsibility for the Comintern1 
activities, and only rarely, as in the case of the trade 
union radio broadcasts in late 1930 and the Izvestiya 
editorial in late 1932, did the Soviet side show any 
inclination to go even part way to meeting the British 
-complaints .
One theme constantly invoked in the Soviet 
and Comintern pronouncements was the threat of war, 
but, after the genuine alarms in mid-1927, the constant 
invocation became more and more a device of Stalin*s 
for internal purposes. Only after mid-1931 did Stalin 
have genuine reason to be concerned about the Soviet 
Union’s security.
Stalin himself rarely had any direct contact 
with non-communist visitors and diplomats (Ovey never 
met him) (1), but there is little doubt that he and the
1. Stalin seems to have confined his ’audiences* to a
few Japanese politicians, American and German journal 
ists, and British ’personalities* such as George 
Bernard Shaw and Lady Astor. No British diplomat 
had yet met Stalin even when Chilston sent his 1935 
report assessing Stalin's character. Chilston to 
Simon, 22 February 1935, N1017/6/38, FO 371/19449.
Politburo retained control over the main guidelines 
of Soviet foreign policy through both its arms, though 
he seems to have been increasingly cynical about the 
usefulness of the Comintern. Chicherin was less 
suited to the Stalinist policies than Litvinov, who 
effectively took charge of the day-to-day running of 
the Narkomindel from mid-1928, but he too had only 
limited freedom to act as an independent decision­
maker (1).
The Soviet diplomats in London were allowed 
-little latitude in their conversations with their 
British counterparts, and Litvinov, recalling later 
the role of the Soviet representatives in London during
1. The question of a distinct ’Litvinov policy’ during 
the 1930s is still the subject of scholarly debate. 
See Henry Roberts, 'Maxim Litvinov' in Craig and 
Gilbert, op.cit. pp. 344-377. Apart from the 
limited examples from Anglo-Soviet relations cited 
in this thesis, Litvinov's deference to Stalin can 
be demonstrated from other documents in the D.V.P. 
series. In June 1932, when approached by the 
Chinese at Geneva about resuming relations and 
signing a non-aggression pact, he had to telegraph 
Moscow for instructions (Vol XV, Doc .Nos. 267, 271); 
in October he telegraphed from Geneva, direct to 
Stalin, asking for a decision on the formula for the 
proposed Soviet-Rumanian non-aggression pact (ibid, 
Doc .No. 389); in June 1933, while negotiating with 
Simon in London, he telegraphed to Stalin and 
Molotov asking for decisions (Vol XVI, Doc .No. 195). 
Moreover, the direction of policy towards the Far 
Eastern crisis was put in the hands of a special 
Politburo commission headed by Stalin, in December 
1931. Voennoe Izdatelstvo Ministerstva Oboroni 
SSSR, Istoriya Vtoroi Mirovoi Voini, 1939-1945, 
(Moscow 1973) Vol I, p .377. .
the first decade after recognition, described them as 
having 1 in reality been nothing more than a consul* (1). 
However, there were some occasions, as shown in this 
thesis, when their assessments and suggestions did 
carry some weight in the Narkomindel.
During the period under examination in this 
study, Litvinov had meetings in Geneva with three of 
the British Foreign Secretaries; with Chamberlain in 
December 1927, with Henderson in May 1931, and with 
Simon in July 1932, Although there were some differ­
ences in the main points under discussion (with 
Chamberlain propaganda, with Henderson propaganda, 
debts, and Lena Goldfields, with Simon the balance of 
trade and Lena Goldfields), the language used by the 
Foreign Secretaries and by Litvinov ran along well-worn 
paths, as the British side expressed their continued 
frustration and disappointment at the course of relations 
and Litvinov argued the correctness of the Soviet Govern­
ments attitude (2). These exchanges show the friction 
which prevented a real exchange of opinions on wider
1. Department of State, Papers relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, (Washington 1946 -) 
(hereafter cited as F.R.U.S.) Volume III for 1934, 
p. 230. The British thought Sokolnikov bften looked 
like a hunted animal’ who 'had to refer every new 
detail back to Moscow’. Dalton, op.cit. p.234.
2. D.V.P. Vol X, Doc .No. 283, Vol XIV, Doc .No. 170,
Vol XV, Doc .No. 299; D.B.F.P. IA/IV, Doc .No. 82, II/VII 
Doc .No. 158; Memorandum by Simon, 21 July 1932, 
N4404/149/38, FO 371/16326.
international issues. In July 1934, after Britain 
had made clear her attitude on the Eastern Pact
i
proposal and on Soviet-Japanese relations, Litvinov 
told the American Ambassador in Moscow: ’For the first 
time since recognition by Great Britain we now have 
actual diplomatic relations. Until the present 
neither myself nor Tchitcherin has ever discussed any 
diplomatic question of any importance with the 
British1 (1).
The emergence of the Japanese threat in the 
Far East found both Britain and the Soviet Union 
psychologically unprepared for any rapprochement and 
the mistrust and mutual misunderstanding of the previous 
years across a^  range of issues prevented any real 
dialogue. This situation had not changed by the time 
that Hitler arrived on the international scene.
Although the British did not intend to push Japan 
northwards, as has been alleged by Soviet scholars, 
suspicion of Soviet policies and the memory of previous 
Soviet activity in China did not make the Soviet Union 
seem a useful factor in the Far Eastern context where 
Britain was so seriously exposed. The Soviet Union, 
militarily weak, suspicious of French and British
1. F.R.U.S. 1934, Vol III, p .230.
contacts with Japan, and as yet still distanced by 
the Americans, adopted a conciliatory attitude towards 
the Japanese in order to gain time before the expected 
attack •
The basic problem of establishing a 
harmonious relationship with a fundamentally alien 
government, the policies of which were now reconstit­
uted around Stalinist precepts, remained largely 
unsolved.as far as the British were concerned. There 
was still no common language.
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